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ABSTRACT
Santo Domingo, the first European colony in the Americas, was the original
thread at the edge of an expansively woven Spanish imperial tapestry. From 17841822 this hem frayed, threatening to unbind the most basic stitches that tied
Caribbean colonies to Spanish imperial power. My dissertation analyzes colonial
Santo Domingo's cultural, racial, political trajectories amidst influences of the
Haitian and French revolutions, Spanish reaction, African Diaspora, and Latin
American independence movements. A uniquely Dominican cultural politics of
race and nation were born at the intersections of these social and cultural forces,
unraveled colonialism, and set terms of engagement with their Haitian neighbors
for generations to come. Across the 1790s Spanish colonialism regressed from
inclusive counterrevolution and popular piety to linking blackness with impiety
and violence while Dominicans of color pursued their own often radical social
ambitions. From 1802-1809 Spain surrendered Santo Domingo to French
occupation, and despite Spanish recolonization from 1810-1821 Dominicans
increasingly abandoned decrepit empires to explore national self-definitions.
Popular

Dominicans

undertook

frequent

x

anti-colonial,

pro-republican

conspiracies in collaboration with Haitian conspirators. By 1822 demands for
citizenship and sovereignty propelled Santo Domingo toward two competing
independence movements – one more elite and moderate, the other popular and
pro-Haitian. I argue that Dominicans navigated the signature contests of this era
to ultimately achieve the most progressive Spanish American independence –
immediate emancipation, unqualified citizenship, and stable sovereignty – as they
were bound into a New World fabric of anti-colonial racial solidarity via
annexation in 1822 to Haiti, the world’s first black republic.
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INTRODUCTION
WHO BELONGS, WHO BELIEVES?: BECOMING DOMINICAN IN HAYTI

In 1785 Antonio Sánchez Valverde, a prominent priest in Santo Domingo
with metropolitan intellectual connections and strong ties to local planters and
politicians, lamented the disparities between lucrative French Saint-Domingue
and economically stagnant Spanish Santo Domingo. Sánchez resentfully admired
French exploitation of their much smaller portion of the island of Hispaniola,
while Dominicans, “lived drowning in poverty,” but walking upon the “gold and
silver” of “more fertile soil.”1 He interchangeably called his homeland Hayti, just
as Oviedo had in the sixteenth century. This was the name that Spanish colonizers
in the 1490s inherited from Taíno inhabitants who they eliminated by violence,
forced labor, and disease in the ensuing decades, and whose memory they
dissipated by renaming the place Isla Española – “Spanish island” – or, Hispaniola.

Antonio Sánchez Valverde, Idea del valor de la isla Española (Madrid: Pedro Marin, 1785): 136-138.
The renowned chronicler of French Saint-Domingue, Médéric Louis Elie Moreau de Saint-Méry,
drew heavily upon Sánchez Valverde for his own books on Spanish Santo Domingo. See the dozens
of direct references in: Médéric Louis Elie Moreau de Saint-Méry, Description topographique et
politique de la partie espagnole de l'isle Saint-Domingue: avec des observations générales sur le climat, la
population, les productions, le caractère & les moeurs des habitans de cette colonie, & un tableau raisonné
des différentes parties de son administration: accompaneée d'une nouvelle carte de la totalité de l'isle, Vols.
I and II (Philadelphia: Author, 1796).
1

1

Sánchez wrote specifically in his hopes of improving the lives and afterlives of the
“creoles of Hayti” – otherwise known as Dominicans – for whom he deeply cared.2
This astute observer of contemporary social affairs, who acted out of duty
to his deity and as a Dominican, had a deep understanding of the island’s strained
symbiosis involving the Spanish in the east, and the French in the west, who had
by the time of his publication occupied the French western one-fourth of the island
for roughly a century.3 His adoption of this term, “Haiti,” was nearly prophetic,
as in just under twenty years an entirely separate group would use this name for
an unthinkable project of nation building.

Since the Haitian Revolution,

Dominicans have been tied to national definitions in comparison or contrast to
their neighbors to the west, and this engagement was shaped by the depth and
extent of those ties before and during the revolutionary era.

The Age of

Revolutions produced nations naturalized from complex contingencies, rather than
natural divisions between Dominicans and Haitians.
Dominican locals and Spanish officials understood this connection
beyond abstractions on printed pages. The two societies that Sánchez described
differed substantially even before Sánchez characterized Santo Domingo as more

Sánchez Valverde, Idea, vi, 9, 59, and 72; Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, Historia general y natural
de las Indias, Tercera Parte, Tomo IV (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1855): 96.
2

French colonial Saint-Domingue was territorially smaller than the future independent Haiti,
which later permanently absorbed territory west of what is now the central border region with the
Dominican Republic from roughly Lago Enriquillo to Dajabon.
3

2

Catholic and creolized than the hedonistic whites and unassimilated Africans of
Saint-Domingue. However, he wrote with admiration of French legal and labor
practices that fomented Saint-Domingue’s financial flourish through building a
profitable plantation society. Imperial interfacing and multiethnic exchanges were
facts of daily existence for the two European colonies with majority populations
of African descent cohabiting on one Taíno island - Hayti. In 1796 a French official,
in an attempt to begin integrating Dominicans into the French Republic, asked the
Archbishop of Santo Domingo if he might want to stay as the prelate of a unified
island.4 In 1804 the first universally liberated independent state of the Americas
made Saint-Domingue into the new, black state of Haiti.5 In 1820 the President of
the Republic of Haiti began asking Dominicans of their interest in “the whole
island of Hayti” uniting under with one government and one citizenry.6 In 1821
two movements for independence from Spain gripped Santo Domingo. One
venture raised the flag of the neighboring “Republic of Hayty.”7 The other, elite-

Philippe-Rose Roume to Fernando Portillo y Torres, Santo Domingo, 22 May 1796, Archivo
General de Indias (AGI)-Estado, 11A, n.2.
4

David Geggus, Haitian Revolutionary Studies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002): 207220.
5

6

Ysnardi to Pablo Alí, San Juan de la Maguana, 9

1820, AGI-Audiencia de Santo Domingo (SD), 970, no. 25.
“La Concordia diario histórico político y literario: Gazeta del Gobierno de Hayti Francés,” Portau-Prince, 23 December 1821, AGI-SD, 970, no. 33.
7

3

led project declared an autonomous Spanish Part of Hayti.8 In early 1822 thousands
of Dominicans greeted the mostly black army of the neighboring Republic of Haiti.
While the elite-led independence projects fell without violence, the greatest fight
of the preceding and ensuing decades pertained to unresolved tensions of race,
nation, and religion that Sánchez began to identify in 1785, and which transformed
across the island over the decades that followed.9 With time, some Dominicans
came to viscerally reject their place in Haiti, and their shared past and future of
one place – Hayti.

APPROACH & QUESTIONS
Santo Domingo, founded in 1496 as the first European colony in the
Americas, served as the original hem that tied together a widely spun and diverse
Spanish imperial tapestry. Social transformations from the 1780s through the
1820s frayed this thread, threatening to unbind the fundamental stitches that wove
Caribbean colonies into Spanish imperial power. Haiti shredded the fabric of
colonial order, while Dominicans more gradually unraveled the ties that bound
them to Europe. Ensnared by Atlantic turmoil, Dominicans maneuvered through

“Acta Constitutiva del Gobierno Provisional del Estado Independiente de la Parte Española de
Hayti,” Provisional Government of Santo Domingo, 1 December 1821, AGI-SD, 970.
8

Frank Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic: A National History (Princeton: Markus Wiener
Publishers, 1998): 120-124.
9

4

this era's transformative schisms between royalism and republicanism, religiosity
and secularism, and slavery and abolition, altering paths of European empires and
foreshadowing trajectories of Spanish American independence.
From 1791 to 1804 the Haitian Revolution transformed the wealthiest
plantation colony in the Americas into the world’s first black republic through the
largest and only successful slave revolt in history. After this infinitely complex,
watershed event Haiti's subsequent nation building spilled over the border into
the Dominican side of Hispaniola and shaped anti-colonial aspirations, struggles
for emancipation, and desires for civic participation. Their ambitions, manifested
in plots and revolts, taxed Spanish power and spread debt, prisoners, and agitation
to colonial neighbors. Competing paths of empowerment, including the heavy
involvement of people of color in Spanish military forces, combined to form lasting
legacies of irreversible popular mobilization. The self-empowerment of slaves in
Saint-Domingue, and eventually oppressed Dominicans, pressed Spanish
colonialism to offer upward mobility to these formerly excluded social sectors in
exchange for much needed support. To secure loyalties and prevent enemies from
arising within, Spain championed inclusive colonialism based around popular
religion and populist royalism. The long-lasting legacies of Catholicism and
Spanish culture tied emergent Dominican identity to selective memories of Iberian
heritage.

5

Dominican society was born into modernity in many ways as a fraternal
twin to their Haitian neighbors. Their parentage from Catholic piety, a century of
Bourbon dynasties, slaveholding labor regimes, agro-export economies, and
military alliances on one shared island made them inextricably linked. These
societies were varyingly locked in cooperation or conflict, locked on admiration or
admonishment, but always locked with what could be accurately described as
fraternity at best, and a sibling rivalry at worst. Whether in collaboration or
conflagration, coexistence was unavoidable. Santo Domingo, with synchronicity
and synergy at every pivotal point of this process, was also remade in the registers
of race, nation, and religion with repercussions for their shared island that
extended throughout the Age of Revolutions and far beyond. This dissertation
examines these foundations of Dominican ideas of national, racial, and religious
differences from Haiti.
In the well-known typology used by scholars of Atlantic slavery, Spanish
Santo Domingo was a society with slaves rather than a slave society like French SaintDomingue.10 Furthermore, legal questions pertaining to coerced labor did not
define the over eighty percent of Dominicans who were neither enslaved nor
owned slaves, including many of whom were free people of color and peasants.

Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America (Cambridge:
Belknap/Harvard, 1998).
10

6

Dominicans of color – whether loyalists or subversives, but always pragmatically
multivalent – rejected, appropriated, and modified European symbols into their
own cultural politics.

By and large, they sought advancement and security

wherever opportunity and conviction coincided amidst revolution and reaction.
Why do Dominicans consider themselves to be so different than Haitians?
How did Dominicans begin to define themselves as more European and civil, and
Haitians as more African and depraved, while exploring their distinctions from
Spain, France, and Britain? How did religiosity – both in the socially-binding
practices of belief and ritual, and in the ideological discourses of cosmology and
position in the universe – influence ideas of Dominican distinction? How did
Spanish colonialism and Dominican culture evolve through unanticipated popular
empowerment? How did Santo Domingo presage competitions central to the
emergence of Spanish American independence conflicts?

ARGUMENTS & RESEARCH
This dissertation examines how amid the French Revolution, Spanish
reaction, mass slave insurgencies, formation of the Haitian nation, and emergent
Latin American independence movements a uniquely Dominican cultural politics
of race, nation, and religion emerged that served to unravel colonialism and set
terms of engagement with their Haitian neighbors for many generations to come

7

on Hispaniola. I analyze these macro processes through microcosmic episodes,
which offer scholars unique vantages into the affinities of Dominicans of color
whose crucial actions remain peripheral in most historical canons.11 I will show
how their daily struggles engaged and formed changing ideas and structures
signature of the Atlantic Age of Revolutions, and portended trials of race, nation,
and citizenship in Latin American independence.
I use underutilized records on underrepresented peoples to reveal how
they remade Dominican society at the epicenter of the Age of Revolutions, a body
of scholarship from which they are typically excluded.

This dissertation is

founded upon archival materials from the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Spain, the
Vatican, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Understanding marginalized
actors through almost any collection of this period entails using sources that were
often composed by privileged people for state, church, or commercial uses. These
sources occlude certain voices, which necessitates a deconstructive discursive
analysis to cut against textual intentions to reconstruct the ambitions, attitudes,
and actions of the disempowered majority. For studies of Santo Domingo during
this time period, and in Haitian revolutionary studies generally, ecclesiastical texts

Lara Putnam, “To Study the Fragments/Whole: Microhistory and the Atlantic World,” Journal of
Social History 39, no.3 (Spring 2006): 615-630; Lisa A. Lindsay and John Wood Sweet, eds., Biography
and the Black Atlantic (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); João José Reis, Flávio
dos Santos Gomes, and Marcus Joaquim de Carvalho, O alufá Rufino: Tráfico, escravidão e liberdade
no Atlântico negro (1822-1853) (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2010).
11

8

have been largely underutilized by scholars. Few sources yield more nuance than
those composed by observant priests cataloging the cultural drift of congregants.
Chapter One examines in detail the context of Sánchez’s appeal to Spain
to revitalize the Dominican slave system by borrowing strategically from SaintDomingue. This chapter establishes the background of social and economic
connections between the two colonies, including the profusion of maroons from
Saint-Domingue with whom Dominican administrators contended. Dominican
slaves were: far more creolized than their counterparts in Saint-Domingue: a far
smaller portion of the populace; and rather that working in brutal sugar regimes
engaged at a much higher rate as hired out day laborers, as domestic workers, and
in the less brutal livestock industry that primarily supplied Saint-Domingue. To
optimize economic performance, Dominican planters and Spanish officials
proposed many innovations to imperial slave codes in the 1780s, and began to
crack down on black autonomy.

Spanish evangelization was critical to

incorporating dissenters into the Dominican body politic. Policies crafted in the
1780s served to establish a template for spiritual reconquest and to assimilate black
populations during the revolutionary years to come, though these policies also
antagonized many Dominicans of color.
Chapter Two analyzes how the early eruptions of the French Revolution
in 1789 shocked Spanish officials and Dominicans with discourses of natural rights

9

and open attacks on the monarchy, the church, and social hierarchy. As the
opulent ruling classes of Saint-Domingue began to fracture between whites and
gens de couleur, and between royalists and republicans, fractious political discourse
descended into civil warfare. The admiration that Dominican elites so recently
had for Saint-Domingue proved fleeting. A gens de couleur revolt prompted a
violent backlash, after which conspirators who had been demanding equal rights
to whites fled into Santo Domingo, which resulted in a protracted extradition
battle. Next the governor of Saint-Domingue took exile in Santo Domingo after a
revolutionary white mob executed his chief of staff. Before any slave revolt
commenced, Dominicans and Spanish officials knew well of the anti-clerical, antimonarchical tide inundating France, and washing upon Caribbean shores. The
concept of counterrevolution that Spanish officials in Santo Domingo advanced at
this time was diametrically opposed to these two ideologies above all else. When
the largest slave revolt in Caribbean history erupted in Saint-Domingue in August
1791, the insurgents’ vehement anti-French stance, along with their professions of
religiosity and monarchism, appeared as divine providence to many in Santo
Domingo.
Chapter Three explains how the most formidable slave insurgents in
Saint-Domingue became formal affiliates of King Carlos IV of Spain, and whose
form of self-liberation and legally free status as Spanish subjects became the

10

vanguard of black revolution on Hispaniola, and counterrevolution to French
radicalism.

This chapter details how black insurgents and Spanish officials

participated in a range of mutually affirming public rituals of piety and popular
monarchism that structured a westward sweep of Spanish forces. Spain offered
upward mobility and resources in exchange for much needed military skill. This
popular empowerment of ex-slave insurgents served as an example to Dominican
populations of color for many years. To secure their loyalties, and to prevent
enemies from arising within Santo Domingo, Spain championed inclusive
colonialism based around popular religion and populist royalism. This was the
Spanish alternative to what officials cast as destructive slave revolts and impious
republicanism, and it attracted a wide range of new adherents that scholars have
yet to study in detail.
Chapter Four explores how this military conquest cooperated with a
spiritual revival directed from Santo Domingo with support from Madrid and the
Vatican. Through this process Spanish operations attempted to integrate new
black, white, and mulatto subjects from Saint-Domingue into an improvement
project that nearly succeeded by 1793 and 1794. The black auxiliaries – the most
powerful groups of ex-slave insurgents who formally aligned with Spain – had so
pressured and impressed republican officials in Saint-Domingue that in 1793
French

commissioners

in

Saint-Domingue

11

decided

to

issue

makeshift

emancipations to attract much-needed black support, followed in 1794 by
confirmation of emancipation from Paris. This chapter also unveils how the public
piety of the black auxiliaries reinforced Dominican ideas of their difference from
their French colonial neighbors and encouraged the profusion of evangelization as
a means of social mediation through the supernatural. These public ceremonies
that cemented alliances also set an expectation for black inclusion in which
sufficient professions of faith and royalism merited social belonging in Santo
Domingo, whereas secularism or overt African spirituality, republicanism, and
racial radicalism increasingly signified “blackness,” Frenchness, and eventually,
being Haitian.
Chapter Five analyzes the fallout of the unexpected Treaty of Basel in 1795
through which the cession of Santo Domingo became a peace offering from Spain
to the French Republic as part of a broader cessation of hostilities between the
empires. The once outward-looking mission to conquer and evangelize quickly
pivoted inward to protect Dominican territory and traditions. Social unrest, from
which Santo Domingo had largely been spared through the first four years of the
Haitian Revolution, increased substantially with the arrival of a provisional French
envoy. Slavery had been central to the revolution in Saint-Domingue, where
roughly 500,000 of the 600,000 total inhabitants were in bondage. Over eighty
percent of Saint-Domingue was enslaved in 1791. At the height of Spanish

12

involvement, as many as 14,000 ex-slaves fought for King Carlos IV, a number that
equaled or surpassed the total number of Dominican slaves in Santo Domingo,
where roughly 125,00 people lived in total.12

One condition of peace was to

relocate the black auxiliary leadership off of Hispaniola. The other hurdle for
Spanish officials was how to employ the thousands of remaining black troops who
still hated France and might otherwise side with the British. Furthermore, slavery
was far less central in Santo Domingo. The transfer of Santo Domingo to France
that was supposed to transpire in twelve months instead lagged on for over six
years. Just after the treaty, one French general attempted a strategically-significant
abolition in Santo Domingo which Spanish officials quickly rebuffed with a legal
argument that maintained slavery in Santo Domingo until formal French
occupation years later. This precipitated an apology on the matter from Paris and
an admittance that such actions would violate the Treaty of Basel.13

Spain

continued day-to-day management in the majority of the colony, and although
French officials were politically present and denounced slavery they had no
jurisdiction, as evinced in the ongoing Spanish adjudication of slave transactions
in numerous notarial records.14 There was no invisible nor failed emancipation in

12

Sánchez, Idea del valor, 117–150; Geggus, Haitian, 5, 69–74, 132, and 179-180.
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Santo Domingo the 1790s, a confusion elsewhere derived from exuberant rights
discourses in overwhelmingly French sources.15 As Spain lost collaborators,
spiritual control, and political power, they reverted into increasingly negative
racial ascriptions that tied blackness to impious republicanism.
This chapter also explains how some Dominicans celebrated Bastille Day
in 1796 in Santo Domingo, read revolutionary texts, and commandeered churches
for republican meetings, all of which scandalized Spanish officials and many
Dominican residents. A mulatto priest even denounced the king, renounced his
vows, married an enslaved girl in a secular ceremony, and declared himself a
citoyen. When the largest slave revolt of this era in Santo Domingo erupted at one
of the colony’s few major sugar plantations just west of the capital the initial,
superficial presumption made by Spanish officials was that French influence was
to blame, a plausible explanation that some historians have since embraced and
projected upon this event. Once thwarted, a Spanish investigation based upon
testimonies from hundreds of slave insurgents showed that the revolt had been
organized by a clique of Kongolese friends who had particular local grievances
about treatment on the plantation. To stage their insurrection, they sought advice
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from other nearby Kongolese residents who had actually fought as black auxiliary
troops with Jean-François and Biassou in the revolution.

One tangential

conspirator even took the alias “Viasu” during the plot. This shows the more
substantial influence of the original engines of revolution who had initiated the
slave revolts in Saint-Domingue, and not the ephemeral notion of republicanism
nor lesser-known ideas of citizenship. It also underscored a major problem of
Dominican society, which was what to do with underemployed, highly influential
black auxiliaries.
Chapter Six reveals a little-known but critically important response to the
French republican influence that swept Santo Domingo from mid-1796 through
1798. With a growing sense of abandonment by Spain, and a disgust for French
radicalism, a spike of pro-British sympathies inspired a series of Dominican towns
to raise the Union Jack. This included a large conspiracy in the capital, which
involved included black auxiliary officers. This plot implicated a wide range of
powerful figures in Santo Domingo, and resulted in a series of proclamations,
secret letters, and spies sent by British generals into the colony. Should this coup
have transpired, British military forces could have swept in without a shot being
fired and made Santo Domingo a British colony, much like the British occupation
of large swaths of Saint-Domingue. This Anglophilic moment drew in a cross
section of Dominicans due to British promises to protect Catholicism, incorporate
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Dominicans into a moderate constitutional monarchy, and open Santo Domingo
to the more prosperous commerce of the British empire. Though this large
movement failed, it further hardened grievances against Spain and France and
heightened the debates of local distinction from the island’s revolutionary west.
Chapter Seven recounts Santo Domingo’s resignation to the Republic after
1799. Despite repeated French promises since the announcement of the Treaty of
Basel that the Republic would respect the religiosity of Dominicans, every
indication from Saint-Domingue was that the Republic would actively antagonize
Dominican connections to their divinity. This included the brief 1799 revival of
the Cult of Supreme Being, which in its Hispaniola iteration included freemasonry,
vodou, and Christianity as co-equal predecessors and elevated Toussaint
Louverture to a place of historical importance alongside Mohammed and Jesus.
More than ever, Santo Domingo became embroiled in the civil war of SaintDomingue between Toussaint and Rigaud.

However, even when Toussaint

occupied Santo Domingo in 1801 his own actions on the emancipation question
were quite vague.16 When French officials arrived to restrain Toussaint and restore
slavery across the island, Dominicans entered a period from 1802-1809 of a French
empire receding across the Americas. The French had already retreated from
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racial egalitarianism. France soon retreated from Saint-Domingue, then Louisiana,
and finally Santo Domingo in 1808-1809. Thereafter, French colonial power in the
Greater Caribbean was largely confined to smaller outposts in Guadeloupe,
Martinique, and Cayenne in the eastern Caribbean. Dominicans of color witnessed
firsthand the failings of French republicanism and their natural rights rhetoric.17
Many Dominicans with resources, most of whom were white, fled en masse in the
wake of anemic French rule. During this brief occupation the French governors
closed churches, tried to impose their own religious officials into Catholic offices,
sold church property, and quite emblematically turned a monastery’s chapel into
a cannon turret. The Napoleonic period in Santo Domingo soured quite rapidly.

STATE OF SCHOLARSHIP
Certain contests of the Age of Revolutions are well-known, such as the
emblematic American and French variants, or later Latin American independence
projects. Santo Domingo, though, has largely been ignored as a component of this
era's momentous legacy. In recent decades historian David Geggus has not only
recovered the nuance and gravity of the Haitian Revolution, but traced the ripples
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of upheaval emanating from it.18 Carolyn Fick has unveiled Saint-Domingue’s
colonial combustibility and revolutionary eruption, particularly with the
organization and motivations of slave insurgents in the North and West of SaintDomingue.19 John Thornton has shown the deep roots of royalism among slave
insurgents of Saint-Domingue, often with African provenance.20 Jane Landers has
built upon this interpretation, and has traced in detail the career trajectories of
Spain’s black auxiliaries.21 Laurent Dubois has given us the most readable popular
narrative on the Haitian Revolution, which deviates from these scholars to read
slaves’ embrace of French rights discourses and radicalization of the
Enlightenment into their military and political actions. 22 Philippe Girard has
offered a finely detailed account of the Napoleonic French demise in the
revolution’s final years, including important glimpses into Santo Domingo. 23
Jeremy Popkin has published a thorough account of white French colonial politics
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in Cap-Français that preceded local emancipation decrees in 1793.24 Finally, Julia
Gaffield has recently detailed the growing pains of a new Haitian state seeking
commercial stability and diplomatic recognition in an Atlantic context.25
Scholars have only begun to explore Spanish reactions and popular power
in Santo Domingo, particularly into the nineteenth century toward the time of
Haitian annexation.

Recently scholarship has even examined Colombian,

American, and Cuban ties to Haiti, among others, while Santo Domingo – the
polity that actually shared the same island, was more impacted by the revolution,
and eventually became Haiti – has been less studied.26 Dominicans have largely
been overlooked, or misunderstood, due to a prevalence of teleological narratives
tightly focused on French emancipations, republicanism, nation-state formation
and natural rights ideologies. These elements had only limited influence in Santo
Domingo, and such readings tend to overly dichotomize this complex, multipolar
social and political landscape. Historians often celebrate revolutionary intrigues
instead of parsing the competitions and lasting consequences of more complex
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cultural configurations, such as religiosity and reactions to revolution as
ingredients in nation building.
Nevertheless, new studies based on under-unexplored French sources by
César Cuevas Pérez, Guillermo Díaz Bidó, Fernando Picó, and Graham Nessler
have yielded substantial clarifications on the brief French occupation of Santo
Domingo from 1802-1809.27 Anne Eller has recently suggested that nineteenthcentury popular political engagements by Dominicans of color with Haitians,
including work on a fascinating anti-imperial conspiracy in 1810 with far-reaching
implications for pro-Haitian popularity toward the 1822 merger.28 Nor, as Eller
has importantly demonstrated, was this Haitian support for Dominican antiimperialism limited to the independence era, as Haiti extensively aided successful
Dominican popular resistance from 1863-1865 to Spanish recolonization that had
commenced in 1861.29
Aside from attempting to attribute the mode of vodou in the eruption of
the initial slave revolts in Saint-Domingue in August 1791, and from brief
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explorations of certain leaders’ spiritual compass, the study of religious faiths and
its ubiquitous functionality have remained absent from scholarship.

This is

particularly concerning given the definitive divide of divinity in Dominican
nationalism and its deleterious descriptions of Haiti. The Haitian Revolution and
its aftermath challenged all participants to reconsider their own positions in their
known universe. Scholars have a far better grasp and far more comfortable
analyzing modern political and social registers – such as rights discourses, nationstate formation, and abolition – especially in Saint-Domingue. However, each
cultural group, and indeed each individual, managed these events through their
own varied conceptualization of what it meant to be human and how the natural,
preternatural, and supernatural worlds operated.

Belief served a series of

structurally significant systems of ritual, rhetoric, and routine. 30

These faith

professions identified participants within layered societal strata of empire and
economy, race and region. Evangelism was more pronounced in Santo Domingo
than Saint-Domingue. Indeed, Spain emphasized the supernatural far more than
French monarchical rule did. The greater divergence came when the Republic
traveled anti-clerical and secular paths unthinkable to a majority of Dominicans
and Spanish subjects more broadly. The greater openness of African spirituality
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and of freemasonry in Saint-Domingue further startled many in Santo Domingo.
Over time, one prominent version of Dominican belonging developed in this era
was defined by Catholicism, the Spanish language, and Iberian heritage and
history as the cultural repertoire that differentiated them from their Haitian
neighbors.31 As Scott Eastman has shown regarding Spain and Mexico, the
Hispanic nationalism that developed in the Age of Revolutions marked by a
Catholic public sphere, with legal protections for faith, and monarchical sanctity
became transformed into a liberalizing, “mixed modernity” that integrated belief
and ritual into Enlightenment political developments.32 Such discourses thrived
in Santo Domingo.

With Spanish abandonment of Santo Domingo, and

Dominican criticism of Spain, this Catholic cultural core became tied to an
idealized Spanish past rather than a shared Iberian imperial future.
Finally, works on Latin American independence ignore the Dominican
variation of independence, largely due to its unique trajectory of annexation to an
extant independent state – Haiti.33 This confluence of ambitions formed early
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Dominican national aspirations, a key variation among contests of Spanish
American independence, civic belonging, and political modernity in the Atlantic
Age of Revolutions more broadly. This specifically includes connecting themes in
this dissertation to other movements of Latin American independence, and the
suggestion that Santo Domingo joining Haiti in 1822 was one of the most peaceful
and progressive forms of independence in the entire Americas.

Without

understanding the intricate cultural politics of revolution, reaction, and their
fallout in later defining race and nation in Santo Domingo we seriously risk
fundamental misunderstandings of interwoven Spanish colonialism and
religiosity, and Haitian radicalism and republicanism.

WHO BELONGS AS DOMINICAN?
For twenty years Dominicans had a front row seat to European imperial
mismanagement. Increasingly, Dominicans of color, who were shunned by Spain
and France and affronted by local elites’ interest in the status quo or perhaps
greater autonomy (primarily for themselves), came to embrace a multiethnic,
multinational citizenship with more radical tenets such as immediate
emancipation and racial egalitarianism. Dominicans revolted against French rule
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from 1808 to 1809 and welcomed Spanish recolonization in 1810.

Many

Dominicans of color reacted negatively to the new evangelization project by Spain
and the failings of the Cortes de Cádiz to incorporate people of African descent
into Spanish liberalism. Simultaneously, they engaged Haitian spies who sought
to expand Haitian nation-building projects into Santo Domingo. Derived from
discourses forged during the revolution, Spanish officials portrayed the new
Haitian state as immoderate, African, and religiously and socially aberrant.
Resurgent Catholicism and Spanish culture tied emergent Dominican identity to
memories of Iberian heritage, a cultural repertoire that differentiated them from
their Haitian neighbors.34 At the outset of separatist sentiments sweeping across
Latin America these ideas were far more concrete than abstract for Dominicans
given the immediacy of the Haitian example. Many Dominicans came to embrace
Haiti, which had just been unified under Jean-Pierre Boyer after lingering years of
civil war between Christophe and Pétion. As opposed to the often corrosive
Dominican national memory of the present, this dissertation asserts that the
unification of the island under Haitian rule was one of the most peaceful and
progressive forms of independence in the Americas as a multiethnic state of
immediate abolition and citizenship.

34
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Understanding this variant of independence for Santo Domingo as the
culmination of a lengthy, successful collaboration contradicts the national
incompatibility projected on the past that undergirds much of Dominican
nationalism and historiography. Indeed, Dominicans attained freedom, rights,
equality, and state belonging as Haitian citizens in what was perhaps the most
resounding victory for popular ambitions in Spanish America during the Age of
Independence. And, even more remarkably I would suggest this represented one
of the most unique contests over race and nation in the Atlantic Age of Revolutions
as an apex slave colony turned black republic brought independence to a Spanish
Caribbean colony. However, the defeated elite faction that had sought to ally with
the moderate republicanism of Simón Bolívar’s Gran Colombia are nevertheless to
this day wistfully heralded in scholarship and national historical memory alike.
Accordingly, this elite nationalism has whitewashed the aspirations of popular
Dominicans in the Age of Revolutions. For them, membership in the Haitian state
was the epitome of citizenship, racial solidarity, and national future.

Such

exclusionary historical memory casts the decisive anti-colonial actions of popular
Dominicans and Haitian collaborators that forged independence and inclusion for
the entire island as a black menace of Haitian “occupation” that impeded
Dominican modernity. This has distorted a sense of belonging for Dominicans of
color and the legitimacy of ethnic Haitians within the Dominican nation to the
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present day.35 Popular Dominican demand for the 1822 Haitian union was among
the most progressive and inclusive forms achieved in the course of Latin American
independence.
In the worst examples of this sibling rivalry, Dominican discourses depict
Haitians as more African, more depraved, less civilized, even less human.
Dominicans are championed as more Catholic, with Spanish as a more
distinguished language than Kreyol, and a more cultured, more moderate, and
more urbane lifestyle. These characterizations present Santo Domingo as a stable
society being only acted upon by radical Haitians or French revolutionaries. It
describes a series of black invasions as unprovoked aggressions – Toussaint in
1801, Dessalines in 1805, and Boyer in 1822 – while ignoring the deep Dominican
influence in the Haitian Revolution and later the favor for Haitian rule among
many in Santo Domingo. Such depictions range drastically on the scale of racist
overtones, and this phenomenon cannot simply be blamed on the era of the
notoriously anti-Haitian Trujillo dictatorship.

The historical memory of
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“unwarranted” Haitian aggression and racial or ethnic contamination dates to at
least the nineteenth century with ties to the Spanish administration during the
revolution. Even left of center intellectuals in the twentieth century failed to
question or empirically validate such assertions, and largely accepted that
involvement with Haiti was one of the most disruptive phenomena of Dominican
history.36 Explaining the formation of anti-Haitian discourses is thus critically
important. The turbulence of late colonialism and independence from 1784 to 1822,
including the uniquely Dominican fetishizing of Spanish Catholic culture, is key
to understanding this rivalry between two nations with populations both of
majority African descent. Historical distortions have been invoked to legitimize
and legalize contemporary exclusions of people of Haitian descent in Dominican

For a more expansive discussion on this entire issue, see: Pedro L. San Miguel, The Imagined Island:
History, Identity, and Utopia in Hispaniola (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005): 834; Sibylle Fischer, Modernity Disavowed, Part II. Prominent intellectuals during the Trujillo era who
did deliberately craft an anti-Haitian Dominican nationalism with many direct references to the
Age of Revolutions included Joaquín Balaguer, a top advisor and vice president to Trujillo who
later served as an autocratic President of the Dominican Republic for almost twenty-four of the
next thirty-six years following his death: Joaquín Balaguer, La isla al revés: Haiti y el destino
dominicano (Santo Domingo: Fundación José Antonio Caro, 1983). Scholars such as Emilio
Rodríguez Demorizi who is well known for his numerous compilations of primary sources not
only toed the Trujillo anti-Haitian line, but actively attacked Haitian scholars who suggested a
shared past and future with Dominicans. Juan Bosch, now the emblem of modern Dominican
democracy, was more nuanced and less essentialist toward Haitians, and mentored one of the most
important twentieth-century Dominican politicians – José Francisco Peña Gómez – who was of
Haitian descent. However, he never fully abandoned the idea that Haiti was to blame for much of
the economic and social languishing of nineteenth-century Dominican history: Juan Bosch, Trujillo,
las causas de una tiranía sin ejemplo (Santo Domingo: Editora Alfa & Omega, 2005).
36

27

society, and contribute heavily to deleterious, internationalized stereotypes of
Haitian culture.
From the Dominican split from Haiti in 1844 to Haitian aid against Spanish
recolonization in the 1860s, the 1937 massacre of tens of thousands of Haitians by
a Dominican dictatorship, Dominican assistance after Haiti's ruinous 2010
earthquake, Haitians and Dominicans have long been entangled in layers of
antagonism and amicability, hostility and harmony, conflict and cooperation.
Anti-Haitian racism often fills Dominican policy, evinced by the Dominican
revocation of citizenship from thousands of ethnic Haitians in 2013 followed by
their tragic mass deportation in 2015. This most corrosive cases of Dominicans
asserting their national difference draw directly upon a series of grievances against
Haiti rooted in a particular national memory of the late colonial era. Ideas about
this era have enormous contemporary consequence.
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CHAPTER 1
ANTECEDENTS: SANTO DOMINGO THROUGH THE 1780S

When the priest and intellectual Antonio Sánchez Valverde lamented the
disparities between lucrative French Saint-Domingue and stagnant Spanish Santo
Domingo in 1785 his words transcended simple disparities in profits or jealousy
to specifically criticize the weak Dominican slave regime and legal order as the,
“paramount cause of the difference between the wealth of Saint-Domingue and
Spanish poverty.”1 Among other factors, Sánchez blamed autonomies held by
people of color – peasants, peddlers, maroons, and even enslaved wage earners –
for defying racial boundaries and setting examples of social ascent, which
allegedly eroded slave obedience, and thus, the vitality of the Dominican
economy.
Father Sánchez argued that French prosperity rested upon their massive
importation of Africans, who – unlike Spaniards and creoles, he asserted – were
perfectly suited to working in the torrid climate despite what he called their “vain,
self-flattery.” Spain’s ambitions to catalyze a plantation regime had been foiled by

1
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the French, English, Dutch, and Portuguese control over the African slave trade.
Those few enslaved Africans sent to Santo Domingo had been passed over for
some physical ailment due to their traumatic passage, and other slaves sent to the
island were, “second- or third-hand” castoffs from Saint-Domingue or elsewhere
in the Caribbean. Sánchez appealed for more direct access to slaving vessels by
opening the asiento contracts to more suppliers and the expansion of regional
commerce for Dominican hacendados to capitalize on larger slave markets in other
Caribbean ports through direct purchase, when possible.
Sánchez dramatically cited thievery, festivities, random truancy,
prostitution, and aiding runaways as vices of free people of color that had also
rendered the slave population less productive by undermining slaves’ discipline.
He pleaded for severe restrictions on the social and spatial mobilities of
Dominicans of color to coerce them toward religion, obedience, and work.
Sánchez also sought to curb their numbers by ending emancipation by selfpurchase, owner granted manumission practices, and marronage. He argued,
rather erroneously, that the efficient French had cut these practices, and hoped that
these prohibitions would draw underemployed whites back into skilled jobs.2
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Figure 1.1: Hispaniola, showing the major cities and colonial borders of Spanish
Santo Domingo and French Saint-Domingue.
Finally, he advocated corporal punishment to actualize reform, writing
that though the screams of a beaten soul might shock Europeans, it was a rational
act to maximize profit. This even included whipping free people of color to affirm
racial subordination. He said that a planter would never do that, “except when a
slave has failed badly.” His defense of corporal punishment primarily regarded
slaves, though the new Código Negro Carolino and subsequent ordinances did
make it quite likely that free people of color could experience the lash. The local
cabildo and audiencia endorsed these codes but they were never fully accepted at
the imperial level, and most legal innovations were overturned in 1789 by a
somewhat less robust imperial slave code that was itself never completely
implemented. Sánchez, and many other well-off white urbanites, bureaucrats, and
planters wanted to enact prohibitions to severely curtail the hiring of slaves in
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cities and further accused them for giving their owners only part of their earnings
and resting at length.3
Sánchez expressed a range of perfunctory, racist diatribes mixed in with a
collection of distinct and newer policy recommendations regarding the perceived
leniency toward free people of color and slaves. However, the real novelty of
Sanchez’s treatise was its mass printing and direct appeal to King Carlos III, both
of which superseded common local complaints.

Thus, a wide metropolitan

audience learned of policy designs that Dominican elites had already
recommended in testimony to colonial officials.

Their common goal was to

revitalize the moribund economy of Santo Domingo into a dynamic agro-export
colony, which it had never been aside from a brief sixteenth-century flourish.
Sánchez’ book reinforced the lobbying efforts of the master class to coincide with
the imperial review of the pivotal, newly-drafted Código Negro Carolino of 1785.
These wishful laws that attempted to limit geographic mobility and nonplantation labor of slaves ultimately had little impact. However, in the mid-1780s
local Spanish officials quickly implemented statutes designed to curb the social
and economic lives of Dominicans of color. Sánchez appraisal of the colony as a
whole, and the unrealized value thereof, transcended the carefully focused scope
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of the new slave laws. It was also a timely socio-cultural introduction to a colony
that would become unrecognizable over the ensuing three decades, during which
time the tempo of change in the sleepy, small, and economically forgotten colony
would outpace any events or periods of the preceding three hundred years.
Finally, Sánchez Valverde demonstrated the entanglement of the church with
colonial politics, imperial policies, slavery, and definitions of local history and
identity. This was not an isolated case, and would only become a more strident
and essential relationship in the ensuing years.
This first half of this chapter focuses on the 1780s and considers the
consequences of new restrictive racial policies, views of Saint-Domingue in Santo
Domingo, anti-colonial affinities of Dominicans of color, and attempts at
evangelization to mediate these social and cultural tensions. The second half of
this chapter examines how this collection of social antecedents set the stage for the
three tumultuous decades that followed on the island, particularly as Spanish
officials and Dominican elites implemented restrictive resettlement policies upon
two particular communities of color, one beside the capital, and the other on the
extreme imperial periphery.
This chapter will advance three arguments. First, the process of forming
new legal codes for slavery in the colony was, though ultimately ineffectual, a
process of projecting local particularities within the Spanish empire and
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Dominican differences from Saint-Domingue.

Second, influential images of

French sugar, coffee, and indigo profits swayed officials and planters in Santo
Domingo to emulate the brutal racial dominance that they observed in SaintDomingue, albeit with overtones of evangelical purification.

This renewed

emphasis on evangelical mediation to assimilate black subjects prefaced
geopolitical strategies of spiritual allegiance and conquest that would emerge
during the Haitian Revolution. Third, subversions by Dominicans of color a
decade later in the 1790s transpired within the context of these recent draconian
efforts, mixed with the ideological ferment and structural vulnerability unleashed
from 1789-1791. To reconstruct their lives and influence requires an examination
of administrative, ecclesiastical and military papers kept by powerful Spanish men
and institutions that many Dominicans of color tried to avoid. This chapter seeks
to dissect textual biases and intents that construed decisions by people of color as
contradictory or confused, and instead reveals their “transcript” of actions.4

SANTO DOMINGO, SAINT-DOMINGUE
From the first fort that Christopher Columbus built on Hispaniola in 1492,
and the first 39 crew members that he left there, the colony that soon became Santo
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Domingo a backwater. It was the first European colony in the Americas, from
which Spain “discovered” Jamaica and Cuba, and in which it founded the first
permanent European settlement in 1496 – the city of Santo Domingo. Even before
the Columbus brothers were stripped of ruling power, the settlers on the island
had proved hard to govern, many Spaniards and Taíno having fled further west
into the island’s distant and rugged interior. In 1508, after less than twenty years
of Spanish rule the 60,000 Taíno out of the perhaps 400,000 when Columbus
arrived had managed to survive forced labor (mostly in gold mines), Spanish
atrocities, and disease, which was truly the greatest killer. In 1511 that number
dropped to about 33,000. In 1514 the number hit 26,000. In 1516 they numbered
11,000, and in 1519 the Taíno – at 3,000 – were nearly eradicated from the island.5
Much of this decline transpired before the major smallpox epidemic of 1518-1519.6
The systems of repartimiento and encomienda labor regimes had forced indigenous
peoples into virtual slavery and forced conversions under Spanish power, but this
dire demographic collapse, which laid bare Spanish profit motivations and disdain
for indigenous humanity, also produced one of the most significant figures of the
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sixteenth century world – Bartolomé de las Casas. This encomendero turned priest
became a champion of protecting indigenous lives, however his momentous
writings also opened the door to increasing the African slave trade, then in
nascence.7
The depletion of gold supply and indigenous labor allowed for livestock
and sugar to grow as colonial enterprises. In the newly-depopulated interior,
cattle escaped pens and wandered across the island, constantly reproducing and
consuming the lush vegetation. Prior to the cattle trade becoming a dominant
economic force in the colony, horses, in fact, were regularly raised and exported
to support other colonization efforts.

Dozens of ingenios began to dot the

landscape around the capital, the only population center capable of the requisite
capital investment for sugar production equipment. African slavery rapidly
expanded. By the mid-1540s only 5,000 Spaniards lived in the colony, compared
to 15,000 slaves, a number that rapidly grew to well over 20,000 by the late-1560s.
The average ingenio slave population exceeded 100. The numbers of slaves,
ingenios, and sugar output at this time in the sixteenth century likely exceeded any
time in the eighteenth century. At least a few thousand maroons fled sugar
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plantations and regrouped into autonomous bands in the rough interior. They
would steal and resell Spanish goods to smugglers along the unguarded coastline,
just as many other colonists engaged in similar contraband. The economy in the
majority of the north and west of the island was based on contraband by the 1570s.
A variety of new products that could be produced more cheaply and fetch better
profit margins (often illicitly) surpassed sugar, which was not as easily smuggled,
and at the same time new sources of sugar – namely Brazil – cut into market share.8
Santo Domingo saw the first sugar boom in the Americas, and it was also the first
colonial economy to go bust. This was the colony that Sánchez Valverde lamented
having lost and wanted to recover, and the same model colony that contemporary
French planter Médéric Louis Élie Moreau de Saint-Méry admired in his own
contemporary study of Spanish Santo Domingo.9
As much as Spanish officials despised contraband, their preoccupations
with smuggling also focused on their desire to defend against foreign spiritual and
political ideas and affiliations form infiltrating the island and its populace. In 1605
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Governor Osorio marched northward and westward from the colonial capital and
evicted colonists to great protest and revolt. Intending to deprive colonists of
unholy and illicit activities, they instead opened territory for smugglers and rivals
to perch on the empty lands. These “devastations” also ruined the colony’s
economy as slaves fled and their overall numbers collapsed, livestock died or ran
away, and crops rotted in the ground. Their poverty was so extreme that Spanish
imperial officials directed a new situado, or budget supplement, from the rich
colony of Mexico. Over the seventeenth century the Dutch, English, and French
jockeyed for settlement space on the island, with many early settlers having been
the same smugglers that the Spanish tried to undercut. During that time residents
of Santo Domingo suffered from hunger, little imperial aid, hurricanes, and
epidemics.

By the 1670s the French had settled about a dozen small but

prosperous towns across the western and northwestern edge of the island. After
the Treaty of Ryswick of 1697 formally assigned the western third of the island to
French control, Santo Domingo continued to sputter across the eighteenth century
as Saint-Domingue became the most profitable acreage in the Americas by the end
of the 18th century.10
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This cross-island, trans-imperial relationship had developed over three
centuries into alternating sibling rivalry and symbiosis. In the eighteenth century
the cattle trade became the tie that bound Santo Domingo to its French neighbor.
The French were unwilling to dedicate much of their fertile land to livestock or
subsistence, and as their export crops and profits soared they generated a cash
flow that afforded a negative balance of trade with neighboring Spanish domains
for certain staple crops, and for the draught animals, and hides of the cattle trade
in particular. Thousands of slaves and free blacks in Santo Domingo were those
who tended herds owned by colonial elites, which benefited the French elites and
fueled the sugar and coffee expansions that brutalized African labor next door.
The dynamic exchange of goods transformed the interior and border region of
Santo Domingo. Most notable among the settlers colonizing the border regions
were migrants from the Canaries.
Dominican cattle traders were in constant tension with Spanish officials,
and sometimes French officials, regarding bureaucratic efforts to tax, regulate, and
sometimes politically undercut the powerful livestock trade. This was a central
contention regarding the border region as well, and despite the number of treaties
over the century that tried to demarcate and recognize the respective colonial
entities the issue was never fully resolved. By the 1760s and 1770s the volume and
importance of the livestock industry was so essential to both colonies that it
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required top-level negotiations in both colonial capitals to secure lines of trade,
prices, and property rights. In 1762 this contract stipulated that about 9,600 heads
of cattle per year would be sent across the border to Saint-Domingue. In 1787 the
French deregulated their cattle ordinances and allowed for the free purchase at
market rates.11 That same year the king’s councils in Spain received a map
delineating the estimated annual trade in cattle to Saint-Domingue.

The

explanatory notes indicated that about 33,000 heads of cattle entered SaintDomingue from Santo Domingo annually, and another 3,000 from Puerto Rico.
They not only crossed the frontier, but were sometimes sent from Monte Cristi,
Puerto Plata, or Samaná. It included a fascinating list of individual locales and
their estimated overall intake, which in total represented an impressive geographic
coverage of all major towns in Saint-Domingue. Some of the notable numbers
included 1,500 heads of cattle to Port-au-Prince and to Saint-Marc each, and an
incredible 6,900 to Cap-Français alone, the latter city having a population
approaching 18,000 at the time.12
Cattle production was the major industry in Santo Domingo during the
eighteenth century.

However, Dominican elites and Spanish officials were

painfully aware of its far inferior profitability to Saint-Domingue’s exports, of their
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own reliance upon Saint-Domingue’s markets, and of their comparative weakness
and economic subordination to the French. That is the sentiment that Sánchez
Valverde had articulated, and that was the motivation behind the mid-1780s
project to collect planters’ testimonies and critiques of the status quo to improve
Dominican society in the image of their neighbor. Unquestionably the peasantry
of color, maroon communities, slaves and free blacks in the livestock industry, and
slaves in the capital who worked liberally for pay had a very different existence
than the majority of sugar and coffee slaves only so many miles away in French
domains. That is what Spanish officials and Dominican elites sought to change.

Figure 1.2: Spanish Santo Domingo.
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French Saint-Domingue flourished through its vicious agro-export
regime, which was fueled by massive importation of enslaved Africans. Between
1785 and 1790 the colony imported about 31,400 African captives a year, creating
a population of 500,000 slaves out of nearly 600,000 residents. 13 Meanwhile Santo
Domingo had less than 14,000 slaves in a population of roughly 125,000.14 In SaintDomingue roughly 8,000 plantations were under cultivation. Its reputation as the
“Pearl of the Antilles” was built by slave labor, and contributed to at least 40% of
France’s overseas economic activity. By itself, a geographic entity barely larger
than Maryland, Saint-Domingue exported more commodities in worth than the
United States. It produced more total exports than all of the British Caribbean
colonies combined. Its slave population alone was roughly four times the size of
Spanish Santo Domingo’s entire population, despite Spanish Santo Domingo
having over three times the geographic size of its neighbor to the west. Its slave
population was twice the slave population of the closest major sugar and coffee
rival, Jamaica.15 Perhaps the jobs of one million of France’s 25 million people relied
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directly upon Saint-Domingue, and about 15% of the National Assembly members
owned property there. It produced more sugar than perhaps Cuba and Jamaica
combined.16

Figure 1.3: French Saint-Domingue.
Saint-Domingue had nearly 800 sugar and cotton plantations each, and
over 3,000 coffee and indigo plantations each. It produced as much as 40% of the
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world’s sugar and half of its coffee.17 In the year 1790 alone Saint-Domingue
produced 60,000 metric tons of sugar. By comparison, Cuba produced 15,000 in
1790.18 Around that same time Santo Domingo had fewer than 50 ingenios, and a
sugar plantation with 50 slaves was considered to be large.19 In Jamaica the
average was over 150 per plantation, and in Saint-Domingue it was 185.20
Furthermore, the meteoric rise of Saint-Domingue had occurred in only one
century, whereas Spain had a two-century head start on colonization on the island.
The French side of Hispaniola had not even been formally recognized until the
Treaty of Ryswick of 1697. Only then did Spain finally concede de jure status to
the de facto colony that had sprung up from the inauspicious start of deliberate
Spanish depopulation to curtail contraband trade that enabled the eventual
settlement on land by those same smugglers and pirates who they tried to
undercut.
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NEW SLAVE CODES AND THE MIND OF THE MASTER CLASS21
As early as the 1760s planters in Santo Domingo had tried to reform their
slave laws to fortify racial hierarchies but were thwarted by royal reluctance. With
an envious eye on their neighbor Saint-Domingue, in the 1780s Dominican elites
again schemed for social and political dominance in the service of economic
resurgence.

Their complaints about black autonomies such as freedom of

movement, lack of white oversight, participation in small-scale commerce, and
their perceived rowdiness prompted the Consejo de Indias (Council of Indies) to
sanction the composition of new laws.22

Thus, just prior to Hispaniola's

inundation by the Haitian Revolution, officials in Santo Domingo set out to graft
Saint-Domingue's success and Code Noir onto local conditions. 23 The resultant
Código Negro Carolino, provisionally adopted in Santo Domingo in 1785, codified
many suggestions advocated by Sánchez and sparked debates leading to the
imperial Código Carolino Negro of 1789. It was one of the latest, and most
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ambitious, attempts of the Bourbon reform.24 With blessing from the king and
Consejo de Indias, the order went forth in late 1783 from Madrid to begin collecting
suggestions and testimony from leading political, military, and especially
economic officials in Santo Domingo. José de Galvez, one of the most important
Enlightened advisors to King Carlos III, conceded that the empire needed to draft
new ordinances for the governance of political economy and morality of the blacks
on that island and other colonies, and specifically referenced the success that the
French had extracted through their Code Noir in Saint-Domingue.25
The process of forming new slave laws began in Santo Domingo in March
1784. The instructions informed the Audiencia to collect and review all old and
more recent laws regarding blacks and slavery to study their relevance and build
off the French Code Noir, and collect elite testimony regarding the applicability of
such laws.26

With direct oversight from Governor Isidoro Peralta, officials

instructed the powerful roster to consider reforms for the “economic, political, and
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moral governance of the blacks of this island.”27 Contributors included Antonio
Dávila Coca, a major hacendado near the capital. He voiced his enthusiasm to
participate in a process that he viewed as essential to stimulating agriculture. He
argued that one of the primary impediments to developing haciendas was the
management of blacks, both enslaved and free.28 Nearly all participants voiced
similar sentiments. Other testimony came from Antonio Mañon, a militia officer
who had served in the region for twenty-five years, Andrés Herédia, a
distinguished and high-ranking commissioned officer who had served on the
island and particularly the frontier for over thirty years, and Ignacio Caro, another
seasoned military officer.29 Francisco de Tapia, José Nuñez, and Francisco Cabral
were all prominent community members who also testified.30
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Their testimony indicated a number of common areas of concern, and
depicted a range of racial tensions that churned around the institution of slavery
in Santo Domingo. One of the primary complaints centered on the cost, efficiency,
and demonstrations of Catholicism of the enslaved. As did nearly all deponents,
Caro criticized the slaves’ “excessive fiestas” and claimed that slaves received more
than ninety sanctioned days for religious observance, though his number might
have included Sundays. He suggested that the archbishop reduce the number of
such holy days and obliquely criticized church protections for this free time that
were established about three centuries before by Pope Paul III, who certainly
prioritized souls over planters’ profit.31 Dávila Coca complained that holidays and
religious fiestas seemed to only increase in number. When masters excused slaves
to attend an extended mass, he said, he could busy himself with his oxen and work
but the slaves were able to refuse to help unless he financially contributed to the
archbishop for their Festivals of Two Crosses, some of the largest celebrations of
the year.32 On these various days of the year, separate from Sunday observances,
both Spaniards and the racial castas were obligated to stop work and hear mass
and an evening vesper, which drew from a Vatican imperative issue by Pope Paul
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III to honor certain saints. Because of the dismissal from labor duties, these days
had raucous reputations elsewhere in Latin America.33
Mañon also complained about the boisterous nature of these specific
celebrations.34

Caro said that the slaves’ celebrations of the patron saints were

notorious and excessive, and he particularly detested their celebrations at
Christmas time when many slaves and free blacks travelled extensively and
without any oversight. He suggested limiting celebrations to only three major
holidays a year.

Caro said that a century before the archdiocese had even

supported priests at various locations to administer sacraments and celebrations,
and without cost incurred to the hacendados. However, without this funding
“slaves without spiritual delivery” had become the religious responsibility of
individual planters who supposedly paid priests a piecemeal fee for each
confession they heard from blacks.35 Nuñez appreciated that slaves were always
provided the fundamentals of religion and give “Christian care”.36

In his
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complaints over the festivals, Cabral suggested moderating the use of aguardiente
in those events to avoid drunkenly disorder. He said that slaves should just pray
and then quickly return to their masters’ homes, rather than stay away all day.37
Undeniably, the enslaved exploited the resources at their disposal to
ameliorate their daily existence, in this case taking advantage of church protections
for their spiritual wellbeing. Not only did slaves in Saint-Domingue endure
harsher labor regimes in sugar, coffee, indigo, and cacao, whereas a great many
Dominican slaves worked in cattle and various urban or domestic roles, but the
vibrant Dominican debate over how to evangelize slaves and allow for religious
holidays was, by comparison, a muted whimper in French Saint-Domingue.38
Spanish governance in Santo Domingo at least considered slaves as souls, a
distinction that slaves in Saint-Domingue experienced to a far lesser degree.39
Planters also wanted to claim greater oversight over public rulings in
colonial courts regarding slave conduct. Dávila Coca recommended that all such
legal proceedings should be advised by a co-judge who should be an intelligent
planter capable of arranging better subordination of the slaves to white owners
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and overseers and, implicitly, to erode their limited privileges.40 Cabral also
suggested that if a slave raised a complaint against a slaveholder that there should
be co-advisement on discipline and legal matters from an experienced planter. 41
Specifically, slaves’ opportunity for self-purchase, known as coartación in many
parts of the empire, was a legal maneuver that perplexed planters.42 Mañon
advocated prohibition of this practice, which he said sometimes transpired
without consent from their masters and had caused many social problems.43 Caro
speculated that peasants of color sometimes helped slaves pay for their freedom,
which he thought contravened the law. He also stated that many freed people
were subsequently so poor and indigent that they became criminals, vagrants, and
“bad women”.44 Herédia did not like freed people and thought they were bad
examples who availed themselves of the laws of the “Incas of Peru” which, to him,
apparently meant undue privileges. He said that French restrictions on slave
manumission were worthy for adoption, and aside from extracting greater labor
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demands from the existing population, he advocated for the introduction of more
slaves.45 In his treatise Sánchez Valverde lambasted the practice of self-purchase
as a distortion of religious rights and principals that produced criminals and
prostitutes, implicitly to both pay for freedom and sustain freed people thereafter.
He admired the French rejection of the practice.46
Several of the additional testimonies collected by the Audiencia of Santo
Domingo whole-heartedly endorsed the effectiveness of French law and the Code
Noir. In his three decades on the island, Andrés Herédia had served on frontier
commissions that allowed him to observe how the French managed slavery. He
strongly favored their approaches, and even collected additional ordinances from
Saint-Domingue to submit for consideration.47 Self-purchase was not only easier
in Spanish lands than in Saint-Domingue, there was no similar provision in the
Code Noir, and in general the free population of color was larger in percentage in
Santo Domingo.48 Basic differences in Spanish slave law arose from the Siete
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Partidas, a statutory code created by King Alfonso X of Castile in the late thirteenth
century, which defined slavery as something other than a natural condition,
allowed slaves control of property, and opened a path to manumission. 49 At this
very moment how coartación worked was in debate across the entire empire.50
Unsurprisingly, colonial elites believed slaves had too much freedom of
movement and privilege. Mañon recommended that no slave should be able to
leave their masters’ properties without a signed license. He even said that any free
blacks who wandered the countryside without passes should be caught and sent
to the jails as delinquents.51 Francisco de Tapia suggested that any black traveler
carry a “seal or mark of iron or other material that accredits them.” to a master or
a superior. These passes would be distributed by the ayuntamiento to avoid any
fraud, with harsh penalties for any slave pretending to be free or have
permission.52 Cabral concurred that blacks should carry a mark or token when
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they travelled, which he thought should be registered with the local authorities to
record the legitimacy of different seals. 53 Cabral was against jornaleros – daily
laborers who moved between the city and country, or plantation to plantation –
outside the city walking freely, and thought that they needed greater oversight
from their masters.54 Finally, the testimony revealed a great deal of concern for the
lax practice of blacks carrying weapons in the colony.

Caro noted that the

prohibition on slaves carrying arms from 1772 was rarely enforced, nor were they
usually made to carry travel licenses on the roads.55 Cabral and de Tapia also
complained about free blacks using arms, both inside and outside of the capital,
and advocated restrictions of weapons.56
Added to these elites’ concerns over travel and weapons were
manifestations of broader problems with discipline among slaves and the wider
black population. Mañon recommended tougher punishment against slaves in
general.57 Caro also complained about the “feigned illnesses” that the slaves
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repeatedly used against weak overseers. To counter this practice, he wanted to
establish medical bohios at every large plantation where slaves who said that they
were suffering from illness could be verified their claims and recuperated as
quickly as possible, or disprove their feigned malady and send them back to work.
He added that foot-dragging was a common delay tactic that hampered
production and efficiency across the colony.58 Nuñez commented that on the
plantations he knew the slaves had been treated with, “the greatest care and
mildness,” and with consideration to their abilities and assigned work, though he
did concede that during the grinding and harvest seasons they did work overnight
in shifts. Nuñez said that punishment for offenses was moderate, and only to deter
undesirable behavior. He thought planters usually maintained subordination
without the problems of resistance or flight.59 For those who did runaway, Cabral
said that slavecatchers were not enough to stop fugitives, since they often fled
beyond the range of trackers.60
The planters also identified other local customs that undercut agricultural
output. For example, Mañon argued that inefficient planters should be prohibited
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from renting out their lands to free blacks for small-scale peasant production,
which might incentivize their own production and limit black autonomy.61 Caro
also complained about planters leasing their land to free people of color, whose
self-sufficiency served as a bad example to slaves. Instead, he thought that free
blacks should be collected together and segregated into separate settlements with
heavy-handed moral, political, and labor laws to govern their daily lives. 62
Another common concern was that slaves were sometimes underfed, and were
also often supplied food at cost to the planters. Caro suggested slaveholders make
their slaves grow plantains, potatoes, and other produce like the French did to
avoid shortages of staple crops and to make slaves feed themselves.63 De Tapia and
Herédia concurred, and suggested that slaves could increase their own production
of basic foodstuffs such as rice, maize, beans, millet, and other legumes to support
their wellbeing and relive costs from planters.64
For its prodigious length and expansive range of topics, the most notable
testimony came from Joaquín García, a well-known military officer who would

“Testimonio… para la formacion del Carolino Código Negro…,” Antonio Mañon, 11 March 1784,
AGI-SD, leg. 1034, 8-10.
61

“Testimonio… para la formacion del Carolino Código Negro…,” Ignacio Caro, 12 March 1784,
AGI-SD, leg. 1034, 10-16v.
62

“Testimonio… para la formacion del Carolino Código Negro…,” Ignacio Caro, 12 March 1784,
AGI-SD, leg. 1034, 10-16v.
63

“Testimonio… para la formacion del Carolino Código Negro…,” Francisco de Tapia, 16 March
1784, AGI-SD, leg. 1034, 33-35v; “Testimonio… para la formacion del Carolino Código Negro…,”
Andrés Herédia, 20 March 1784, AGI-SD, leg. 1034, 50-55v.
64

56

soon become the governor who ruled the colony throughout the Haitian
Revolution.65 García was born in 1731 and having arrived in Santo Domingo from
Puerto Rico in the late 1760s had spent nearly three decades in the colony.66 He
endorsed the project to renovate the slave code as a “wise and pious decision” that
would make him the happiest inhabitant of the island. García admitted that he
knew less about plantations and management than others, but had observed many
issues by travelling around the island with the militias and was more directly
familiar with “the few domestic slaves that God has given me.” He noted that the
colony was depopulated, but fertile and lovely, and was confident that savvy
colonists knew best how to rearrange the “distinct classes of blacks and their
descendants,” which he identified as black slaves, freed people, libres mas antiguos,
and mulattoes of various legal categories. Most freed people strived only for
momentary impulses and day-to-day existence, he said, without much
consideration of long-term plans.

He mentioned the sometimes “prideful

presumptions” of slaves against their masters, or freed people against white
residents. García claimed that these people confused their realm of color with that
of the white social sphere, or of “honored patrician” culture. All this combined for
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a “lethal idleness” among workers and a “propensity to theft” of their own
plantations or properties nearby.
including stolen goods.

Some near the coast traded illicitly, often

He also complained that nobody bothered to stop

fugitives or track them down, and said that runaways operated with impunity
around the island. Sometimes these people would steal Spanish mules, horses, or
cattle and then sell them on the French side.67 To whatever extent these latter
points were true, it showed that people of color exposed themselves to a wide
array of influences and ideas with such connections.
García also indicated that, “There are countless blacks and pardos that live
in the countryside in dispersed shacks, without more patrimony than that which
they or their ancestors brought from Guinea, and they are content…only because
they are free. They do not work, but only when they are hungry, and they kill at
the cost of their closest neighbor who has supplies.” He continued, saying,
“Among themselves they hide fugitive slaves from the haciendas. How are they to
learn what suits the owner or the state?”68 Here he hit on major differences
between Dominican society and Saint-Domingue. Santo Domingo featured an
expanse of under-occupied territory in which descendants of freed people or
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runaways settled the expansive terrain as free peasants, relatively untethered from
the government and property relations, and therefore also more separated from
the impositions of racial hierarchies.69
García offered concrete policy solutions.

García suggested that a

standardized census administered at regular intervals would help monitor the
population,

with

territorial

divisions

to

ease

management

and

local

commissioners to enact stable governance. He recommended that those free
people of color who did not verifiably produce goods, nor labored to sustain
themselves, should all be forced into residence and cultivation on certain plot of
land. He also suggested that they be required to apply for license to work as a
jornalero to curtail fugitives, vagabonds, and deserters from wandering the
countryside with ease. Aside from the Code Noir, which he stated he had not read
himself, he recommended that they consult the widely-used Traité sur le
gouvernement des esclaves by Émilien Petit who published this treatise on slave
management in 1777 after four decades as an official and planter in SaintDomingue and Martinique. García thought this could help with the formation of
what he called the, “Código Dominicano” (Dominican Code). He also thought it
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would be prudent to form a council of distinguished planters to decide public
matters regarding the black population. Like the others, he complained about
slaves who routinely asked their owners or colonial authorities how much they
were worth to initiate self-purchase through coartación, and thought that
emancipation was simply too easy and often without merit. He believed that
liberated slaves should also be drafted into public service, such as in hospitals.
Though he echoed complaints about religious festivities and time off, he strongly
advocated Christian education as a civilizing influence. Toward solving the
runaway problem, he suggested that all slaveholders in the colony contribute a
small, annual fee to fund a gang of robust trackers, or slave patrols, to scour the
countryside and pursue fugitives, vagrants, criminals, and those without
passports. In a colony so depopulated and occupied mostly with raising livestock
animals and subsistence crops he complained that there were too many blacks who
simply travelled about freely.

He also recommended that this fund could

indemnify the cost of fugitives who died in chase or did not return.70
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This collection of testimony reveals the state of affairs in Dominican
slavery, and though only from an elite perspective nevertheless details points of
friction across society. There was a tension among the ruling class between their
narrative of paternal mildness and their desire for maximizing labor output,
between their narrative of religious instruction and their craving for profits like
Saint-Domingue. Their envy of Saint-Domingue pervaded the testimony. This
envy motivated their detailed description of the colonies’ divergences and their
own ambitions, which influenced the social strain they placed upon free people of
color in the short-term and would inform geopolitical strategy in the era of the
Haitian Revolution.71

These testimonies from planters and officials, like the

published plea from Sánchez Valverde, depicted an idealized Dominican future of
prosperity and racial discipline modeled at least in part on Saint-Domingue, also
voiced a Dominican elite identity distinct from Spanish imperatives that offered
correctives for a past of colonial languish, and sought to moderate any French
extremes with a robust Catholic cultural mediation and corporate social order.
Once the new slave code was written it had to be sanctioned by imperial
officials before its eventual implementation across the colonies, although it was
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approved locally by the Audiencia de Santo Domingo on 16 March 1785.72
Ultimately this new black code had few lasting effects across the empire when it
was finally disseminated in 1789. Locally, though the extent of de jure enactment
remains unclear, the spirit of the law guided a renewed de facto crackdown by
creating heavy new restrictions that curtailed basic rights for people of color, and
particularly free people of color. The ordinances restricted free peoples’ basic
sumptuary conduct, such as the wearing of silk, lace, and gold, or carrying swords.
It obligated free blacks to religious instruction and observances specifically to
supplant “superstitions” with loyalty to the church, crown, and Spain.
More harshly, any perceived disrespect toward whites could be met with
the lash. Free people of color could not verbally contradict whites, and any of
them who put their hand against a white could receive one-hundred lashes, two
years in prison, cut rations, and fetters. Free blacks were restricted from education
and instruction. A slave who put their hand against a white could be executed.
Tercerónes or cuarterónes (that is, people with one-third or one-fourth African
descent) would be fined for disrespecting whites, the former classified as the
progeny of a mulato or pardo and white and the latter as the offspring of a tercerón
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and white.73 Individuals and groups who had enjoyed property, physical mobility,
and cultural diversity to various degrees were summarily stripped of significant
autonomy all in the name of making an anemic society with slaves, ostensibly
more robust and similar to Saint-Domingue. Santo Domingo’s slavery regime
never developed as elites had hoped, but that was not required to alienate large
segments of free Spanish subjects in the Dominican populace.
This policy was not predicated entirely upon simple coercion, though.
The goal was to offer conciliation and assimilation by faith and conduct into selfregulating royal subjects. Their compulsory relocations mirrored long-running
Spanish centralization of “others” into missions to expedite their subjugation and
acculturation. This underscored venerated views of municipalities as bastions of
metropolitan values and order. While the elite testimony had castigated urban
free blacks for supposedly corrosive inattentions to racial boundaries, officials also
feared maroon communities throughout the colony that had attracted slaves to flee
for freedom. Urban free blacks and maroons both influenced the aspirations of
less-privileged blacks and were key targets for subjugation.74 Specifically, the
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maroons at Maniel and “negros ganadores”, or black wage earners near San Lorenzo
de los Mina were two such groups. Their resettlements under Catholic instruction
and state supervision, and later anti-colonial responses, illuminate broader trends
for free people of color in Santo Domingo in this era.75

CONFINING FREE PEOPLE OF COLOR & SAN LORENZO DE LOS MINA
The town of San Lorenzo de los Mina was initially formed in the late 1670s
when Spanish officials gave sanctuary and freed status to several runaways, whose
collective title “Mina” might indicate Akan origins or ties to the Mina region on
the Gold Coast of West Africa. By the 1780s it had several hundred inhabitants. 76
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In 1786 San Lorenzo became the focal point of several new ordinances issued by
the Cabildo of Santo Domingo following the new slave codes of 1785. Residents
of San Lorenzo were specifically accused of neglecting civic duties, but the new
ordinances extended far beyond the scope of their town. On the premise that these
free people of color had abandoned Christian life and committed thefts, a range of
purportedly delinquent Dominicans of color around the capital city were uprooted
and forced to relocate their families and livestock to San Lorenzo to labor on
nearby fields.77 Another complaint was that they engaged in loud dancing and
singing that lasted until late into the night, and to the detriment of their neighbors.
This scheme to relocate free people of color came as part of a larger plan to
reorganize the barrios of the capital city and “whiten” portions where the
populations converged, or where the influence or visibility of free people of color
was pronounced.78
Targeted free people of color had only forty-five days to resettle. The
policy separated married couples from singles who were then subdivided by
males and females. It tore farmers, peddlers, and artisans from their livelihoods
and heavily restricted their economic and social opportunities. On the pain of fifty
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lashes the law compelled San Lorenzo residents to take their produce to one
central market and to stop haggling over prices. These codes even restricted their
use of horses and limited their travel, and prevented those who kept livestock from
breeding them. A magistrate was sent to adjudicate their every action, and a priest
was sent to minister to residents whose earnings supported his salary and who
were coerced to hear his weekly sermons. Also, their children were forced to daily
learn Catholic doctrine. If any of these legally free people fled San Lorenzo or tried
to live elsewhere they could receive fifty lashes and be made to wear shackles for
six months. Second-time offenders could receive one-hundred lashes. Third-time
offenders could get two hundred lashes and six years in public works, service that
was open for purchase as plantation labor.79

These free people of color were

thrown from commercial viability and physical mobility into quasi-bondage. The
autonomies that they had once enjoyed were being extinguished.
The Cabildo also issued sweeping restrictions on wage-earning slaves
near the capital, often called jornaleros, and certainly targeted residents San
Lorenzo de los Mina as well. Though unfree, some could purchase freedom with
income and their spatial and social mobility influenced other slaves. On threat of
punishment and fines, they were forced to procure a license for their work. Any
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payment slaves received had to match established rates and masters had to report
receiving anything over or under expected amounts. If any slave was seen outside
of their masters' properties after evening prayers they would receive twenty-five
lashes, ending chances to work far from home. Owners were instead encouraged
to send all slaves into fieldwork.80 Beyond restricting free people of color, these
codes also confined this large intermediate sector of skilled slaves who had already
experienced varieties of freedom in an urban setting.

THE MAROONS OF MANIEL
As early as the mid-seventeenth century some residents along the southwestern edge of Santo Domingo contended with what they perceived as an evasive
menace. By 1784 Archbishop Isidoro Rodríguez repeated Spanish lore about
Maniel, saying, “For over one hundred years a few small mountains around
Neiba…have been inhabited by some entrenched blacks (whose number in the day
amounted to about three hundred, among whom there are many seventy-yearolds born there) who have always lived only from theft and insult, who have
persecuted the region, the people personally, and their fruits, livestock, and
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women.”81 Maniel occupied dense forests that leached imperial wealth rather than
producing it. Maroons’ bodies, self-removed from slavery’s modes of production,
defied the capital valuations of their former status as commodities and tore at the
boundaries of colonial labor relations. Their raids on plantations and travelers,
peaceful but illicit trade with neighboring peasants, and the cost of numerous
military expeditions to stop them, further depleted Spanish and French
resources.82 Thousands of slaves, especially those brutalized in Saint-Domingue,
fled bondage to palenques (maroon communities) in less-populated Santo
Domingo.83 Around that time scores of Spanish troops spent weeks combing the
wilderness for a notorious maroon named Come Gente (People Eater), ultimately
subduing twenty-four maroon collaborators.84 This consistent marronage also
sustained Maniel.
Yet the Maniel maroons had distinguishing advantages.

First, they

exploited a fictive border devoid of imperial governance. Their presence pulled
the two outward-looking, metropolitan-oriented colonies into a treaty in the 1770s
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to define interior boundaries, areas previously inscribed as maroon territory on
official maps.85 Subsequently, the maroons manipulated imperial geopolitics by
moving between colonies, capitalizing on armistice treaties between France and
Spain and the jurisdictional boundaries of state power. French attempts to reclaim
runaways as property and lax Spanish policies toward fugitive slaves further
complicated bilateral pacification of the maroons. As a result, Spanish and French
administrators bickered incessantly over strategy and responsibility for restoring
frontier order.86
In this phenomenon of slave flight to the refuge of neighboring polities,
especially Spanish colonies, Santo Domingo stood alongside several other
prominent cases. British slaves from southern North America fled to Spanish
Florida87 Dutch slaves paddled canoes from Curaçao and other nearby Dutch
islands to the coast of Venezuela.88 So did Danish slaves who fled St. Croix, St.
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Thomas, and St. Jan – later the “Virgin Islands” – to Puerto Rico.89 The case of
French slaves fleeing into Santo Domingo fits into this litany of Spanish policy that
weakened the labor regimes of neighboring rivals by siphoning off human capital
that, once converted to Catholicism, could become highly-motivated free subjects
of the Crown of Spain and useful builders of empire in their own right.90
After numerous French hostilities, which included offering cash for each
captured maroon, in 1783 envoys from Maniel used trusted local proxies to initiate
dialogue with Spanish forces. They hoped to gain legal freedom in exchange for
peace and resettlement. Santiago, a fifty-year-old maroon from the Spanish side,
renegotiated their fugitive autonomy into protected subjecthood and requested
cultivable land. Santiago, freeborn maroon Philippe, and bozal LaFortune were
Maniel’s primary leaders. Though months earlier they had made similar contact
with the French, Dominican officials considered that these proposals were meant
in earnest. Amid this détente Juan Bobadilla, a trusted creole priest in nearby
Neiba, visited Maniel as a goodwill emissary. He quickly established a rapport,
and a few dozen maroons reciprocated by agreeing to be baptized. After building
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this initial relationship Bobadilla would work directly with these maroons over
the next fifteen years.91
While coinciding with Spanish interests, the choice made by the Maniel
maroons was strategic, and corresponded with the actions of maroons in Jamaica,
Colombia and elsewhere who also pragmatically rejoined colonial society with
legal protections of their earned free status.92 The Maniel maroons were hampered
by illness and food scarcity. They preferred the Spanish, who might compromise,
over the French, who still tried to re-enslave them. They also probably knew of
ongoing treaty negotiations which would lead the Spanish to return all fugitive
French slaves as part of officials’ and planters’ efforts to revitalize slavery and
commerce. With an envious eye on Saint-Domingue, the Spanish severely curbed
free black autonomy that might inspire slave dissent, and crafted harsh new laws
especially against the impugned maroons.93 Ceasing hostilities immediately
benefited all parties, as the maroons evaded the French, kept their freedom, and
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recuperated, while the Spanish removed an impediment to their exploitative labor
regime.94
The Spanish began this resettlement project in the 1780s amid local and
imperial anxiety to revitalize the struggling Dominican economy and the
institution of slavery. The maroons hindered both for over a century by repulsing
frequent armed imperial incursions. The palenque (maroon community) of Maniel
had existed for at least several decades, and was the single most visible and
consistent fixture of black autonomy on Hispaniola. Naranjo, only founded in
1790 after years of wrangling, was a few miles away from Maniel; its settlers had
agreed, at least officially, to submit to the authority of the Spanish state and
church. Maroon groups were colloquially known as manieles in Santo Domingo.95
At Naranjo both maroons and Spanish officials temporarily suspended customary
contentions to search uneasily for stability. The intertwined turmoil of the French
and Haitian Revolutions in the 1790s, though, caused a decrease in emphasis on
the Spanish project of reinvigorating Dominican slavery. Instead, the military
potential of the maroons provided the desired catalyst for the Spanish counter-
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revolution’s campaign against “impious” republicanism and slave insurrection.
Despite being constrained by Spanish and French collaboration, threatened with
re-enslavement, and jeopardized by warfare, as pins in major imperial hinges these
maroons wielded pivotal influence.96
The maroons’ acceptance of a peace offer in the 1780s sacrificed their
achievement of non-state, outsider status.97 The state extended beyond urban
bastions of power and into unfamiliar geographies to initiate new subjects through
rituals of popular royalism and piety that constituted a proselytic colonialism.
Through a politics of elusion – that is, a realpolitik of evasiveness – they savvily
navigated cultural and material constraints to maximize their autonomy and
quality of life. At each juncture the maroons adapted to and exploited state
encroachments that sought to confine and use them, whether by re-enslavement,
resettlement, or conscription. In contrast to the ineptitude and indecisiveness that
Spanish officials perceived, maroons consistently made anti-state choices. Their
alignment with metropolitan power, which may seem counter-intuitive to readers
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today, was a temporary defense against more invasive legal and property relations
that would have drastically limited their autonomy.
Maroon submission was more performative than real. Under Spanish
tutelage the maroons consistently undermined deals, demanded more
concessions, consorted with enemies, and sometimes simply disappeared. Maniel
and Naranjo sat on the rural colonial periphery nearly 125 miles west of the capital
of Santo Domingo in the Baoruco region, an area between Saint-Domingue and the
southern coast of Santo Domingo that had harbored defiance against colonialism
since the sixteenth-century Taíno uprisings, such as the well-known and longlasting Enriquillo revolt.98 They maximized this precarious location as a spatial
buffer to waylay imperial power. Their pragmatic multivalence of selective cooperation and conditional allegiance came to sour Spanish hopes of assimilating
dissident blacks and reconquering the entirety of Hispaniola from the French. By
the mid-1790s violence and re-enslavement returned to the maroons, partly due to
their proximity to a Spanish state that had only temporarily safeguarded their
liberties.99 Faced with this later crossroads, the majority of these maroons simply
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returned to sanctuary in the mountains instead of heeding Spanish or
revolutionary entreaties.
The maroons of Santo Domingo complicate often teleological and simple
historical categories. Despite their position at the confluence of disparate historical
currents, these maroons have remained peripheral – in proportion to their own
geographic remoteness – to the insights of the last two decades’ most significant
analytical trends.100 Absenteeism dissipated the inherent tensions of bondage by
providing an opportunity for enslaved people to cross into fugitive status and
enjoy temporary liberties. Many of these petit marrons (minor maroons) resumed
former state and labor relations after protesting against conditions, or posed as
free people in towns, or stayed in small local groups until caught.101 Resolutions
of liminal processes, like petit marronage returning to plantations or legal tactics to
free the enslaved, often reaffirmed social order.102 Quite separately long-lasting
grand marrons (major maroons), rather than approaching state and society for
guarantees, held to starkly different ideas and methods for freedom. 103 Stable
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grand marron groups formed that successfully broke with colonial society. 104 Yet
geographically and chronologically disparate maroon communities shared similar
politics of elusion. This was a politics that drew on incisive knowledge of colonial
states and lifestyle adaptations to property relations that claimed them.105
Another year passed before Maniel and Spanish officials again negotiated.
During this interlude of ambiguity the maroons covertly bargained with the
French, reviewed their options and utilized their internal cultures of dissent and
decentralization. The French in turn pressured Spain to resettle the maroons on
similar terms in Saint-Domingue, in accordance with their recent treaty on
runaways. This haggling severely delayed progress, and both colonies feared that
if word of negotiations spread then more slaves might flee to Maniel to gain
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liberty. Both states disliked negotiating with the maroons, whose tactics bought
time, renewed imperial conflict, and assured greater concessions.
In 1785 a tentative agreement between the Spanish and the Maniel
maroons stipulated that the maroons would be pardoned, relocated to their
original colony, and resettled under “civilizing” Catholic tutelage with names
recorded to prevent interlopers. This supervised, formalist freedom averted reenslavement, but from the beginning some refused to acquiesce, remained at
Maniel, and took in new runaways. The two groups of maroons – those who
agreed to resettlement and those who resisted it – never ceased collaborating with
one another, which presented a perplexing challenge to the Spanish authorities.
Santiago, who represented this maroon group to the Spanish, had initially claimed
to lead 137 women, men, and children, perhaps the largest of a few local bands
rumored to total more than a thousand maroons. Ultimately, 133 ethnicallydiverse maroons were listed in the treaty. The majority had fled from SaintDomingue while a handful were from Santo Domingo.106 Many were freeborn and
native to Maniel. Names ranged from Holandés (Dutch), to Quamina and Ybie,
which indicate possible Akan and Edo origins respectively. Pemba possibly
referred to the Mpemba region of the Kingdom of Kongo, and the names Masunga,
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Macuba, and Sesa correspond phonologically to Bantu languages. 107 The Angola
and Kongo regions supplied roughly half of the Africans who entered SaintDomingue, their languages were spoken widely, and, not surprisingly, many
maroons previously captured from Maniel were identified as having been from
West Central Africa.108 However, both the names on the Maniel roster and the
patterns of slave importation into the West region of Saint-Domingue indicate an
important variation in African import patters that influenced both the resulting
maroon and slave population in Santo Domingo.
In the regions of Saint-Domingue closer to Maniel and the southern side
of Santo Domingo more generally the ethnic diversity of imported African captives
was much greater than the likely majority of West Central Africans in North. This
is evident in the names recorded in the Maniel roster, as maroons fleeing from the
nearby Cul-de-Sac or other locales would have had a much easier and shorter
distance to traverse to refuge in the mountains of Baoruco. As indicated by the
Slave Voyages Database out of the almost 109,000 Africans trafficked directly into
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Port-au-Prince and the Cul-de-Sac in the eighteenth century about 40,000 were
from West Central Africa, or about 36% of the total captives disembarked, with
69,000 from elsewhere on the continent.109 The Bights of Benin and Biafra sent
about 40,000 captives to Port-au-Prince and the Cul-de-Sac by itself, roughly equal
to the Kongo and Angola regions of West Central Africa. While Africans from the
Bights may have been a slight plurality overall, about 20,000 disembarked slaves
around Port-au-Prince were from Porto Novo and Whydah, neighboring ports on
the Bight of Benin, which surpassed the total known quantity of any two ports in
West Central Africa.110 Whydah sent about 78,500 captives to Saint-Domingue, or
over 12% of total slave imports to Saint-Domingue, making it one of the heaviest
single contributing ports to Saint-Domingue.111
Well over two-thirds of the over 27,000 captives sent out from Porto Novo
disembarked in Port-au-Prince, Saint-Marc, Léogâne, or Les Cayes, a peculiarity
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in the patter flow of French slave imports.112 Roughly 63% of the captives arriving
around Port-au-Prince did arrive in the decade just preceding the outbreak of
revolution, and approximately two out of three ships arriving from West Central
Africa to the region at that time came from unspecified ports.113 By comparison,
in only the decade preceding the revolution Cap-Français disembarked almost the
entire century-long total of Port-au-Prince’s slave importation. About 54% of the
roughly 328,000 Africans that landed there were from West Central Africa. Less
than a quarter arrived from the Bights of Benin and Biafra combined. Over 134,000
of these West Central Africans landed in Cap-Français between 1764 and 1790.114
Such Spanish intervention had recent precedents both in eastern Cuba,
where royal slaves were concluding their lengthy settlement and conversion
program, and in Florida, where runaways who themselves had manipulated
geopolitical borders entered colonial service.115 Generally, enlightened Spanish
Bourbons had veered toward assimilating what they called bárbaros (barbarians)
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on the imperial fringes, rather than annihilating them. Across the Americas, the
Spanish reinforced evangelization as a tool of soft power and cultural
internalization to subdue exogenous peoples, gain their consent, and transform
them into useful subjects while securing volatile borderlands. Amid these trends
Santo Domingo was unique, as those troubling this coarse imperial perimeter were
maroons, whereas officials had tailored such policies to unassimilated indigenous
populations. In these contexts, Spanish officials in Santo Domingo planned to
instill religiosity as a means to moderate what they cast as an intransigent African
character and to remake maroons as vasallos (vassals). Yet incongruities between
metropolitan ideals and local realities afforded the Maniel maroons leeway in
molding their lives, state engagements, and colonialist policy. 116

RENEGOTIATING AUTONOMY, RECONFIGURING COLONIALISM
Problems abounded after the Maniel roster was composed in 1785. Some
maroons had afterthoughts about the French deal to resettle many of them in SaintDomingue. French officials grew impatient and suggested joint military action,
but Spanish officials welcomed this prevarication.

The maroons permitted

Bobadilla to visit Maniel to mediate. Those maroons he encountered were tense
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and well-armed, while others retreated further into the hills. This new diplomatic
impasse jeopardized the deal, yet soon thereafter French resolve faltered as their
governor was recalled, their negotiator fell ill, and a hurricane hit. By late 1785 it
seemed clear that the maroons would remain in Santo Domingo where they
trusted and could use Bobadilla (whom the French accused of enabling their
recalcitrance) and where the Spanish were more tolerant of their decentralized
decision-making and diplomatic disingenuousness.117
In September 1787 King Carlos III, who had sanctioned the creation of the
Código Negro, authorized unilateral Spanish pacification of Maniel. Bobadilla then
informed four maroon leaders that the Spanish would continue with the reduction
of Maniel to “sociable life” and Christianity despite maroon reluctance to honor
the agreement. The archbishop commented: “I am afraid that with procrastination
we will lose everything,” adding that it did not “leave me with hope of harmony,”
but rather “distrust in the blacks.” And, he would “weep inconsolably” over the
loss of time as “each infant” was a missed opportunity.118

The archbishop

lamented postponements that reduced the efficacy of evangelization, as young
maroons were maturing away from priestly counsel. Bourbon rule magnified
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children’s centrality to the Hispanic world’s social, economic, and spiritual
futures. The Bourbons invested in nurturing youths across the empire, and
expanded this policy through royal edict in 1790.119 The Spanish hoped that
maroon children could be Hispanicized more easily than the adults, and that they
would internalize and reproduce colonialist values in their later lives.
Heavy Spanish clerical intercession began with the aid of a slave who
carried Bobadilla’s bed and belongings from Neiba to Maniel, where the priest
relocated to live with the maroons. In 1788 Bobadilla even gained an official
church commission to diligently shepherd his new flock toward spiritual and
material well-being and gradual pacification.

In the late 1780s an assertive

governor, Joaquín García, and a firebrand archbishop, Fernando Portillo, came to
assume power, and while Bobadilla micromanaged Maniel’s resettlement.120
Remarkably, within a few years the maroons’ leaders met personally with
the highest European authorities on Hispaniola, a tribute to maroon negotiating
power, social importance, and geopolitical position.

In late 1787 Santiago,

Philippe, Surita, and Andrés, maroons charged with deciding Maniel’s strategy,
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went with Bobadilla to the capital to meet the governor. There they accepted
Spanish plans without demur.121 As they fine-tuned details of their free status,
other representatives – LaFortune, Juan Manuel, Pedro Alejandro, and Miguel –
promised to not abduct or harass any nearby Spaniards. 122 In return, the church
constructed a hospital to treat their numerous ailments, and the archbishop
praised this initial progress.123
During the three-year delay, however, Spanish officials were aware that
Maniel’s hold-outs continued to lure runaways from both colonies.124 Elite rumors
depicted Maniel as a riotous den of iniquity that even at times accepted white and
mulatto fugitives, suggesting it was a nexus of popular collaboration against
colonialist hierarchies.

Estimates of the maroons’ total numbers fluctuated,

signaling a group whose members moved among a cluster of palenques. When the
French eventually relented and accepted Spanish plans for the maroons, they only
requested that they be relocated further from the border to interrupt their regular
contact with Dominguois (from Saint-Domingue) slaves.

The maroons had
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effectively obstructed French ownership claims, accepted new members, and
stalled Spanish advances.125
Meanwhile, Bobadilla dreamed of an abiding community of ex-maroons,
purified by a Christian lifestyle for those who had “groaned under the cruel
bondage of heathenism.”126 Spaniards, in the spirit of earlier readings of terrain in
which untamed landscapes and unevangelized occupants were satanic havens,
likely regarded the maroons’ wilderness lifestyles as diabolically-influenced.127
This justified the imposition of spatial management through reducción (reduction),
which mirrored long-running Spanish practices of concentrating mobile
populations into centralized missions for conversion and assimilation. This would
in theory render maroons immobile.128
For two years some maroons stayed in Neiba while Maniel’s leaders,
especially Felipe, haggled over the new town’s location. By early 1790 they had
selected Naranjo, an area near to both the coast and Maniel. At Naranjo, the church
initially constructed some small thatched huts called bohios where residents would
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meet nightly with Bobadilla to learn the rosary. Priests administered instruction,
catechisms, the sacraments, and state surveillance worked toward rehabilitating
maroons into Spanish subjects.129 Their municipal focus underscored venerated
Spanish views of organized towns as bastions of metropolitan values and frontier
control.130 Families built homes and received “1,000 yards” of land, materially
embedding European-styled kin and property relations. The residents of Naranjo
came to form a black administration and, in time, an armed militia. Yet Spanish
administrators still worried that maroons would slip undetected into SaintDomingue or the mountains instead of fully submitting. Others were paranoid
that the maroons could be “useful instruments” of French power.131 The Consejo
de Indias nevertheless continued to support this project, which they thought was
“frustrated by the capriciousness and absolute resistance of the black maroons of
Maniel,” but explicitly requested that Governor García, “protect them in
freedom.”132
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After six years of church presence, however, many maroons remained
broadly impervious to Spanish power. In mid-1791 Governor García complained
of their, “treachery, fickleness, and infidelity of the wicked…” He lamented that,
“Their union is not and has been nothing but a federation, and a body of outlaws,
who mock our government and the authority of our laws.” He even claimed that
the maroons, with their proximity to the coast, had illicitly traded with trespassing
foreign merchants whom he lambasted for their corrosive pecuniary influence.
Although García recognized that some maroons accepted the “gentility and
fairness” of the Spanish, he postulated that most were disingenuous and
manipulated their “candor and sincerity.” He argued that “nothing has settled
them, nothing suits them, and perhaps nothing will ever accommodate them but
their existence in libertinage, clumsiness, and dissolution…” Yet he also feared
“cruel offences” if the maroons were abandoned to their “native character.”133
Many Maniel maroons hesitated to abandon their lifestyle because they feared
Spanish betrayal following arrests of local blacks. Bobadilla patiently met with
recalcitrant maroons to coax them toward Naranjo. Cleverly, one of the leaders,
LaFortune, suggested that if he and others could visit Spain to hear their pardons
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directly from the king himself, then they would fully cooperate.134 The Naranjo
resettlement’s earliest notable result was that the maroons had produced
frustrated Spanish priests and officials.
From 1785 to 1791 the Maniel maroons adeptly antagonized classic and
longstanding European rivalries by reigniting local contentions that dated at least
to Spain’s loss of western Hispaniola to the French in 1697. All the while they
demonstrated intimate knowledge of social and legal possibilities in both colonies.
Their political tact and hard bargaining tangled trans-imperial politics enough for
a better solution to emerge.

Unlike European protestations faulting their

fickleness, arrogance and deceit, they had, as much as possible, adroitly charted
their own course. Excuses and aspersions masked the fact that African-descended
maroons were negotiators as skilled and effective as any European.135 The worst
scenario for Spain would have been that these maroons would become politically
radicalized or affiliated with the French.
By the end of the summer in 1791 and on the brink of the epic Haitian
Revolution, only a few dozen maroons actually lived at Naranjo.136
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enticements of land and stability more maroons began to resettle there, including
some resistive leaders.137 Some maroons intermeshed with Spanish colonialism as
sincere and co-operative converts. The remainder performed enough piety and
obedience to assuage the Spanish, cleverly disguising their continued practice of
maroon activities and their reunions with those who still lived at Maniel. Yet
officials were optimistic that the interweaving of Spanish culture and Catholic
devotion was starting to colonize minds and reform what they saw as the innate
and pernicious habits of black nature so as to produce useful subjects. With the
Haitian Revolution initial impulses to solidify the frontier and body politic
changed. Maroons, once irritants to slavery and colonialism, became transformed
into prospective facilitators of territorial and spiritual conquest, but also potential
“enemies within” should they succumb to radical egalitarianism. The maroons
again repositioned themselves within broader geopolitical struggles to gain and
use new leverage at a time of rampant disorder – much to the frustration of state
claimants.
Maroons have appeared disproportionately in scholarship on the Haitian
Revolution.138 One prominent interpretation presents maroons as a revolutionary
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engine, though it conflates rebels and runaways with grand marrons, while others
emphasize petit marrons as facilitators.139 Most convincingly, it seems that grand
marrons were not critical actors in the revolution.140 Specifically, the community at
Maniel displayed ambivalence toward overthrowing state power, liberal
individualism, racial solidarity with enslaved people, and egalitarian rights
discourses. Their tendency, played out across the mountains of Baoruco, only
became more apparent as Spain sought frontier allies amid ensuing turmoil on the
island. Historians have seen as states do, that is, by misunderstanding maroons’
fundamental aversion to entanglements with exogenous powers, complicating the
narrative settlement of these restive people.141 As society splintered on Hispaniola,
Spanish visions of absorbing popular dissidents eventually reverted to a racist
pessimism that assumed the eternal inferiority of people of African descent. Also,
the revolutionary era increasingly ruptured the social structures that confined the
maroons to their settlement with Spain at the same time that Spanish officials
attempted to coax maroons to defend these very colonial institutions.
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Who Defeated Napoléon, 182–202; Fick, Making of Haiti, 46–88.
139

Geggus, Haitian Revolutionary Studies, 40–74; David Geggus, Slavery, War, and Revolution: The
British Occupation of Saint-Domingue, 1793–1798 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982): 302–15.
140

James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed,
New Haven, 1998, 1–191.
141

90

THE IMPERIAL CÓDIGO NEGRO ARRIVES
During these years of cajoling the maroons of Maniel and black residents
near Santo Domingo a morass of metropolitan bureaucrats slowly considered the
proposed slave laws of the mid-1780s. Finally, in 1789 the long-awaited Carolino
Código Negro arrived from Spain which promised sweeping reforms. They were
received by officials and especially planters in Spanish colonies with an
indignation directly inverse to the enthusiasm with which they were proposed in
Santo Domingo. King Carlos IV finished the project started by his then-deceased
father King Carlos III, and the decree that he issued stipulated more protections
for slaves than anything that had been written and approved in Santo Domingo
five years prior.

It protected slave marriage, obliged religious access and

education, and clarified food and clothing requirements. In fact, the code also
placed limits on planters when it came to how and how much they could whip or
otherwise punish slaves, and limited workday hours. One provision that was
included was that religious holidays had to be dedicated to spiritual edification
and reflection, not as an excuse for slaves to fraternize or drink alcohol, as so many
Dominican elites had complained.

Many planters interpreted this as a step

backward from the status quo, and an attack on their interests, so few complied.
In Cuba, for example, the code prompted planters to write the king with
predictions of economic ruin for the colonists, and a decline in church tithes and
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port receipts, due to the costs associated with implementing these new provisions.
They also emphasized their extant magnanimity in providing religious training,
clothing, food, and care for their slaves as a means of refuting the need for such
formal policies. The code was ultimately ineffective, and quickly forgotten after at
best half-hearted efforts to implement it.142
In Santo Domingo the entire project to revitalize the colony’s slave regime
and suppress free people of color by pressured assimilation fell out of official
correspondence. The successive reception of an unwanted code, the outbreak of
strife in Saint-Domingue and France, and negotiating the arrivals of Vincent Ogé
and then Governor Blanchelande into exile from Saint-Domingue, left Spanish
officials perplexed and highly distracted from profit motivations, particularly
since Saint-Domingue had ruptured due to the very racial and legal structures that
Spanish officials and Dominican elites had envied. Officials in Santo Domingo
certainly paid public homage to the new slave code created in 1789. They
emphasized its intent “to favor and protect the miserable slaves” and avoid their
unnecessary suffering or unjust treatment, and celebrated the Catholicism
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prescribed by it. This was, they said, all intended to increase agriculture. These
officials hoped the new provisions would remedy slaves’ lack of education, and
the “pernicious example of their fathers, containing them in the just yoke of
subordination,” and emphasized the magnanimity of the code’s rationale.143
Another wish granted to planters and colonial elites, and a point that
Sánchez Valverde had asserted, dealt with the opening of the slave trade. The
asiento contract system had dominated the comparatively weak Spanish Caribbean
system of importing African laborers. This system had dictated fixed prices for
cargo with various suppliers from various nations, and was seen as lacking
incentives for slavers who could get better returns elsewhere, and for planters who
had to pay fixed rates instead of market values based upon perceived quality. This
was truly a radical shift that opened the Spanish Caribbean to a surge in African
populations and slave labor into the nineteenth century. It primarily Cuba,
though, that benefited from this motion, and only after the complete collapse of
Saint-Domingue when it then filled the demand gap for European commodities
markets. Santo Domingo, mired in problems internal to its island, never actually
saw a change from this policy.144
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Into 1791 a handful of runaways from Saint-Domingue were still regularly
arrested in, or on the border of, Santo Domingo, most of whom were identified as
being of “Congo” and “Nâgo” (that is, Yoruba, generally) ethnicities in runaway
ads in the newspapers of Saint-Domingue.145 No wonder, then, that the maroons
at Maniel and Naranjo had to constantly decide whether to accept fugitives,
thereby augmenting their community and proving safe haven, or turn over new
fugitives who sought refuge, and thereby honor their peace treaty with Spain. 146
That same year for example, a bozal (unassimilated African) whose body
apparently bore the marks of both ritual scarification and French branding walked
into Azua, a town over seventy miles east of the Saint-Domingue border.147
Sánchez Valverde had already detailed how the slave population in Santo
Domingo had been afflicted by some physical ailment due to the horrendous
Middle Passage, and other slaves sent to the island were “second- or third-hand”
castoffs, he said, from Saint-Domingue or elsewhere in the Caribbean.148 At times
the colony had, both in the capital of Santo Domingo and at Monte Cristi and likely
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elsewhere, welcomed illegal intercolonial shipments of slaves.149 Certainly local
demand for enslaved labor may have surpassed asiento availability. Overland
slave trading routes from Saint-Domingue, which would be a more difficult
process that mirrored the sending of thousands of cattle from Santo Domingo
westward, likely did bring in slaves from the French that were often identified as
being unfit, old, or disorderly.150 The ethnic composition of slaves in Santo
Domingo is, therefore, very difficult to ascertain. The majority of Dominican
slaves had long been creoles from within the colony, or if not then were likely
creoles from other Caribbean locales.151 The documented flow of cross-island or
cross-Caribbean slave trading is, by nature, quite sparse. We do know, though,
that at most the direct trade from Africa was around only 2,000 captives in the
eighteenth century.152 In any given year the number of maroons arriving in Santo
Domingo from Saint-Domingue, or the number of illicit intercolonial slaves
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trafficked into Santo Domingo, could have easily exceeded the number of African
captives directly imported into the colony. Including the free blacks and mulattoes
of Santo Domingo, Dominican society featured quite a heterogeneous mix of creole
and African cultures among its population of color.153
Because of all of these factors the heterogeneity of African culture in and
around Port-au-Prince was far greater than in North. This had a direct impact on
the mix of people who fled or were subsequently resold into the areas around
Santo Domingo from the much closer Cul-de-Sac region. Also, this differentiates
the Cul-de-Sac region from the heavy Kongolese influence of North which is often
heralded as a major revolutionary force in its own right. With all of that in mind,
with the additional fact that the direct African trade to Santo Domingo was
virtually nil, many of those of African ethnicity who entered Santo Domingo did
so through Saint-Domingue. These people entered as maroons, as resold slaves,
eventually during the revolutionary years as soldiers, and after that as citizens of
independent Haiti. The specificity and diversity of African backgrounds factored
prominently at various pivot points of Dominican history in the Age of
Revolutions.
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CONCLUSION
Dominican planters and Spanish officials, fueled by pecuniary motives
and envy of French Saint-Domingue, imposed racial immobilities in the 1780s that
sowed seeds of subversion among disaffected people of color in Santo Domingo.
These caustic social measures further antagonized Dominicans of color whose
years of frustrations toward Spain ultimately eroded Spanish colonialism and
Dominican profit in years to come. Subversions by Dominicans of color in the
1790s responded to the context of draconian measures, mixed with the ideological
ferment and structural vulnerability unleashed from 1789-1791 and thereafter.
These cases unveil the patchwork of localisms that comprised the antecedents and
arrivals of the Age of Revolutions as it was dispersed, received, and transmuted in
Santo Domingo and across the broader Caribbean. Also, they demonstrate how
Dominicans of color pragmatically exploited structural weaknesses and anticolonial momentum to radically remedy their own immediate grievances.
The case of San Lorenzo the litany of adversities and alienations that free
people of color in Santo Domingo endured from Spanish officials and Dominican
planters in the 1780s, including forced relocations, coerced religiosity, destruction
of livelihoods and lifestyles, and corporal punishment. Having already lost their
autonomy, they had little reason to protect the status quo. They were prime
audiences for radicalization. These episodes were related to, but distinct from,
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processes in the epic rise and fall of Saint-Domingue. Relatedly, the crackdown
on the maroons of Maniel also showed the means by which Spain attempted to
mold new and useful subjects through the facilitation of routinized religious
practice and limited physical mobility. These policies operated in coordination,
and to Dominican elites the elimination of these loci of black autonomy was
essential to revitalizing the Dominican plantation regime.
The process of forming new legal codes for slavery in the colony was,
though ultimately ineffectual, a means of inventorying and projecting local
particularities within the Spanish empire and Dominican differences from SaintDomingue. Influential images of French sugar, coffee, and indigo profits swayed
officials and planters in Santo Domingo to emulate perceived brutal racial
dominance in Saint-Domingue, albeit with overtones of evangelical purification.
In this time period Dominican and Spanish actors decided – voluntarily – to
inventory their political economy, customs, and traditions. Before the French
Revolution, or the Haitian Revolution, they began a process of documenting a
renewed identity of not only envy, but of what made them unique from the French
in what they regarded as positive aspects. This included, perhaps above all, their
commitment to religiosity and social moderation, and the role of clergy and the
church in regulating the racial hierarchy and maintaining cultural tranquility,
themes that would play out with variations over the ensuing decades. A renewed
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emphasis on evangelical mediation to better assimilate black subjects prefaced
geopolitical strategies of spiritual allegiance and conquest during the forthcoming
Haitian Revolution.
At the dawn of the Age of Revolutions no two rival colonies in the
Caribbean were more intimately integrated in commerce, in migration, or in
cultural awareness.

These sometimes uncomfortable interactions transpired

across a border that seemed distant from major colonial cities, and even more
distant from the metropoles that the colonies intently watched from afar. Yet, in
the next phase of cultural politics on Hispaniola this border region would become
a flashpoint for pivotal activity that captivated the attention of the most important
military and political figures on either side of the island. Instead of dividing the
island, the border became a conduit for the cross-pollination of major ideas,
projects, intrigues, and violence emanating from both sides of the island, and
heavily influenced both Dominican and Dominguois affairs. Without hyperbole,
it was one of the critical battlefields of the Age of Revolutions.
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CHAPTER 2
POLITICAL UNREST, REVOLUTIONARY FUSE: ACROSS BORDERS,
1789-1792

By March 1791 the course of the previous five months had seen the
tenuous peace, ideological turmoil, and ruthless prosperity of Saint-Domingue
under Governor Philibert-François Rouxel de Blanchelande deteriorate into open
political unrest. In an additional five months the colony as it was known and
begrudgingly admired by Dominican elites would be irreparably changed by
social revolution. Mounting Spanish fears that Santo Domingo would irreversibly
change in the process eventually came true.
Specifically, that March García informed metropolitan authorities that
French republicans had “ignited a new fire” in Port-au-Prince. José Arata, the
commander of the Spanish border town Las Cahobas, had relayed intelligence
reports to colonial leaders in Santo Domingo about the pathetic state in which
Governor Blanchelande had fled into protective custody in Spanish domains. The
governor of the most profitable Caribbean colony fled with but a small group of
family and aides, and without much luggage or clothes other than what he had
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been wearing when he abandoned the government buildings in Port-au-Prince in
the face of a radical white mob.1 Blanchelande had hoped to make his way
northward to Cap-Français, but so feared for his own life given the violent political
turmoil in Saint-Domingue that he sought refuge on Dominican soil until, he said,
“I am totally certain that the representative of the King will be respected,
meanwhile I will stay in the Spanish part.” He was hopeful that in Santo Domingo
he would receive Spanish material support against these “revolutions” emerging
in Saint-Domingue.2 Soon enough, he returned to Saint-Domingue, but without
Dominican support. Later in Blanchelande’s public self-defense, printed just
before he was guillotined in Paris in 1793 for anti-revolutionary actions and
malfeasance, he saved himself the embarrassment of mentioning his respite in
Spanish domains and his begging for Dominican resources to aid against
Dominguois unrest.3 Cries from French officials for Spanish aid had crescendoed
over the last year, but would soon be drowned out when political tussles among
the ruling class transitioned to all-out social upheaval. Blanchelande would not
be the last to walk away from Santo Domingo empty handed.

1

Joaquín García to Porlier, Santo Domingo, 16 March 1791, AGI-SD, leg. 1029, no.29.

Philibert-François Rouxel Blanchelande to Joaquín García, Las Cahobas, 6 March 1791, AGI-SD,
leg. 1029.
2

Philibert-François Rouxel Blanchelande, Discours justificatif de Philibert-François Rouxel
Blanchelande, ancien Gouverneur des îles Françoises sous-le-Vent de l'Amérique (Paris: N. H. Nyon,
1793); Jeremy D. Popkin, “The French Revolution’s Royal Governor: General Blanchelande and
Saint-Domingue, 1790–92,” William and Mary Quarterly 71, no.2 (April 2014): 203-228.
3

101

In exile on the Dominican frontier Blanchelande told García of the
“deplorable circumstances” that had forced him into temporary exile.

He

explained that military reinforcements had recently arrived from France and had
intermixed with radical local white patriots, or the “malicious of Port-au-Prince,”
which resulted in a spontaneous revolt.4 At the beginning of March two warships
had disembarked troops from France to maintain the peace there and assist the
colonial government. One was a battalion from Normandy and the other from
Artois. The new troops were “deaf to the voice of their superiors” and blindly
mixed in the politics of the local militia with violent outcomes.5
Rather ironically, only days earlier Vincent Ogé had been executed under
Blanchelande’s orders.6 Ogé, a wealthy mulatto planter from the North had
striven for political rights for his social caste. He had been extradited from his own
attempt at political asylum in Santo Domingo less than three months before after
leading a disastrous insurrection against Blanchelande’s government. The tables
had turned for Governor Blanchelande who now found himself a political refugee
at Spanish mercy just as Ogé had been only several weeks before.7

Philibert-François Rouxel Blanchelande to Joaquín García, Las Cahobas, 6 March 1791, AGI-SD,
leg. 1029.
4

5

Joaquín García to Porlier, Santo Domingo, 16 March 1791, AGI-SD, leg. 1029, no.29.

6

Joaquín García to Lerena, Santo Domingo, 25 March 1791, AGI-SD, leg. 1029, no.259.

7

Consejo de Indias to José Urízar, Aranjuez, AGI-SD, leg. 1029.

102

García was shocked and repulsed by the chaos in Saint-Domingue, and
declined to offer Blanchelande any tangible aid.8 However, trepidation and torpor
in Santo Domingo would prove poor barriers to inevitable involvement in SaintDomingue’s unfolding civil strife. The Spanish handling of the Ogé extradition
fiasco that started in November 1790 signaled a critical shift in their policy. Who
would Spanish officials negotiate with or not? How would they begin to define
their own strategic goals based on the available human resources in SaintDomingue? How would they use these instances of unrest to their geopolitical
benefit? What rhetoric of royalism and religion attracted potential allies and
provided unifying political and cosmological professions?9

News of radical

unrest, and even the human embodiment of it, would only circulate more
frequently in Santo Domingo in correlation to the fracturing of white power in
Saint-Domingue, especially in 1791.
From 1789 through the summer of 1791 the upheaval of the French
Revolution swept like a tidal wave across the Atlantic, crashing against the shores
of Saint-Domingue and creating a riptide of social havoc that submerged the ruling
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classes. Spanish officials and many Dominican residents retreated to their higher
ground of royalism and faith, and watched on with fear as their wealthy neighbors
were inundated. People of color – both enslaved and free, and on both sides of the
island – soon had the opportunity to exploit imperial weakness, dissent among the
elite, and ideological innovations to maximize their wellbeing and liberty. Instead
of the model of prosperity, Saint-Domingue quickly became the exemplar of greed
gone awry.
This chapter argues that this era of extremism and chaos in SaintDomingue forced Spaniards and Dominicans in Santo Domingo to again question
their collectivity in juxtaposition to their neighbors. It also gave Spanish officials
an opportunity to reflect upon their own geopolitical goals vis-à-vis SaintDomingue. In historiographical retrospect this moment was a prelude to the
“real” revolution that began in late 1791. Long before the “real” revolution began,
Spaniards and Dominicans knew they would not be able to avoid SaintDomingue’s fracases. Furthermore, this chapter details the ways in which Santo
Domingo and Spanish became intricately entwined with the turmoil of SaintDomingue, a factor not usually considered in scholarship on either side of the
island in this period. In contrast to the emphasis usually placed on the Ogé revolt
of October 1790, the fracturing of white power and privilege in Saint-Domingue –
highlighted by the flight of Governor Blanchelande – and the display of contempt
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for Catholicism, drove Santo Domingo to consider and present ideological
alternatives to the French decadence.
Ogé, Blanchelande, and maroons were early and heavily politicized
examples of the thousands who were yet to traverse the Santo Domingo border in
search of respite and, often, military support against violence in Saint-Domingue.
Blanchelande explained the he fled when, “they cut off the head of Monsieur
Mauduit…and have committed many other crimes.”10 Colonel Mauduit, who
commanded local militiamen in Port-au-Prince, had been a defender of the French
colonial establishment and royalism. Mauduit had actually tried to dissipate the
approaching mob around government offices, and became a sacrificial victim that
allowed Blanchelande to escape. The white mob paraded his body around the
streets and to the church where they then demanded that the priest sing a Te Deum
blessing over the severed head, only the newest offense to devout Catholics as
republicans had already been using churches for political meetings.11 Arata, who
hosted Blanchelande and lived less than fifty miles from Port-au-Prince and had
direct exposure to Saint-Domingue that García did not. He offered his own rather
prophetic analysis, saying, “You can consider the colony lost.” Their radical
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neighbors had “profaned the Catholic religion and offended our creator” with
heretical offenses that devoutly Catholic Spanish subjects could not countenance.12
This particular act of violence deeply disturbed Spanish officials, and in response,
Governor García further strengthened Spanish military presence in the
borderlands out of fear that such discontent would reach the Dominican side. 13
Only six months later and fifty miles further north on the Santo Domingo
and Saint-Domingue border, eight heavily-armed blacks in mid-September 1791
passed by a Spanish garrison at San Rafael. These rebels raised their voice to the
guards and proclaimed “Peace with Spain.” Their purpose, instead of raiding and
overwhelming lightly-defended Spanish properties, was to burn the home of
Monsieur Bouget and unite with other insurgents in the vicinity. Almost daily
these Spanish troops reported watching black rebels engage, and usually defeat,
white troops. Almost nightly they watched plantations burn in the far distance. 14
The largest and only successful slave revolt in the history of Atlantic slavery was
less than one month old. Slaves from some of the wealthiest plantations in the
world took provisional weapons, organized, and killed thousands of French
whites. This capital in human form eliminated hundreds of thousands of livres in
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fixed capital, real estate, and commodity crops. They changed their own world.
More than any contemporary observers could have predicted they changed the
worlds of slavery and emancipation, race and empire, and eventually citizenship
and universalism. More than anyone has yet understood they changed the world
of Dominican and Spanish neighbors.

The affability that the slave rebels

demonstrated toward Spanish subjects was not isolated. In so many words they
explained that their actions were not indicative of an all-out race war, and that in
fact they had no quarrel whatsoever with their Dominican neighbors. Maintaining
the peace along the lengthy, weakly-defended border was key, and at first that
meant interfacing with slave rebels, despite whatever racist repugnance that
conjured among their Spanish military counterparts. However, in this moment of
pragmatism Spanish officials listened to what the slave insurgents said, often in
cautiously optimistic incredulity.
These three new points of contact – Blanchelande, Ogé, and slave rebels –
thrust the white, mulatto, and black racial tensions and incumbent radical politics
of Saint-Domingue upon Dominicans and Spanish officials.

Throughout the

revolutionary era many actors from Saint-Domingue would seek some type of
support from Spain or advantages drawn from Santo Domingo to augment their
own domestic positions. These new ties became as unavoidable for the Dominican
side as the trade, marronage, and envy of Saint-Domingue had been. In the short
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term, Spanish officials realized that playing into Saint-Domingue’s internal chaos
could further their own geopolitical aims and potentially exact retribution against
French profits drawn from territories Spain lost a century prior. Over the longer
term, Dominicans of color began to find material and ideological pathways in this
revolutionary moment, often imbricated with revolutionary events to the west or
Spanish distractions due to them, to pursue their own redress of grievances and
upward mobility. In this period the clouds of revolution gathered, though the epic
slave revolts of late 1791 had not yet begun. The strains of ideological radicalism
that challenged the divine right of monarchies, the church, and racial hierarchy
scandalized Spanish and Dominican observers.

FRENCH REVOLUTION, SAINT-DOMINGUE FALLOUT
The French Revolution unquestionably exacerbated the precarious
political and demographic situation in Saint-Domingue.

Soon enough the

promises of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen – liberty, natural
rights, and popular sovereignty – abounded in the colony, followed by the more
succinct cries for liberté, égalité, fraternité. Alongside unfolding debates about the
future of royalism, the Société des Amis des Noirs, a French metropolitan
abolitionist society founded in 1788, locked in a parallel debate about the future of
slavery with the Club Massiac, a well-funded, politically well-connected planter
and merchant lobby. The Amis des Noirs only actively campaigned for ending the
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slave trade and for rights for the gens de couleur (free people of color), which was
by itself sufficient to antagonize the privileges of white planters and colonial
merchants.15 In Paris another powerful ally for the mulattoes and slaves emerged
– the Abbé Baptiste Henri Grégoire – a priest who defined mulattoes as
“descendants of Europe” and advocated for their equality, while supporting the
attempts by the Amis des Noirs to attack slavery. He attempted to advance these
positions in front of the National Assembly but was vociferously overwhelmed by
the pro-planter lobby. His predictions, and open calls for slave insurrection, were
seen as treasonous. Consequently, he and the Amis des Noirs became easy targets
for blame when unrest among the gens de couleur and slaves occurred in SaintDomingue.16
The power of poor white mobs in Paris, and then across France, ushered
in the National Assembly in in the metropole in the summer of 1789. Elected
assemblies in the three provinces of Saint-Domingue – North, West, and South (in
French Nord, Ouest, and Sud, respectively) – soon followed. Planters and other
colonial elites had no voice when the States-General had first gathered in 1788, but
instead wielded backroom financial power to broker representation. In colonial
assemblies their representation was open and dominant – at first. Their power
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was mediated by merchants or professionals who could be elected as well.
Traditional local military power devolved to local elected control, and the militias
shifted into “national guards” with heavy influence from the grand blancs (that is,
“big whites,” the wealthiest and most powerful segments of white French colonial
society). By 1790 the governor – then Peinier, and Blanchelande later that year –
held fragile authority over a decentralization moving beyond imperial control.
In April 1790 a “Colonial Assembly” began meeting in Saint-Marc, where
it proclaimed its sovereign power and wrote a constitution that curtailed French
oversight.

Some of its most belligerent representatives even promoted

independence. These radicals, known as either “patriots” or pompons rouges,
pushed the governor into an uneasy alliance with the assembly of North, which
was still dominated by conservative planter interests. Within the city of CapFrançais more moderate political forces held power through 1791, while in Portau-Prince petit blancs (“little whites” or middling, working people of French
descent) echoed demands of the metropolitan masses, which drove them toward
a collision with the governor, the most disruptive of which occurred in March
1791. Politics among free people – the extreme minority on the island, whether
white or mulatto – began to divide these racial lines, and among the whites even
along lines of class, region, and ideology. Debates raged about colonial autonomy
and who could or could not vote and hold office. Discussion on the future of
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slavery did not exist in the colony, though, and gens de couleur use of the tricolore
(the blue, white, and red of the French Republic) cockade and revolutionary
discourses made colonial whites quite uncomfortable. White politicians in SaintDomingue and France demonstrated their selectivity with rights discourses and
clarified who they excluded – people of African descent.
Some gens de couleur who asserted their citizenship as free people and
property owners were murdered in the colony. The assembly of West forced
powerful people of color to give an oath of obedience. Although a gens de couleur
militia supported the governor in eventually quelling the Colonial Assembly in
July and August 1790, they gained no favors. For the time being the National
Assembly in Paris kept quiet on colonial racial questions.17 By August 1790 interior
parishes near the Dominican border – Dondon, Ouanaminthe, Fort-Dauphin, and
others closer to Cap-Fran – began to write letters with concern for the deteriorating
situation over the rights of people of color.18 For many Spanish and Dominican
observers the chaos unleashed in France and Saint-Domingue was abrupt,
politically dramatic, and culturally repugnant. It became a new impetus from
which to define themselves, reaffirm Spanish and Dominican differences, and
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ponder strategic possibilities as the wealthiest and likely tensest colony in the
Americas slid into disarray.

OGÉ & CHAVANNE
When Vincent Ogé returned to Saint-Domingue from Paris in October
1790 this pro-slavery, pro-colonial, and affluent merchant and planter brought
with him some of the most intense ideals of the French Revolution. He intended
to practice them, but it is uncertain that he desired to start a revolution in the
colony. Ogé had arrived in the French capital at the beginning of 1789, the year in
which he turned thirty-two, and was thus present for the break toward full-scale
political transformation.

Though his motivations appear to have been quite

complicated, he was clearly perturbed by the racial subordination of free people
of color in Saint-Domingue, which had only worsened from the 1770s onward with
the reclassification of free-born mulattoes as affranchis – a term for freed slaves that
marginalized their fiercely-guarded freeborn status – and other significations of
their second-class status. He and his peers could not vote nor hold office, and
while in Paris he politicked to moderate revolutionary influence from being
launched upon Saint-Domingue. Ogé certainly sought equal political rights of
citizenship that white elites in the colony, or even less-wealthy whites, enjoyed by
default.

He, along with many other gens de couleur in Saint-Domingue and
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metropolitan circles, embraced the fervor of rights and representation, liberté and
egalité – though not for the thousands of slaves their class collectively held. In
many ways, their financial privilege and indebtedness to much of the imperial
status quo made this cadre unlikely agents of change.19
When he returned to his family’s lands around Dondon near the
Dominican border, a critical strategic position in the mountains just south of CapFrançais, he rejoined colleague Jean-Baptiste Chavanne. Unlike Ogé, Chavanne
had actual military experience, having served with French imperial forces in
Savannah, Georgia during the War for Independence in the United States. Also,
unlike Ogé, his resources were few. However, he was an ambitious free man of
color who also came from a coffee-planting family, and had participated in illicit
conventions of gens de couleur in North around the town of Grand-Rivière in the
spring of 1790. This was one of many shadow conventions by gens de couleur across
the colony who wanted to send their own delegates to colonial and French
assemblies when whites barred them from participation in their parish-level
nomination conventions. After colonial authorities persecuted these groups he
chose, quite interestingly, to flee into self-imposed exile in Spanish Santo Domingo
before returning later that year. Both men would flee to Santo Domingo on 6
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November 1790 after their armed protest, or rebellion, failed and was crushed by
French military forces, causing their supporters to flee eastward as well. 20
Ogé and Chavanne had written provocative letters to colonial officials that
demanded their citizenship and political rights. They had amassed a force of 300
or more, mostly gens de couleur, to back up their militant claims. Ogé definitively
declined Chavanne’s pleas to arm local slaves for their cause, likely to delineate
his measured intentions. Later gens de couleur activists were not so mindful of
maintaining the socio-political status quo, particularly after the massive slave
insurrections in North in 1791, and did arm some slaves. 21

Perhaps more

importantly, this debate over the inclusion of slaves in free peoples’ own intrigues
stunted the comprehension of slaves’ own politics and motivations when the fullfledged slave rebellions erupted.
The arrival of free colored activists at the Dominican border thrust the
disintegration of Dominguois society into Spain’s purview. For Santo Domingo, a
colony with a higher portion of free colored residents, the stridence and violence
shocked officials and elites who wanted to quarantine the colony from similar
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unrest. They subsequently handled the flow of politically-minded French subjects
and citizens with much greater delicacy and deliberation than in years past.
Before, maroons like those at Maniel and Naranjo, and dissidents like Chavanne,
could find safe haven in Santo Domingo where Spanish officials were often willing
to tradeoff their provocative presence and example for locals to inflict political or
economic injury upon their French rivals.22
Ogé and Chavanne spent roughly as much time in Spanish custody as
with the French. In fact, they begged and pleaded in the right language to give
Spanish officials pause about their extradition, which France demanded. Finally,
after Spain interrogated the prisoners, and engaged in extensive internal debate
about the expediency of extradition, Ogé and Chavanne, and their associates were
given handed over to French officials in Saint-Domingue on 29 December 1790.
The French expressed their extreme gratitude for this decision, and encouraged
French officials that their Spanish counterparts would cooperate in their attempts
to suppress radicalism or threats to their racial hierarchy. 23

While Ogé and

Chavanne were extradited, it was not without dissent from some Spanish officials
who wanted to either wait for royal orders on how to proceed, or debilitate French
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rule by allowing these dissidents safe haven.24 By April 1791 the Spanish crown
had been notified of the occurrences of the revolt and the arrest of Ogé and
conspirators at Hincha.25 Ogé and Chavanne had both requested to be vassals of
King Carlos IV, and pleaded using all the right language and appeals to religion
and mercy. Yet Spain declined, despite the fact that soon enough they would
entertain the professions of loyalty of thousands of slave rebels who were clearly
more seditious in material and symbolism.
In July 1791 the king’s ministers in Madrid reviewed the events and
reactions of officials in Santo Domingo. They had received nine groups of letters
and testimonies on Ogé, a mulatto or sangmelé, as they borrowed from French, of
“daring thoughts” who wanted to amend the old French colonial system and to
open the assemblies to people of not exclusively European descent. They reviewed
the details of Ogé’s stay in Paris, visits to London and the United States, his return
to Saint-Domingue, and his refuge in Santo Domingo. In particular, Spanish
officials focused on Ogé’s depiction of the way that his class had once even been
treated like whites and criticism of whites for eroding their old privileges. That
this privilege had once been the case, and that Ogé and others were ostentatious
enough to demand this treatment, riled metropolitan Spanish officials, especially
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their request that they wanted to be treated like “men, citizens, and French.” The
penalties imposed on mixed people who violated these new rules, abuse from
whites, and political exclusion further antagonized wealthy gens de couleur. They
were appalled at their militancy to recover status, and the “seditious” letters they
wrote to then-Governor Peinier. In particular, they lodged strident demands for
implementation of their rights as described in the decrees issued on 8 and 28
March 1790, and other writings with mulattoes in Mirebalais and Port-au-Prince.
Mulattoes in Mirebalais and Port-au-Prince wanted to see the documents of their
rights that he claimed to bring from the National Assembly, and Peinier was
furious that he had returned without permission and with intent to dissent. The
Spanish officials observed that in this moment Ogé decided to live by the fiery
words on the portraits he carried with him, Vivit, et Ardet (roughly “he lives, and
he burns” in Latin). He tried to rally the mulattoes of Mirebalais and Port-auPrince, and told them he was one of six deputies of the National Assembly under
the title of Colonos Americanos. As if these details were not disturbing enough for
the royal officials, the fact that Ogé and Chavanne fled to Spanish Santo Domingo
set the problem squarely within their own jurisdiction.26
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Figure 2.1: Proximity of Dominican (square) and Dominguois (circle) towns.
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The royal officials did not mind the extradition process that colonial
officials used in observing their reciprocity treaties with the French, which the
twenty-six prisoners were sent by ship into French custody in the last few days of
1790. At the moment local and imperial bureaucratic levels were equally paranoid
about inciting French aggression, involvement in French civil strife, or favoring a
particular political side give the uncertainty of who would emerge with power,
both in Saint-Domingue and Paris. However, the captured mulattoes told them
that the whites were divided on whether or not to invite British rule, but Ogé,
Chavanne, and the twenty-odd other prisoners of course expressed their
preference for the Catholic Majesty, which, considering their predicament, was an
excellent choice of words.

Of course metropolitan officials doubted their

statements of submission and loyalty to Spain. They agreed that Spain could not
harbor such people, and could not threaten their tenuous peace with. They
concluded that Ogé should have submitted his protests in Paris and not with guns
in the volatile colony. The officials said that asylum would have been difficult to
issue anyway given their violent actions. This entire situation provided further
proof of “a true anarchy” engulfing Saint-Domingue, which apparently now
included debates over possible independence or British rule. Spanish colonial
authorities were also quite concerned about setting a precedent for welcoming
disaffected mulattoes into the refuge of Santo Domingo during what seemed then
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like an unfolding revolution. They ultimately commended officials in Santo
Domingo for keeping “sparks of that volcano” at bay with their wise conduct,
while keeping peace with the French and even British as best as possible. 27 The
buffer that they managed was not simply the fractious border, or diplomatic peace,
but the firewall against the conflagration of the entire Caribbean.
News arrived in Santo Domingo that just before Ogé was executed in
February 1791 a group of armed mulatto sympathizers had attempted to take the
guards by surprise to free him and others.

The plot failed, the guard was

enhanced, and the prisoners were soon executed anyway.28 Saint-Domingue
watched the result of the failed Ogé protest, as Ogé and his remaining accomplices
suffered gruesome, exemplary public executions.29 Spanish officials immediately
understood that the looming clouds to their west, and across the Atlantic in France,
portended a storm that would test the exclusionary racial hierarchies.

WATCHING & WORRYING
Dominicans and Spaniards collected information from docking ships that
regularly delivered rumors and newspapers regarding Saint-Domingue. Reports
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trickled in from Paris, but flooded in from Saint-Domingue. José Antonio Urízar
summarized the Audiencia’s caution, saying, “I am persuaded that the confused
and bellicose state that the French part has had until now…will be more favorable.
Our government, although exposed to and even fighting the sparks from that
volcano fire, has managed itself with dignity and respect, and without lacking
essential principles has conserved the best harmony with the French…” With the
collegial exchange of Ogé and Chavanne, and the temporarily diminished dissent
by gens de couleur in Saint-Domingue, perhaps it seemed the French had stabilized.
Urízar complimented the diligence and restraint that García had used in handling
the situation. He also thought that a renewed favorable demeanor from the French
was partly due to Dominicans who travelled to Saint-Domingue with positive
stories and attitudes about Spanish governance. Furthermore, a looming rumor of
warfare with the British, who could lure in discontented subjects and put Spain
“between two fires” could greatly challenge their small forces.

Therefore,

implicitly, it was better to present a friendly front to their Bourbon colleagues.30
Sooner or later Spain would actually have to take a side in the proceeding
storm of Atlantic warfare.

The press in Saint-Domingue conveyed the

governmental turmoil that enveloped Paris in November 1790 in parallel with the
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Ogé and Chavanne unrest. Paris had been on edge over the dismissal of ministers,
openly pondered the risk of war, and speculated on the risk of losing Spanish or
French colonies to independence with British support. Imperial dividing lines
were being drawn, as reports from London indicated that Earl Stanhope, had
railed against the, “odious…mercurial writing on France,” and accused the
English revolutionary societies of being closely linked to French Jacobinism, which
aggravated concerns over growing British hostility generally. As if the new French
National Assembly did not have enough pressure, prominent merchants and
officials of Bordeaux, a city intimately tied to Saint-Domingue, asserted
“incontestable rights” to their properties and their considerable sums invested in
the colony – implicitly including human capital, should the revolutionaries veer
toward truer definitions of equality.31 This geopolitical posturing portended the
eventual strategic British hostilities on Hispaniola that aimed first at seizing SaintDomingue, and second at adding Santo Domingo, amidst the destabilization of
both colonies.
The press in Saint-Domingue also praised the journey of “good citizens”
from North to Paris to explain their positions.

Only a year before similar

representatives from Saint-Domingue had been Ogé and his colleagues requesting
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representation and rights. Now more threatening possibilities to French profits –
independence and emancipation in Saint-Domingue – had drawn the ire of elites
on both sides of the Atlantic, in Cap-Français and Bordeaux alike. These particular
visitors – “patriots” – defended their cause in Saint-Domingue, and reiterated their
ties to the mother country in spite of wanting their local demands taken seriously. 32
In January 1790 in Port-au-Prince Governor Blanchelande awaited the
arrival of one Colonel Mauduit who had just left a garrison of 200 to keep the peace
in Les Cayes so that he could escort the governor to Cap-Français. Blanchelande
fretted over the spreading disorders and subversions by some citizens in PetitGoâve, where he asked citizens to assist in resisting the secret landing of some
eighty men by a Monsieur Montaut 3 miles from the city. Blanchelande sent a
preemptive proclamation there and to the North regional assembly to buttress his
authority. The proclamation called for patriotism and commitment to public
affairs. Given the difficult circumstances he even selected a delegation to visit
Santo Domingo to engage with Spanish officials. He hoped for “civic virtue” and
cooperation from Dominicans and “Don Joachim de Guarcia” who Monsieur
Negrier praised for helping the French mission. Negrier had witnessed García’s
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merit during his time on the island, and while the delivery of Ogé was primarily
due to Aranjuez and treaties, but García fulfilled his duty anyway.33
As reports of social turmoil emanated from Saint-Domingue, French
revolutionary discourses circulated among white leaders in Saint-Domingue, who
even flirted with declaring independence, and the absence of governmental rights
for free people of color incited subversion against the colonial assembly.34 The
Consejo de Indias deliberated over warnings of impending “false liberty” that had
consternated Archbishop Portillo.35 They asserted that, “The French had made
anarchy, they had beheaded their government at our borders... Resulting in total
division and heading for ruin, mainly in Guarico [Saint-Domingue], where there
is a difference between whites, blacks, mulattoes, slaves, and freed.” They also
warned against neighboring leaders who exacerbated social tensions and fostered
suspicion among racial groups, particularly the mulatto Vincent Ogé.36 However,
rumors suggested that some had sought refuge among maroons, including those
at Maniel. As aforementioned, Ogé was arrested north of Baoruco and later
executed in Saint-Domingue, but it is possible that some of his supporters may
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have trekked further southward and hidden at Maniel.37 Officials, fearing that
maroons would be radicalized by widespread discussions of racial equality,
urgently reprioritized their attempts to acculturate the maroons. The church was
the Spanish cultural antiseptic to disinfect the Dominican body politic of the social
maladies afflicting Saint-Domingue, and particularly against the possibility of
rights discourses radicalizing newfound collaborators into revolutionaries.

FRACTURED WHITE POWER, SUMMER 1791
Brazen violence in Saint-Domingue and the fissures within white power
continued to shock observers in Santo Domingo. In March 1791 news arrived
through Neiba of the execution of Ogé, forwarded by a resident of Port-au-Prince.
On 25 February the same ship arrived in Port-au-Prince that had taken “the
haughty Mr. Caradu (sic)” to France when, to protect the power of the colonial
assembly, Caradeux had been attacked in 1790 in Saint-Marc by Mr. Mauduit.
Once in sight, French officials and residents noticed that, in fact, there were two
ships sailing together flying a white flag decked with purple and black stripes in
the top-left corner. Mauduit had supposedly received new instructions from the
king, and Caradeux wielded 3,000 armed men who were to be boarded in locals’
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houses. Caradeux then published a paper calling for a general political assembly
in the church.

At that hour Caradeux arrived with his men, and Mauduit

confronted him with his own contingent. That day, 4 March 1791, Mauduit wore
a white cockade, to which Caradeux took exception and told Mauduit that he had
to remove it before he could be admitted to the Assembly. Mauduit informed him
that he had, “sworn to that emblem, and it could not be removed.” 38
The troops of Normandy and Artois that had just arrived and joined
Caradeux’s militia which had been insubordinate on the whole Atlantic voyage
and were uninterested in supporting the ancien regime on the island. False decrees
about the political situation circulated, and the troops were at a state of near
mutiny when they refused Blanchelande’s attempts to send them northward in the
colony. The gens de couleur took advantage of this moment of governmental
dysfunction to help free Rigaud, who they saw as an unjustly-confined political
prisoner, from jail. These soldiers were welcomed by local petit blancs, and in turn
the soldiers supported their popular assemblies and demanded the return of their
flags that French royalist troops under Mauduit had taken at the same time as
Caradeux’s arrest the previous August.
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Mauduit and Caradeux was to return these banners, but Mauduit would not
submit to removing his royalist insignia, nor to kneeling and apologizing. 39
Caradeux then reprimanded him a second time. Mauduit answered that,
“nobody would take it off the cockade without his head,” and without a reply an
officer, “removed both with a strike of a sword.” It fell to the ground alongside
his body. Caradeux rallied men loyal to him to take arms in that plaza and
deferred the political assembly to the next day. They dragged Mauduit’s body
through the streets, following his head atop a pike. The rumor was that Caradeux
brought with him orders from the colonial committee, that had conferred with the
National Assembly and had royal approval, and that 12,000 troops were destined
to regarrison the colony. Another rumor was that he had orders for the execution
he committed, and the same for two or three other residents.

The rather

impromptu manner of Mauduit’s death might suggest otherwise. In any case,
Caradeux sent letters to all the towns across the West, claiming command, freeing
prisoners, and reforming the troops all the while Blanchelande fled to Las Cahobas
to avoid a similar fate as Mauduit.40
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The political assassination of Mauduit and flight of Blanchelande were
momentous events for Saint-Domingue, both politically and racially, despite being
overshadowed in historical memory by the Ogé revolt before and the monumental
slave revolt of 1791 in the Plaine-du-Nord afterward. Early protests by the gens de
couleur and later insurgency by the black masses bookended these events of largely
white-on-white violence and radicalism.

Racially, it was not a strike at the

hierarchy, but an irreparable crack in the façade of white power on the island.
Politically, it signified a shift from royalist control to rapid republican ascendance.
Geographically, it was a shocking shift within Port-au-Prince and the Cul-de-Sac
region, not in North. Ogé had quickly been crushed, and while it was a dramatic
threat and set a precedent of dissent for other gens de couleur, for Dominicans and
Spanish officials the chaos of white power in Saint-Domingue was far more
ominous. Future major upheavals from below would likely have a less improbable
path toward social revolution without a unified response of white supremacy to
immediately crush dissent.
For Spanish officials who observed these events, it was closer in proximity
to Santo Domingo, and it was appalling to see someone of their own ruling class –
both Blanchelande and Mauduit – so treated. Mauduit had been a royalist check
on the island, and actively shut down prominent and dissenting radical
republican, gens de couleur, and independence assemblies in the colony, and was
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certainly a well-known figure on the island. He was involved in a public dispute
with the commander general of the colony over his handling of the closure of the
popular assembly at Saint-Marc, which involved expelling citoyens from the
church their meetings occupied, an event that on the whole ended with loss of life
and damage to property.41 Like Chavanne and many later powerplayers in the
Haitian Revolution Mauduit had served with distinction in the United States’ War
for Independence, and was an influential adviser to both Governors Peinier and
Blanchelande. Mauduit had arrested Caradeux in August 1790 for his role in
undercutting the governor in the General Assembly, put down a suspected revolt
by André Rigaud in South, and was generally known for his intolerance and
severity.42 With his death, and Blanchelande’s confinement in Santo Domingo and
later in Cap-Français, the General Assembly and assembly at Saint-Marc had
gained popular power among the whites in the Cul-de-Sac. It signified a more
substantial political and social shift than the failed Ogé revolt.
Arata recounted the disorders in Saint-Domingue that he had learned
from Port-au-Prince and his new guests Governor Blanchelande, his son, nephew,
and ten others who had fled to his protection in Spanish lands. After they had cut
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off Mauduit’s head and put it on a pike they marched to the church with great
music and clamor and obligated the priest to sing a Te Deum of thanks which, he
said, “profaned the Catholic religion and offended our creator.” The troops that
had arrived in Port-au-Prince numbered 1,600 men. However, ship crews from
various vessels had joined them along with the local militia, which then amounted
to 5,000 men, along with other ‘vagabonds’ around the port. “You can consider
the colony lost,” he said, because these troops and locals had elevated Caradeux
to provisional power. The situation was so pathetic that Governor Blanchelande
and his son had no clothes, and Arata had none to give, so he instead helped them
wash theirs.43 Other news arrived regarding Port-au-Prince, indicating that indeed
Caradeux had taken power in the assembly. Spanish officials were sure that the
dissidents would try to gain independence soon and perhaps try to expand the
colony by taking Spanish lands. Either through this scenario or a multiplicity of
others, they were more certain that the conflict would spread to Dominican side.44
García and Spanish officials began to decipher the falsehoods Mr.
Caradeux had spread regarding the orders he claimed to have from the National
Assembly to take command of the colony. They were equally perplexed by his use
of the white flag with purple and black stripes while the whole nation used the
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vertical bands of the blue, white, and red tricolore. It made them quite paranoid at
the possibility that these “patriots” would soon declare independence from
France. The legitimacy of Caradeux’s power was entirely in question, and SaintDomingue’s descent into anarchy was gaining speed.45
By June 1791 there at least seemed to be greater tranquility on the French
side though discord still remained in the North and West. Spanish officials were
very interested to see what would happen when the new commissioners sent by
the French National Assembly arrived, and particularly regarding the contentious
colonial constitution. Those were the biggest and most fraught questions of the
vibrant assemblies of Saint-Marc and Cap-Français, and even in smaller towns.
The regiment of Port-au-Prince, after the horrific murder of their leader Colonel
Mauduit, had embarked for France.

García opined that the press in Saint-

Domingue was far too open. Every day there were prejudicial and incendiary
papers circulating in the public arena inciting dissent in Saint-Domingue and fear
in Santo Domingo. One could not read them and not be appalled by the writing
that paraded as truth, he said, which included the most “diabolical and insulting
species” that “conspires against the powers and their wise dispositions.” They
aspired to a mass movement, and published their ideas under banners of
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eloquence and labels of “Glory” and “French Liberty.” These papers were arriving
on the Dominican side frequently, but he said that Spanish subjects continued to
manifest their loyalty anyway.46
At least García gained reinforcements that month from the Cantabria
regiment, which had arrived in Santo Domingo without specific instructions from
metropolitan officials. Compared to the past months the frontier was quieter for
the time being, and the island seemed more moderate although Santo Domingo
was suffering from lack of funds which it awaited from the Viceroy of Mexico. 47
That same day, García asked specifically for financial support from Mexico for that
regiment.48 This began a cycle of heavy dependence upon neighboring, wealthier
Spanish colonies for military expenditures in Santo Domingo, costs that would
soon become exorbitant, highly unpleasant deficits that further fragmented
support for an unpopular conflict.
In July 1791 conflict erupted anew in Saint-Domingue. Their French
neighbors were consternated because of a decree from the National Assembly sent
15 May of that year which declared that all mulattoes of free fathers were full,
active citizens and admissible to the voting assemblies. Spanish officials expected
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a civil war over this matter, and were again scandalized by the brazen contempt
for religious authorities displayed by their neighbors.49

García and Spanish

officials continued to watch Saint-Domingue with alarm following the arrival of
news from the National Assembly. Reports passed across the frontier regarding
the “major consternation” that arose on 10 July. All districts of Saint-Domingue
joined together “to treat this grave matter” and “made many debates, and criminal
views” and some “went voting with many noisy voices.” One opponent stridently
suggested that, “that all neighbors and planters would take arms to end the people
of color.” In response after leaving the assembly, “many individuals put on the
black cockade and…hanged in effigy the Bishop of Blois, previously the Abbé
Grégoire, who they supposed to be the author of this decree.” They resolved to
send representatives to the National Assembly to ask them for this law to not take
effect, since they were concerned that when the naval ships arrived with
commissioners and troops that they would force this law into practice.

He

mentioned two armed factions in Saint-Marc. García predicted that the whites
would not settle upon indifference, but this ruling from the National Assembly
would “ignite a war among the troops who they awaited, the white locals, and the
free people of color.”50
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Early in the next momentous month, August 1791, García was disturbed
by intelligence that he had received from the frontier regarding a British ship had
appeared at Cap-Français. It had been sent from Jamaica with an offer of eighteen
naval warships and troops to augment the French parties who opposed the decree
of 15 May from the National Assembly for the rights of gens de couleur. The
message bearer, who García thought was the captain, had jumped to land and
rushed to the Provincial Assembly. However, the white leaders declined his offers
because they still believe that the decree would not be placed into full effect. The
rumor still circulated about the British military being poised in Jamaica for
deployment in Saint-Domingue.51 Soon enough, a new rumor circulated on the
island that just off the coast of Saint-Domingue was a British fleet of twenty-five
vessels that were already prepared to intervene. On 14 August a large citizens’
assembly met to debate whether or not to admit this fleet.52 Spanish officials were
highly aware of the very proactive stance the British had taken from Jamaica to
exploit weaknesses in Saint-Domingue to their own strategic economic and
political advantage.
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The deputies from the Saint-Marc assembly returned with three
commissioners for the colonial government, and it was assumed that these
commissioners would publish the decree. García thought that the grands blancs of
the North and West would fiercely resist equality with the mulattoes. Indeed,
many French colonists were “resolved to sacrifice their lives and haciendas before
admitting the decree of equality.” However, García had collected enough
intelligence that indicated to him that the decree would not go into effect – at least
not yet. As if the changing of the political guard next door was not enough,
newspapers from Saint-Domingue also told of the flight of the King of France from
the court in Paris disguised as a butler, and his detention in Varennes because he
had been recognized by a postmaster. The farcical chaos of French affairs baffled
Spanish authorities who might have otherwise laughed had the consequences not
been so terribly dire.53
As if the National Assembly had not unsettled Saint-Domingue’s slave
regime enough already, later in August 1791 news from the border town San
Rafael informed García of a new French decree that stipulated that any slave who
presented twenty-five pesos to their master would be freed, and that any others
who served for five years would also be free. This was the implementation of a
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clear coartación-like policy where previously there had been none, and the prospect
of legally limiting the length of what had always been a permanent condition,
confirmed to Spanish observers that the rival colony and profits that they had once
hoped to emulate would soon no longer exist.54 By the time García wrote this
report this path was more certain than he could have yet known. The massive
slave revolt in Saint-Domingue’s Plaine-du-Nord was less than three days old, and
would expand exponentially.

SLAVES REVOLT, AUGUST 1791
As political tumults afflicted every corner of the colony and French power
fractured, slaves led by Dutty Boukman, who toiled at some of the most profitable
sugar plantations in the world in Saint-Domingue’s Plaine-du-Nord, revolted and
began murdering their managers on 22 August 1791.

This event had been

coordinated and planned by many slave conspirators across these wealthy
plantations, with one such meeting in the days preceding the revolt featuring a
binding vodou ceremony and sacrifice of a pig. Participants in this meeting took
an oath of retribution against whites and redemption for themselves, possibly of
the Petro tradition with specific ties to Aja-Fon blood oaths that influenced the Rada
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tradition. This event, called Bois-Caïman for the “alligator wood” in which it was
reputedly held, has served as the origin story for the Haitian Revolution. Even in
the time of contemporaries who participated in this ceremony, whatever it actually
entailed, the connotation of the event was depicted as anti-Christian, anti-white,
and diabolical, particularly by French whites who disseminated stories on the
buildup to open revolt.55 As news reports flooded into Santo Domingo, Spanish
subjects looked westward with initial concerns of self-preservation. Gradually
their gaze revealed avenues of opportunity, but also showed the inevitability of
Spanish and Dominican involvement in the revolution. Nearly every vying party
in Saint-Domingue sought trade, refuge, or military and political support from
specific potential partners on the Dominican side. The deep pre-revolutionary ties
prefigured this unavoidable connectivity.
Less than 48 hours after the revolts began in the Plaine-du-North, Spanish
border officials began sending detailed intelligence from Dajabon to Governor
Joaquín García regarding a large revolt of blacks – and reportedly mulattoes – that
had occurred near Cap-Français.56 García collected intelligence reports on the
revolt, which explained that without warning the uprising began the night of the
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22nd and morning of the 23rd by the slaves on wealthy and highly reputable
plantations around Petit-Anse, Limbé, Plaine-du-North, and elsewhere.

For

example, in Petit-Anse the well-known plantation of Sanite had been burned to the
ground. The rebels set vicious fires on homes and plantations with “depraved
intention” against the whites, who were laid waste if found. The residents of
Ouanaminthe – a river-crossing town almost forty miles east of the revolts just on
the Saint-Domingue side of the border just across the river from Dajabon – fled
into Santo Domingo in droves, especially women and children frightened by the
rapidly spreading fires and black insurrections.57
Officer Francisco Pepin told García that around Fort Dauphin, an
important port over thirty miles east of the initial slave revolts and close to the
border, they had observed a great deal of militant activity at night. In the weeks
following the revolts the Assembly of Saint-Domingue also formally requested
Spanish assistance, because, “North is a mountain of ashes,” and they said 100,000
rebel slaves had burned 100 sugar ingenios and killed 100 owners, along with
numerous coffee plantations.58 Spanish officials hesitated in addressing these
requests, and their wait-and-see approach became default policy. The French had
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requested this support under Article 9 of their extant peace and aid accords with
Spain. While Spain pondered their options, the French had rallied some 300
veterans and 3,000 militiamen as an impromptu defense force. 59 Among the
admittedly confusing news that Pepin sent was a rumor that about “130 men from
Europe” had “put the blacks in movement,” another whisper of white radical
machinations that denied slaves’ own cultural politics in forming the uprising.60
These supposed 130 white subversives had diffused throughout the colony telling
the blacks that the National Assembly had made them free.

Some French

observers also wondered what influence the 15 May decree of citizenship for
mulattoes had on these events.

Whether intentional or not, these reports

obfuscated the roots of the revolt as having been from slaves’ ingenuity against
slavery’s brutalities, all the while the raging fires persisted and spread eastward
toward Fort Dauphin and the Dominican border.61
Reports and pleas also arrived from French officials. Just after the revolt
began Governor Blanchelande informed the nearest Spanish outpost, which
happened to be at Dajabon, that in North a massive rebellion of blacks had
erupted, which destroyed all whites in its path, burned the cane fields, and leveled
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their buildings. French troops had been completely unsuccessful at suppressing
it or its growth. Blanchelande begged for support to secure the border region, and
to send Spanish troops to unite with the French forces due to their alliance, treaties,
and national friendship.62

Blanchelande also begged Francisco Nuñez,

commander at San Rafael, a town further southwest along the border, for military
assistance. Whites, he said, were being massacred in droves.63 On 26 August the
Marquis de Rouvray, a staunch royalist, was named to command the eastern areas
of the province and sought Spanish support, yet Spanish officials still
equivocated.64 They voiced their concern, but refused to act, and were willing to
preserve their own forces should the revolt spread to the border while watching
the opulent French planter class be humbled.
Information and implorations also crossed the border directly from
French planters, including Monsieurs Maire and Coussac at Dondon near the
border, who reported widespread revolts, murders, and fires already in that area.
Their reports alleged, likely erroneously, that some mulattoes were stoking this
insurrectionary conflagration. This had the same negating undertone toward
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slaves’ grievances as the rumors of seditious white influence on the revolts.65
Other informants said that Limbé had been torched, which it had, and that beyond
an isolated slave revolt a general revolution had arisen, a realization that French
whites formed within days of the initial uprising. While the rebels obliterated
anything European and killed all owners, they actually spared most priests and
women, who they used for spiritual and carnal satisfaction, respectively. Some
insurgents were armed with guns, but the vast majority had swords or other
makeshift weapons.66
Into early September information also crossed the border with the stream
of refugees, such as Monsieur Coustard. He told of the new disorders in the Culde-Sac region, well over 100 miles from the slave revolts in North. Coustard
explained that the free people of color at Port-au-Prince and around the whole Culde-Sac and adjacent areas raged against the Provincial Assembly, and that when
they had taken up arms many black slaves had been enlisted into their cause. The
residents of the Cul-de-Sac having felt the necessity of ceasing this disorder and
with the fear of a general insurrection among the slaves had made proposals of
peace to the people of color. However, some in Port-au-Prince demurred, and did
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not want to hear from envoys sent by the parish of Croix-des-Bouquets. The
people of color encamped at Carbonera and had fought with some white soldiers
in the area in which some whites were lost, injured, and captured. A detachment
of national guardsmen from Port-au-Prince confronted them a second time a few
days later at a plantation outside of Port-au-Prince. At that time the armed gens de
couleur killed 48 troops, captured the commander, and seized two prized pieces of
artillery. Officials in Port-au-Prince accused many residents of the Cul-de-Sac of
aiding the mulattoes, and put a price on some of their heads, including Coustard.67
At least in this case, unlike in North, the slaves around Cul-de-Sac were more
involved with mulatto and white revolutionaries, though their threat of choosing
general insurrection remained very real, especially now that some were armed.
Maríano Caro first hosted Coustard in Santo Domingo, after which he
moved into the home of Gregorio Recio, whom he had known long ago because
this Spanish subject had married a “natural daughter” of one of his uncles, who
was likely a Dominguois mulata. These networks of kinship, friendship, and
commerce linked the colonies, and in this moment panicked Dominicans on the
personal and familial level as much as governmental or military concerns,
especially since the revolt could have spread into Dominican territory. While in
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exile, Coustard continued to receive news from the Cul-de-Sac daily, often within
hours of an event and which he then passed on to the Spanish. The latest news
had suggested a new lull and possible peace between Port-au-Prince and the
mulattoes of the Cul-de-Sac. On this Coustard opined that, “if not, one of the
richest parts of the colony will inevitably run to its total ruin.” Also, the growing
sentiment in Saint-Domingue stood against any counterrevolution, both on the
island and in Europe. In Europe movements were afoot to reestablish the King of
France to his throne, and rumors were that an army of 180,000 composed of
Prussians, Russians, and Swedes would be moving against France after harvest
time. Coustard, like many others, was astounded at how this powerful political
philosophy had grown over five decades, and remarked “Blessed are the people
who have judiciously conserved the principles of their parents, their customs, and
their religion.”68 With this onslaught of information Spanish officials initially
perceived the uprisings in Saint-Domingue to by based in both North and West,
with similar causes rooted in the years of building dissent and triggered by French
revolutionary upheavals. They did not yet, and perhaps could not, distinguish the
slave revolts that rocked North as being fundamentally distinct and more
profound phenomena than the preceding events.

68

Monsieur Coustard, 8 September 1791, AGI-SD, leg. 1029, no.5.

143

In the last week of August, the French commander Rouvray begged for
Spanish assistance, He said that, “Already the bandits with torch in hand have
passed to Grande-Rivière, devastated all the territory from Placensia to the forum
of Limonade.” The rapid spread of the revolt was clear, and he warned that if the
fires and uprisings spread to Ouanaminthe then soon similar “disgraces” would
befall the Spanish side of the island. He concluded by pleading, “In the name of
our common interest, in the name of humanity, in the name of the House of
Bourbon, we require your assistance,” and tried to curry sympathy by explaining
the despair of French women and children.69
The desperation in Rouvray’s letters increased. He wrote to Herédia to
again beg for assistance, and he began to comprehend and explain the worldchanging scope of the events, saying, “Likewise I warn you that in two years’ time
Spain will have no more colonies – this is a disorder of the globe.” Rouvray
prompted Herédia by stating that, “You and I, sir, are under the eyes of Europe.”70
This reference to their metropolitan roots carried more than a passing plea for
white solidarity. Their home continent would judge those Spaniards who were
unwilling to suppress the greatest threat to European empires in the Caribbean –
black solidarity and insurrection. Rouvray continued to beg for Spanish material
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support, but also pleaded for Spanish protection of his own wife and children. He
claimed total destruction was possible, and that many whites including himself
had even considered taking slaves, leaving property behind, and moving to
Havana. Even while he was trying to defeat the slave insurgents he asked for
asylum in Cuba, and explained his and others’ needs for new sugar and coffee
land and their desire to practice Catholicism.

He appealed to religious

commonalities, to the memory of King Henry IV, the Bourbon family connection,
and the recent unfortunate dethroning of King Louis XVI.71 He knew how to play
to his Spanish readership to hedge his bets in Saint-Domingue.
The inferno expanded exponentially throughout September. In one battle
French troops had arrived from near Limonade had move toward the Paruese
plantation. There they had found a great deal of purified sugar and clothing of
the whites’ in black homes, which made them suspicious. On those grounds the
commanding French officer ordered 200 blacks of both sexes massacred as an
example to any potential rebels. Such brazen violence only deepened the already
near-irreparable racial chasm. That afternoon the troops found the plantation of
Monsieur Chevalerie burned by 200 black insurgents who rode good horses and
carried some type of white banner with them. The French failed to stop these
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rebels before they escaped through the cane fields, but not before killing a soldier
from the Ouanaminthe detachment, likely someone known on the Spanish side.72
The royalist officer Marquis de Rouvray demanded that his men wear a
white royalist cockade to distinguish from the enemies, whether white radicals,
mulattos, or blacks. The white cockade, a symbol of monarchist affinity, was a
reminder of the social and political divisions still afflicting the French in their time
of trying to suppress their greatest crisis and worst fear – massive slave revolt. His
French troops had lost Monsieur Dormon, who was a distinguished resident and
son of the Count Dormon of a nearby plantation. He had tried to be a hero by
following some slave insurgents into the cane with sword in his teeth and pistols
in hand. The younger Dormon had been the courier of initial French letters to
Dajabon regarding the revolt. He had served as a deputy to the Assembly at
Léogâne only three months after coming from France, and had considered a
promising career in the church. One small detachment of blacks did surrender,
though, and asked for mercy from the French. They were disarmed and taken to
the general.73 Likely, they were then quickly executed as many prisoners of war
were. The uprising steadily spread toward the Spanish, both through territorial
and personal connections.
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On 7 September 1791 García explained to Herédia his hesitance to help the
French. García was very concerned about growing black and mulatto power and
wanted to maintain resources to prevent “infection” on the Dominican side of the
island. He was even quite concerned about letting French refugees seek refuge in
the colony given all the recent political unrest they might bring with them, though
he viewed women and children differently. He was very suspicious of men who
wanted in, and urged caution about their spreading of disorder and seditious
thoughts. The “bordering towns of Ouanaminthe and Dondon” could only send
refugees of women, children, the infirm, and the old out for humanity’s sake.
However, any French prisoners, colored or white, had to be sent back to SaintDomingue immediately. He also absolutely forbade any support and supplies
from crossing the border.74 When violence dissipated around Ouanaminthe, the
Spanish officials decided to send back some women who had been staying there
in early September.75
Throughout September 1791 correspondence from French officers and
civilians poured across the border, all of which informed of the, “latest horrors
that have fermented in the French colony,” where, “slaves, free people of color,
and even some bastard whites have put fire to the cañverales,” a continuation of the
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myth that slaves needed such guidance. Certain parties had discussed arming
their slaves, including Ogé and Chavanne, so this was not a strategic stretch. The
overarching initial assumption seemed to be that black slaves could not possibly
have planned and accomplished the level of uprising at hand, especially at the cost
of so many white lives and in defiance of the French military.76
In the early weeks of the revolt rebel groups remained extremely
fragmented, and while some operated in concert and virtually all attacked French
property, people, and power, their motivations and cohesion differed drastically
and remained local. Soon enough, particularly-talented black generals and heirs
to Boukman – such as Jean-François, Georges Biassou, and Jeannot, and eventually
Toussaint Breda – began consolidating their command of thousands of slave
insurgents into a crudely unified force.77 In any case, thereafter the demands of
the rebels became more clearly distinguishable through their collective actions,
including the political and ideological power of black ex-slaves who they had so
underestimated.
This force included the less famous officer like Paul (Pablo) Alí. He was
then just over thirty years old, likely of Islamic heritage, and had been born into
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slavery near Grande-Rivière. He may have participated in, or at least had intimate
knowledge of, the Bois-Caïman ceremony. Over the next three decades he not only
proved his talent, bravery, and intelligence time and again, but would factor as a
major figure at nearly every pivot point in Dominican cultural politics. His
influence did not surpass other in his cohort, which included Toussaint,
Dessalines, and Christophe, but he came to have a disproportionately important
role in Santo Domingo and outlasted all these peers as a public figure on the
island.78
An early sign of the devastation came with French reports that by early
September the dead and captured black insurgents already numbered up to
25,000. To the French these deaths represented millions of livres of destroyed
human capital, on top of the scorched mills and cane. This was, of course, only a
fraction of the overall number rebels ringing Cap-Français and providing the
conditions and inspiration for revolutionary hostilities elsewhere in the colony. 79
In the countryside around Rocou the French forces under Rouvray sustained a
fight against 800 rebel blacks who they defeated with the benefit of cannons and
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cavalry. Notably, after the engagement they reported that, “one of the blacks after
examined and washed was found to be white.” It is impossible to say how this
made it into Spanish intelligence, but it would seem to have been yet another
rumor fostered by the suspicion of racial egalitarianism, along with doubts about
the ability of slaves to organize themselves or wield socio-political aims.80 A free
black prisoner of status in Cap-Français said that within the territory some, “600
whites have part in the conspiracy.”81 One black captive even stated that one
Monsieur Vincent, apparently a reputable local, was even involved in the uprising.
French commanders Cambefort and Tousard did not believe him. While the
prisoner may have simply been trying to delay or distract his captors from
discovering whatever real activities in which he may have been involved, he may
have also been deliberately trying to sow seeds of paranoia among the already
fractured master class.82
In the earliest weeks of the slave insurrection the army of Boukman
pressed incessantly against the outskirts of Cap-Français. One convent near the
edge of town may have had a certain non-conformist nun of African descent
named Améthyste who would leave in the night and allegedly practice vodou away
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from the Catholic control. This convent, which had accepted women of color for
several years, may have had others vodouizan who joined Améthyste. When
Boukman, Biassou, and Jeannot approached the city it is possible that she and her
cohort aided the insurgents’ maneuvers.83
Violence accelerated directly adjacent to the Dominican border.

In

Ouanaminthe on 7 September French authorities hanged two black slaves from
the Pitober plantation and one free mulatto for alleged seditious activities. In
nearby Moka one rebel group supposedly numbered up to 15,000, and burnings
of plantations continued regularly around Fort Dauphin near the border. In CapFrançais reports suggested that residents and troops were taking up the white
cockade of royalism, not the republican tricolore. Considering the Bourbon royal
connections, the political proclivities of elites on both sides of the island, and
preexisting personal ties, it is likely that French royalists were the ones most
vociferously begging for Spanish aid were also depicting an agreeable cultural
scene to readers in Santo Domingo.84 One black prisoner said that in the doorway
of a certain home they could find a black man observing and relaying the signs of
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what was happening in the Plaine-du-Nord. When captured, the French then took
a sharp sword and decapitated him.85 Any and all people of color increasingly fell
under great suspicion.
Instances of interpersonal violence escalated in Saint-Domingue alongside
the open revolt. In Cap-Français the slave of a baker made two fresh batches of
bread. For some reason the backer became suspicious of his slave, and pulled a
pistol on him. Gun drawn, he forced the slave to eat one batch of the bread. Soon
thereafter the slaves became nauseated and fell at the baker’s feet. He had
poisoned both batches of the bread which, presumably, was to have been for sale
to white customers.86 Such intimate interpersonal violence from an urban slave
engaged in a trade, not from a sugar plantation, drove home a new paranoia in
Santo Domingo about who could be trusted to evade radicalization.
Spanish officials learned that urban slaves within the city of Cap-Français
were loaded onto ships in the harbor to preclude their participation in revolts.
Black rebels nearby had seized two artillery pieces, one of 24 caliber, and had
turned the weapons back upon on the French. The rebels were short on supplies,
and reportedly willingly “discarded” women, the old, and children as victims to
lighten their forces. In Moka the white officer Baubard had success, as he had led
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130 troops against an enormous party of rebels, killing thirty-five and taking
another forty-four prisoners. However, dulling the enthusiasm for this minor
victory was news that the commander of Grande-Rivière had been captured by the
rebels. The insurgents then cut off his head and placed it in the same spot where
Ogé’s head had been displayed, which they interpreted as an homage of sorts to
the former rebel.87
These snippets of information that funneled into Santo Domingo through
Dajabon further confirmed to Spanish observers that there was some link between
the revolutionary movements of whites and free people of color with the massive,
vicious devastating slave revolts reordering French Saint-Domingue.

The

motivations and power of the insurgent slaves were, though, extremely different
from any forerunners of dissent. Their worldview and affinities were mediated
through African culture and cosmologies more than Enlightened European rights
discourses, especially in these early years of black-led social revolution.88
French Governor Blanchelande continued begging García directly for
assistance, again appealing to Article 9 of their imperial treaties. He said that the
state of “fermentation” of the slaves in Saint-Domingue was critical.89
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Blanchelande judged that García would not act due to not wanting to involve
Santo Domingo with internal French dissensions. That was, in fact, García’s legal
strategy, as a clause in the treaty prevented meddling in issues of internal unrest.
Blanchelande tried to assuage García’s concerns, saying that because, “The white
race, the class of the people of color, and the free blacks are reunited, and none
other than the slaves are in open uprising, who kill their owners and burn their
habitations.” This desperate portrayal belied the well-known facts. This was not
like the Ogé case, Blanchelande continued, as it was not the mulattoes raising the
revolt. This was an expedient shift of blame French officials had cited mulatto
organizing for influencing the initial revolts. He pleaded for any help against the
“400-500,000 enemies within…to impede 60,000 souls from being slaughtered.”
Blanchelande warned García not to fool himself into thinking that these slaves,
once having killed the French colony, would not turn toward Spanish interests in
Santo Domingo.90 Through the end of that month García reiterated to
Blanchelande that his intelligence showed that the people of color were still in
active dissent against the assembly, and especially in the West, and he pointed out
that Port-au-Prince was in arms, including some slaves there. His intelligence
assured him that among the rebels were many people of color, with some “white
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caudillos” among them, and that he would continue to withhold Spanish troops
and supplies since this was a domestic issue.91
Rouvray increased his personal attacks on Spanish officers’ honor as they
bided their time and guarded their resources. He implored Spanish troops to rally
around their common “Roman Religion” which the Parliament of Great Britain
had already tried to supplant with Protestantism over the last century, and which
was now threatened by slaves. He said that they confronted a, “great conspiracy
that threatens the whole globe with total subversion, and that all the colonies of
the world – French, Spanish, British – all should be the first victims,” and that
Spain’s willful decision to not engage would doom them all. Returning to his
royalist rhetoric, which unknowingly contradicted Blanchelande’s own appeals,
Rouvray said that Spain should not fear the French blacks alone, but “a multitude
of whites…who deserve hanging, who the conspirators have sent for six months
to the colony for your destruction and ours. They are the ones in sum who have
put our slaves to revolt by the principle of the Declaration of the Rights of Man.”
Rouvray, like many, was still unable to distinguish the French Revolution from the
more radical political motion afoot in the minds and actions of slave insurgents.92
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In mid-September some members of the General Assembly of SaintDomingue – Paul Cadouch, the president, and Poncignon, the vice-president –
wrote to the National Assembly in Paris. At the time they claimed that 100,000
blacks had revolted in North and burned more than 200 sugar plantations,
murdered the owners, and taken women captive whose lives were now worse than
death. The blacks had already secured most of the mountains, and had burnt
many coffee plantations, too. Those whites who could escape the carnage fled
onto ships in the harbor of Cap-Français. They begged for help from France.93
While French colonists begged Dominican neighbors and the National
Assembly for aid, the Spanish found out that they had also requested British aid,
and that perhaps over one thousand troops and guns had been sent from Jamaica
to assist efforts against the insurrection. That day at Caracol, between CapFrançais and Fort Dauphin, 300 sailors disembarked and destroyed a camp of
insurgents at the Chabanon plantation near Limonade. Another detachment of
soldiers departed Cap-Français that night and dislodged the rebels at the Gallifet
plantation who had entrenched themselves there with many cannons.94 Soon
thereafter, 2,000 French troops departed from Haut du Cap and destroyed a camp
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at the Nort plantation near Fort Dauphin, killing or executing around 350 black
insurgents. After this engagement, rumor circulated that Cambefort had seen a
white man in a blue uniform at the head of the rebels.95
The legend of white radicals’ complicity continued to form Spanish
perceptions as white radicalism held Spanish blame alongside lack of French
evangelicalism and their brutality toward slaves. While overstated, and supported
by some fictitious anecdotes, white radicalism had fractured the elite whites, and
powerful gens de couleur from solidarity with propertied interests.96 The French
had failed to creolize their slaves’ cosmological vernaculars.97

The slaves

themselves cited French cruelties as compelling their actions. 98

Spanish

comprehension was distorted, but not wholly inaccurate. Their understandings of
French whites reaping what they had sowed as divine providence, their historical
disdain and envy of the French possessions to the west, and their perceptions of
which groups were most potent, all shaped Spanish dispositions.
The French had sent their own emissaries Jean-François Bertrand and
Monsieur de Borie representing Port-au-Prince and West to Santo Domingo to beg
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for supplies and ships to aid their Assembly. These emissaries had the authority
to create any type of pact relative to the much needed support under the “honor
of the French name, and under the guarantee of the French possessions in America,
and notably from the French part of West of Saint-Domingue.” They answered to
Monsieurs Desaulnoi and de Blie, both having risen in power after the
assassination of Mauduit. Mr. de Blie had expressed to García “that the General
Assembly and the Provincial Assembly of the North…have concurred to request
from foreign powers all the ships, men, arms, munitions, and provisions” to avoid
their “total destruction with the insurrection of the slaves.” One commissioner
had told García that, with the unrest, some malcontents might even declare
independence from France. Spanish officials were floored by the “confusion and
disgrace” infringing upon them from Saint-Domingue, and with apparent French
governmental paralysis and ineptitude that had continued for two years. Spanish
officials already knew that the French had also asked Jamaica and the United
States for similar support.99
The French emissaries promised their friendship and cooperation, and
tried to convince Spanish officials of peace in Saint-Domingue among the whites,
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mulattoes, and free blacks, arguing that the insurrection was only the work of
black slaves. Urízar rebuffed them outright, and lengthily noted the in-depth
Spanish understandings of their dishonest depictions. He said that in West the
free mulattoes especially were strident and organized to gain the rights they
thought were promised them, which contradicted their claims. Urízar adamantly
traced origins of the Saint-Domingue revolt to “two-hundred of the seditious of
Paris,” thus linking radicalization to metropolitan ferment in the National
Assembly. Urízar said that, “Chief of all is a habitant…called Milsant de Mogé,”
who, feeling mistreated, went to Paris with other mulattoes where they plotted
revenge, especially after the whites refused to implement the 15 May decree of
equality. Indeed, reports circulated that free mulattoes and a growing number of
blacks had threatened to attack Port-au-Prince to enforce this decree. These
mulatto activists had circulated printings of the decree and asked for priests to
sing Te Deum over its implementation.100
Nevertheless, even pro-mulatto sympathizers were weary of the possible
recourse to Ogé’s tactics if their dissent remained unaddressed. Urízar claimed
that these free colored partisans had recruited many black slaves, “seducing them
with the philanthropic doctrine, of liberty of man, assuring them that all would
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enjoy it all since slavery was contrary to the rights of man,” and “deceived these
rude and innocent wretches with such flattering hope.” Furthermore, Spanish
officials feared that “missionaries” from Paris would spread these “philanthropic
doctrines” to produce an eruption of thousands of new followers who demanded
liberty.

To Spanish officials, republican and revolutionary actions offended

religion at every possible turn.101 Thus, while white citizens of the National Guard
of Port-au-Prince under Caradeux met with the citizens of color from the army of
Croix-des-Bouquets this peace was stained by the secular meeting in a church with
a Te Deum performed in gratitude for their reunion of whites and people of color.102
Spanish officials had seen the peace terms set between whites and
mulattoes in West, and forwarded a copy of the “Concordat” to Spain, which
proposed terms for inclusion and cast aspersions on the tactics of Ogé and
Chavanne. They were dubious of its stability, as both parties were driven to an
accord due to the more threatening revolts of black slaves across the colony, and
their unity was required to spare Saint-Domingue from annihilation.103 Many
slaves that had been armed in this conflict returned to their plantations, though
many others did not and took to open revolt. Nothing about this agreement
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encouraged Spanish perception of the French demise.104 Soon enough, Spanish
officials learned through reports from the southern border town of Neiba that
officials in Port-au-Prince were restricting the movement of free mulattoes and
black slaves due to the growing rebellion in West that produced symbolic
atrocities, massacres of white, and the widespread burning of plantations. 105
By mid-September 1791 Governor García began to increase military
presence and security on the border, particularly with new reports of violence in
Ouanaminthe and the burning of plantations and cane fields nearby.

He

reasonably feared that the rebellion of slaves would simply pass into Spanish
populations, or that the rebels themselves would make incursions into Dominican
lands.106 If Spanish military forces along the frontier had actually rushed to the
immediate aid of white French planters and officials under attack by black rebels
then the spread of the rebellions and retreat of French troops could have been
stopped or reversed. Soon enough, tentative and informal Spanish dealings with
ascendant black leaders such as Jean-François, Georges Biassou, Jeannot, and
Toussaint Breda would provide critical financial, political, and military aid to their
insurgent faction – support that other slave leaders and groups lacked – and which
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solidified this rising cadre of revolutionary black talent as the revolutionary
vanguard. Before any direct involvement, and before any formal policy, the
interest of non-intervention and self-preservation, of schadenfreude and retribution
toward the French, and of appeasement and curiosity toward amicable black
rebels, all swayed the precarious balance of white power in Saint-Domingue.

CAUTIOUS CONTACT: BLACK INSURGENTS, SPANISH OFFICERS
A remarkable overture arrived in Santo Domingo on 21 September 1791
near the border town of San Rafael. A letter came from the chief of the black rebels
at Dondon on the eve of the uprising’s one-month anniversary. In it the rebel
leader promised to engage on topics of great importance with the King of Spain.
The “Ethiopian General” explained his interests in finding and developing mutual
interests between his camp and the Catholic Monarch. He had recently suggested
these political terms during a face to face with General Joaquín Cabrera facilitated
only by an interpreter, at which time he frankly explained the motivations of the
blacks in rebelling and their interests in offering services to the Spanish crown. 107

“Lettre d’un nègre, signée Fayette, du Dondon, le 22 octobre 1791,” Dondon, 22 October 1791
and “Lettre signée Bouce et Jean-François,” n. D., in Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860: recueil
complet des débats législatifs et politiques des chambres françaises, Premiere Série, Tome XXXVII (Paris:
Paul Dupont, 1891): 312; Popkin, Your Are All Free, 129-130.
107

162

Jeannot had captured Dondon about a week before, giving the black insurgents
direct access to the Spanish border less than a month after the revolts had begun. 108
Cabrera said of this meeting that, “After a lengthy reasoning of fine and
suggestive political expressions in favor of the Spanish nation, he made me offers
of sugar…asking in recompense powder and balls to continue the war made in the
name of God and of his King against the whites, rebels to both majesties.” The
black general very tactfully understood Spanish monarchism and disdain for the
disruptive radicalism of French whites and their new Republic.

Cabrera

continued, saying, “After he made these relations, so distant from that which I had
conceived from his letters, I manifested him my gratitude for his reverent offers,”
though Cabrera declined to provide munitions at the time due to his own forces’
needs and defense responsibilities. Intriguingly, this newest letter came not only
after the meeting, but apparently a series of missives that had enticed Cabrera to
meet with the rebels under a modicum of trust and confidence.109
After the meeting, Cabrera observed the black officer depart
“accompanied with about 200 men of his color, and other mulattoes, all on horse,
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well-armed with shotguns, pistols, and swords.” The officer’s uniform was “blue,
adorned with a cross that I could not understand of which order it was, many
number of his entourage adorned with epaulettes as insignias of colonels, one and
the other calling themselves by that title.” This impressive retinue did not alienate
Cabrera, and though he said the matter was settled respectful contact between the
parties obviously continued. Cabrera sensed, “in these people of color much
pride, much disposition to combat against the whites…[and] the spirit of
decadence within them.” During their visit the blacks had hinted that they had
not yet taken Marmelade because they had lacked good opportunities, but that
they had ambushed and taken prisoner some white officers and troops by surprise
as they were casually sipping their coffee. This seemed to impress the Spanish
general as an act of precision and tact.110
As early as September the top black officers – who in this case was likely
Georges Biassou, though he was unnamed in the sources – began to court Spain
with interest in a range of strategic, and ostensibly monarchist and spiritual,
commonalities. Spanish officials viewed this dalliance with cautious optimism,
given the context of white republicanism, mulatto demands for rights, and the
multitudinous, splintered parties of slave insurgents of varying motivations and
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aims. From the very first weeks of the revolution these insurgent groups began to
build trust, trade, and eventually military and political partnerships toward
defeating their mutual enemy – the French. This trajectory would take years to
form, and would only become formal after open declarations of war between Spain
and France in 1793.111 How to communicate with Spanish officials became a timeconsuming task.

Jean-François delegated this responsibility of how to gain

Spanish favor to lesser-known black officers including Fayette and Bouce. Their
goal was to also stave off Spanish support for royalist French whites, and to collect
whatever intelligence from the Spanish for their own military and political
needs.112 All the while this unlikely relationship formed, Spain denied assistance
to the French, and Blanchelande reiterated his bewilderment at the Spanish
decision to only protect their frontiers to officials in Paris.113
In the meantime, the neighboring gens de couleur had regained full French
citizenship.

French republican printings circulated into Santo Domingo and

flagrantly insulted Spanish principles.
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metropolitan officials to pay much closer attention to political sentiments
developing just outside its domains. Spain could not directly intervene and thus
leave their own colony undefended to similar insurrectionary sentiments. Thus,
the potential of an alliance with the friendly black insurgents yielded many
strategic advantages. Spanish officials trusted Herédia and Cabrera to defend the
border, but also to prudently manage these newfound points of leverage with
politics in Saint-Domingue.114
The black insurgents near Santo Domingo continued to increase the
territory in their control. A French mulata woman from the plantation of Monsieur
Canais had crossed the border to inform the Spanish officers that a number of
blacks had passed to Dondon to burn it. On 24 September locals from Dondon
wrote the Spanish commander to beg for help and to inform him of this attack by
local blacks, the massacre of many whites, and the burning of many plantations.
The Dondon whites also relayed reports that on the night of 22 September blacks
from various plantations gathered in the night to coordinate burning the city of
Cap-Français, starting with a cane field beside the city to draw attention and give
light. The French troops rallied to the defense. The next day in their heightened
fears French troops found a mulatto walking on Rue Espagnole who had just come
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in from the countryside. When the man still seemed hesitant after three queries
from an officer, the Frenchman drew his sword and hacked the mulatto to death
based only on suspicions. This encroaching violence further panicked the city.
Soldiers roamed the streets with guns loaded while merchants shuttered their
goods inside and homes barricaded their doors. A detachment went to Morne
Rouge where they expected to find 2,000 black rebels with, according to rumors,
some whites as their leaders. These French troops did retake some plantations and
sent back two whites and ten blacks as prisoners suspected of taking part in the
uprising. Military orders dictated that any people of color in the area of the
rebellion were automatically suspects, and they were as likely to be shot or knifed
as apprehended. Of course, this draconian French reaction only deepened the
racial divide and created newly-radicalized enemies to fuel the rebellion.115
The black rebels of northern Saint-Domingue produced growing white
columns, as the countryside of the colony was choked with smoke, and as its roads
were choked with French colonists in flight. Many newly-arrived French women
and children had entered Santo Domingo at San Miguel, and some were admitted
on toward Hinche. After Dondon burned both Limonade and Limbé were put to
the flames, too. Through 26 September French troops engaged in heavy fighting
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with black rebels in the Grande-Rivière region.

The insurgents consumed

plantations’ foodstuffs before torching them, and after eating they provoked the
French with “arrogant” shouts and taunts of “Vive la Liberté.”116 Monsieur Barada
and another official, who served in the militia from Marmelade, who told of 25
soldiers moving toward Grand Morne, and 300 troops left Guarico to engage
rebels, and the recent deaths of an estimated 2,000 blacks. Rumors continued that
mulattoes and some whites were likely leading the revolts. The rebels increasingly
surrounded the remaining 300 French troops near Dondon, and Grande-Rivière
was then burning, too.117
One party of rebels involved in these attacks advanced to the border hill
of Jatiel. There, “a black with his machete, spear, and holster with pistols” realized
that he was about to enter Spanish territory and preemptively explained to the
nearby Spanish guards that his black insurgents had no quarrel with Spain, but
said bluntly that they did not want to leave a single French white alive, including
any refugees in Spanish possessions. To this end these insurgents began issuing
passports to those who travelled under their protection.
At San Rafael a group of people of color arrived looking for whites of the
Bajon militia. These rebels passed on to the plantation of Monsieur Flaman where
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they stole horses and arms, killed all the whites, and set the plantation on fire.
Residents of San Rafael circulated rumors that rebel bands were trying to utilize
Spanish territory, and so forces were sent out to intercept them. Instead, the local
black rebels explained that they were only seeking the plantation of Monsieur
Cavanis, that they wanted nothing but friendship with the Spanish, and that they
had been ordered by their general to show respect to Spanish subjects. Despite the
fact that these rebels were seen “well provisioned with bottles” and had a wellearned reputation for raucous hostility, they did exhibit consideration for Spanish
interests.118
In fact, in early October 1791 a black rebel general who was likely Jeannot
Bullet, but identified himself only as Médecin Général based at Grande-Rivière
(partly due to his vodou healing activities), discussed leadership strategies of who
and how to interface with the Spanish. Jeannot was one of three, alongside JeanFrançois and Biassou, who Boukman prophesied would lead the revolution. In
the earliest weeks of the revolution he was the closest and most powerful operator
to Boukman, and the “judge” of the revolution who oversaw the rampant torture
and gruesome executions of white prisoners.119 Jeannot’s violent reputation grew
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rapidly.120 Two weeks later in a letter apparently to Biassou, Jeannot discussed
forming ties with the Spanish, his apparent interest in better establishing their
military position before such undertakings to show their strength, including
destroying more French properties around Cap-Français, a priority because
without this “their people” would be exposed to “butchery” of the whites. He
mentioned the opinions of “Bouqueman” (Boukman) and also Jean-François,
whose retinue of young women he sarcastically referenced.121
Only weeks later in November 1791 white French troops killed Boukman
and severed his head for public display.

This prompted profound bouts of

mourning among the slave insurgents. At almost the same time Jean-François
ordered the controversial execution of the Jeannot due to his extreme use of
brutality and heinous torture against white prisoners and any blacks who dared
to draw his ire.122 For example, recently Jeannot and Biassou had made advances
toward Cap-Français until they arrived at the convent of the vodouizan nun named
Améthyste with chants of “Glory to the Almighty, eternal hatred to France.”
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Allegedly, Jeannot approached the convent with a white child on a pike, and
commenced atrocities against all the women who he assumed were French. He
had nuns sawed in half, with appendages amputated and eyes gouged
beforehand. Nuns who protested by saying that they were creoles were made to
say, “Nanett allé n’en fontaine, Cherché d’l’eau, Cruche à li cassé.” If nuns did not pass
this shibboleth they were bayoneted for being French. Jeannot may have collected
their blood in a receptacle mixed with rum and gunpowder to later consume.
These nuns, who had long treated the black population with far greater dignity
than they rest of the French due to their evangelistic imperatives, were likely a
scandalous retribution, even for Jeannot’s colleagues.123
The core of the revolutionary black leadership who were part of the revolts
from the start then dwindled down to two – Biassou and Jean-François, with JeanFrançois assuming greater political and military responsibility. The death of
Boukman sent the rebels into deep mourning, followed by spiritual ceremonies,
and then a three-day commemorative celebration.124 Shortly thereafter, JeanFrançois assumed the responsibility of dealing with Spanish and Dominican
neighbors. At a moment in which the black insurgent leaders sought Spanish
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collaboration, they also made peace overtures to the French, and aside from
protesting Jeannot’s cruelties Jean-François could not abide the impression that
such excessive torture against white prisoners gave to white powerbrokers. 125
Elsewhere on the border Spanish troops encountered, “thirty-six
insurgent blacks close to the line saying with a high voice God, and King.” These
rebels offered to share food and rest with the Spanish troops.

During this

conversation they asked the troops to not allow any French whites to flee to the
Dominican side. The situation only miles away in Saint-Domingue was that, “The
terror that the whites have is great, in terms that if only the blacks would yell they
flee and abandon their own homes, leaving them in desertion to the rebels.” 126
Spanish officials did continue to accept white refugees, which was a constant strain
with the black insurgents, but they could hardly believe their fortune with the
black insurgents’ affability.
However, a week later news arrived that a separate party of black
insurgents had shouted some insults at Spanish border guards. In response, they
had received exemplary punishment from their black leaders, both as a sign of
cooperation to Spanish officials (who had actually complained about the matter,
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which was in itself a sign of recognition and relationship), and as a sign of the
sanctioned conduct for the rebels to follow when dealing with Spanish subjects,
their potential allies. Once again, at the beginning October 1791, a group of black
rebels passed along the border at Villarubia and went to the home of a Spaniard
married to a French mulata. There they captured several French women who were
in hiding at the property and took them along as captives.

The Spanish

complained to rebel commanders nearby at Dondon, who subsequently punished
their soldiers for lack of discipline with Spanish interests.127
The tide of battle was also clearer with time.

The French camp at

Marmelade numbered 600 troops, while the aforementioned camp at Dondon
included an estimated 4,000 black rebels. Blacks largely dominated the rural
interior of the Plaine-du-Nord, while pro-French residents and refugees crowded
into Cap-Français. In mid-October news arrived of the French retaking of the
Gallifet plantation, the location which was often considered the epicenter of the
initial slave rebellion. Part of this report baffled Spanish officials, as the “Capuchin
father Cayetano had married a daughter of a sugar planter from the plain with a
black, and that after the nuptial prayer the two were proclaimed King and Queen.”
Since the marriage, the “priest [Cayetano] of Petit-Anse was arrested and had been
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executed. The Queen of the Brigands had been arrested,” as well but she refused
to talk, and her execution was suspended to see if they could gain information
from her as they had from the priest.128
The idea of this priest participating alongside the rebels, of him conducting
a holy sacrament among their racial insubordination, and of these insurgents taking
royal titles within a radical insurrection was a confluence of cultural dissonance
that the Spanish were yet ill-equipped to comprehend.

Paired with rebels’

articulations of respect for the divine, for monarchy, and for Spain particularly,
the officials in Santo Domingo monitored the threats of violence and sedition, but
also the content of their mixed of ideological messages. They were shocked that a
radicalized priest had profaned a sacrament to flaunt racial hierarchy and
consecrate local African political leadership.129 The catch-all term for Africanderived spirituality embraced by the French across the late eighteenth century, le
vaudou, has imparted our contemporary popular names for diasporic religions in
present-day Haiti vodou, or “voodoo.” In this range of practices engaged by the
extremely cosmopolitan African population of Saint-Domingue, the designation
of a “King and Queen” in “vaudou” communities to signify the primary religious
leadership was also quite common. In this case it is unclear whether such African
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spirituality factored into these titles, but across the similar cases of proclaimed
local “Kings” and “Queens” across the Haitian Revolution it would seem likely
that religious power contributed to these titles.130 When such overtly African
clerical categories appeared to Spanish observers their outrage only increased.
However, even when Spanish slaves tried to join the cause and cross from
the Dominican side the black insurgent commanders were quick to redress their
Dominican neighbors’ concerns. For example, a refugee planter who owned a
coffee plantation adjacent to the Spanish border near the Aponte family plantation
on the Dominican side said that the borderlands were full of blacks who had put
fire to homes and cut down all the coffee. During this local event about twenty
Dominican slaves from the Aponte plantation had joined the uprising, and that
property in Santo Domingo temporarily passed into black control. However, the
priest who served as executor for Aponte complained to the insurgents from SaintDomingue, and crossed the border to meet with their general. There he met with
an officer named “Bautista,” who may have been Jean-Baptiste Marc. This black
commander told him that his officers had returned forty-four Spanish blacks to
their plantations, implying that it was policy to not admit Spanish blacks to their
corps. He further explained that they had not encouraged such rebellion, and said
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that his troops were instructed to make certain that these slaves returned to their
plantations and did not rejoin the insurgents.131
On 27 September the Cabildo of Santo Domingo reviewed the
“sacrilegious revolutions of the French” that had exploded, especially in CapFrançais, Port-au-Prince, and along the frontiers. They again formally blamed,
“The seditious fermentation of the French of Europe has served as incentive to
those of the colonies of the same nation to move themselves to equal restlessness
and revolutions, removing governments…killing leaders, murdering, robbing,”
and installing civil assemblies in their own name instead of the legitimate king.
They referenced the precedent of Ogé and Chavanne, which served as evidence of
mulatto ferment, and as a warning to direct involvement with Santo Domingo.
They began to welcome certain French men, such as Monsieur Nicolle, a former
battalion commander and son of a French general, and Monsieur Laviegeri, a
French consul. By bending the policy toward refugees, they set a new precedent
of exceptions to the rules, and more refugees would follow.132 At least for the time
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being García saw these royalist newcomers as potential geopolitical assets, and not
yet as a drain on colonial coffers.
Many, such as Monsieur Melio de Melsant, a former metropolitan official
and regiment of Normandy commander who fought for the king, had united
under the flag flying, “Long Live Religion, Long Live the King, and Death to the
Traitor Nation.” These new partisans aligned with the Spanish and might enhance
border security and planning. Given Rumors were circulating that the British were
openly interested in putting down the conspiracy and taking territory with royalist
support from French whites, García recognized his need to intercept their support.
Various British ships had even been seen along the coast.133 What also caught
Spanish attention was that the British had offered six million pounds in aid, a
power play that ingratiated them with colonists but one that Spain was hesitant to
make.134 This was an enormous amount of money, especially considering the cash
flow in Santo Domingo to support Spanish troops, such as regiments from
Cantabria and Puerto Rico. It became common practice for neighboring Spanish
colonies to send troops and funds to Santo Domingo, and receive only disruptive
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prisoners from it. Finances were also a distinct problem when Spanish officials in
the course of the conflict attempted to win over, and employ, new allies.135
Fires closed in closer to the border with Dajabon, some that Dominicans
could even observe firsthand. The towns of Limbé, Anse, and Trou all burned.
Many mulattoes and even blacks put the white cockade in their hats, and carried
signs reading, “Long live the King.”

The committee of notables from

Ouanaminthe and Fort Dauphin had communicated to the Provincial Assembly
their favorable stances toward the mulattoes and by 3 November the mulattoes
commanded Ouanaminthe.136

These self-identified “people of color” in

Ouanaminthe wrote to Herédia. In a gesture of royalism and righteousness these
free officers of color professed that, “We, the citizens of color of the dependencies
of Ouanaminthe and Fort Dauphin, together have taken the resolution of living
and dying as good Christians and faithful to our King.” These men, Amilcar,
Monsino, Levetre, and Mar, identified themselves as “captains” and were loyal to
the King of France and complained about republican officials, saying that
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Catholicism was no longer practiced in the colony, that anarchy reigned, and that
certain groups wanted to surrender the colony to the British. This confirmed and
heightened existing Spanish fears. These free people of color who lived just miles
from Saint-Domingue said they knew that their slaves and others in their area were
on the brink revolt, and planned to tell them that the King did not condone such
rebelliousness and crimes. Perhaps this was due to the local circulation of a rumor
of a suppressed royal emancipation. The free officers of color explained their
decision to take Ouanaminthe and the surrounding area, in part to avoid alarming
Dominican neighbors. They wanted open communication with Dominican locals
and Spanish officials, and expected to hear from Herédia if he had any concerns
about their actions.137
However, on 9 November some slaves of Ouanaminthe, Maribaroux, and
Fort Dauphin did revolt and united with those who had taken Ouanaminthe
earlier. They tried to communicate with the insurgent “arsonists” of GrandeRivière and Santa Susana to pause their fires and negotiate. Spanish officials
thought these free people of color were engaged in asking the rebelling blacks
exactly what their demands were. García believed that the slaves had asked for
three days of their own per week, which the planters refused. Details of these
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occurrences came from the elderly priest of Ouanaminthe, a “dandy” capuchin of
80 years who had fled to the Dominican side “from the hands of the insurgents.”138
The request from slave insurgents for three days mentioned by García
came from negotiations due to a unique window of transition. That month new
commissioners arrived in Saint-Domingue from the National Assembly in Paris.
They brought news that the Republic had not only overturned the monarchy, but
that at least for the time being rights of gens de couleur were suspended,
complicating the political situation for the armed free people of color in
Ouanaminthe and across the colony. The new commissioners did, however, relay
the news that those involved in revolution could be pardoned if they put down
their arms. Jean-François and Biassou saw this as an opportunity to make a
favorable peace with France and achieve modest gains for slaves in North. They
black insurgents halted hostilities while these precarious negotiations occurred
alongside those of their precarious new free colored allies in Ouanaminthe.139
By the end of November 1791 the mulattoes and now their black allies
were back in firm control of Dondon and Ouanaminthe.140 In December 1791
García observed Saint-Domingue careening to its total ruin. It was immersed in
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anarchy, where white powerbrokers had no recourse but to entertain mulatto
allies, who he guessed would betray them as soon as it suited their ends. 141 In
some locales mulattoes also forged new alliances with rebelling slaves. By the end
of 1791 the Haitian Revolution was barely over four months old, but was
ensconced in most of the rural reaches of North, and in the minds of the majority
black population therein. Not only would the revolution spread across the year
1792, but Dominicans and Spanish officials would be more closely pulled into the
conflict as they shed their observer status and embraced, whether they welcomed
it or not, the role of participants.

CONCLUSION
While the ferocity and immediacy of the massive slave revolts that
erupted in August 1791 paralyzed both French and Spanish authorities with fear,
they also began to open new avenues of geopolitical opportunism for Spanish
interests. Many Dominican and Spanish observers of Saint-Domingue had feared
that the French colony was a dormant volcano, so to speak, as contemporaries and
historians alike have described it. The first phase of the unraveling of colonialism
in Saint-Domingue emerged in the period from 1789 to late 1791 when the
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shockwaves of the French Revolution hit the island. Only by the end of 1791 were
French and Spanish officials fully aware that the slave revolts represented a social
revolution distinct from the preceding political chaos. Soon the colony’s social
revolution would push the French far beyond what they had intended for their
triumphant universalisms.
This extremism and chaos in Saint-Domingue forced Spaniards and
Dominicans to review their collective roots and ties in contrast to their neighbors,
but in this case not due to their extravagant living and decadent wealth. It halted
all attempts of the 1780s for the revitalization of the Dominican slave regime, and
deeply devalued the once-esteemed French model for plantation economies. As
Spanish officials began to reflect upon their own geopolitical goals vis-à-vis SaintDomingue, including their fears of growing British aspirations to seize that colony,
they were approached by highly savvy and strategically-minded black insurgents
who began to court their machinations.
These three new points of contact – Blanchelande, Ogé, and slave rebels –
thrust the white, mulatto, and black racial tensions and incumbent radical politics
of Saint-Domingue upon Dominicans and Spanish officials.

Throughout the

revolutionary era many actors from Saint-Domingue would seek some type of
support from Spain or advantages drawn from Santo Domingo to augment their
own domestic positions. Santo Domingo became intricately entwined with the
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turmoil of Saint-Domingue, a factor not usually considered in scholarship on
either side of the island in this period, and these connections extended far beyond
the Ogé revolt of October 1790, his flight to Santo Domingo, and the subsequent
extradition fight. As the complex Gérard case showed, above all other operatives
in Saint-Domingue the black generals Jean-François and Biassou were militarily
brilliant, skilled in imperial and local-level politics, and wielded their highlymotivated force of slave insurgents with aplomb. From the morass to the west
Spanish officials began to see a new potential ally emerge.
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CHAPTER 3
IMPROBABLE BLACK ALLIES & THE WHIRLPOOL OF WAR, 1792-1793

In the summer of 1793 Father José Vázquez, a mulatto priest from Santo
Domingo, learned of rumors that Jean-François had received enticing offers from
the civil commissioners and might reconsider his affiliation with Spain. 1 Only
several weeks before with the declaration of war from France had the black
insurgents become formal black auxiliaries of Spain.2

Vázquez galloped on

horseback directly to meet with Jean-François, much to the black general’s
surprise. In response to the concerns Jean-François, “put himself on his knees
pledged [his obedience] before God and the sacred name of the King of Spain.”
Jean-François also willingly surrendered an unopened recruitment letter sent to
him by a pro-Republic mulatto adversary. Both parties satisfied, Jean-François
then discussed his newest battle plans Father Vázquez.3
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In the days preceding this encounter the French commissioners Sonthonax
and Polverel had issued an emancipation decree to slaves around Cap-Français in
exchange for their support against internal threats. In July Sonthonax expanded
this emancipation to include the families of those who served. By the end of
August this emancipation included slaves across the North province. By the end
of October all people of African descent across the colony were declared free,
equal, and recipients of the Rights of Man. The logical extension of universalist
egalitarianism espoused by the French Republic came only at the threat of black
insurgents toppling the white utopian project. Practically speaking, Sonthonax
and Polverel cynically wanted to keep their republican friends close, and their
black enemies closer with these emergency measures, with perceived
revolutionary virtue as an ancillary bonus. These decrees aimed to end the slaveled revolution that had the Republic reeling on the island, and from which JeanFrançois, Biassou, and their formidable black auxiliary troops had formed, and to
incorporate new military support into the French cause.

The French

commissioners desperately struggled to incorporate these powerful black forces
into the Republic to support their sagging prospects. Spanish officials, rightfully
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fearful of defections, were thus rather moved and quite impressed with the overt
royalism, Catholicism, and loyalty demonstrated by Jean-François.4
By the end of 1793 Spanish forces, including the newly-formalized black
auxiliaries under Jean-François, Biassou, and the ascendant Toussaint Louverture,
had captured perhaps three-quarters of North and half of West in Saint-Domingue.
The black auxiliaries alone totaled up to 14,000 troops at the time and were the
premier fighting force on the island.5 In comparison, at the height of this alliance
the Spanish black auxiliaries likely outnumbered the entire slave population of
Santo Domingo.6 The new French commissioners in Saint-Domingue tried to rally
disparate bands of mulatto and ex-slave rebels to the Republic, and were
increasingly desperate to convince the powerful black auxiliaries to defect with
enticements to more fully develop radical universalisms of the French Revolution.
While the Spanish counterrevolution peaked in 1794, the countervailing French
social and political experiments that started to undercut this massive project began
in the latter half of 1793, and at least came partly in response to the stunning
successes of pro-Spanish forces. First, French abolition decreed in the summer of
1793, the deliberate inclusion of people of color in military and political affairs,
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and offers of higher salaries and ranks to enemy forces, all chipped away at the
opposition to the French Republic and, with numerous key defections, bolstered
French forces and territorial recovery.

Second, British assistance for French

planters, especially in South and West, combined with their envy of the colony’s
commodity abundance resulted in an all-out invasion in September 1793 that
lasted in significant parts of Saint-Domingue for the next five years, eventually
resulting in direct conflict with Spanish interests.7
In the unopened letter that Jean-François turned over to Vázquez,
commissioner Léger Félicité Sonthonax – who had by then become the most
influential French republican on the island – decried Jean-François’ loyalty to
Spain, criticized monarchism, and predicted that Jean-François would die for a
misguided, losing cause.

None of these condescending rhetorical flourishes

swayed Jean-François, particularly due to the unwavering spiritual counsel of
Vázquez, who García described as, “the principal spring of Jean-François and [his
people], a zealous ecclesiastic, active, full of a love that merits the greatest
considerations, and has made himself worthy since the first moment of the
appreciation and distinction of this Captain General, and by consequence should
merit that of you and of the King.” This remarkable decorum prompted Governor
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García to celebrate Jean-François’ loyalty, “compliments of his words of being a
true Spaniard.”8
To further prove his steadfast loyalty Jean-François then sent two of his
closest officers with a personal letter of gratitude to García. After their visit, the
governor claimed that their conduct, “belies the stain covering his body.” This
intended compliment emphasized the black auxiliaries religiosity and civility as a
progression from their natal racial condition, further distinguishing them from
unallied black rebels or pro-French black troops in Saint-Domingue who
outwardly represented African or republican heresies to Spanish observers.9 The
dynamic pairing of Jean-François and Vázquez encapsulated the improbable
military, ideological, and political ingenuity that characterized Spain’s
intervention in Saint-Domingue’s social revolution.
Several critical unanswered questions remain about this pivotal period of
the Haitian Revolution and its shaping of Dominican history. How did this
discursive divergence of the sacred and profane emerge from the black insurgents,
and how did the black auxiliaries become a canvas upon which Spaniards could
portray this divide? What was the significance of the black auxiliaries’ religiosity
and royalism to the Spanish counterrevolution? How did black demonstrations of
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piety and civility recognizable in Hispanic registers deepen cross-island divides?
How did evangelical strategies formulated by Spain, and forged by the black
auxiliaries, forward a counterbalancing cosmological narrative to the French
Republic? How did this momentum carry Spanish colonialism toward nearly
conquering the whole island by 1794?
This chapter will demonstrate how the formation of a practical ideological,
military, and strategic geopolitical relationship consolidated around notions of
popular Catholicism and monarchism among ex-slave insurgents. The integration
of these new black auxiliaries drove the Spanish military and spiritual reconquests
of Saint-Domingue, all the while this project incorporated less reliable white
French royalists. This broad-based movement operated across the volatile frontier,
with administrative roots in Santo Domingo and Madrid, and attempted retake
Saint-Domingue for the Spanish empire after a century of opulent, but decadent
and corrosive, French rule. Vázquez, Jean-François, García, Biassou, Portillo,
Toussaint, and many others planted the seeds of this project in 1792, and nurtured
its growth across 1793. In these practices at the confluence of utility, sincerity, and
partisanship, people of color left their material mark on the Haitian Revolution
and contributed to forming the beginnings of a Dominican religious
exceptionalism that later supported anti-Haitian nationalism that has endured
from the 1790s to the present. Over 1792 Spanish subjects on the Dominican side

189

of the island became proactive in laying the foundation for conquests that, after
official warfare commenced between France and Spain in 1793, yielded them rapid
and stunning gains as part of a Caribbean Reconquista.

BORDERING BLACK POWER & THE CAUTIONARY CASE OF GÉRARD
Perhaps more so than the three aforementioned points of dramatic contact
that emerged in November 1790, March 1791, and August 1791, the little-known
trial of Charles Gérard that began in January 1792 illustrates the prerevolutionary
and revolutionary ties among all three major racial sectors in Saint-Domingue and
the Dominican border region. Perhaps more importantly, the Gérard trial also
reveals how Spain began to form a cogent, nuanced response to these groups for
their own geopolitical interests. Ultimately, Gérard found himself in Spanish
custody due to the strategic brilliance of Jean-François who during the months of
late 1791 and early 1792 recognized the impossibility of negotiating with the
French, secured territory along the Dominican border, outflanked competing
political or rebel factions in the process, and forced the Spanish to see his forces as
their most logical ally to wage a proxy war in Saint-Domingue.
This last point was of incalculable importance as Jean-François was
strapped for resources, and began a partnership that drew Spain deeply into the
war in Saint-Domingue in which the avowed monarchist and increasingly Catholic
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forces under Jean-François and Biassou and their Spanish allies became the
exemplars and engines of slave insurgency and social change. Furthermore, the
Gérard case illuminated for Spanish officials the personal networks of sympathies
or simple commerce in Santo Domingo upon which political operators in SaintDomingue drew.

To forestall unwanted influence upon Dominicans and

uncontrolled lines of support to unaligned parties, Spanish officials suspended
certain resources or connections from Santo Domingo. Particularly in North of
Saint-Domingue, and in West to a lesser degree, Spanish withholding of support
from the French white establishment, their passive approbation of insurgents of
color, and their manipulation of Dominican-based support networks all had
tipped the balance of power in Saint-Domingue.
In the early weeks of 1792 Spanish authorities began to abandon
reactionary passivity toward the neighboring revolution. They instead more
assertively pivoted toward cutting unfavorable cross-border factionalism,
welcoming the strategic precision and amenability of Jean-François and his forces
that occupied key border crossings and substantial territory in Saint-Domingue,
and fueled white French partisanship between republicans and royalists, the latter
who they soon welcomed as allied combatants against the Republic. The collapse
of peace negotiations between the black insurgents and French, in which Gérard
seems to have factored heavily, was a tipping point in these shifts. The Gérard
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case offers a previously unknown detailed vantage into early and momentous
Spanish and Dominican dabbling in Saint-Domingue’s revolution, and specifically
into how they slow-played a developing relationship with black insurgents.
Amid the calamities and violence to their west, and because of them, on
26 January 1792 in the city of Santo Domingo Governor García commenced the
trial of one “Carlos César Agustín Gérard,” or Charles Gérard in his native French.
This white French national had been arrested at the order of Herédia in Dajabon,
the Dominican town that was increasingly tied to the neighboring conflict due to
its border with Saint-Domingue. Gérard had been arrested on suspicion of being
a, “firebrand and accomplice in the revolutions of the people of color of that
colony,” and to, “prevent the ills that his evil spirit from pouring out and
spreading to the same people of the same class in our towns.” With the assistance
of Dr. Vicente Antonio de Faura and interpreter Don Joaquín Pellon, the Spanish
officials hoped to uncover any secret plots or operatives in Santo Domingo with
which Gérard may have been associated.10
Gérard was held in seclusion. When he was taken into custody he had
been searched for weapons, at which time Spanish officers found a hidden bundle

“Testimonio de la causa criminal seguida contra el francés Carlos César Agustín Gérard por
sospechoso, 1.a Pieza,” 26 January 1792, Santo Domingo, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 321-322 and 325.
Perhaps due to his family ties, “Gérard” is also used as a name for the area around Maribaroux just
northwest of Ouanaminthe
10
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of papers. One document was a passport issued on 14 January by the French
commander of Ouanaminthe. It was apparently intended for a patrol of eight men,
headed by a “Monsieur MacDonal”, who was killed the following day by black
forces under ascendant black general Jean-François who sacked the town. He also
carried a small scrap of a letter signed by “Monsieur Tousard,” the prominent
French general in North. The third paper was a letter that had apparently been
split in half. Another letter was an unused recommendation. Spanish officials
deemed other documents less important.11
When Gérard testified the next day he told the officials that he was 31
years old, originally from Marseille in France, and he did not know the reason for
his arrest.12 He lived in Maribaroux near Ouanaminthe, was unmarried, and
worked in planting.13 Gérard said that he had been arrested when he fled the
recent attack on the French forces in Ouanaminthe, and in so doing had passed
into Spanish territory on Sunday, 15 January at around ten in the morning. On the
banks of the river near Dajabon he encountered two soldiers. They ordered him

“Testimonio…Gérard…1.a Pieza,” 26 January 1792, Santo Domingo, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 323324. This did support his claim that he worked four Tousard, at least some of the time. Gérard
exchanged information about his troops with an officer named MacDonal and separately with
Tousard. See: “ Testimonio…Gérard…3.a Pieza,” n. D., AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 383-384.
11

“Testimonio…Gérard…1.a Pieza,” 27 January 1792, Santo Domingo, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 325328.
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“Testimonio…Gérard…1.a Pieza,” 23 March 1792, Santo Domingo, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 359367.
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to halt, when coincidentally the official Juan Sánchez passed them. Due to their
acquaintance Sanchez allowed Gérard to continue on openly into Dajabon. There
he housed with “a French mulata” named Martina. He said that the following day
Captain Francisco Pepin arrived at the house and took Gérard to see Brigadier
Herédia, who ordered him to be escorted to Santiago and then to the capital. 14
Gérard clearly knew Dajabon and its residents fairly well, and had a history with
at least Sánchez and Martina.
The officials asked Gérard if he had ever resided in Spanish Santo
Domingo. Gérard explained that he had indeed spent significant time in various
parts of Santo Domingo. He had lived in Dajabon for three months with the
permission of the Spanish commander starting in May 1789. After this time the
commander told him he could no longer continue enjoying asylum in Dajabon.
Instead of returning to Maribaroux, Gérard then moved on to Santiago where he
lived for five or six months before then returning to French Saint-Domingue. He
had relocated to Santo Domingo to avoid a pending court case against him
involving a Monsieur Lagrave, and warrants posted for his arrest, his brother, and
his first cousin. He and his brother had both taken asylum in Spanish dominions. 15

“Testimonio…Gérard…1.a Pieza,” 27 January 1792, Santo Domingo, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 325328.
14

“Testimonio…Gérard…1.a Pieza,” 27 January 1792, Santo Domingo, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 328329. By May 1789, under “persecution” driven by “machinations of an enemy” who was a well-off
French colonist Gérard asked the Spanish for refuge in Santo Domingo. With the understanding
15
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Shortly after going to Dajabon his brother had secretly returned to SaintDomingue and then fled to New England. His equally-persecuted cousin had fled
to Port-au-Prince. Lagrave had litigated against them regarding a dispute over the
ownership of a sugar mill. The case became criminal when Lagrave suspected that
Gérard, and his brother and cousin, tried to burn this sugar mill in question to the
ground.

Perhaps conveniently for Gérard the revolution had left the case

unresolved.16

of Monsieur Lamote, commander of Ouanaminthe, and of Francisco Barba, then commander of
Dajabon Spanish records showed that he was allowed to live in the latter city for four or five
months after which he lived in Santiago for seven or eight months. Gérard was sure that residents
in both towns would testify about his good conduct, including Luis Pérez, Spanish commander of
Santiago. While he waited personal resolutions the revolution began, and amid this turmoil and
violence in September 1791 he even pondered returning to Santo Domingo to enjoy peace and
liberty there, and queried the Spanish about asylum. He even promised loyalty to the King of
Spain, who he praised, and asked to bring over his slaves and to reestablish in Dajabon area. See:
“Testimonio…Gérard…2.a Pieza,” n. D., AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 372-376. Rather ironically, it was
his purported old “friend” Luis Pérez who had to forward Gérard in custody to Santo Domingo
along with intelligence gathered by Herédia that the general thought condemned the prisoner. See:
“Testimonio…Gérard…2.a Pieza,” Dajabon, 16 January 1792, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 376-377.
“Testimonio…Gérard…1.a Pieza,” 27 January 1792, Santo Domingo, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 329.
In the course of their investigation Spanish officials uncovered information on Gérard that
furthered their denouncements against him. A letter from 4 June 1789 indicated that the Gérard
brothers, who had sold slaves across the border to Espaillat, had taken asylum after being accused
of burning the cane fields of Lagrave and were wanted for arrest by French officials. The
commander of Fort Dauphin had written to Spanish border officials about intercepting them. See:
“Testimonio de varias cartas relativas a los execsos y apprehension de Mr. Gérard, 4.a Pieza,”
Dajabon, 4 June 1789, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 396-397. Spanish officials had replied on 15 July 1789,
saying that they would not avail their illegal immigration and self-exile, and wondered if they had
marched onward to Santiago, or perhaps even the capital. See: “Testimonio…Gérard…4.a Pieza,”
Dajabon, 4 June 1789, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 397-398. A month later Spanish officers located one
Gérard brother in Santiago, the other having seemingly fled to New England, though they
apparently did not share this information with the French. See: “Testimonio…Gérard…4.a Pieza,”
Dajabon, 5 August 1789, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 398-399.
16
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Spanish officials questioned why, if he had not been convicted, had he fled
to the Spanish side. Gérard informed them that Lagrave was a very powerful man
in Saint-Domingue and that in Santo Domingo he had avoided a public
“trampling.”

Eventually, Gérard’s friends in Saint-Domingue had written him

assuring that risks to his person no longer existed, and thus he went back to his
home in February 1790, temporarily spared by the political upheaval across the
colony as all proceedings had been suspended due to the revolution. The officials
asked if he had ever returned to Santo Domingo. Gérard said that in August or
September 1791, despairing his case with Lagrave and the fatal state of the colony
he had asked Herédia if he could pass into Spanish territory with some blacks
(who were likely his slaves) to reestablish himself there. Gérard never received a
response, but came to trust in the protection of French commander Monsieur
Tousard and hoped for an improved social situation on the French side.17
Spanish officials were suspicious of his choice to remain, particularly since
he had not been harmed in the interim as so many others had. Gérard said that
only during the attack on Ouanaminthe was he threatened. When the attack on
Ouanaminthe began Gérard was in the home of free mulatto Jean Tamplier. When
they saw that armed blacks were encircling the house, Tamplier hid Gérard in a

“Testimonio…Gérard…1.a Pieza,” 27 January 1792, Santo Domingo, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 330331.
17
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box and evacuated him from the area by having an enslaved mulatto carry Gérard
about halfway to the river.18 Thus Gérard was able to flee his imminent demise
into Santo Domingo for the second time in his young life.
Given this peculiar drama Spanish officials wondered if Gérard had held
any public offices or military positions in Saint-Domingue. Gérard said that he
had only served the interests of Tousard, but did mention that the people of color
had a great deal of confidence in him. Gérard explained that the free people of
color had frequently consulted with him about the affairs of the revolution,
conversations through which he claimed to have induced them to submit
themselves to the orders of Tousard. He presented himself as a trusted go-between
for the people of color to deal with Tousard. Spanish jurists were very curious to
hear about how he could have possibly built confidence with the free people of
color when Tousard’s political positions were directly opposed to their ideas and
projects. Gérard contested that at the outset of the revolution the gens de couleur
who he knew were not affiliated, and thus he offered them advice while their
minds were open to different opinions. Gérard explained that when Tousard
arrived that many free people of color thus submitted due to his counsel. 19
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“Testimonio…Gérard…1.a Pieza,” 27 January 1792, Santo Domingo, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 331.

“Testimonio…Gérard…1.a Pieza,” 27 January 1792, Santo Domingo, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 331333.
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These explanations seemed to make Spanish officials all the more
suspicious. They demanded to know upon what character or authority he earned
the respect and ability to take his ideas to a multitude of insurgents. Gérard
replied that he neither had an esteemed character nor art of persuasion, but had
lived in the area for eighteen years. He suggested that these free people of color
had agreed with him until the invasion of Ouanaminthe when many had joined
the insurgents. Gérard noted that he had gradually lost his rapport with local
people of color, while Tousard and his officers of color were more immediately
involved. Gérard claimed to never have participated in their combat. 20 When
asked, Gérard explained what the free people of color fought was against “The
Committee”, which he said represented the public authority and the popular voice
of the whites. Gérard said that the first intent of the mulattoes was to dispel this
assembly and administrative body, but was not against all whites. Gérard said
that he was himself against the Committee, and had been from the beginning. 21
This white Frenchman, with ties to both sides of the island, with apparent political
and moral flexibility, was a broker of mulatto and white power on the border and,

“Testimonio…Gérard…1.a Pieza,” 27 January 1792, Santo Domingo, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 333334.
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“Testimonio…Gérard…1.a Pieza,” 28 January 1792, Santo Domingo, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 339340.
21

198

as a hub of connection, began to reveal to the Spanish the inner workings and
social contexts of key groups of insurgents that operated along their frontiers.
Spanish officials pointedly asked where Gérard had been on 3 November,
1791. The prisoner said that he did not recall. Upon further prompting Gérard
recalled going to visit Herédia and Spanish officers in Santo Domingo twice to
assist Tousard, and that those meetings were in November and December 1791.
Gérard recalled that during a night in November he had spoken with Herédia
about the first invasion and taking of Ouanaminthe and the critical state of events,
and that he had done so in the presence of various other people, some of whom
were actually French. He recalled that one of those present had come from
Santiago with a letter from a physician there.22 Spanish officials asked if he knew
a Monsieur Decavilletaine another Spanish prisoner who was apparently at this
same meeting. Gérard claimed he did not know the other prisoner, and that he
did not know much about the messenger who had brought the letter from
Santiago.23
Spanish officials aggressively asked Gérard if Herédia had questioned
him about allegedly leading the mulatto rebels. Gérard said he had no memory of

“Testimonio…Gérard…1.a Pieza,” 28 January 1792, Santo Domingo, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 334335.
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such a conversation. They then asked if Gérard had not effectively admitted to
Herédia that he had in fact been the leader of mulatto insurgents, defended their
actions, claimed that their cause was just, and even asked Herédia to abet their
actions.

Again, Gérard denied such a discussion.

The officials then asked

specifically if Herédia had not scolded Gérard for a commission with a white
militia in favor of leading mulattoes in revolt. Gérard again denied this, retorting
that the jefe of the mulattoes in question was one Jean-Baptiste Marc, who Gérard
claimed to never have dealt with, as other whites apparently had.24
Jean-Baptiste Marc, who was actually a free black, had fought as a
commander alongside rebel slaves near Dondon but he had feigned submission to
the forces of Tousard, who supplied him with weapons and allowed him to occupy
the Ouanaminthe area alongside free people of color there aligned with Tousard.
He served Tousard with distinction until, without warning and in what seems to
have been calculated duplicity, he and his men turned their guns on the proTousard mulattoes and placed Ouanaminthe under the direct command of rebel

“Testimonio…Gérard…1.a Pieza,” 28 January 1792, Santo Domingo, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 337339. In February 1789 the court at Versailles sent notice to the North region to form a blanc militia
under Gérard around Ouanaminthe. Gérard thus became a lieutenant of the white riflemen.
Granted at Versailles on 1, placed under command of governor, but was only certified as evidence
on 23 November 1792 in Santo Domingo. See: “Testimonio…Gérard…2.a Pieza,” Versailles, 1
February 1789, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 372.
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slaves apparently commanded by Jean-François.25 Tousard argued that the people
of Ouanaminthe owed their lives to the mulattoes for preventing the blacks from
enacting atrocities against the whole town. Gérard said that in the three or four
days that the black insurgents were in the town he stayed with them, after which
he remained in Ouanaminthe when the blacks left for Santa Susana.26
Gérard explained that the whites of Ouanaminthe fled or hid in their
homes when the “black incendiaries” took the town for the first time. Local whites
had assumed that the mulattoes would defend the town, and that this more than
the humanity of Jean-François gave them a sense of security. Gérard had tried to
stay in Ouanaminthe, too, and that he had no interaction when these black troops
when they invaded with hostile intentions. When asked, Gérard admitted that he
had actually been part of a council from Ouanaminthe that mediated between
Monsieur Tousard and the mulattoes. On 18 November 1791 Tousard had sent a
letter to the mulattoes intimating to them that there was a pardon and that they
should discuss the matter. The town selected and sent deputies for this meeting,
and Tousard said it would be of value to have Gérard there, as he regularly wrote

Carolyn Fick, Making Haiti, 111-112. During Jean-Baptiste Marc’s calculative duplicitous
collaboration with the gens de couleur of Ouanaminthe, he answered to a Sieur Gérard. See: Fick,
Making Haiti, 304n105.
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for the mulattoes. On 23 November 1791 Gérard and the mulattoes went to meet
Tousard in the place called Pueblo Viejo.27
Upon questioning, Gérard said that he spoke to one Monsieur Corbière
about the joining of the mulattoes and whites against the blacks. Gérard noted
that the mulattoes would not go along with the ideas and projects of Corbière
because they thought he wanted to preserve the Committee.28

Apparently

motivated by some paranoia, the Spanish officials asked whether he and Corbière
spoke about the possibility of Spanish rule in northern Saint-Domingue, to which
Gérard responded that they only spoke about the mulattoes and a letter for
Herédia, not about Spanish rule. He said that the letter was an explanation to
Herédia about the motives for the mulattoes’ revolt, just cause, and attempts to
contain the unrest in Saint-Domingue, in his handwriting, and signed by the free
people of color.29 Herédia’s reply said that he would only trust those who behaved
honorably and submitted themselves under the general of the colony.30

“Testimonio…Gérard…1.a Pieza,” 28 January 1792, Santo Domingo, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 340341.
27

“Testimonio…Gérard…1.a Pieza,” 28 January 1792, Santo Domingo, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 341342.
28

“Testimonio…Gérard…1.a Pieza,” 28 January 1792, Santo Domingo, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 342343.
29

“Testimonio…Gérard…1.a Pieza,” 28 January 1792, Santo Domingo, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 343344.
30

202

These exchanges with Gérard reveal that the Spanish were far from
passive observers in the adjacent revolution. Herédia and Gérard clearly knew
each other, and Herédia in Dajabon had developed a network of informants in
Ouanaminthe who made Spanish and royalist preferences known to a range of
rebel factions. Spanish officials were aware of rumors of their own geopolitical
machinations for northern Saint-Domingue, and perhaps had already discussed
such possibilities with certain operatives, thus prompting some of their edgy
questions.

They were undoubtedly focused on preventing the conflict from

jumping the border to their own populations.
Further questioning revealed that Gérard had frequent contact with at
least one Spanish officer and some French residents in Santo Domingo. He
exchanged letters with Santiago's commander Luis Pérez Guerra on two or three
occasions, and with François Espaillat and a Monsieur “Cabiro” on three to four
occasions each. With Espaillat in particular he had discussed transactions of
slaves.31 He explained that his recent correspondence with Espaillat and Cabiro
covered subjects like the dependence on the slave trade, and that his letters were

“Testimonio…Gérard…1.a Pieza,” 28 January 1792, Santo Domingo, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 344345. Espaillat was French colonist in the Cibao, naturalized as a Spanish subject in 1787. He became
a factor of tobacco for Santiago by 1790s. His slave Santiago was later indicted as part of the Boca
Nigua revolt, and Espaillat had previously purchased slaves from Gérard. It is possible that this
slave was even from Saint-Domingue. Espaillat later had sons, Ulises Francisco and Santiago, who
became national leaders in the Dominican Republic, and eventually president. Papeles de Espaillat:
para la historia de las ideas políticas en Santo Domingo, 474, indicates that he and family went to Puerto
Rico in 1805 with the Haitian invasion by Dessalines, and that he died there in 1808.
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not secretive and mostly only dealt with personal issues, though one did perhaps
pertain to national proclamations. One was a manuscript from Tousard for the
“powers of the sirs, inhabitants, and citizens of the part of the L’este” and another
concerned the rebels’ negotiations for pardon.32 Just as Herédia had meddled into
Ouanaminthe, Gérard and some of his colleagues had been complicit in funneling
a particular royalist message to the Spanish side in hopes of securing support for
his own political and military engagements around Ouanaminthe.
Herédia submitted his own account from Dajabon roughly six weeks later.
Unlike how Gérard defined himself, he referred to the prisoner as “General
Monsieur de Gérard, putting himself at the head of the mulattoes of the part of
Ouanaminthe and Fort Dauphin, who surprised the people of Ouanaminthe with
his troops and arms on 2 November 1791.” Herédia reported that his force later
united with the “black incendiaries” of Jean-François, “who those maleficents call
‘General’.”

He claimed that Gérard and Jean-François then collaborated to

“extort” the locals. Spanish officials pursued testimony from one Pierre Martin, a
prominent free mulatto whose correspondence they had captured.33

Martin

confirmed Gérard’s position as leader of mulattoes near Ouanaminthe and Fort

“Testimonio…Gérard…1.a Pieza,” 28 January 1792, Santo Domingo, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 345347.
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Dauphin, and, “when the men of color met together at the end of last October the
Monsieur Gérard…was General of that camp.”
Martin related that before the black invasion of Ouanaminthe, Gérard was
widely known in this role, and that he actively protected property of whites and
gens de couleur. He visited one Monsieur Escot, and afterward sent a detachment
of troops to disarm some guards working for certain blanc planters. Gérard
allegedly took keys from the Committee and seized their powder and cannons
from the armory. A few days later he returned with the troops of Jean-François,
who had combined forces with his own troops of color. Gérard was at the front of
these troops when they occupied the city of Ouanaminthe. Gérard then instructed
“all the men of color or free blacks and those who did not have the cockade in their
hats put on those that said “Vive le Roi Louis XVI” (Long live King Louis XVI).
Shortly after he made them put on a tan or white royalist cockade (cucardas
encarnadas). Then, “Monsieur Tousard arrived at Fort Dauphin and sent deputies
to meet with Monsieur Gérard so that he could make his demands.” However,
after Gérard sent emissaries to meet with Tousard he took up the “national
cockade”, or the tricolore of the French Republic, and the two parties – the gens de
coleur from Ouanaminthe under Gérard and French whites under Tousard –
negotiated a treaty with each other. However, to Martin this treaty served nothing,
as black insurgents began the massacre of 15 January.
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It was unknown what actions Gérard took either to incite or prevent this
violence, but he had sneaked into the Spanish side to avoid implication with the
atrocities and to save his own life. He was in danger due to his affiliation with the
“evildoers…[who] sacked and burned” the town, whether he opposed or went
along with it. Martin proclaimed his own innocence in the debacle, and said that
Chasset, Hermand, Escot, Camas father and son, the Mazago son, the Dugoiran
brothers, Sayaune brothers, Bossier, Jean-Charles, and Hilario Gaston were also
innocent, and perhaps others, including the Dufresne family.34
Considering these depositions, it seems that Gérard was in fact the
intermediary who had been duped by Jean-Baptiste Marc, the officer under JeanFrançois, who won the approval and material support from local gens de couleur
and then Tousard before sabotaging French control of Ouanaminthe from the
inside for the black rebels. Even by his own admission Gérard had been in contact
with the black rebels of Santa Susana and Valier, and therefore Jean-François.
After Gérard calmed the whites in Ouanaminthe about these affiliations, and after
he had disarmed the white guards, he brought in mulattoes under his command
accompanied by troops of Jean-François’ brigades, appalling all the whites in the
community.

34

Gérard responded to resistance against his peace plan with

“Testimonio…Gérard…1.a Pieza,” 3 March 1792, Dajabon, AGI-SD, leg. 1030, n.9, 349-352.
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executions of the few who did not cooperate in Maribaroux, namely Monsieurs
Minac, Revello, and Comune. This violent display drove others to pledge loyalty
to Gérard’s camp.35
The Spanish then collected testimony from the free people of color
mentioned by Pierre Martin who confirmed his account. Antoine Escot from
Ouanaminthe added that Gérard had published an order that all the men of color
who did not follow his intentions had to pass in front of a council of war. JeanBaptiste Bossier added that he had heard Gérard and his associates discuss
whether the Spanish would bother protecting the French whites against the
insurgent blacks.36

Apart from the trial evidence, a Monsieur Hurvoy, the

commander of the “patriotic” forces at Ouanaminthe, later recorded his
confrontation by a few soldiers of color and Gérard himself, who wanted to discuss
Jean-François and to have him reassure the town of their intentions. Hurvoy said
Gérard was particularly interested in a peace deal, and that the people of Fort
Dauphin and l’Acul-des-Pins might have as well.

After parting peacefully,

Hurvoy said he then went out to calm several plantations regarding Gérard’s
intentions, only to return to town to find the citizens of color in arms. He was able
to warn Tousard just before he was supposed to arrive. Negotiations over the fate
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of Ouanaminthe commenced at the Escot plantation, property of a free family of
color.37
The trial moved back to Santo Domingo, where in May 1792 Spanish
officials hoped to obtain a confession from Gérard. He did admit to having been
a militia officer, but only for Tousard. He also admitted to having issued political
proclamations.

Spanish officials doubted the extent of his admissions, and

wondered if the people of color had actually fled Ouanaminthe to avoid the fury
of the blacks due to his political actions. Gérard tried to justify his actions of
interfering with whites and their property, disarming the white guards, taking
cannons and powder, and later uniting with troops under Jean-François. He
claimed that Tousard knew about all of his actions in the town. Interestingly, he
said that his meeting with Jean-François was not necessarily voluntary, and that
the black rebels had surprised him and the smaller forces of the people of color,
and troops that were definitely not under his command.
Gérard adamantly denied that he was seditious, that he had commanded
mulattoes, that he helped give the town to the blacks during their attack, and that
he participated in the violence. He agreed that Jean-François and his troops

“Rapport fait à M. Hurvoy, commandant des troupes patriotiques de Ouanaminthe, par M. De
Fondeviolle…,” Ouanaminthe, 2 October 1791, in Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860: recueil
complet des débats législatifs et politiques des chambres françaises, Premiere Série, Tome XXXVII (Paris:
Paul Dupont, 1891): 308-309.
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committed atrocities but that in Ouanaminthe the mediation of the mulattoes
diminished the violence.

When pressed he also claimed that he never said

anything about Spanish involvement with the French whites against the
insurgents. He insisted he only advised the free people of color. He did admit,
though, to knowing many people of color in the Ouanaminthe area who submitted
to Tousard after having received a pardon.38
These testimonies and lines of questioning reveal critical details pertaining
to all involved parties. Spanish officials were extremely upset about rumors
circulating regarding their own interests in adjacent areas of Saint-Domingue, and
were specifically concerned about the idea that they were in support of French
whites against troops of Jean-François, perhaps due to their peaceful and growing
ties to those insurgents. Furthermore, any Spanish support for the whites in
Ouanaminthe may have only been as a counteraction against the rise and
dominance of free people of color and in such close proximity to Dominican
populations. They were also concerned over Gérard’s apparent autonomy from
Tousard and his precarious intermediary position between French regulars, the
free people of color around Ouanaminthe, and even apparently black insurgents.
Whatever the actual intent of Gérard, they were equally alarmed at depth of
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connections to people on the Spanish side of the island, and how their own covert
geopolitical interests were understood and by whom.
The documents collected into evidence also reveal a complicated
relationship with Spanish officials and Dominicans. A letter from just over a
month after the slave revolts began revealed Spanish concerns that if the French
actually dislodged the black insurgents from Dondon and Grande-Rivière then the
black insurgents would have no other recourse or refuge than to take hold in the
mountains on the border with Santo Domingo. It speculated about direct Spanish
involvement to preempt black rebels from entrenching themselves in the border
mountains and to preserve Santo Domingo.39 This letter reveals conversations
among Spanish officials and certain operators in Saint-Domingue about seeking
Spain’s own geopolitical interests regarding intervention and how, despite their
undisclosed friendly early meetings with the black insurgents, Spanish officials
feared that if given no choice that the rebels might bring their rebellion into Santo
Domingo. This gave them all the more reason to encourage amicable interactions
with the rebels, and to also collect detailed intelligence from French informants
about the true situation on the ground in Saint-Domingue.
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The next week in early October 1791 Herédia sent a letter explaining the
French leadership paralysis, and lamented the possibility that Spaniards would
become subject to black whims, and suggested supplying the French through
Manzanillo if roads were unsafe.40 That same day, Gérard petitioned Herédia to
enter Santo Domingo. Per the unpopular policy of only granting asylum to those
whose lives were overtly threatened, Herédia denied Gérard, who stayed in
Ouanaminthe and obviously became more involved in local politics.41 Eleven days
later and from Santo Domingo García refused Gérard’s appeal. Amid negatives
news from Banica, García further worried that in all parts of the Spanish colony
reigned a great silence due to the blacks, “they say nothing from Cahobas, Neyba,
nor San Raphael.” All of these Dominican border towns were afflicted by the
revolution, and now Dajabon was being pulled into the fray.42
Spanish officers reported on 3 and 5 of November that, “free mulattoes
and slaves from the part of Ouanaminthe, Maribaroux, and part of Fort Dauphin”
had revolted. They encamped in the hills, and soon arrived at Ouanaminthe where
they captured four small canons, powder and shot, and horses, and freed political
prisoners before returning to their camp “where they communicated with the
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incendarios of Grande-Rivière [and] Santa Susana,” likely the troops of JeanFrançois.43 Separate from the trial, Hurvoy reported on this takeover. He received
resistance from troops of color under his command, which he thought was related
to a meeting of free people of color a l’Acul-des-Pines. Gérard asked for a meeting,
which made Hurvoy hesitate. Gérard told him of his troops’ intention to seize the
town. Without Hurvoy’s consent, but without firing a shot, these troops overtook
guard positions throughout Ouanaminthe, took the keys to the jail, and
suppressed whites. Hurvoy visited the headquarters of the free people of color,
who intimidated him, but he supposed that he had to cooperate with them to
forestall takeover from the slave insurgents.44
After a lull of gens de couleur occupation, at four in the morning of 9
November “eight blacks from Santa Susana came down and incorporated
themselves with the mulattoes,” and that afternoon “they took over the town of
Ouanaminthe” while both disarming and guarding local white elites. More men
arrived on horseback, bringing the number of troops to six hundred men. Some
white and free black residents tried to flee into Dominican territory, and that
afternoon the local Dajabon militia had hurriedly assembled out of fear for cross-
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border violence. Then, as Herédia explained, “At four in the afternoon four blacks
on horseback arrived at the mouth of the river, asking permission of the garrison
to give me a message from their general. They announced that their black general
would have “the honor of visiting” the following day. Herédia speculated that
“their general was Monsieur :::::::::: free black that had come briefly from France
decorated with the Cross of Saint Louis that the king had given him.” The name
of the supposed leader was in fact missing from the record, reading “so it is” beside
these transcribed dots, but given his personal description it could have been JeanBaptiste Marc, who was already a free black, or potentially Jean-François himself
given his own propensity to wear the Cross of Saint Louis, though the latter had
certainly never visited France.45
Herédia had also heard that Gérard had become the leader of mulattoes.
Gérard tried to make amends with Herédia, who said that, “this night it displeased
me to see him coming to talk with me.” Herédia accused Gérard of having incited
the mulattoes into insurrection. Gérard countered by saying that he was only a
spokesman for their cause. He also asked Gérard why he had allied with the
incendiarios, or black insurgents, and Gérard said they had surprised him that
morning and obliged him to collaborate. Later, Herédia watched fires burn across
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the border all night, and at daybreak morning saw the home of “Madame Carrera”
(a Spanish surname) and others burn. Spanish troops remained on high alert at
seeing the rebels in such proximity. Hurvoy, the French commander responsible
or defending the town, was arrested but somehow escaped into Dajabon.46
Ahead of Herédia’s meeting with this “General of the Brigands”, rumors
arrived that the insurgents in Ouanaminthe might force whites to declare all
mulatto and black slaves under their dependence free, with the stipulation they
continue to work the ingenios and houses. Herédia speculated that this would ruin
the whole colony. At eight in the morning on 10 November Herédia received a
letter from the black general about their meeting. An hour later black troops
approached the river on horseback, followed by a tense haggling of who exactly
could attend the meetings. Spanish officers who dealt directly with this black
general said that he was a, “very dark black with two crosses on his chest, one of
Saint-Louis and the other which was unknown, that he spoke little,” and that
perhaps he had delegated negotiations to his officers. Nothing, it seems, actually
came from this visit. Ironically, during this meeting over thirty refugees entered
Dajabon with their many slaves.47 The blacks were the military muscle who had
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won the mulattoes’ victories at Ouanaminthe, even if the gens de couleur did not go
looking for armed black involvement.48
One letter from Gérard’s college the “Count of Corbière” apparently went
to Herédia on 9 November 1791, the day that some insurgent slaves had first
entered Ouanaminthe. The letter requested a license to pass to the Spanish side at
Dajabon under the auspices of Herédia and gave a military report of French affairs.
It mentioned that Tousard’s forces were at l’Acul-des-Pins and discussed reuniting
at Vollines and strategized about how to reconnect with, “subjects of my beloved
King who they serve.”. Corbière and his partisans were intent upon negotiating
with the powerful free people of color in the borderlands. He identified “600
brigands” in the area who had burned plantations around Maribaroux, violence
that would force refugees to stay longer on the Spanish side. Corbière also
complained to Herédia about one Frenchman in particular, a Monsieur Legras,
who the Spanish had given asylum.49

No wonder, then, that Herédia was

concerned about what conversations Gérard had with Corbière, considering that
the latter readily supplied intelligence to the Spanish, operated in Dajabon among
Dominicans and refugees, and coordinated with Spanish officers on military,
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royalist, and refugee affairs. Spain had other informants. For example, a note from
Monsieur Petiton written on 15 November provided intelligence to the Spanish on
the rebel presence around the mouth of the Rio Masacre. Tousard had yet to
arrive, instead staying near Fort Dauphin with some 800 troops.50
Also, Gérard seemed to have sent letters to friends in Santiago in which
he was perplexed at how to explain his leadership of a group of gens de couleur and
free blacks from his region. He said that the people of color in his area sought his
counsel, and he tried to moderate them from imprisoning or attacking whomever
they wished, and hoped to guide them through their treaty of 23 November with
Tousard, all the while blaming, “enemies of the constitution…[who] have
projected the ruin of this lovely colony.” Gérard then bragged of his own heroics,
saying, “I liberated the part of Maribaroux; I protected…their haciendas without
doubt,” and said he was sending a proclamation from French officials. He noted
that the regiment of Provence had arrived and that corresponding French troop
movements were expected. With regards to the insurgent slaves he did say that,
“The chiefs of the bandits have repeatedly sent deputations toward the end of
pursuing pardon,” and those who had just recently agreed to a deal were possibly
hiding out at the nearby house of Saint-Michel where they were amassing all their
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white prisoners. In reference to these rebels, who were likely troops of JeanFrançois, Gérard said that, “We must hope that all will compose and submit to the
laws.”51
The proclamation that he may have sent into Santo Domingo was from the
French commissioners Ignace-Frédéric de Mirbeck, Edmond Saint-Léger, and
Philippe-Rose Roume de Saint-Laurent (hereafter Philippe Roume, as he was
usually called), who called upon refugees to return home and promised
tranquility.52 It is no wonder, then, that if Gérard came to a compromise and
support for French republican positions that he would circulate a call for support
and the return of capital and powerbrokers through the French expatriate
community in Santo Domingo that he knew very well.

His immodesty at

newfound power in letters to residents of Santo Domingo seem to prove that
Gérard was in fact a leader of free people of color and actively negotiated with
black insurgents under Jean-François.
When arrested Gérard also carried the terms of peace that Tousard had
arranged with the “Deputy Sirs” of the free people of color and free blacks of Fort
Dauphin from, apparently, 25 November 1791, lending credence to his claims of
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having been a peacemaking intermediary. It called for a union and fraternity. It
recognized the demands by people of color for political representation and legal
equality, but asked “citizens of color” to abide by the law. The deal included
several actionable articles, including the implementation of the contentious
national decrees regarding rights for citizens of color and a pardon for those
involved in armed uprisings.

The deal stipulated that people of color who

committed violent excesses would not be pardoned and were subject to the
“severity and vengeance of the law.” All qualified people of color who signed the
pact and united at Ouanaminthe were to become part of the French army of the
east under Tousard and would serve to reestablish order in the colony, implicitly
against slave insurgents. Officers of color could keep their status and troops, and
Tousard would personally visit Ouanaminthe to receive pledges of obedience
from the citizens of color and free blacks in common cause against the “bandits.”
Tousard in turn would be their advocate to high-ranking French officials and
would circulate their treaty to colonial assemblies, the National Assembly, King
Louis XVI, and the public. Tousard would also have a Te Deum blessing to thank
divine providence for this peace and pray to maintain it. 53 This was the pact that
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Gérard claimed to have engineered for peace along the northern border of
Hispaniola.
On 14 January 1792 Gérard wrote directly to Espaillat to share about, “the
good that I have done to my territory,” which he said he had enacted with the
cooperation of French leaders. He asked about procuring pack animals through
Santo Domingo that he could not find in Saint-Domingue, and mentioned having
written to the physician Joseph Cabiro, a Frenchman who had lived on the Spanish
side for at least a decade. He mentioned that the “bandits” had asked for grace.54
This reference to Jean-François proved wrong when the black insurgents seized
Ouanaminthe the very next day.
Gérard’s role in these series of events was already turbid, Corbière
proceeded to make them even murkier. Corbière, who concurred that Gérard had
led the mulattoes of Ouanaminthe, had been dispatched to deal with Gérard and
the free people of color to form a treaty with whites and then attach the “black
incendiaries.” Gérard had apparently cautioned Corbière in confidence that the
Spanish wanted to take over the North of the colony, a hope that Corbière had
taken with him into refuge in Santo Domingo. Gérard allegedly had shown
Corbière a letter from Herédia on this matter, and Corbière wondered if perhaps
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Gérard was actually conspiring with the insurgents to surprise Ouanaminthe.
Herédia expressed his disbelief about these accusations to García. The details of
Herédia’s dealings with Gérard, Corbière, and others are almost impossible to
discern, though it seems clear that Herédia dealt with people and plans
unbeknownst to officials in the capital.55 Herédia was highly suspicious of both
Gérard and Corbière due to their ties to insurgents and their deep connections to
the Cibao region around Santiago. For example, Spanish troops also intercepted a
mulatto who was trying to deliver a letter from Gérard to the Dominican resident
Juan Aranda, which seemed unusual, and two other letters bound for Santiago. 56
Proceedings against Gérard closed in May 1792 without a clear verdict or paper
trail regarding his fate, which was likely forwarded for review in Spain. Quite
surprisingly, years later Gérard reappeared as a free man and French envoy in
Santo Domingo where he continued to antagonize Spanish authorities.
More importantly than the trial outcome, the sum of the Gérard case
unveils complicated cross-border networks through which Herédia cagily
monitored Spanish interests. This included his anxious role in the Gérard case,
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before and after his arrest, which seemed to indicate a greater familiarity between
the two men than what the court record revealed. Gérard told Corbière of Spanish
designs for North. Gérard knew several Spanish officers, had lived in Santo
Domingo, probably spoke Spanish, and had many friends who were either
Dominican or permanently resided in Santo Domingo. Less powerful Spanish
officials were not really questioned regarding their plans for North, nor their
contact with Gérard, Corbière, or other operators in Saint-Domingue, despite their
months of direct contact with insurgents. Gérard clearly conspired with the armed
gens de couleur, held espoused royalist preferences, wore monarchist emblems, and
cooperated with Tousard for a treaty. He also met with Jean-François, who along
with Biassou and the emergent free black Toussaint Breda had conducted their
own peace negotiations with the French commissioners.
Jean-François had patiently asked for four-hundred manumissions and
three days a week of free time for slaves, along with the improvement of living
conditions and treatment. The white planters and assembly had no interest in
acknowledging their movement as a political act, and held out that their crime
against governmental order deserved unconditional surrender and punishment.
A white planter even slapped Jean-François during one meeting regarding peace.
By January these negotiations were in tatters, and the French would not even offer
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the insurgents sixty manumissions or any stipulations on increasing slaves’ time
off or bettering their treatment.57
Most likely, Jean-François understood that Gérard had made a peace deal
with Tousard, took up the “national cockade,” and started transitioning
Ouanaminthe to the Republic. He had planted Jean-Baptiste Marc and others loyal
to him as feigned partisans of the Ouanaminthe mulattoes. He had also forced
Gérard into a quasi-partnership with his forces, as much to present a unified front
among insurgents to the French.

By January he understood that the slave

insurgents had been forsaken by these uneasy gens de couleur allies, and thus he
decided to outright capture the key strategic town and border crossing. With the
chance of peace with France eliminated, this also gave Jean-François and his black
insurgents another point of direct contact to Spanish officials whose support he
desperately needed. The duplicity accomplished by Jean-Baptiste Marc was brash,
exceedingly clever, and was an important free black allegiance to the slave
insurgent cause, as was the newfound talent of Toussaint Breda. This action
resulted in a major geopolitical loss for the French, all of which had to impress
Spanish observers. It showed Spanish officers who the savvy powerbrokers in
Saint-Domingue really were – in this case, Jean-François outmaneuvered local
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royalist whites, republican officials in the colony, and militant free people of color.
Spain, with growing opportunistic interests in the conflict beyond self-defense,
had a new point of contact with talented black insurgents – Ouanaminthe.

OPPORTUNISTIC DIVINE PROVIDENCE: DOMINICAN-INSURGENT TIES
Into early 1792 Governor Joaquín García still faulted French philosophy
and actions as the root cause of the adjacent unrest, and in so doing he and others
continued to chronically underestimate the social, cultural, and political
motivations of the black majority in Saint-Domingue. Soon, this would cause him
to further underestimate the shrewdness of new black allies of Spain. Their
eventual recognition of black political autonomy would primarily develop in
parallel with the continued espousal of monarchist and Catholic values by rebels
near the border who had, by early 1792, been interacting in peace and amity with
Spanish military personnel and Dominican residents.58
Newly-appointed French commissioners Philippe Roume, IgnaceFrédéric de Mirbeck, and Edmond Saint-Léger had arrived in Cap-Français in
November 1791, though they did not last long. However, around that time news
also arrived that the 15 May decree that provided juridical and political equality
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for free people of color had been supplanted in the metropole. While mulattoes in
North affiliated with Gérard negotiated a peace treaty after this announcement, it
instead plunged the tenuous stability between whites and free people of color in
the Cul-de-Sac region back into open turmoil. These conflicts in West featured free
people of color who increasingly relied upon the military labor of their own slaves.
While this mobilization differed distinctly from open revolt, they were
nevertheless an irreversible precedent of popular empowerment. This represented
a frightful precedent to local political and economic elites in West who hoped to
avoid replicating the slave uprisings of North. Soon thereafter in Spring 1792,
though not in direct correlation, both Léogâne and the Cul-de-Sac witnessed tens
of thousands of slaves in open revolt under the leadership of Romaine la
Prophétesse (who may have been Dominican originally) and Hyacinthe,
respectively. The former was a man who took a female title of prophetess, held
mass in a church with an upside down cross, and claimed that the Virgin Mary
was his godmother who communicated directly to him in writing.59 The latter of
the two later became an outlier as a black auxiliary of Spain in the Cul-de-Sac,
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though his brief but bold career was pocked with self-inflicted conundrums.60 By
the start of 1792 the regions surrounding Port-au-Prince began to resemble the
scorched plantations of North as West fell similarly into open social revolution.61
Despite the recent uptick in violence in West and from black insurgents in
North whose peace dealings with the French had failed, the thousands of black
rebels in Saint-Domingue under Biassou and Jean-François continued to respect
Dominican borders and Spanish interests. By that time General Herédia regularly
corresponded with the black “colonels” who increasingly sought Spanish
support.62 Through his contacts those relationships expanded and matured in
trust and intensity across 1792. García opined that the arrival of the French
Republic’s commissioners in Saint-Domingue had brought a much anticipated
slowdown to hostilities. Spanish officials welcomed this lull, and it eased their
immediate concerns of being sucked into direct warfare especially when they were
so short on funds.63
Only months later, in June 1792, news from Cap-Français indicated the
local implementation of the declaration of equality for mulattoes and free blacks
with whites, which Spanish officials saw as one of the fundamental and earliest
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points of discord that instigated the revolution. Thanks in part to the arrival of the
commissioners, whites and mulattoes began to negotiate again despite their
obvious recent tensions and with a great deal of mutual suspicion. While the
Republic focused on securing the cooperation of elite and middle sectors, the black
generals Biassou and Jean-François professed their doubts about the lasting
success of the decree, and postulated that if the free colored people aligned with
the whites that they would quickly lose any support from among the blacks. 64 That
is, Biassou and Jean-François seemed to logically conclude that mobilized and
newly-politicized slaves would expect to share in the benefits of a peace
agreement, and that without addressing their interests the Republic would only
further lose traction among the majority of rebels – the black masses. Earlier
attempts at a compromise with the French had nearly caused a mutiny from
among their ranks as the self-liberated ex-slave troops felt that their gains were
jeopardized, and that they might never trust promises from the French anyway.
Additionally, Biassou and Jean-François specifically doubted that rebel
leaders could trust or ever strike an accord with the Assembly and Commissioners.
García, who was well aware of this, understood that this fundamental tensions
between the armed slaves and the French, who represented many of their former
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masters, would never be resolved, and that Biassou and Jean-François would likely
never agree to terms with the Republic. García analyzed the new status of slave
rebels in Saint-Domingue, saying, “These men since the day in which they took up
arms against their owners and masters have lived with an imponderable liberty,
they have named captains, colonels, brigadiers,” and have lived unlike blacks
typically did. He was certain that such blacks would not easily resubmit to the
yoke of servitude.65 The black insurgents’ negotiations with the French for a peace
had already completely failed by January 1792, and were confirmed when JeanFrançois attacked Ouanaminthe that month.66
Because of mounting cross-island tensions between Spanish and French
officials, García also suspended the extradition of a mulatto named Louis Guedey
from Santo Domingo to French custody until he was assured of a peaceable state
on the border in Saint-Domingue. The nature of his case is unclear, however, what
the Guedey case does show is that Spanish officials were increasingly cautious
about who, exactly, was finding their way into Dominican territory and which
political faction such prisoners’ rendition into Saint-Domingue might benefit most.
Beyond human movement García criticized the invasive, “public papers…always
satirical and scathing [that] continue speaking with arrogance,” and remitted
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copies of the Moniteur General de la Partie Française de Saint-Domingue and a
proclamation by Blanchelande to prove his point.67
In June 1792 Archbishop Portillo remarked about similar encroachments
form the west, saying that, “each day to our side arrives more colonists from the
three parties,” which likely meant fugitives of the republican, royalist, and free
colored camps.68 Spanish officials had accepted more refugees for asylum, but
refused sanctuary to any perpetrators of violence.69 That same month, García was
surprised at the relative silence in Saint-Domingue surrounding the debate over
the decree for the equality of free people of color. Referring to the French he said,
“This silence, opposed to the character of this nation,” was tied to the, “sensible
pain caused by the equality of some men who they have always seen with
contempt, and that their hearts full of confusion and depression machinate new
discords.” To García and other elites in Santo Domingo the prospect of reshuffling
racial order had haphazardly chipped away at the foundation of social stability.70
Meanwhile, the slave insurgents of North continued their rebellion, and
had just burned more properties just outside of Fort Dauphin. Five subaltern
officers of the rebels gave a splendid celebratory banquet for their general Jean-
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François in Maribaroux, south of Fort Dauphin near Ouanaminthe.

García

explained that further south on the border, “In Mirebalais the mulattoes made a
fort in the highlands called Masicot, a gunshot away from the town, and have in
place three cannons and continue their active work.” Around Mirebalais the local
Dominguois mulattoes and whites held great suspicions of the insurgent blacks of
the Cul-de-Sac plain and the mountains of Grand Bois, likely troops of Hyacinthe. 71
In the roughly ten months since the slave revolts began open revolution had
splintered into varied, local fragments across Saint-Domingue, which by summer
1792 encompassed nearly the entire border region with Santo Domingo.
In hopes of procuring additional support, officials in Santo Domingo
praised the king’s magnanimity, piety, and attention to the dangerous situation on
the island where the influence of “new philosophers” and new laws formed a
threat that cascaded across the Atlantic from Bastille Day in Paris to the present
turmoil in Saint-Domingue.72 Spanish officials insisted that for the time being their
efforts had prevented the fervor from the French side from spreading to the
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Dominican populace and disturbing their domestic peace. 73

García again

reinforced garrisons on the frontier in spite of the spiraling costs. 74
In June 1792 Urízar recorded an interpretation of the “anarchy” in the
French colony from officials observing through the Dominican context for
metropolitan bureaucrats. He explained that, “dissensions of the mulattoes, free
blacks, and slaves with the whites have remained relentless, with major obstinacy
and tenacity.”

He noted the several treaties in place with white colonists,

including one from 14 April between those parties in Petite-Rivière and Artibonite
that contained nine articles, all substantially directed at the political rights of the
citizens of color. The whites and mulattoes of North did not respect the republican
officials and never handled strife over juridical equality with any semblance of
order, he thought. Another agreement between whites and the four parishes of
the Saint-Marc region came the week prior and featured the same objectives while
obligating armed slaves to return to plantations and obey their masters, which he
thought was nearly impossible.

Slaves rebels’ continued absences from

plantations provoked a new crisis for Saint-Domingue when food supplies
diminished.

Since many slaves were no longer working, and some sugar
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plantations had been converted to grow subsistence food. This latter provision, of
course, was unlikely to succeed, and Urízar was unsure of how the Republic could
proclaim peace since so many blacks were free on their own accord and had made
themselves rulers of their masters’ plantations. “This is the much vaunted French
liberty,” he retorted.75 The armed rebels under Jean-François had reacted severely
to his own attempts to negotiate a return to plantations with better conditions.
In contrast to this perceived French disorder, Urízar said that the proSpanish “black chiefs are demonstrating with us extraordinary attention and
utmost respect, and publicizing that they are addicts [to the Spanish cause] and
submissive to our will.” Some in Santo Domingo doubted these rebels’ professions
of love for Spain and the sustainability of their impressive successes. Spanish
officials bided their time to see how these “black chiefs” behaved and if they could
capture more territory before entertaining their loyalties in any formal sense.
Urízar himself speculated that these friendly rebels simply needed support and
had nowhere else to turn, while some of his colleagues more readily believed their
adherence to monarchism and Catholicism.76
Urízar elaborated on his hesitance toward the black chiefs, saying that in
March 1792, “One of their generals called Biasiu (sic), having brought himself up
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to our frontier of the southern part in company of the famous general in chief JeanFrançois, sent word to the commanding general…he sent a message with such
haughtiness, and at the presence of the official of our guard and troop, he
complained that we were assisting the whites, and denying the blacks.”77 Spanish
officials recoiled at Biassou’s seeming presumptuousness regarding Spanish
policy on aid, and quite preferred Jean-François’ more supplicant attitude. The
complaint Biassou made had most to do with the preferable Spanish treatment of
the French royalist refugees and those French whites who collaborated with Spain
either militarily or politically. Biassou and his troops were far more potent
military, the black general seemed to have forgotten that whatever furtive contact
and support Spain gave them, and they remained second-class allies because there
was no official state of war between France and Spain. It was impossible to openly
acknowledge the black rebels whereas it was quite easily justifiable for Spain to
welcome and affirm desperate or collaborative French whites.
Urízar had taken exception with Biassou’s appeals, yet, Dominicans and
Spanish officers along the border still generally enjoyed favorable interactions
with the blacks.

Nevertheless, after that heated exchange Spanish officials

dispatched two more companies of the Cantabria regiment to secure that border
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area, perhaps as an insurance policy in case Biassou changed his mind about the
utility of his informal friendly ties to Spain. Urízar did express a difference
between the two black generals, saying, “We have recognized in the mentioned
General Jean-François the greatest affection and respect to the Spanish at all times
and cases.” 78
For example, a few days earlier a black Dominican man had gone to the
border at Dajabon to give two horses a drink. At that same spot was a soldier who
fought with Jean-François who then took the horses. Whether this was theft, or a
gift, was unclear, though Spanish officials assumed the former. If the black
Dominican was independently abetting the rebels he likely did not try to tell them
otherwise. This interaction transpired while a Spanish soldier who was supposed
to have been on guard was bathing nearby in the river.

Spanish officers

immediately complained to Jean-François who then investigated that matter,
arrested a suspect, and even sent the prisoner to the Spanish. Jean-François then
issued threats of harsh punishment, including execution, to any of his soldiers who
committed “insults” against Spanish interests.
Economic conditions on the French side of the island were even more dire,
as intelligence filtered into Santo Domingo that a trade had arisen between certain
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French planters and Jamaican merchants, in which those in Saint-Domingue
would sell their slaves for British food, money, and arms. This foray, Urízar
feared, came due to a growing British desire to capitalize on the unrest and take
Saint-Domingue from the French.79 Aside from possible French aggressions, the
specter of British interference daunted Spanish officials. Growing contraband
trade, including between Spanish subjects and the black insurgents, began to
bolster distinct war efforts among competing parties in Saint-Domingue.
Urízar assured the metropole that he and other officials would conserve
order in Santo Domingo even if they did have to rely upon support from Havana,
San Juan, and Caracas.80 This reliance was never particularly popular in Cuba,
Puerto Rico, Venezuela, or any other neighboring Spanish colony.

The

economically languid colonists of Santo Domingo could not fund their own
defense. Santo Domingo regularly siphoned hundreds of thousands of muchneeded pesos from Mexico to support Spanish military buildup. 81 Chronic cash
shortages, exorbitant expenses, and overreliance upon neighboring Spanish
colonies would all increase exponentially in the ensuing two years. These were
problems that only compounded existing infiltration of unrest through radical
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publications, politicized refugees, and the constant contact of Dominican border
residents with revolution next door.

ARRAYS OF ROYALISM THROUGH LATE 1792
On 15 June 1792 the French general and royalist sympathizer Monsieur de
Rouvray, having recently retaken Ouanaminthe, appeared at Dajabon with four
planters, four mulatto captains, and the priest of Trou parish. This delegation
asked Spanish officials permission to have Dominican locals print copies of the
new declaration of equality for free people of color along with other documents
for public circulation. In particular, this group sought to attract the return and
support of French refugees in Santo Domingo, including gens de couleur, for whom
they had drafted a special proclamation. Another document was a decree from
Blanchelande. The Rouvray party also sent letters to García which included a plan
to retake all of Saint-Domingue. In these letters they complained against Spanish
officials on the border who had helped and consorted with the insurgents, and yet
another request for Spain to side with the French military efforts to suppress the
revolution. Spanish dealings with the black insurgents were no longer secret, and
drew the great indignation of French whites, both republican and royalist.
Rouvray then asked his mulatto companions in this entourage to visit a separate,
specific building nearby in Dajabon to appeal to those “of their own class” and
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color who apparently congregated there.

Herédia flatly denied all of their

requests. He found Rouvray and his mulatto colleagues to be ostentatious and
pretentious, and refused to print foreign political documents in Dominican
presses. On the one hand, Rouvray’s envoy reminded Spanish officials of the
turmoil surrounding the Ogé case. On the other hand, their impression of growing
incompetence and dissension in Saint-Domingue prompted them to more
proactively ponder how to position themselves against a British takeover there,
which seemed increasingly possible.82 Tensions between French and Spanish
officials on the island had become inflamed by not only the lack of inter-imperial
support, but of course by the quasi-affiliations constructed between Spanish
officers and top black generals. Rouvray was rightfully concerned about the proxy
war that Spain had positioned itself to wage against his and his allies’ interests,
managing operations from the Dominican borders deep into Saint-Domingue
through newfound allies. Soon enough this specter haunting French whites would
become much more real.
For example, roughly two months after this confrontation with Rouvray
the black general Jean-François was back in control of Ouanaminthe. There he
moved to bolster his defenses against another French assault near the border by
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rearranging the placements of five cannons. “Boliu” and the mulattoes resisted
this move and tried to capture the cannons and a redoubt to undercut the growing
local power of these black rebels. Jean-François reacted by attacking this position,
taking cannons, and killing about 50 mulattoes and free blacks arrayed against
him, and he pursued those who fled to “make them feel the lack of obedience to
their General Jean-François.”

García was convinced that every day Saint-

Domingue tried to destroy itself.83
In October 1792 García also reported on the recent arrival in Cap-Français
of the new interim governor, Desparbès, three new civil commissioners, and 6,000
additional French troops, all to reestablish the order against the black insurgents.
These new units were preparing an attack against the blacks at Ouanaminthe,
specifically. Of course, with the proximity to the Spanish side this violence would
certainly impact Santo Domingo. He thought that Ouanaminthe was the primary
fixation for French officials at that moment because of its great concentration of
important rebels. What he did not mention, though, was that it was also a critical
transit point through which insurgents could deal with sympathetic Spanish
officials or willing Dominican trade partners.84 About half of these new troop
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arrivals would die before the close of 1792. At best, the temporary governor was
ephemeral in his impact. However, two of the three new commissioners – Etienne
Polverel and Léger Félicité Sonthonax – would soon contribute to some of the most
pivotal events and enduring legacies of the entire revolution.85
By that time about 11,000 troops in total had arrived from France to
support the Republic on the island, García estimated. In response, Jean-François
busily attempted to unite politically disparate and geographically dispersed black
rebels. He sought to meet their detachments, coordinate fortifications in various
localities, and await French attacks to collectively defend what he thought was
their just cause. Jean-François’ forces, which nearly totaled those of the French
armies he fought, had recently put fire to the few homes and haciendas that had
remained in the plains between Ouanaminthe and Cap-Français. This was a
deliberate strategy to clear the countryside and ease their observation of French
army maneuvers. Jean-François’ tactics consciously exposed French troops to the
“strength of the sun” by day, and the “excessive humidity of the night,” to which
the slave insurgents were far better acclimatized, and García complimented JeanFrançois’ efforts as, “orders of skill uncommon to the rusticity of the black…from
an intelligence in the art of war.” He trusted Herédia’s wisdom of border affairs,
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implicitly including whatever discrete ties he had to the black insurgents. 86 The
admiration with which Spanish officials observed Jean-François signaled not only
their increasing trust in his character and abilities, but the strategic importance of
his skill to their own geopolitical ambitions.
Regardless of Jean-François’ preparations, by 7 November 1792 the French
army had overrun Ouanaminthe and driven the blacks out who were friendly to
Spain. The newly-arrived General Rochambeau had commanded this expedition
with 1,300 soldiers and cavalry, having had one column advance from TerrierRouge and the other from Fort Dauphin. By that evening forces of the Republic
had raised the French tri-colore flag over the turret that the rebels had constructed
in the steeple of the town’s church, a marker of local military and political change
that was highly visible from the Spanish side. Herédia observed the battle,
mobilized Spanish forces, and watched the numerous fires rage. He and García
were surprised at the weak rebel defense of Ouanaminthe. Many black rebels died
in the attack, and many more fled up into the mountains to avoid pursuing French
troops.

On 9 November Rochambeau wrote to Spanish officers and then

personally visited Dajabon. He was accompanied by Monsieur Pouget, a colonial
intendant, and other avowed citizens of the Republic, who all pleaded with the

Joaquín García to Diego de Gardoqui, Santo Domingo, 25 October 1792, AGI-SD, leg. 1030,
no.330.
86

239

Spanish officials to return any blacks that passed to their side to their respective
French owners.87 Apparently many of Jean-François’ troops had fled into the
safety of Dominican territory in retreat from Rochambeau. Compared to the
relative conviviality of their recent occupying neighbors – the rebels under JeanFrançois – Spanish officers were met with, and also returned, frosty suspicion with
their French republican counterparts.
That month Spanish troops on the frontier near San Rafael witnessed the
black rebels near the line reinforcing their defensive sites and enhancing security
measures in response to the widespread French offensive.

New military

operations pushed new refugees across the frontier. García reported that on 27
October a group of “144 free mulattoes of both sexes” approached the line at
Villarubia, “asking for asylum in our lands to free themselves from the fury of the
black rebels.” They were admitted, and then escorted to Marmelade to stay with
the white refugees there. This newfound persecution of both the mulattoes and
free blacks transpired because these groups had aligned themselves with the camp
of the well-known mulatto named “Raimundo” at the Seynet plantation near Haut
de Trou. This was not the famed Julien Raimond, who was actually in France at
the time. Allegedly this Raimundo, and 300 people “of his color”, passed toward
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Marmelade to deliver black slaves to the whites in conformity with supposed
secret treaties. “The black slaves, vigilant and attentive of conserving their liberty,
understood the conspiracy of their commander and…took measures to encircle
and attack…making most mulattoes pay with their lives for the treason.” That is,
in accordance with new white and mulatto peace treaties and power-sharing
agreements Raimundo had tried to return ex-slave black soldiers into bondage
with their old masters, which of course backfired.

The mulatto Raimundo

demonstrated his bravery by, “sustaining combat until his forces were reduced to
twenty-five men.” After this battle the black rebels persecuted the routed ancien
libres with great enthusiasm as the free people of color fled to Marmelade where
the whites received them.88 These brutal conflicts further signified the increasingly
irreparable relations between ex-slave combatants and those mulattoes or free
blacks who had made accords with the Republic.
By December 1792 French efforts to re-enslave rebels had proven more
effective in Ouanaminthe, which they had recently re-occupied, than in most other
places. Four warships had arrived in the harbor at Cap-Français enforced the
decree of equality for the mulattoes. Both measures, in concert, were an attempt
to resolidify the French racial regime over labor, while simultaneously opening
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their ruling ranks to powerful gens de couleur, all toward forming a new French
colonial order. Some Spanish observers suspected that the “patriotic” forces that
Rochambeau had rallied would support the mulattoes in any potential struggle
that might result from recalcitrant whites, and that his presence and actions would
further erode the old grand blanc political positions.89
At the close of 1792 the social revolution in Saint-Domingue was even
farther from resolution than twelve months prior. At the imperial level, French
forces were perhaps in less control, Spain awaited open warfare with the French
and had grown more tied to friendly rebels under the direction of Jean-François
and Biassou. All the while Britain pondered their own prospects for direct
involvement in the warfare. Dozens of Spanish troops in Dajabon and San Rafael
who were supposed to protect the borders had fallen very ill, just as their French
adversaries had in the inhospitable climate and unfamiliar disease vector, which
made soldiers born into locales with these physical vexations, including local black
insurgents, all the more durable in combat.

Slave rebels themselves were

frequently divided on strategy. For one, García thought that the black leaders of
all rebel bands were finally coming to terms with their precarious lack of funds,
and their disparate variety of motivations. Implicitly he thought, and hoped, it
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might yield the black insurgents greater unity. 90 The following year brought
drastic realignments not only in black allegiances, particularly with Spain, but also
direct Spanish and British military engagement, all of which contributed to the
conditions for the French republican commissioners in Saint-Domingue to abolish
slavery.

IMPERIAL REALIGNMENT FROM SOCIAL RUPTURES: EARLY 1793
In January 1793 García fretted over the expanding public debates in CapFrançais concerning liberty for slaves, which he described as, “taking in one hand
the wick, and in the other the revolution for this new world, they put into
execution the perfidious ideas that the French Revolution expressed in its first
public papers.” Across 1793 this debate would expand into piecemeal French
action. As García and Spanish officials had feared, these strident discussions of
emancipation had developed from the logical extension of rights discourses.
Rochambeau wrote García to explain his newest operations against the blacks, and
he and Pouget sent García various decrees from the National Assembly. One of
these documents included the news that the French National Assembly had just
recently abolished royal privilege and had declared national unity and the
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indivisibility of the French Republic, which shocked Spanish officials.91 This antimonarchism was yet another clear indicator of the political dividing lines
developing between Spain and France. As France raced toward egalitarianism and
undoing traditional social structures, officials in Santo Domingo retrenched into
Hispanic concepts of, religion, social virtue, corporatism, and crown.
At the end of January 1793 French troops had recently extended their
offensive against rebel blacks near the southern border close to Neiba. French
regular forces also recaptured Dondon from pro-Spanish black insurgents without
much bloodshed. The insurgents, under orders from Jean-François, moved on to
regroup on the mountain of Tatiel. Rochambeau left North for Martinique in midJanuary, as did a voyage of 120 delegates affiliated with the renegade Assembly of
Saint-Marc who were subsequently sent to France for having caused such political
rifts in the colony. His departure was likely a small strategic gain for JeanFrançois. More importantly, news had also just arrived that France had declared
war on Britain, Holland, and Spain. Among the fear of looming open warfare
between Spain and France, García discovered that the Republic was more
proactively trying to win over the black insurgents that had been interacting so
favorably with Spanish officials. If Jean-François were to unify with the French,
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their hardened and accomplished forces could pivot eastward with an all-out
attack on the Dominican side of the island, a dire prospect for Spanish rule.92 This
provided all the more reason for Spanish officials to court the black insurgents.
By March 1793 the majority of the recent outcomes of conflicts in SaintDomingue had favored the French Republic. The insurgents had suffered a major
setback with heavy casualties at Fond-Parisien in West near the border, which
García said, “had obliged them to retire into the mountains.” Amid heightened
tensions across the island, Spanish forces seized a ship that allegedly was in transit
to Hanus de Jumécourt, who was the mayor of Croix-des-Bouquets, a previously
conservative planter, and the “protector of the blacks,” as García called him. The
ship was loaded with war materiel including 800 rifles, 100 blunderbusses, 600
swords, 400 pistols, and huge quantities of powder and ammunition. The captain
of the intercepted ship explained that he had left from North America with an
order to deliver this equipment to Jumécourt and the black general Hyacinthe. 93
Jumécourt was rumored to be a clairvoyant among some black insurgents and had
at times coordinated with both free people color and Hyacinthe, the major black
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insurgent leader of the Cul-de-Sac.94 With shortages across the island insurgents
collected resources and support from wherever they could find it.
Royalists in Santo Domingo were shocked by news in March from the
gazettes of Saint-Domingue that had finally published stories on the regicide of
Louis XVI in Paris, whose “disgraced death” had occurred on 21 January. García
observed that, “since that sad news arrived one observed a great suspension of
arms against the blacks,” and the French had augmented their activities in
Ouanaminthe, seemingly implying that French whites themselves were in a
political disequilibrium from this news. It was as of yet unclear to him how the
death of the king had impacted the mulattoes and blacks. 95 The shockwaves of
outright regicide would heavily influence the coalescence of the nascent Spanish
counterrevolution, including an increased exodus of militant French royalists into
the Spanish camp, and the perhaps under-anticipated continued gravitation of
monarchist black rebels toward Spain as well.
After the death of Louis XVI fears of brutal and devastating open warfare
with France mounted for García, who awaited the Republic’s offensive to seize the
Spanish side. He reported that, “The sad news of the unfortunate death of the king
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caused the greatest dread, horror, and emotion in all sensible subjects who view
the French Revolution as a scourge and want to get away from that colony and all
those who follow the…republic.” With this latest episode of exemplary republican
violence, the flow of refugees into Santo Domingo increased dramatically. With
the prospect open, inter-imperial, cross-island warfare, “the civil commissioner
Santonax [sic] with his companion Polverel published a decree of pardon to all the
blacks who surrender their arms and deliver themselves to the nation, with
professions of being well-received, treated with humanity, and forgetting their
criminal actions.”96 These French commissioners also understood quite well that
open war between Spain and the Republic could also mean that developing ties
between the most powerful black rebels and their rivals in the east would only
grow, and to their great detriment. French arms would open wider to the rebels
incrementally throughout 1793. A year and a half after the initial slave revolts, the
black insurgents under Jean-François had quickly become sought after imperial
personnel assets.
Despite the apparent olive branch of this pardon, black generals had a
very difficult time believing that any French offers were in good faith. They were
fearful of imprisonment, reenslavement, or even death if they acquiesced to their
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former imperial masters, and well-remember their treatment during the
negotiations from November 1791 to January 1792 that failed so miserably. García
was relieved the black insurgents’ hesitated, and that they had interpreted the
French commissioners’ offers as belated opportunism and desperation.
Furthermore, dissent was rife among French troops. Their French garrison at
Ouanaminthe was so displeased with republican military officials that it hinted at
allying with the Spanish in the case of war between the Republic and Spain.
Perhaps this was due to their latent monarchist nostalgia or lack of trust in the
already-volatile Republic trying to managed a ruined sugar colony.97
García noted that, “the civil commissioners have dispatched three
deputies – a mulatto and two whites – to General Biasou (sic) with advantageous
propositions for ceasing with his ideas, recognizing his flaws, and passing to the
party of the Republic.” To García’s great relief, Biassou did not listen, and instead
“manifested his love for the Spanish nation with expressions worthy of
gratitude.”98 That spring, Archbishop Portillo mentioned his clergy’s enlistment
to emphasize the greater freedom, stability, and satisfaction of serving Spain as
part of direct spiritual counsel with governmental backing to Jean-François and
the black troops. For this noble cause he had “given them his vicar at Dajabon,”
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Father Vázquez.

This was, he concurred, a prudent contribution toward

governing the “five-hundred or six-hundred thousand” blacks on the island, and
that such mercy might moderate their alleged bad faith, insolence, and violence.
Portillo said he had thought of this as a solution as early as December 1791 to
"achieve greater progress in a glorious recuperation, availing ourselves of the
forces of blacks," referring to the alliance with Jean-François’ forces to reconquer
the whole island and triumph over the Republic. He hoped Spain could somehow
spiritually rehabilitate and utilize troops that were now content to, he said, “sit
under a tree to eat, drink whatever is closest to their voices, and kill a man to get
a plantain.”99 This extremely negative impression changed rapidly into affection
and praise the longer that Vázquez knew Jean-François and his troops.
Jean-François had to frequently deal with competing bands within his
force that often divided on ethnic lines. Given the demographic dominance of
Kongolese and Angolan captives in the North of Saint-Domingue, many of his
troops were from these African cultural backgrounds. This was the foundation
from which the Kongo-born general Macaya famously proclaimed himself the
subject of the kings of Kongo, France, and Spain, also a veiled reference to the three
magi who visited the Christ child. Given the extensive Portuguese presence in
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both locales over the preceding two centuries, which their evangelical efforts to
convert African populations to Catholicism and the establishment of a separate
Kongolese church hierarchy. Perhaps many of the black auxiliary troops had at
least been exposed to Christian ideas that they internalized or incorporated to their
extant spiritual repertoire.

Just as many insurgents already had military

experience from civil warfare in Africa, many also entered the revolution wielding
longstanding understandings of royalism and Christianity.100
When Biassou declared himself the “chief of the counterrevolution” and
promised to serve heaven and religion it was in protection of these traditions from
the unproven ideas of a self-immolating republic, and from a French populace that
had so recently brutalized them and separated them from their homes.101 Biassou
also included “sorcerers and magicians” in his circle of advisors who were likely
vodouizan, and included symbols of African spirituality on his domicile. 102 Perhaps
his professions of Catholicism seemed disingenuous. More likely, he saw them as
compatible cosmologies.
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As summer approached in 1793 the clouds of war gathered along the
frontier, the necessity of formally recognizing and supporting the steadfast and
cooperative black forces of Jean-François and Biassou became obvious for Spain,
to block French advances both among those ranks, to defend from incursions into
Spanish territory, to further disrupt the French social experiment, and to retake
productive land lost a century before to France. Thus, as soon as word of open
warfare with France arrived, and with approval of the king and his ministers, JeanFrançois, Biassou, Toussaint Breda, and the black insurgents of North, and
Hyacinthe in the West, became the Black Auxiliaries of King Carlos IV, a
formalized ally in the unfolding revolution on Hispaniola.103

BLACK AUXILIARIES, SPANISH PLURALITY: SUMMER 1793
In June 1793 Spanish officials wanted to deflect what they saw as the
incredible confusion of four years of political and social upheaval that had befallen
Saint-Domingue. They decried the civil dissensions that had produced a tyranny
that ignored authority through uprisings, deaths, and burnings, all of which had
driven away much of the planter class and their capital. Many French attempts to
put down the slave revolts failed, in part due to Spain steadily refusing to help.
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When Rochambeau’s forces had dislodged insurgents from Ouanaminthe, the
commander at Dajabon had basically ignored his request that Spanish troops
surrender any fugitive blacks who crossed into Santo Domingo. Insurgents had
fled to Santo Domingo, and some were apprehended, but the process of remitting
these captives back to Saint-Domingue was circuitous, and the incentives were few
for even bothering with such cases. Averting the imperial gaze was geopolitically
and bureaucratically advantageous. One of the aforementioned problems was that
the French offered many excellent enticements to compete with Spain for the
loyalties of the black rebels. As García explained, the blacks who had as of then
yielded to the Catholic deity, “as the Lord touches them, and their persons belong
to him, their care, protection, and courtesy will be instructed in the Christian
doctrine, and employed with utility.”104

Of course, to García this was

geopolitically providential. As the ties between the Spanish and friendly black
insurgents became formalized their hope was that overtures toward Christianity
would mature into full-fledged Catholic piety.
García postulated that one path toward restoring social stability might be
for French masters to sell recalcitrant and susceptible slaves who were not yet in
rebellion to Spanish planters, whose dedication to fair treatment and Christianity,
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he said, would lead to greater submission and social peace. He thought this could
limit more revolts and curb social complications such as marronage. García also
determined that any unclaimed fugitive slaves from Saint-Domingue could be sold
at “public auction” in Santo Domingo with the funds put in the royal coffers, and
thus the war effort. He claimed that no such slave would be sold without due
diligence in recording their “signs” or brandings, stature, age, characteristics, and
a declaration, even if it was in the “creole of Guinea” that they might speak. García
said that before such a sale Spanish officials would also document owners of such
slaves, the part of Saint-Domingue in which they lived, the specific plantation, the
slaves’ labor specializations, and other details. 105 Perhaps paradoxically, JeanFrançois and Biassou also sold slaves deemed unhelpful or unfit into Santo
Domingo as payment for weapons and supplies.106 These newly-arrived slaves
might have confirmed to Spain that they could be integrated into peacability in
Santo Domingo. While the Spanish opportunistically built their ties to ex-slave
rebels, they also cynically captured fugitive slaves fleeing the same conditions that
the insurgents fought directly, and did so only with the clear rationale of profit,
with both contradictory engagements being justified through evangelical
vocabularies. To some extent Spain executed this plan by capturing unaffiliated
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black insurgents as prisoners of war and selling them to either Dominican planters
or transporting them off the island to toil on nearby Spanish plantation colonies.
As formal Spanish war plans formed, in July 1793 officials in Santo
Domingo reviewed alarming secret papers provided to them by a new French
defector at Dajabon. Apparently, as García explained, these were, “premeditations
of the civil commissioners [of Saint-Domingue] to unite sea and land forces with
desire to have a landing in Ocoa,” under the protection of French naval warships.
This coastal town, on a bay roughly fifty miles west of the capital, would put
French troops within an easy march on Santo Domingo. García wondered if these
leaked documents might have been a ploy by the commissioners to stir Dominican
fear or dissent in favor of the Republic, and to pry away the loyalties of new black
allies like Jean-François. García made an intriguing distinction between their new
blacks allies and the slave insurgents aligned with the French Republic, the latter
who he said were of “indefensible character” and indolent, of whose
“birth…distinguishes them from all men of rational principals and...permits them
to commit all the villainies and unjust actions.” By contrast, the black auxiliaries
had proven their diligence despite French enticements of the, “many proclamation
papers that the civil commissioners have running in favor of the mulattos and free
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blacks, and even the insurgent blacks.” Such papers had already made a great
political commotion, and circulated widely into Santo Domingo.107
In response, Spanish officials had issued their own proclamations from
Santo Domingo targeting potential sympathizers in Saint-Domingue. Each day
new French refugees arrived in Dajabon seeking asylum, “and manifesting lively
desires to fight against the captious…enemies of human society and religion.”
One such partisan, the “gentleman” Dugres, offered a corps of French royalists
who were appalled by the revolution and positioned at Marmelade. They had
been attracted by proclamations – Spanish public papers – and pledged to serve
the King of Spain with their abilities.108 In July French royalists described antiRepublic gains in North, which they partly credited to the proclamations that
García had made. Unallied parties there openly debated whether the King of
Spain or the French commissioners could offer more or could be better trusted. 109
García also noted that his proclamations had started drawing in subjects from the
French side, many whom would soon fight under Spanish flags and with Spanish
salaries.110
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That summer, García celebrated Jean-François’ loyalty, “compliments of
his words of being a true Spaniard.” 111 First, in early June the archbishop was
concerned about the loyalty of Hyacinthe, who some priests on the frontier had
suspected of cutting deals behind Spain’s back, though he was pleased to have
been assured of his loyalty. Father Vázquez also reported that Jean-François,
whose thousands of troops had just been supplied with new weapons by Spain,
received overtures from French republican General Galbaud.

Jean-François

rejected these offers very publicly, gave “a fierce response,” and insisted that all
his troops were passionately for Spain. He speculated that relations with France
were irreconcilable for the black general, whose loyalty, “is the most solid
foundation you can secure from a black.” Spanish officials then gave Jean-François
an impressive new general’s uniform. To solidify these ties, Portillo had ordered
his priests on the borderlands to welcome the black troops, treat them well, give
them care, and inspire their affection. The archbishop closed his letter by relaying
his plans to preach against the French the next day in Santo Domingo.112
The temptations of Jean-François were far from completed.

The

recruitment letter that Jean-François had handed over in June had come from the
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mulatto Martin Sessesa, commander of pro-Republic forces around Terrier-Rouge.
As a token of trust Jean-François passed it, unopened, to Father José Vázquez, a
humble, respectable operative for Catholic and Spanish order on the frontier. It
included some information of interest from the civil commissioners. In the letter
sent by Sessesa, Sonthonax decried Jean-François’ loyalty to Spain, criticized
monarchism, and predicted that Jean-François would ultimately die on the wrong
and losing side.

None of this provocative rhetoric swayed Jean-François,

particularly because of Vázquez, who García described as, “the principal spring of
Jean-François and [his people], a zealous ecclesiastic, active, full of a love that
merits the greatest considerations, and has made himself worthy since the first
moment of the appreciation and distinction of this Captain General, and by
consequence should merit that of you and of the King.”113
In this case, when Vázquez learned of rumors that Jean-François had
received overtures from the civil commissioners and might waver in his loyalty,
Vázquez immediately galloped on horseback directly to Jean-François’ camp. He
told Jean-François of his concerns, which apparently surprised the general. After
the general pledged his loyalty to Spain on his knees before the priest, the two
moved on to discuss the black general’s plans to retake Ouanaminthe.114 This
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pairing of Jean-François and Vázquez – the ex-slave from Saint-Domingue and
mulatto priest from Santo Domingo – formed a previously improbable yet
dynamic military, ideological, and political tandem that characterized Spain’s
intervention in Saint-Domingue’s social revolution.
After these French offers and rumors about his loyalty, Jean-François tried
to vigorously prove the sincerity of his friendship and allegiance to the Spanish
throne. He sent one of his closest aides to visit García and submit a letter
explaining his respect, submission, and affection for the governor and the king.
On the first day of July at eleven in the morning two black officers – “Bernardino”
and the interpreter “Pedro”, or likely Bernardin and Pierre – appeared in Santo
Domingo. There they met García, who reported that they respectfully presented
him with the credentials of Jean-François and proclaimed their gratitude for
Vázquez. After a visit they departed for their inn, citing their need to rest. García
reflected that these men were faithful and clever, and that a, “great presence
adorns Bernardin, with a pleasant and good mode of expression that belies the
stain covering his body.

He is fine in his demonstrations, and has much

moderation. The secretary and interpreter, called Pedro, is lively, insightful, and
boisterous. He understands some Spanish, and one knows that there is liveliness
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in his mind, but he is attentive to the orders of Bernardin.”115 García’s compliments
for these black officers emphasized the progression of the black auxiliaries into a
trusted status that transcended the “stain” of their race and skin color, as he put it,
and further distinguished them from non-aligned or unallied black rebels in SaintDomingue. To García and others, their decency was due in no small part to
spiritual uplift and moral improvement.
In the summer of 1793 Spanish officials on the island also determined to
formally outfit the black auxiliaries with uniforms, a major symbol of their formal
alliance. Soon thereafter Vázquez informed García that Jean-François had, as a
gesture of conformity and reciprocity, “resolved to marry himself and because of
this sent his fiancée to Dajabon to protect her from the attacks and calamities of
the war.” Jean-François, “asked permission to realize his proposal and live in the
security of his conscience.” Archbishop Portillo and Governor García both asked
Vázquez to perform the marriage and to treat Jean-François’ fiancée with
distinction to thereby win over more of Jean-François’ respect and loyalty through
lavish treatment. Toward this end, Spanish officials in the capital sent silk and
stockings for the bride and provided new blue cloth and golden braids for JeanFrançois and his officers. Not surprisingly, costs of the counterrevolution soared.
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This was due not only for the new black allies but also for French royalist émigrés,
some of whom ironically used to be the slaveholders of the black auxiliary troops,
which incurred a separate range of problems in the esprit de corps.116 Officials in
Santo Domingo appreciated his salute to the sacraments and the enhancement of
their vows of alliance.

Jean-François benefited from his voluntary Catholic

conformity, but in so doing affirmed the Spanish narrative of civilizing piety.
Also that July an officer at the Dajabon border, Luis Quero, suspended
several French immigrants from participating in combat. The émigrés were to
form their own force, primarily because of irreconcilable differences with the black
auxiliaries.

Still, the royalist refugees refused to treat the black troops like

anything other than slaves. In turn, the black auxiliaries accused French royalists
of not acting in good will and only fighting with the Spanish out of necessity – not
conviction – and warned that these whites might turn against Spain in the future.
One suggestion that Jean-François fielded was to put the whites on the border at
Las Cahobas where there were then no black auxiliary troops.117
Despite heeding these concerns and tightening their ties with the
auxiliaries, the Archbishop nevertheless lamented the slow progress that García
had made in his command of the Reconquista of Saint-Domingue. Contrary to
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García’s depictions of dedicated Spanish support, Portillo had received many
letters from Vázquez and Jean-François about bad pay, poor conditions, short
supplies, and limited munitions that all hampered the black auxiliaries’ military
efforts. They were left alone with their faith and politics to confront their enemy.
He praised Jean-François’s loyalty, who kept successfully fighting despite this. 118
This was but one of many examples in which the church shadowed the state as a
political and intelligence network.

INTERNECINE TENSIONS & THE RISE OF TOUSSAINT
As white royalists continued fleeing eastward, Sonthonax consistently
tried to persuade the black auxiliaries to join the French Republic by offering to
significantly increase officers’ pay, including double for higher ranks, along with
abundant provisions. Although Jean-François had affirmed his loyalty, García
fretted over the black general, “Biasou (sic) [who] has given some signs of
inconstancy…but Colonel Joaquín Cabrera had procured a valorous and loyal
black named Toutsaunt (sic), who fought under the orders of Biasou, and if he
faltered could direct his army.”119 On one level, this was one of the earliest and
most significant mentions of Toussaint Breda in Spanish records. Toussaint, a man

118

Portillo, 1 July 1793, AGI-SD, leg. 1031.

119

Joaquín García, 14 July 1793, AGI-SD, leg. 1031, no.124.

261

who was freed long before the revolution, had joined Spain before Jean-François
or Biassou, though he fought under them, and in August 1793 he adopted the new
surname Louverture, “the opening”, as his revolutionary nom de guerre. Toussaint
Louverture became the common denominator among the flamboyant egos of the
Spanish-affiliated black auxiliaries following his rapid ascent as an officer and
adviser among their ranks.120
While García and others galvanized the black auxiliaries, new infighting
between mulattoes and ex-slaves erupted in North. General Galbaud attempted
to bolster the Republic’s forces with several warships and 150 merchant ships
stationed along the coast and the French commissioners were camped with 80 men
in a plain near Cap-Français reviewing the esprit de corps. Likewise, his counterpart
Jean-François toured the countryside distributing 4,000 pesos in an attempt to pay
and persuade his troops to remain a coherent and unified force.121 Soon thereafter
Spanish-affiliated forces took Dondon and Petit-Bois, thanks in large part to the
ingenuity of Toussaint. His troops had ambushed and captured a detachment of
over 70 troops of the Republic who were foraging for food and supplies. After
being searched one French soldier was found to be carrying a letter detailing dire
needs of the Republic’s troops in Dondon. Armed with intelligence regarding
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troop strength, Toussaint then rerouted his troops to attack the weakened enemy
at Dondon, taking the French forces in the area by total surprise and preventing
much bloodshed. In the victory Toussaint captured roughly 600 prisoners and all
of their weapons. As a gesture of gratitude, García sent him 400 pesos for his valor
and considered commending him with a gold medal as he had the three for JeanFrançois, Biassou, and Hyacinthe.122
The last mentioned – Hyacinthe – was somewhat of an outlier compared
to the other major black generals given his comparative youth (he was in his early
twenties, his regional base the Cul-de-Sac, not North), and his more open practice
of vodou (while the others, at least publicly, more readily professed a Catholicism).
Unlike Biassou, Jean-François, or Toussaint, Hyacinthe was more of a political
enigma who furtively played all anti-Republic sides, including the gens de couleur,
white royalists, and the Spanish.123 Also, unlike the other generals in North his ties
to Spain were handled by the experienced Dominican creole Ignacio Caro who
served García’s geopolitical agenda.124 Compared to the other three, who loom
large over the narrative of the war and Spanish involvement, the importance of
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Hyancinthe’s pro-Spanish influence in the Cul-de-Sac, thought brief, was
nevertheless critical to extending García’s influence into West.
In late July roughly 550 French troops supported by cannons attacked
Spanish positions in the hillsides of Petit-Bois.

Spanish forces rebuffed the

attackers after a thirteen-hour fight, and the ground was razed. The French
nevertheless kept a camp nearby.125

Into August 1793 the Havana battalion

maneuvered to support Jean-François’ offensives in the field.126 Subsequently,
droves of prisoners arrived in the capital from across the war front, which
produced an unanticipated crisis for Spanish management.

Most of these

prisoners were black and mulatto, and were far more politically radical than the
local population of color. They mostly hailed from Dondon, Tannerie, Petit-Bois,
San Rafael, and Banica. Only one thousand Spanish troops were actually in the
capital of Santo Domingo to manage crowd control.127
The only remaining option was for officials in Santo Domingo to export
their prisoners of war, and thus their political ferment, to neighboring Spanish
colonies for detention. In August 1793 Governor Creagh of Puerto Rico received
over 200 prisoners of war in a shipment. At least 14 of these enemy combatants
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were black and, unlike their mulatto or white counterparts, were to be sold at
auction as slaves.128 The sale of these 14 captives netted 2,149 pesos for the Spanish
treasury, or roughly equivalent to two-thirds of one day of Spain’s wartime
operations on the frontier of Hispaniola.129
That same month Jean-François continued to garner compliments from
Spanish officials for his rational and effective command, yet he firmly resisted
answering directly to the Spanish officers at Dajabon and insisted on answering
only to the governor directly. The governor called upon Jean-François to organize
his troops into regiments, companies, and squadrons, but that proved impossible.
Disorder, García thought, was the greatest impediment to the effective utilization
of their limited funds. He estimated that Jean-François had just over 6,600 troops.
Further complicating matters, Jean-François and all other black auxiliary
commanders had to confront new internal divisions and defections in the
aftermath of the proclamations of abolition made by the French commissioners in
August 1793.130 Almost a year passed from French general abolition to the first
major defections to the Republic. Slave insurgents loathed their former French
masters, were umimpressed with yet unproven republican government, were
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unswayed by arguments of natural rights, and were unlikely to trust and fight for
a state that had tried to crush their movement from its outset.131
Toussaint nevertheless continued his military successes as more white
émigrés – grand-blancs – were fleeing from the “despotism of the mulatto
commander” into Santo Domingo and joined Spanish ranks. Spanish forces were
also reinforced with “black émigrés” from Dondon who burned a municipal
building and a commander’s house, dislodged a French garrison, and took
cannons and munitions that the retreating forces abandoned. Spanish forces
sustained only one injury in this fight. Cabrera moved to take command of the
area, but in contrast to the black auxiliaries’ successes he was pinned down at San
Miguel with only 500 men and confronted by a French force of 1,200 under
Desforneaux. Spanish lines at Grand-Boucan were also attacked, but were held by
the valiant “Spanish blacks from Dondon.” The French sustained heavy casualties
there, with about sixty killed. Eight white prisoners were taken, three of which
the black auxiliaries decided to decapitate. Increasingly the mulatto parties sided
with the French Republic rather than remaining autonomous, but were hard for
the Republic to control. However, Spain had their own concerns, headlined by
their growing fears of inconstancy among the black auxiliaries. 132

131

Popkin, You Are All Free, 236,

132

Joaquín García, 23 August 1793, AGI-SD, leg. 1031, no.132.

266

In addition to these preoccupations, by the end of August 1793 García had
to beg for royal assistance in meeting the “extraordinary cost” of supplying their
troops along the frontier cordon. Soldiers lacked supplies. 133 Martin Mueses had
explained the problems to García, saying that many of those transporting foods to
the interior towns and troops were not trustworthy. They needed sound people
to supply the towns of Banica, Azua, Santiago, Monte Cristi, and other frontier
positions without incurring the attrition of graft and corruption.134
Spanish war efforts were compounded by what Archbishop Portillo called
the “United Provinces,” or crews from the newly-founded United States of
America. He criticized them as were the cruelest enemies on the seas, because
many sailed with phony papers from Martinique, took ships as prey, and
conducted them to New York and Philadelphia as prizes for resale. Portillo also
lamented the “French blacks” – apparently distinct from the black auxiliaries –
who he said were killing, burning, and pillaging at leisure. He complained bitterly
about the irreverent customs of the French royalists at San Rafael, whose town
priest informed him of their reprobate conduct that neither befit royalists nor
Spaniards.135

The Spanish were apt to believe and trust many of the black
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auxiliaries’ leadership because of their professions of piety, and were readily
suspicious of white French allies for behavior that seemed excessive, unholy, or
opportunistic. While Portillo complained about some of García’s strategies, he did
praise the diligent work of priests all along the frontier who kept the black soldiers
loyal and increased the socio-political trustworthiness of piety among their
ranks.136
That summer Spain also gained a huge symbolic victory when the
Marques d’Espenville agreed to defect to the Spanish side. Many powerful French
whites were further alienated from the Republic due to Sonthonax’s appointments
of mulattoes into elevated military and governmental ranks. However, the white
Frenchmen of Mirebalais were divided on whether they should join Spanish or
entertain other options. In the meantime, Spanish forces had made no progress
toward the conquest of Fort Dauphin.

The army was ill, injured, and

underequipped. To relieve pressure on depleted forces across the colony Spanish
officials sent 500 prisoners from the Dondon region to Caracas at the end of
August, again exporting the side effects of social revolution. 137
Through September 1793 discord continued to creep into the relationships
between Spanish officials and the black auxiliaries. Even worse, outright acrimony

136

Portillo, 25 August 1793, AGI-SD, leg. 1031.

137

Joaquín García, 25 August 1793, AGI-SD, leg. 1031, no.133.

268

beset ties between the top black generals. For example, García had no choice but
to accept Toussaint’s professions of contrition for his regular disobedience of the
Spanish operational plans. Perhaps more significantly, the rivalry and rift between
Jean-François and Biassou had only grown, which provided endless exasperation
for Toussaint, as did their respective personality traits. Part of the friction between
Jean-François and Biassou was over which of the two could claim superiority in
rank, talent, and success. This division grew after Spanish officials decided to
favor of Jean-François. García ultimately decided that Jean-François was first in
command, and that Biassou was the second highest-ranking officer among the
black auxiliaries.

Unsurprisingly, Biassou was furious while Jean-François

responded with submission and gratitude. Subsequently, both of the generals then
requested the arrest of their counterpart. Biassou sent an officer and a secretary
close to him to the governor to argue these points. 138 Not only did the black
auxiliaries expend an enormous amount of funds, their distractions over prestige
and comparative power pulled their attention away from organizing their
disparate forces and from defeating the surging French Republic in the field.
Spain’s Reconquista atrophied.
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FRENCH ABOLITION, SPANISH GAINS, FIRST DEFECTIONS: LATE 1793
The black general named Pierrot, who fought for the French civil
commissioners, added to the climate of mistrust when he wrote to Jean-François.
Pierrot told Jean-François that very few whites remained in North, and that people
of color were largely in governmental control. He tried to persuade Jean-François
to unite his forces under the “banner of liberty” of the Republic. Jean-François and
Toussaint both declined this most recent invitation, and as yet another sign of
loyalty Jean-François also placed this particular letter in the hands of Father
Vázquez, who in turn passed it to the commander of Dajabon.139 Pierrot and
Macaya, former black officers for Spain, were some of the earliest defectors who
helped the commissioners Sonthonax and Polverel put down a the internal threat
by Galbaud and French sailors in June 1793, one of the key impetuses for the
abolition decree. Even then, some defectors still preferred Spain, and held a thinlyveiled contempt for the Republic and commissioners. Macaya even returned to
Spanish forces. The most important black generals, including Toussaint, gave
scathing rejections of the commissioners and their emancipation and offers.
Furthermore, Jean-François even wrote a blistering reply to Pierrot’s letter in
which he lambasted him for trusting and collaborating with the French, and
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Toussaint arrested several envoys sent by the civil commissioners to entreat with
him.140
Very soon, though, more details of the French commissioners’ abolition
began to infiltrate the Dominican border following the 29 August decree.141 The 38
articles written by Sonthonax attempted to mesh newfound liberty for slaves with
the duty of service to the Republic. At first, Spanish officials doubted that this
decree would impact their loyal black troops, and even thought more of the French
commissioners’ troops might defect to their more formidable forces. However, the
mulattoes were firmly devoted to the French, and to celebrate the proclamation
they arranged a meeting with “Colonel Candi, black subaltern of Jean-François.”
Candi did not refuse these envoys as Toussaint and other officers had, and flanked
by a substantial escort these pro-French mulattoes tried to persuade Candi to
switch sides.142 If the French could not win over the major black generals, it seems
their backup plan was to pursue a campaign of debilitation by gradual attrition
among talented black officers who were comparatively overshadowed and might
– whether due to ego, opportunism, or ideology – defect to the Republic.
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Once notified of this meeting, Jean-François marched with Father Vázquez
to visit Candi and evaluate his loyalty. Candi assured them of his commitment
and the constancy of the troops he commanded.143 Candi was a valued, effective
commander, who was reportedly as ferocious as the legendary Jeannot. 144
Allegedly, a favorite torture of his was to pull white French prisoners’ eyes out
with a corkscrew.145 Yet despite his apparent hatred of the French, and his avowals
to Jean-François, Candi defected to the French with all of his troops, and was given
a key garrison post at Terrier-Rouge in Republic-held Fort Dauphin.146 If Jeannot
had lived, Candi, his subordinate, might never have considered French offers of
earlier amnesty for free people of color, nor later offers for the wider integration
of ex-slaves. Neither Biassou nor Jean-François could control him as Jeannot
had.147
Even once Candi negotiated his transition to the Republic, French
observers were skeptical of his sincerity due to the duplicitous actions of
seemingly amiable militants of color, particularly considering the actions that
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involved Gerard and his retinue at Ouanaminthe. The French demanded that
Candi send the families of his force to the Republic’s lines as a demonstration of
his trustworthiness and as hostages against any contradictory behavior. When
droves of hungry and tattered women and children arrived the French officers
surmised that Candi’s defection was at least partly driven by the lack of supplies
– that is, of Spanish material deficiencies. He and his troops, the French perceived,
were hardly willing republicans, and their transition of command to General
Pageot was extremely tense.148 Nevertheless, once under French orders Candi
bravely served the Republic at Trou and nearby Sainte-Suzanne.149
After having unsuccessfully confronted Candi, Jean-François took the fort
at La Tannerie and subsequently sent 166 white prisoners to Santo Domingo for
imprisonment. He left La Tannerie immediately to oversee attacks on other
advanced positions and placed the newly-captured fort in charge of “Miso, black
subaltern of the chief Biassou.” However, the French quickly retook the position
when reinforcements from Dajabon were delayed in their arrival. Jean-François
was furious and seemed to suspect treason given the context of French offers and
recent defections. He had an altercation with Michaud, who was then executed,
likely by Jean-François’ own orders. Spanish officials were terrified that his death
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would deepen animosity between Jean-François and Biassou because not only was
Michaud a prominent officer under Biassou, he was Biassou’s nephew. Spanish
officials in Santo Domingo believed that the black troops were absolutely essential,
but that their pride, indiscipline, and ignorance made them far too difficult to
manage. García, who presumed Spain’s ultimate victory, said, “I will not know
what to do with [the black auxiliaries] when the hostilities end, and that might be
to reduce them to police.”150 This was, of course, a major question to all white,
imperial managers – what would be the status and social position of tens of
thousands of armed ex-slaves once combat concluded.
Losses of black officers continued.

In mid-August Spanish officials

reported that the young black general Hyacinthe had, “paid with his head for the
artificial conduct” that he had engaged in by trying to place himself politically
between his Spanish allegiance and furtive dealings with pro-French mulattoes.
Apparently six Spanish officers had invited him to breakfast, arrested him, and
tortured him to elicit a confession and the names of white accomplices to his
treason. Shortly thereafter, he was executed when they “finally put him on the
pole.”151
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In the weeks following this dissension the increasingly trustworthy and
prominent Toussaint prevailed by taking the French camp at Marmelade then took
the places of “Pilvoro” (likely Morne Puilboreau) and also Ennery, all with few
casualties. He captured five officials and over fifty white soldiers. In light of recent
internal dissent and some defections to the Republic Toussaint had distinguished
himself as the most reliable and capable operative for Spanish interests in SaintDomingue.152 Spanish officials thought that this, despite recent defections, showed
how weak the French actually were that they would readily surrender to avoid
being killed. The only real French force was comprised of, “mulattoes, patriots,
and vagabonds,” so the Spanish estimated. Some unallied, “renegade” black
rebels were still in the mountains, but were sparsely armed. Despite these signs
of success, Spanish regular troops were often very ill, as were their French white
counterparts, and were limited to guarding the borders. Nevertheless, Spanish
officials asserted that “the conquest should continue” in capturing territory and
fortifying all the newly-won positions. Spanish officials considered dividing their
military management between Cap-Français and Port-au-Prince zones of
operation to more agilely oversee daily operations. They also considered sending
ships to new territories to forcibly remove French patriots, mulattoes, soldiers, and
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provocateurs from the general population, ostensibly to ready the area for Spanish
colonial renewal. Spanish officials thought that, “Purged from that type the colony
would be found in a prospering state like before, if provided the appropriate
means for allowing the fruits of its agriculture.”153 That sentiment might have
likely implied the reinstallation of slavery among the unaligned black population.

BRITISH INVASION, FRAGMENTED ROYALISM, MILITARY MORASS
One remaining consolation for Spanish officials was that they had yet to
hear “echoes” of Paris and Versailles, of the French constitution, or of social
revolution that had dominated French domains since 1789 being voiced by “these
faithful” Dominicans. They attributed those raucous upheavals to the “school of
their grand and celebrated modern philosophers” in France, greatly appreciated
the King’s approval of their local royalism against their opprobrious neighbors,
just as Spain battled French republicanism along their European borders. 154
However, a completely new complication came in late August 1793 when twentyfive officials and planters from the French side arrived in the port of Santo
Domingo on a British merchant vessel, accompanied by the HMS Penelope, a naval
frigate. They arrived from Jamaica carrying letters for Spanish officials. Upon
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their arrival, Monsieur L’Oppinot presented one letter to García, and explained
that he had been Lieutenant Governor of Saint-Domingue at the time of the
beginning of the revolution. To save his life he had fled to Jamaica with some
companions.

Monsieur Cougnae, who accompanied him, was the royalist

representative of the colony to the Regent of France and the Comte d’Artois, who
had urged them to “suffocate the seed of revolution” on the island.155
However, metropolitan royalist support never arrived from the Regent or
anybody else, and following the burning of Cap-Français and revolutionary
successes of the civil commissioners these local royalists considered it their
autonomous obligation to save the fragments of Saint-Domingue by their own
accord. They claimed their submission to the “legitimate authority” of Louis XVII,
and with direct material support from the Governor of Jamaica sought a strategic
partnership with the Spanish government areas of common interest.

This

proposed allegiance of the two crowns would punish factious revolutionaries,
avenge a dead Bourbon king of their mutual dynastic family, and reestablish the
Catholic religion.156 It was in the interest of these Dominguois elites to cooperate
with Spanish officials, and was even more in the interest of the growing British
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presence in Saint-Domingue to quell Spanish angst about their actions through the
practical pleas of this third party.
However, García saw their political positioning as a British ploy contrary
to Spanish efforts to retake the whole French side with a dash of disingenuous
sentimentalism. He asserted to his unwelcomed guests that Spain was better able
to defend their properties and stability than the British, though he did not openly
oppose their operations. L’Oppinot reiterated their interest in cooperation to
defeat the “criminal, bloodthirsty, and sacrilegious” and argued that “iron and
fire” could not solely “annihilate the brigands” without crucial naval support from
the British that could capably fend off French seaborne attacks. This might even,
he hinted, defend Santo Domingo if French geopolitical designs expanded to
include that colony. García thought that the arrival of L’Oppinot on the frontier
might galvanize other planters, as royalist exiles continued filing into Santo
Domingo. Thus, Spanish officials agreed to support the French royalist planters
on the frontier regions with arms and supplies, in cooperation with the interests
of the Regent of France and House of Bourbon with the stated goals of restoring
Louis XVII and the respect of religion in French domains. However, García was
resolute in his hope that these royalist operations would occur under the banner
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of Spanish rule and without British meddling.157 Nevertheless, at times Spanish
forces did, albeit in a minor way, coordinate with the British.158
Aside from notable victories by Toussaint, the Spanish Reconquista had
become bogged in its own path. It was further impeded when, in an attempt to
accelerate defections to the Republic, in September 1793 the French commissioners
sent copies of their abolition decrees to Biassou after having established contact
with him through a confidante with compromised loyalties. The French offered
Biassou a handsome commission, but he resoundingly declined as he had before.159
Despite this constancy by Biassou, that same month the British operating through
Jamaica were collaborating more aggressively with French royalists, including
operations that recruited Spanish partisans and blatantly interrupt Spanish
conquests in West, all under the pretext of having a common cause just as García
had feared.160
Archbishop Portillo lamented British meddling on the front lines and the
generally slow progression of the war. He had hoped that Spanish forces would
take advantage of the chaotic situation to rapidly seize more towns. Moreover, he
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was critical of whites who had fled Saint-Domingue with their liquid capital,
leaving the Spanish-held territories economically moribund, and creating a sector
of royalist refugees in Santo Domingo who, separated from the cane fields and
slaves, were simply a burden to the Spanish state.161
Although Portillo praised the loyalty of Vázquez and Jean-François, he
noted that the black auxiliaries themselves were also growing impatient with the
leisurely pace and haphazard handling of the Reconquista. He also worried that
Spanish military officials both suppressed the value and took for granted the merit
of their black allies, thus jeopardizing their loyalties.

Not only were they

sometimes poorly treated, but the black auxiliaries lacked basic material needs,
such as weapons. Jean-François and Vázquez were risking their lives to take
towns, all the while Dominicans were largely shielded from violence at the hands
of the French or mulattoes. Finally, Portillo relayed complaints against Matias
Armona levied by Jean-François and Vasquez for his mismanagement of Michaud,
which apparently they thought could have avoided the terminal confrontation.
More broadly, Portillo argued that Spain needed to heed and calm the mounting
tensions between the black leaders Biassou and Jean-François, a rivalry that had
crescendoed because of Jean-François’ execution of Michaud.162
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In September 1793 while Spanish officials were preoccupied with
managing the black auxiliaries, who Urízar insulted for their “vile condition, rude
education, and infamous conduct,” they also worried about how difficult it would
be to control or re-enslave blacks remaining in Saint-Domingue after their
experience of liberty and knowledge of the abolition decrees.

Without this,

though, Urízar speculated that it would be “very difficult to reestablish the state
of opulence” of the French colony, and to do so would require “a powerful hand
that destroys the anarchy,” and reducing rebel blacks to subordination would be
very dangerous. He feared the “spirit of revolution” communicated to their loyal
black auxiliaries by the “French mulattoes and whites” who were “fanatics for
their vaunted liberty.” Of course, he and others were oblivious to the double
standard of embracing the black auxiliaries while attempting to re-enslave their
adversaries, and of the likelihood that either population would likely politicize
Dominicans of color given the probability of increased contact. He continued to
believe that blacks were still more interested in Spanish rule, though he ridiculed
their “vile condition, rude education, and infamous conduct.”163
At that same time Urízar authored an economic report on the state of the
colony, though it did not circulate in the court of Madrid for many months.
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Despite his aforementioned fears he wrote with optimism about restoring the
robust commerce of Saint-Domingue under the Spanish empire. A level of
complementary economic collaboration had already existed between SaintDomingue and Spanish colonies – albeit largely in contraband – including Santo
Domingo foremost, but also Caracas and Puerto Rico, which often sold the French
planters draft animals. Of course, Santo Domingo dominated this livestock circuit,
as they did the regular tobacco trade from Santiago.

However, the overall

commerce of Santo Domingo was appallingly small compared to their neighbor,
whose hypothetical expertise within the Spanish empire could augment Santo
Domingo’s own sugar regime.164
Setbacks continued into November 1793 with the dire health of Spanish
troops. The arrival of the Puerto Rico battalion had provided much-needed
support, but the corps’ health was dubious, exemplified by their chaplain who had
been afflicted with severe fevers since August and looked like a skeleton.
Implicitly, the spiritual health of these troops was now in danger. As another sign
of French weakness, reports arrived that Governor Galbaud had been arrested in
Cap-Français. Interestingly, one Spanish official thought that the French might
rally the Indian “savages” of Louisiana against Spanish rule there as retribution
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for Spain’s anti-French actions among the population of Saint-Domingue and as a
territorial Reconquista of their own.165
Into December 1793 Urízar reported on the continual discords and
grievances between Jean-François and Biassou, which had only escalated over the
previous weeks due to provocations from Biassou.166 In spite of this recalibration
of allies, Jean-François soon conducted a disastrous operation at Trou in which his
forces sustained over 100 dead and over 200 lost to injuries and capture.167 Worse
yet, Spanish fears of direct British intervention had materialized.

A British

expedition arrived from Jamaica and in the name of King George III had taken the
fort at Môle-Saint-Nicolas, one of the most secure and defensible harbors in the
Americas, with 100 cannons that could handle 100 ships. So defensible was MôleSaint-Nicolas that it carried the nickname the “Gibraltar of Hispaniola,” an irony
not lost on the Spanish. This new British perch would easily allow them to harass
key Spanish shipping routes that connected Mexico and Havana to metropolitan
ports. Spanish officials were flummoxed as to how they could prevent British
incursions without open conflict.168
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Spanish officials responded to these situations. First, for the time being
mediation had curtailed the disputes between Jean-François and Biassou. Second,
the Spanish had sent proclamations across the island that detested the actions of
the commissioners, who, these papers attested, were “two monsters who unbound
all divine and human links and, and they only study to increase the horrors of fire
and blood.” One of their proclamations sent to the French side was expressly for
unaligned black rebels who they hoped to sway to the Spanish side. The other was
expressly for the white colonists who doubted the Spanish government and intents
and were, perhaps, favoring the British.169
In December 1793 several ships were captured and sent to Curaçao and
Puerto Cabello for refitting and renovation for wartime use. Apparently this was
part of an operation against the white Frenchman François Gay and the “perverse
revolutionaries from the coast of the Pedernales” who were suspected of
contraband trade along with social subversion. “The effects taken by the perverse
Gay,” were a large quantity of precious military equipment. The pro-Spanish
French royalist Garraud arrested him, and sent him to the capital.170 He was held
in the fort in Santo Domingo on charges of mistreating the residents of Jacmel and
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with circulating seditious texts for the republican commissioners, including in
Santo Domingo.171 Through these surreptitious personal connections Dominicans
were introduced to the decrees and proclamations that Spanish officials so loathed.
On 18 December 1793 Father Vázquez reported that spiritual conquests
along the frontier progressed incrementally, especially as Father Quesada had just
arrived to manage the troubled church in Valliere. 172 Father Porta, previously
stationed at Valliere, had been suspected of speaking against the Spanish there.
Jean-François had been the first to actually suggest substituting him for a loyal
Spanish priest, which Vázquez facilitated by finding the mendicant Father Manuel
Quesada who had worked in Dajabon and even spoke French. As Porta went to
the capital for investigation, and García thought that Quesada was well-suited to
aid Vázquez’ work with the black auxiliaries.173 The completion of this plan, which
Jean-François had offered months earlier, actively expanded pro-Spanish
religiosity in his spheres of power and pleased officials.174 This initiated a process
in which Spain sent Francophone priests to minister to the black auxiliaries and
residents in conquered territory, which included royalist French priests who had
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been exiled in Spain.175 Meanwhile, Archbishop Portillo was thrilled with the
evangelical work of Vázquez in Dajabon at winning the trust of Jean-François.176
In late December 1793 Father Vázquez told Portillo that a letter for JeanFrançois had arrived from the Commissioner Sonthonax in Cap-Français who he
called “Pene,” a rather unpriestly reference to male anatomy. Sonthonax again
tried to convince Jean-François that he had made a huge mistake in trusting the
Spanish, and that if his error was uncorrected he would meet a similar end to Ogé
and Chavanne. Jean-François’ former subordinate Pierrot who then fought for
Sonthonax, also again wrote the black general with similar indications. 177 These
offers, and particularly the promises circulating from Pierrot throughout the black
auxiliaries’ ranks, greatly troubled Vázquez and Portillo.178 French agents had also
sowed rumors of impending re-enslavement by the Spanish, which further
aggravated doubts about Spanish goodwill among free people of color.179 Soon
thereafter, in March 1794, five French republicans – one white, one mulatto, and
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three blacks – were arrested near the border for spreading sedition. Such instances
were commonplace, intensifying Spanish anxieties.180

CONCLUSION
During 1793 the Spanish gained tremendous territorial conquests far from
the border across northern and western Saint-Domingue, largely due to their
formal alliance with the black insurgents – the “auxiliaries” – commanded by
Biassou, Jean-François, and Toussaint.

Their profound faith professions

dovetailed with Spanish motivations for spiritual and territorial Reconquista from
the “impious” French republicans to their west. While their successes continued
into 1794, the complicating factors of the recent French abolition and British
invasion soon curtailed Spain’s counterrevolution on the island.

French

republican officials were able to gradually redirect talented black officers from
their Spanish affiliations and into service of the Republic. Internal rivalries and
squabbling greatly diminished Spain’s black auxiliary forces and the forward
momentum of territorial acquisition. Likewise, British incursions compromised
the loyalties of French royalists on the island, captured regions that were targeted
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by Spanish officials, impeded Spanish progress toward regaining the entire island,
and threatened open conflict with yet another major imperial rival.
Over 1792 Spanish subjects on the Dominican side of the island became
quite proactive in laying the foundation for territorial recovery. After official
warfare commenced between France and Spain in 1793, yielded them rapid and
stunning gains as part of a Caribbean Reconquista through an improbable military,
ideological, and political ingenuity that at least nearly ended Saint-Domingue’s
social revolution. This chapter has demonstrated the formation of a practical
ideological, military, and strategic geopolitical relationship of popular Catholicism
and monarchism among ex-slave insurgents whose integration into a Spanish
counterrevolutionary, all the while integrating white French royalists and
propagating broad-based movement to cross the volatile frontier and retake SaintDomingue for the Spanish empire after a century of opulent French rule. In these
practices at the confluence of utility, sincerity, and partisanship, people of color
left their material mark on the Haitian Revolution and contributed to forming an
anti-Haitian Dominican religious nationalism that became more deeply fixed in
the local Hispanic body politic across the remainder of the 1790s.
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CHAPTER 4
BLACK ROYALISM & BLACK RELIGIOSITY, 1794

In mid-1794 General Georges Biassou first met Archbishop Fernando
Portillo on the borderlands of French Saint-Domingue and Spanish Santo
Domingo, their respective home colonies. Biassou and Portillo represented two
drastically different phalanxes of a Spanish counterrevolution that by that spring
had nearly defeated the French Republic’s social revolutionary experiments on
Hispaniola. Following the initial revolts of August 1791, the over one hundred
thousand self-liberated slaves, including Biassou, had ruptured the brutal
plantation regime that made Saint-Domingue the world’s most profitable
plantation colony. Though the French had issued a general emancipation and
tried to recruit the black auxiliaries into the Republic, the powerful ex-slave allies
of Spain had not defected in significant number or rank, and Spanish forces
controlled nearly half of Saint-Domingue, from Gonaïves to the outskirts of both
Cap-Français and Port-au-Prince. For the first time since the French colonization
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of western Hispaniola well over a century before, Spanish rule stretched from the
east coast to the west coast of the island.1
The Spanish Reconquista accomplished this with a broad spectrum of
political, social, and religious ideas that during the early 1790s adhered a range of
disparate actors. Monarchism and virulent Catholicism stood as traditionalist
bulwarks against surging French rights discourses of egalitarianism that, to many
observers, seemed to have triggered this deluge of violence, impiety or outright
anticlericalism, and chaotic social reordering.

The movement included

Dominicans from a range of social backgrounds motivated by employment, by
faith, by maintaining their preferred social order, by love of the crown, or by
wanting to preserve their property. Yet in opening years of the revolution their
direct involvement was limited to border towns or military engagement. Spanish
troops from across the empire participated, though as regular troops their
motivations and voices were more muted by their simple explanation of proving
service and following of orders. French white royalists, many from wealthy
backgrounds and formerly planters in Saint-Domingue, also affiliated with Spain
in hopes of regaining a lost colonial world that once seemed like a paradise to
them. Their monarchism mattered, and many were devout Catholics, but Spain’s
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continued support for slavery and their restoration of property that drove their
participation, the same reason that many of their colleagues supported the British
invasion. The truly dominant force on the island remained the insurgent slaves
who, in 1793, formalized their positions as “black auxiliaries” of King Carlos IV.
Though Spain made them free, they knowingly supported a Spanish movement
that promised to uphold and restore slavery. Their motivations for continuing to
fight for Spain even after the French declared general abolition were complex, as
were the cultural and social practices that bound them to Spain.
Before his first in-person meeting with Archbishop Portillo, Biassou
specifically and the majority of his black auxiliary troops rejected French overtures
of abolition, racial equality, and well-compensated positions as troops of the
Republic as discussed in the previous chapter. Furthermore, he and his colleagues’
appropriation of Spanish counterrevolutionary and cosmological vocabularies to
explain their geopolitical ambitions and motivations bolstered the cultural mode
of the Spanish counterrevolution along with local, Dominican ideas of difference
from their neighbors to the west who they increasingly viewed as republican,
irreligious, violent, and more black, savage, and African.

Unlike the anti-

colonialism and vodou often conjured in popular memory on the Haitian
Revolution, Biassou publicly professed devotion to Catholicism and King Carlos
IV, as did more than ten thousand black auxiliaries. During their meeting on the
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frontier, Biassou and Portillo performed a ritual of respect by exchanging gifts and
praise, thus mutually affirming the improbable spiritual ties that had bound them
together over the preceding two years.2
However, when Biassou requested the sacrament of marriage, the
Archbishop harshly rebuked him for openly keeping seven mistresses. Biassou,
the accomplished black general so critical to the Spanish war effort, sulked away.
However, his response shortly thereafter sharpened public divides over black
religiosity and the political symbolism of union – in this case as an individual
marital act became a metaphor for the complex, fraught relationships borne of the
revolutionary era and its responses. Dominican and Spanish discourses depicted
piety as increasingly opposed to the “other” of radicalism from the French
Revolution and vodou that marked the type of black ascendancy and French
radicalism to the west.3 This episode – and many others like it –defined this
upsurge of black participation in the Spanish counterrevolution and the
interpretation of these events in Dominican culture.
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Need a transition before you jump into these questions. How did public
displays of devotion, or irreverence, distinguish Spanish subjects from
revolutionaries during the identity crises surrounding the Haitian Revolution?
How did people of color, in a Dominican body politic with a majority of color,
contribute to a national inclusion predicated upon the rejection of Haiti based
upon the conflation of heresy and violence with blackness?
Some scholarship has broken ground with analysis on the roots of African
royalism among some black rebels.4 Yet despite the Haitian Revolution having
been a cosmological upheaval, scholars have habitually under-explored black
Christianity, white depictions of African beliefs, and the cultural politics of public
religiosity.5 Rituals such as prayer and marriage offer us a window into partisan
ambitions, power relations, and the intricate weavings of social networks. 6
Cultural inclusion became more evident as secularism challenged religious
assumptions that explained and justified the divine right of monarchy, human
nature, causation, and universalisms. Diasporic divergences have created varied
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territorial identities and multiethnic friction that often preceded and even helped
consolidate some nation-states.7
Dominican concepts of belonging expressed by the colonial elite, which
shaped aspects of popular culture, embraced virulent Catholicism, Hispanic
culture, and the disavowal of blackness, while Dominican ideas of Haiti
emphasized the worst caricatures of African primitiveness. Imperial dichotomies
between Spain and the French Republic helped map this proto-national line. Also,
while Vodou was unquestionably influential and practiced by Spain’s black
auxiliaries, Catholicism was the hegemonic supernatural idiom of their allies in
Santo Domingo. For Catholic observers, the black auxiliaries’ success and upward
mobility appeared as blessings for their faithful service. For the black auxiliaries,
Catholic belief was a social practice at a convergence of utility, sincerity, and
partisanship.

For them, this actionable belief offered material function with

weapons and cash, and metaphysical flexibility to mask or blend with extant
African cosmologies.8
This chapter demonstrates how Afro-Catholicism merged with Spanish
fears of rampant African heresy and French anti-clericalism to contribute to a
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discourse of Dominican difference. Unaffiliated black rebels and people of color
aligned with the French Republic in Saint-Domingue were demonized based on
ideals of Hispanic civility and piety, in which a person of color could attain
Spanish inclusion with sufficient Catholic devotion.

Thus, people of color

coincidentally contributed to this elitist element of Dominican religious
nationalism that endures in anti-Haitian sentiments even today.

The macro

processes that these records and episodes illustrate add to our variegated
understandings of national belonging and modernity in the Black Atlantic. 9
However, the array of participants that Spain tried to incorporate into this project
frayed their royalist coalition, including many French whites who the black
auxiliaries first tried to eradicate in their early days as slave rebels. As defections
increased into 1794, the counterrevolution stalled. The inverse of this process of
spiritual, military, political, and territorial reconquest came when the outward
project turned to defending Hispanic institutions internally. At that time, by the
mid-1790s Dominicans began to explore secular ideals and, in Spanish and
Dominican eyes, also passed toward being more French, more black, or,
eventually, more Haitian.

Linda M. Heywood and John K. Thornton, Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles, and the Foundation of
the Americas, 1585-1660, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007; Childs, Aponte, 78-119;
9
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COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY APEX
At the start of 1794 Governor García personally visited the frontlines to
review the Reconquista for himself.

In January García had departed Santo

Domingo for the frontier, leaving Urízar in charge of his duties, explaining to the
metropole that the commanders wanted him by their sides.10 He spent a great deal
of time with Father Vázquez and Jean-François around the newly-besieged Fort
Dauphin, and gave him an account of the poor conditions in that area.11 While
Spanish forces slogged along, conditions were even more deplorable for the
French at Fort Dauphin, likely due to disease and shortages of food. At night,
seven mulattoes surrendered and notified the Spanish of several notable deaths
within the city.12 The Spanish policy to besiege, starve out, and weaken the French
through attrition appeared to be yielding results.
While the Republic’s losses in North meant gains for Spain, in West the
decline of French rule came at the hands of British incursions. From his position
near the southern border, Father Bobadilla reported rumors pertaining to the
British blockade and siege of Port-au-Prince. He supposed that the British had
likely already taken the city, as some residents of Port-au-Prince were approaching
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the border to seek asylum. The French had lost many troops in these resounding
defeats. Also, previously closeted royalists defected either to the British or the
Spanish once the French began to suffer military defeats. Louis-Jacques Bauvais
retreated toward Mirebalais and the Spanish commander Arata at Las Cahobas
prepared for hostilities. Bauvais was a free man of color from Port-au-Prince who
had been educated in France, served in Savannah during the American Revolution,
had entered the revolution in Saint-Domingue as a collaborator with Jumécourt,
and worked for the Republic commanding the “Legion of Equality” in the Cul-deSac.13
Bobadilla opined that all border towns should garrison themselves against
likely French advances as the British pushed their forces eastward and out of the
Cul-de-Sac. He specifically feared the arrival of any unknown operatives who
might introduce conflict to the border towns of Maniel and Naranjo, and even
considered sending warnings out to Maniel and the uncontrolled maroons there
to be on the alert. Furthermore, this eastward pressure caused by British advances
had pushed the French royalist refugees from Grand-Bois to return to defend their
homes and perhaps leave their families and precious goods in Santo Domingo.
This wavering caused Spanish officials to also doubt the veracity of white French
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royalist allegiance, particularly with recent defections of royalists to the British
side.14
The Spanish, already struggling to fend off French and British seditions,
were poorly equipped to deter buccaneers and illicit slave traders who began to
terrorize the southern coast in the midst of this imperial flux. Bobadilla wrote that,
“This has put the blacks reduced to Naranjo in such fear, that already three
families have retired to Maniel, taking with them the slaves they had acquired in
battle.” In other words, some maroons actually fought for Spain like the black
auxiliaries when it suited them, seized black prisoners of war from SaintDomingue, and brought them to Naranjo. Yet the majority of maroons were
conspicuously content to bide their time and exploit imperial volatility to leverage
for greater autonomy rather than delve into revolutionary egalitarianism or
Spanish counter-revolution. Spain’s opportunity to use maroons as instruments
of empire had largely failed after years of strategizing. Spanish officials feared
their turn toward British or French militancy, but more so the maroons’
overwhelming suspicion toward legal guarantees and states motivated their break
from their settlement at Naranjo in favor of a return to grand marronage. Over the
following years, the trickle of families retreating to Maniel from Naranjo turned
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into a stream that overflowed the dam of Spanish bureaucracy. Hundreds of
maroons chose a less volatile and more secure life in the mountains away from
confinement, indoctrination, re-enslavement, material deprivations, warfare and
clamoring state claimants.15
As maroons fled back to the mountains, and some black auxiliaries
defected, Bobadilla also reported that in Saint-Domingue the towns of Arcahaye
and Léogâne many French royalists who may have otherwise allied with Spain
had joined the British. Bauvais had burned several homes in Grand-Bois and
enticed the blacks there to join his ranks, causing dozens of mulattoes and white
refugees to flee.16 Portillo, who seemed to always sense geopolitical opportunism
provided an ideal moment to petition for material support to serve spiritual needs,
begged for money to support his parishes on the frontier who bore the brunt of
counterrevolutionary cultural combat.17 Furthermore, Bobadilla informed Portillo
that of a dozen or so French émigrés who had recently arrived in Neiba, ten were
under suspicion for having openly criticized Spain.

Several had voluntarily
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chosen to return to Saint-Domingue, which indicated they might have actually
been spies, though it was unclear for whom they were working.18 This was a
moment of great migratory and political flux, particularly along the southern
borderlands which, compared to northern sugar zones of Saint-Domingue, had yet
to experience this degree of competition, and none of which favored Spanish
interests.
Against these antagonisms the Spanish counter-revolution relied heavily
upon priests as decisive foot soldiers of cultural politics and upon black adherents,
including the presumably loyal cadre of resettled maroons, as partisans and
military labor. Bobadilla even suggested to the archbishop, “If you think that
Pedro Luiz, Juan Bautista, Simon, and some other pardoned blacks from Naranjo
could secretly form a posse to go to the colony, learn of Commissioner Santonax
[sic] or Commissioner Polverel, you could offer them two-hundred pesos fuertes
(hard cash) for each of the commissioners who they bring as prisoners; I leave it to
your prudence.”

He even mentioned the mercurial LaFortune as a possible

agent.19 In that impromptu message, haphazardly scrawled as marginalia on the
back of a letter, Bobadilla clearly suggested utilizing the most trusted remaining
maroons from Naranjo to drift into Saint-Domingue, using their skin color and
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French language skills and seize some of the highest ranking French revolutionary
agents.

As Spanish desperation deepened, so did their reliance upon such

expedient allies.

Undoubtedly, the communities at Maniel and Naranjo

recognized their own leverage and geopolitical importance increased in
correlation to Spain’s desperation.
At the end of January 1794 the French Republic’s forces and partisans in
North at Fort Dauphin finally proposed some terms of surrender for the Spanish
to consider. General Gabriel Aristizabal reviewed these proposals as the Spanish
naval squadron anchored itself in the bay and menacingly angled its heavy guns
at Fort Labouque. The French requested to keep their ranks or commissions and
weapons, but Aristizabal said the first was up to the king, and the second was
impossible since they would be prisoners of war. The French also asked that, “the
political rights of the gens de couleur, our brothers, will be conserved with all
integrity,” but Aristizabal again deferred that question to the King (who, of course,
could not effectively respond). Aristizabal, did, however, promise to protect their
property. At the French request, he also pledged to keep any allied black troops
away from the city and agreed to allow the French general to retreat to Port-dePaix. The French asked that all Spanish deserters in their camp be pardoned, to
which Aristizabal said, “that concession would be shameful.” The French citoyens
Candi, Knapp, and Boneaud submitted these proposals, and had the difficult task
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of relaying the Spanish commander’s inflexible position to their own officers. 20
The Spanish bargained with a heavy hand, and as a military power that could
either enforce or wait out better terms they were not likely to negotiate.
Health was a factor in the depletion of sedentary French forces, but the
Spanish were no better off against mosquitoes, germs, and the Caribbean climate.
Archbishop Portillo himself reported that he had suffered fevers during his trips
to the frontier. However, at the time he seemed more concerned with dedicating
1,000 pesos for his own holy garb, including a “precious miter,” despite the dire
funding situation for all Spanish operations and his own begging for
evangelization funds. As astute as some of his geopolitical observations were, his
personal pretensions and spiritual ostentations sometimes interfered with the very
priorities that he championed. A new miter would likely not win over republican
converts. In late January he stood encouraged, though, that the French priest of
Petite-Rivière had not fled with the church ornaments and holy vessels to CapFrançais as his peers had when they abandoned their congregations. Portillo
claimed to have trusted this particular priest from his arrival at that parish in 1786,
implying he could be a priest with whom the Spanish could work. He celebrated
news from his informant priests in Dajabon and Monte Cristi explaining that

“Proposiciones de la Guarnicion, y vecinos del Fuerte Delfin,” Gabriel Aristizabal, Bahia de
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Spanish forces were within view of Fort Dauphin, and he speculated that Spain
would soon be, “owners of the whole colony, without leaving a piece for the
British.” However, the British capture of Mole Saint Nicolas and Saint-Marc, Portau-Prince, and Jérémie soon thereafter were major setbacks for all Spanish efforts.
This shakeup in imperial control of major town and regions fueled contraband
trade, including food stuffs produced in Spanish Santo Domingo that could
otherwise support the Dominican populace and Spanish war efforts.21 As part of
this odd cycle, this lack of sustenance drove Spanish forces to rely upon major
shipments of grain in the food-deprived areas of Spanish conquest, many
shipments of which came in “Anglo-Americano” ships from the fledgling United
States. These supplies were critical, but the prices were extortive. It was, though,
a sign of the general distress for Spanish colonialism in the Caribbean that they
were forced to rely upon the over-priced staple crop exports from the sometimes
unfriendly new republic of North America.22

BLACK PERFORMANCES OF PRO-SPANISH PIETY
Not only was the consolidation of territory a major challenge for Spanish
military efforts due to French and ascendant British operations, but the archbishop
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noted the difficulty of assimilating the diverse and discordant partisans that Spain
inherited within the new territory. Portillo criticized the qualities of newly-gained
French colonists, saying, “not only are they atheists, libertines, apostates,
schismatics, [and] Anabaptists, they are divided for the British, Spanish, royalists,
and assemblyists.” Republican mulatto enemies opposite their southern border
had also grown dominant at that time, but he thought they had forgotten the
lessons of Ogé within the French imperial structure. The overwhelming hope for
Portillo remained the publicly pious black auxiliaries, who did their best to
perform their conformity with Spanish cultural norms. Portillo complimented
Bernardin, a black officer who he said conducted himself well, as “a black of hope,
reflection, and valor.”23
This letter from “Bellair,” who was likely the older Gabriel Belair – not the
somewhat better-known adolescent Charles Belair who was the nephew of
Toussaint – was an experienced officer who worked closely with Georges Biassou.
In this impassioned letter he made the case for Biassou’s quality and character
before the Spanish officials, as he did in person in Santo Domingo.

Belair

dramatically wrote, “I avail myself of my badly cut plume” to write some
introductory words to explain the motives for their struggles, perhaps a metaphor
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for his unfamiliarity with formally-written treatises. Belair argued that there were
many legends and falsehoods that mischaracterized the initial August 1791 slave
revolt, many of which were propagated by their enemies. Belair continued, saying
that, “The protesting, sad, and sweet cries of the lamb are at least as touching as
the howls of the wolf that devours us,” seemingly casting his ex-slave companions
as the lamb and the French as the wolf, and argued that these enemies had brought
this war upon themselves. Belair said that he and his comrades fought to free
themselves from, “the shackles to which some dastardly men had reduced them
under the most outrageous tyranny.” However, he noted that their efforts had
been in vain due to the “barbarity” of the French, “the most remarkable seen in the
world.”24 With offers from the French continuing to reach the black auxiliaries,
with a few defections having occurred, with the shortages of resources for their
troops, and with a deepening divide between Jean-François and Biassou, the latter
black general seems to have been trying to out-pious the former in a competition
for Spanish blessings of war materiel.
Aside from these obvious abuses, Belair pointed to a deeply spiritual
context, saying that, “The second motive that made us take up arms against these
ferocious people has been for our holy religion to celebrate the divine office, the

Belair, Santo Domingo, n. D., AGI-SD, leg. 1031. This letter is not dated, but given the archival
strata in which this letter is located, and the specific concerns of the year, Belair almost certainly
wrote this letter in 1794.
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churches having been converted into places of common assemblies, and in these
sites where they commit the most horrendous horrors and where they profess the
most indecent words.” Belair and his colleagues knew quite well the umbrage that
Spanish officials took with holy sites being appropriated as French republican
venues. Belair claimed that “our holy religion” had been reduced and abandoned
entirely in Saint-Domingue prior to the slave revolts of August 1791.25 This
recurring blame of French cruelty, excess, and irreligion, and particularly their
inability to offer Catholic integration to slaves, blended smoothly with Spanish
explanations for the revolution. Implications of brutality were certainly truthful
causes for the revolt, and if Belair’s references to persecutions of religious lifestyles
were taken as a metaphor for the French antagonisms against their African
cosmologies, and by extension their ethnicities and community life, then perhaps
his words gave a second truth in a more palatable, digestible form for Spanish
readers.
Belair continued, explaining the leadership of the early revolution, saying,
“General Biassou, the deceased Bouequeman (sic), as well as Jean-François, were
all three first chiefs of this revolution, I being the second general of Bouequeman
who accompanied his valor and courage,” although his beloved Boukman was
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unable to realize the “sweetness” of his plans against the sugar regime. Belair
continued discussing Boukman, saying, “He was the first victim of the perfidious
maneuvers of those who worked to extinguish the holy religion, and it can be said
that he gave his last breath fighting for God and our King. This loss made me very
emotional, losing a man who was worthy to command.”26

This depiction of

Boukman as a Christian martyr, and his call to revolt as a cry for the restoration of
Catholic practice, is a far cry from his historical memory of Boukman as a possible
vodouizan.27
Incredibly, Belair depicted the initial slave revolts of the Haitian
Revolution, which have been identified by contemporaries and since by scholars
as at least being inspired by African cosmologies that later congealed into vodou,
as the righteous restoration of Christianity against French reprobates. Thus, he
also rewrote his own history, having been a part of the initial revolts, and revised
the foundational motivations of Jean-François, Biassou, and others. Of course, the
influence of what we know as vodou, was unquestionable among the black
auxiliaries. Belair certainly knew his audience, as this interpretation of French
depravity as having incited the revolution and their common spiritual cause with
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the black auxiliaries further cemented Spanish narratives. Furthermore, he knew
that by so prostrating himself before Spain and their deity that this spirituality
would yield material benefits. While his words and actions may have been cynical,
taken with the profusion of Catholic practices, consultations with priests and the
archbishop, assistance to the Spanish spiritual Reconquista of Saint-Domingue, and
other demonstrations of their Christian inclinations, it is more likely that this letter
revealed the black auxiliaries cosmological flexibility, and their melding of
Catholic belief as a binding social practice and geopolitical vernacular into their
extant African-derived spiritualties.28
Belair explained that following the death of Boukman he had joined
Biassou and never ceased fighting for those same motives. He professed that
Biassou had been most dedicated to Spain and to the war, and although every
measure had been used to seduce him to the Republic, his resolve and valor were
immutable. Biassou had rejected those proposals, always intending, Belair wrote,
to give his last drop of blood for faith and the King of Spain, and had proven so by
fighting exhaustively for two years in the worst of conditions. Belair explained,
“We have preferred death more than to offend our Holy Religion, and finally
retired on a mountain with no space, [where] we have offered our faithful prayers
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to God Almighty with the firm resolution that it would be better to die than to lose
our Holy Religion that is the only base of our existence.”29 This statement might
have been metaphor, but was not hyperbole. Over the preceding two years these
black troops had burned so many bridges with the French. Most still saw as their
former masters of enslavement despite innovative republican niceties, and they
were deeply tied to the Spanish Catholic military and bureaucratic machine.
Belair continued, tying this cosmological orientation into his royalist
convictions, saying, “We find ourselves overwhelmed by the loss of our monarch,
and full of the greatest grief,” in reference to the regicide of King Louis XVI. As
shaky and sometimes suicidal as the Republic appeared to be, and having grown
up with the centuries-old durability of royal institutions of African and European
derivation, the black troops’ sentimentality and appeals to monarchs was quite
understandable. He thanked García for supporting their fight, praised his
generous spirit, and appreciated their attraction to the party of the King of Spain
“the most pious in the land” who had given those who asked “all the benefits of a
generous father for his children.” Not only did Belair play into Spain’s righteous
sensibilities, he played up their sense of paternal benevolence over the black
auxiliaries. Belair deeply desired for the Catholic cause to triumph, and in order
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to withstand the “satanic temptations” he requested more ministers to stay in their
camps to help their soldiers understand that God was on their side. In conclusion,
he affirmed, in quite lofty language, that the black auxiliaries were deeply grateful
and loyal to Spain.30
Belair challenged the now-famous “pact with the devil” narrative that has
since pervaded Western lore on the Haitian Revolution, and it subsequent birth of
the Haitian nation through a vodou ceremony and crafted a Catholic and royalist
image of the initial revolt to advance their rights, resources, and retribution. More
significantly, he and his colleagues played upon Spanish perceptions of French
irreligion and slaveholding excesses that Spanish officials believed had caused the
revolts. He also echoed Spanish ideals that piety would function as a social
mediator, as a means of racial improvement, and as common cause for defeating
French republicanism. In their praises of Spain, the black auxiliaries supported
this confirmation bias by echoing these same interpretations.31
On 31 January 1794 Governor García stopped in Dajabon on his tour of the
northern borderlands and was impressed with the reception he received from the
locals, regional officials, and some facilities. More importantly, in Dajabon he
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finally met Jean-François in person. The black general made a very strong first
impression, as did the ever-present Father Vázquez. Jean-François made great
displays of his obedience and gratitude to García, who thought that, “one finds
this black adorned with some uncommon qualities among those of his color.” For
example, Jean-François always immediately executed orders and always conferred
with Vázquez, who spoke with great confidence in the black general. García
elaborated that, “This priest has worked and works with such determination and
love with the blacks that it is necessary to [see it in person] to understand his zeal,
efficacy, and loyalty to our monarch.” Vázquez earned high praise from all
colonial officials, and from the black auxiliaries alike. García elaborated that,
“Jean-François, Benjamin, Vatable, Bernardin, and other blacks that always
accompany him with such subordination to his precepts that none of them stopped
treating him like their oracle.”32 Vázquez was irreplaceable to the cultural and
spiritual life of Spanish operations. His constant contact with the black generals’
battle plans kept Spanish officials apprised of military operations, and his
entwinement with on-the-ground action meant his spiritual counsel extended to
all the rank and file troops he met daily, and unaffiliated blacks in recently-
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incorporated territories. Vázquez was the implementer of spiritual reconquest in
Saint-Domingue.
After the negotiations with the French, in early February, García sent
copies of the official capitulation of Fort Dauphin to the Consejo de Indias in
Spain.33 Soon the Spanish flag flew above that critical port and transit point. 34
Aristizabal sent the French flags surrendered to his forces at Fort Dauphin as a
token of respect to metropolitan officials.35 The day after the surrender, García and
Aristizabal began sending in supplies and allowing ships to dock and sell goods
to the population of Fort Dauphin that had been decimated by the siege. 36 That
same day García complained bitterly about the dire financial state and increasing
costs of operations, and specifically blamed the economic drain that many French
royalist émigrés had on their budget.37
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Despite the exorbitant cost, García continued to welcome and sponsor
French families into royalist asylum with spiraling expenses.38 García said that 44
people had arrived from the parish of Jacquezy – a tiny coastal village between
Cap-Français and Fort-Dauphin – for protection, and pledged vassalage to the
King of Spain. The next day, 150 additional refugees arrived by ship from the same
area. They had all reportedly been persecuted by “Jefe Villatte” – that is, Romaine
Villatte, a regional mulatto commander who worked for the French republican
commissioners. There were also “some gentlemen” from nearby in Saint-Louis
who also sought refuge.39 Another major friction that only continued to inflame
the Spanish operations were the costs of maintaining both the black auxiliaries and
often sumptuous white refugees. Furthermore, these two groups despised each
other given the slaveholding past of many of these French whites over portions of
the black troops.
In mid-February 1794 García then began to organize a “patrimonial state,”
as he called it, for Fort Dauphin from which Spanish officials could administer
governance. As occupiers the Spanish had to arbitrate claims to titles, buildings,
lands, cafeterias and ingenios, and to settle accounts, sometimes with conflicting
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information, pertaining to the King, National Convention, and Republic. 40 Further
complicating their occupation was the overwhelming amount of prisoners.
Governor las Casas of Cuba begged that no more black prisoners be sent to his
island so that he could avoid altercations on Cuban haciendas around Cuba where
he feared prisoners were “communicating to them their pernicious maxims and
the spirit of insurrection and desolation that possessed them,” that is, he feared
that they might spread sedition among Cuban populations of color.41 Their
interaction with the local population, which sometimes lobbied for the release of
certain French prisoners with sugar planting or processing experiences, perturbed
officials in Cuba.42
These gains in North offered only short-lived satisfaction. In February
1794 the Spanish officials learned that brigadier “Petit Tomás” and other black
officers Barthélemy and Louis had been enticed by the commissioners into joining
the French, in part due to the recent abolition decree. They and their forces then
entered Port Margot, committing atrocities in the name of the Republic. 43 At least
Barthélemy and Thomas had fought under Jean-François, and Barthélemy had
actually been one of the alleged co-conspirators of Boukman at the outset of the

40

García to Diego de Gardoqui, Fort Dauphin, 19 February 1794, AGI-SD, leg. 1031, no.441.

41

Casas to Manuel Godoy, Havana, 19 February 1794, AGI-SD, leg. 1031, no.138.

42

Ferrer, Freedom’s Mirror, 137-138.

43

García to Manuel Godoy, Fort Dauphin, 24 February 1794, AGI-SD, leg. 1031, no.66.

314

revolution.44 This was a huge symbolic loss that depleted the leadership of the
black auxiliaries while simultaneously bolstering their enemy’s capabilities.
Throughout that month García remained on the frontier, and reported at
the thronging “multitude of prisoners,” refugees, and slaves who transited into
Santo Domingo. Ships were regularly departing for Puerto Rico with this mix of
passengers. Some slaves whose fare could not be paid were sold to cover costs for
others in their group, and some prisoners’ human property was confiscated and
sold by Spanish officials. North American ships arrived frequently with supplies,
and also stopped at Monte Cristi. Spanish forces gravely needed supplies and cash
to finally take Cap-Français. Mildly positive news arrived from elsewhere in SaintDomingue, including that the British, who had tried to maintain their western
cordon from Mole Saint Nicolas to Saint-Marc, were routed by black rebels who
ransacked the area. Also, further south along the border the Marques d’Espenville,
a royalist ally, had seized the homes of forty Frenchmen who were partisans to the
Republic and who had been under the orders of “the Mulatto Bauvais.”45
The Consejo de Estado had received a great deal of pushback from
Venezuela about the prisoners that they being made to house, and officials there
suggested sending more to the prisons of Havana instead. They complained that
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even many of the voluntary émigrés were irreligious. One intriguing suggestion
that they made was to negotiate an exchange of prisoners through the island of
Guadeloupe in return for an equal number of Spaniards, or at least royalists. 46 This
was yet another extraordinary economic and political cost to the empire. García
mentioned that many new white subjects had an ailment he described as
“dislocation of organization in their heads” after having lost their homes, families,
and commerce to revolution. He faulted whites whose, “lack of reflection, loyalty,
and related conduct” made them think they could turn “our blacks, for whom
without revolutionary heads” had sought out careers under Spanish rule. At that
time García estimated that Jean-François commanded 6,097 troops. In just a few
months his army had spent about 16,000 pesos, and the war was ruining the
colony’s finances.47 Nevertheless, money and troops continued to pour in from
neighboring colonies, such as Puerto Rico48
Besides mounting defections, other hardships persisted for the black
auxiliaries. In April 1794 two black officers under the command of Jean-François
– Acul, who ran the encampment at Loisa, and also Joseph Lafond – professed
their enduring loyalty all the while they recounted their dire need of clothes for
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themselves and their troops, many of whom they said were basically naked. Part
of this lack was due to the sumptuous expenditures that the leading black generals
lavished upon themselves.49 This was one of the primary reasons that Candi and
his men had defected to the French. Lack of resources, coupled with infighting
and rivalry among the black troops, would continue to bog down the Spanish war
efforts in Saint-Domingue.

PINNACLE OF POPULAR PIETY & OMENS OF DECLINE: SUMMER 1794
In May 1794 Father Pedro Cabellos wrote to Portillo explaining that the
border town of San Rafael was in “major calamity and discomfort.” Only the
Thursday before García had been there with his retinue. Now the locals were
either entrenched, or had fled to the interior due to nearby fighting and rumors of
impending violence. The French émigrés, white and mulatto alike, feared another
assault by black troops as had recently happened in Gonaïves, where when the
Spanish troops retired the black auxiliaries had retributively murdered white
Frenchmen, sacked the town, and raised their flag. Father Cabellos strove for
tranquility, saying, “I am interested in calming the blacks” with whom he thought
he had some respect.50

The massacre at Gonaïves had, apparently, been
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perpetrated by restive black troops under Toussaint, and while this event has
never been definitely tied to his ensuing defection to the Republic, it certainly
portended his and his troops’ growing discontent under Spanish management.51
In response to Portillo’s requests to support Spanish frontier
evangelization and assimilation, in May 1794 the Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo
confirmed that he would send six well-qualified and esteemed priests from the
court of France who were exiled to Spain. On the island he intended that they
would travel into the conquered lands to minister to newly-annexed French
residents.52 Roughly six months earlier the Consejo de Estado had conceded
Portillo this request to send refractory priests to the conquered lands of SaintDomingue.53
As part of his proactive embrace of the newly-annexed frontier
communities and the broader Reconquista, the archbishop wrote to the “much
loved children of Christ,” priests who remained in Saint Marc, Petite-Rivière,
Grande-Rivière, Verrettes, Gonaïves, Sainte Suzanne, Marmelade, and other
parishes that practice the sacraments. Portillo stated that, “The submission of your
towns already in effect has filled us with joy,” and he sent the blessings of King
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Carlos IV. He was pleased that these parishes had been added to his archdiocesan
overview, and he wanted to restore pre-revolutionary religious practices. He
stated that on the other side of the Atlantic, “the French nation offered, in the view
of all Europe, the project of new government, which has contained, and will
contain, the mere terms for the political and temporal,” while for the Spanish, “our
principality is not of this world.” The Republic had neglected the divine, and new
laws and ideas could not change the “intimate connection to the spiritual” no
matter how stridently the French tried.54 Portillo’s reminders were that Hispanic
principles traced to eighteen-hundred years of Christian tradition. The battle for
souls was eternal, an impressive juxtaposition to the seemingly ephemeral novelty
of French revolutionary politics that assaulted his congregants in Santo Domingo.
Portillo sharpened his critique, saying that, “Furthermore on this
unfortunate sum, this new project of governing kingdoms elevates itself against
the science of God, subjecting pure ecclesiastical practice to these laws, practices
inseparable from the power of the Church…public divine worship, evangelical
doctrine…all the Church hierarchy.” He continued, saying that the French had
taken it upon themselves, “to extinguish the most flourishing monarchy of Europe,
[and] Christianity, oppressing their teachers, despising and ridiculing its beliefs,
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maxims, mysteries, laws, and rites.” This, Portillo said, had scandalized the “the
whole Catholic world…” In hopes of kindling their sentiments of deference to
Rome, Portillo also referenced the papal breve of 13 April 1791, in which Pope Pius
VI lamented the secular civil order emerging in France and encouraged clergy to
resist its spiritual implications. He encouraged them to consider the support of
Juan Sanchez Valverde on the frontier in Hincha. Portillo said that they should
have no doubt of the Spanish to ably manage their churches, and promised to
reintroduce Catholic practices and appoint clergy as needed.55 He hoped to gain
loyal, spiritually recharged clergy who would assist the Spanish Reconquista with
their special skills of language and local connections, both of which most of
Portillo’s priests lacked.
In May 1794 Archbishop Portillo wrote to the Spanish consul to the
Vatican, to whom he argued that the priests and churches on the French side
should no longer rely upon the French apostolic hierarchy, especially given the
Spanish command of that territory and proximity of his archdiocese. Now that
the colony was returning to its “legitimate Spanish sovereign” and that a
revolutionary situation gripped France, he wondered how religious authorities
there could answer to a hostile French Republic that sought to destroy spiritual
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tradition and the Spanish state. Portillo also criticized British claims to spiritually
oversee the territory that they occupied, primarily given their state Protestantism,
and sought permission to make a pastoral visit to the faithful in conquered lands
as many French priests had simply abandoned their churches. This, of course,
would have served to amplify his and Spanish geopolitical power as well. He also
cited the same 1791 papal breve in the letter as final justification for undercutting
secular governance of his spiritual jurisdiction.56
In June 1794, as part of this wider Hispanic cultural movement, the
Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo confirmed that the King supported the use of
French priests on the frontier region. The six priests selected ranged in ages from
35 to 52, and had worked in the archdiocese of Bordeaux, Nantes, Rennes,
Toulouse, and two in Tours.57 These priest were sent by the metropolitan church
with the blessing of the king’s advisers expressly to work under Portillo as
spiritual operatives to ostensible francophone reprobates.58 In July 1794 these six
priests waited in Cádiz to depart, and 30-40 days later would arrive in the
Caribbean.59 Portillo inched closer to the cultural and clerical control of the island
that he sought.
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A major part of this evangelization effort centered on the continuing effort
to stabilize the maroon resettlement at Naranjo and, thus in part, the southern
border and its local populace of color. Eventually he even hoped to send some of
the French refractory priests to the mission. That June, despite poor health,
advanced age, revolutionary warfare and a grueling journey on horseback,
Archbishop Portillo, visited the remote mountains of Baoruco in the center of the
island close to the border between the Spanish colony Santo Domingo and the
French colony Saint-Domingue. His purpose was to assess recent evangelization
initiatives. He identified, “the administration of sacraments, serious and severe
practices of divine services, and [Spanish] language,” as vital components of this
project. This defined the components to españolizar, or Hispanicize, various newlyannexed peoples, mostly Francophones, and many of African descent.

The

archbishop particularly wanted to visit Naranjo, a village of neophytes who had
reluctantly forfeited their status as “savage” maroons. The attention that the
archbishop gave them on his arduous trip and in numerous letters and documents
signals their disproportionate importance to Spain’s colonialist cultural politics at
this moment. Their geopolitical centrality demanded it.60
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To complicate matters, marauding traffickers on foreign ships moored
nearby at Barahona seized upon dislocations in Spanish power to kidnap both free
and enslaved local blacks, migrants fleeing war-torn Saint-Domingue, and even
maroons. Illicit slaving proved so dire that some of those captured committed
suicide in despair rather than face bondage and displacement.

Though the

Spanish commander in Baoruco formed patrols to impede the bandits, Bobadilla
distrusted some officers and suspected their troops of complicity.

He also

promised to relay to the archbishop inside information gathered from locals, a
parallel church communication network that shadowed, and counterbalanced,
Spanish military foibles. Despite the church being perhaps the sturdiest pillar of
colonialism in Santo Domingo, the maroons’ fears and opportunities
simultaneously grew, compounding the strain on Spanish aspirations.
In mid-1794, Archbishop Portillo travelled personally to assess the
maroons’ progress at Naranjo, where there were then fifty homes.

Despite

revolution being fought all around them, the population grew yearly, as
resettlement proceeded to the rhythm of Christian instruction and sacraments.
However, priests complained about teaching bozales (unassimilated Africans) how
to manage their bohios (huts) and dress, local landowners hesitated to allot
farmland to their new neighbors, and some resettled maroons threatened to
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complain to the governor about Naranjo’s bad food.61 More pressingly, the
archbishop documented illicit slaving, stories of “horrific, frequent attacks by men
without conscience, loyalty, nor appreciation of the law.” Some attackers bound
several captives together by their throats and pulled them away by horses, then
sold them to “pirates” who roved the coast with impunity. Local blacks were
fearful to go outside at night, or to venture far for water, food or wood.
After administering the sacrament of confirmation to some children at
Naranjo, the archbishop transcribed the tragic story of their father Manuel. Close
to town some maroons had been cutting timber. Two Dutch ships moored nearby,
whose captains ‘Francisco Franco and Juan N.’ were from Curaçao. Interestingly,
Naranjo residents identified these pan-Caribbean crews by name and origin,
which suggests previous interactions, probably in contraband trade.

The

marauders kidnapped those assembled near the beach, including Manuel and
three other maroons. As Manuel sought to defend the others, the raiders killed
him with a single bullet. Separately, three Curaçaon ships moored off Barahona,
and the sailors robbed and beat another maroon near Naranjo. Fortunately,
neighbors intervened as he was being dragged away. The archbishop wrote, “I
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have seen the unhappy, swollen, purple side of his face from the blows he suffered,
and the pitiful marks around his neck from the cord that bound him.”62 The
Spanish, already struggling to fend off French and British seditions, were poorly
equipped to deter buccaneers and build their Christian community at Naranjo.
Bobadilla wrote that “This has put the blacks reduced to Naranjo in such
fear, that already three families have retired to Maniel, taking with them the slaves
they had acquired in battle.” In other words, some maroons actually fought for
Spain, seized black prisoners of war from Saint-Domingue and brought them to
Naranjo.63

Spanish officials even praised the maroons of Maniel for their

proficiency in capturing slaves.64 Maniel had absorbed captured people before,
including their leader Santiago who had been taken from a plantation as a child
five decades earlier. Moreover, the practice of taking slaves from Saint-Domingue
was common for Spanish troops. It is doubtful that the maroons saw captives as
chattel, yet their willingness to take black captives demonstrated the limits of their
broader feelings of racial solidarity and egalitarianism. 65 In any case, the
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revolutionary era had revived threats similar to those they had negotiated to avoid
in the 1780s. Structural instabilities replenished alternative avenues to maroon
autonomy that their preoccupied Spanish collaborators could not prevent.
Archbishop Portillo further studied Naranjo in a “prolix description
because without details it is impossible to form a complete picture of this work.”
Upon arrival he was fascinated by maroon displays of Christian religiosity, which
allayed misgivings over their religious progress. The youths especially amused
him, as much as his clerical attire and miter hat amused them. He absolved
residents of “their enormous offences,” toured homes, inspected crops, performed
baptisms, and exhorted converts. Seated at a table, he observed neatly dressed
women and half-naked juveniles sporadically playing and sitting around him, all
contributing boisterous noise, cries and conversation. He praised “the religious
piety of the King that liberated such criminals in this world,” saying that the
maroons were “apparently in love with the King of Spain,” and that the maroon
children devotion to King and Cross inspired him to continue his evangelical
project. The archbishop sensed that some Naranjo residents had conformed
sincerely to Catholic norms and were becoming model subjects. They were prized,
hard-won first fruits of ongoing españolización.
Certain cultural matters troubled Portillo, especially that the maroons
spoke “guineo” (African languages) and French. He requested more Spanish
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language instruction, demanded that Africans take Spanish surnames, and
admonished their continued “superstitious” observances. At his farewell, Naranjo
residents sent him off with a flourish; cacophonous volleys of gunfire and the
rhythms of log drums.66 The former was an ominous symbol of the maroons’
growing armed power. The latter was perhaps more profound, as to many
Christian observers African musicality formed an auditory perimeter between the
sacred and profane and displayed the persistence of African culture and spiritual
practice.67 The maroons’ performance of piety, and their grafting of Christianity
onto African-derived cosmologies, belied the unmitigated conversion desired by
Spain.68
The “atrocious gestures and looks” by those “most expansively pardoned
and forgiven” aggrieved Archbishop Portillo, especially since many maroons were
“well bound with two shotguns, or big pistols, and machetes hanging in the front
of a leather belt... Insolently mocking our weak garrison... They also rob and kill
Spaniards in our roads.” He perceived in the maroons a cruel, bloodthirsty mood.
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On his way to Naranjo the archbishop had already been threatened by what he
called “black thieves.” Armed blacks also confronted his entourage after his
departure from Naranjo.

Though accounts are opaque on these assailants’

identities, allegiances and motives, for Spanish officials such encounters
demonstrated growing social ferment alongside their fading control.

The

archbishop closed his correspondence by referring to a recent massacre and
alleged thefts from churches overseen by a black general and Spanish ally, JeanFrançois. Indications of perfidy by ostensibly loyal collaborators elicited from the
archbishop a dramatized contemplation of his own martyrdom.69
To prevent “treacherous domestic enemies” from emerging, in 1793
Governor García forbade interactions between Spanish subjects and anyone from
Saint-Domingue. Those consorting with republicans would be labelled traitors
and “in the same spot as the act suffer the penalty of death by the gallows, without
distinction.”70 This decree was of little concern to maroons who regularly moved
across the border. Further complicating the maroons’ multi-polar possibilities was
the arrival in early June 1794 of, “the black Tusen (very distinct from the general
[Toussaint Louverture] who militates in the colony) with a company of 140 men.”

Fernando Portillo y Torres to Eugenio Llaguno, 6 August1794, AGI-SD, leg. 1031; Fernando
Portillo y Torres to José Urízar, 6 June 1794, AGI-SD, leg. 1014; Geggus, Haitian Revolutionary
Studies, 19 and 180.
69

70

Joaquín García, 4 June 1793, AGN-ARH, 22, exp.50.(The underscoring is original.)

328

This Tusen was probably a small-scale leader who had operated in the nearby Culde-Sac region of Saint-Domingue.

Toussaint Louverture, the most powerful

revolutionary leader, who had also worked for Spain, was further north at this
time. Tusen had suffered serious losses and approached Naranjo hoping to
procure supplies and recruits, forsaking his tenuous alliance with Spanish forces
who then, “publicly left on horseback to pursue Tusen and the rest of his company,
who travelled with those from Naranjo.”71
That same week a ship from France arrived in nearby Jacmel, SaintDomingue, with news of the Republic’s confirmation of emancipation, which
bolstered the commissioners’ earlier decree. The archbishop wrote, “It must be
pondered how much this news will influence the increase in desertions of our
blacks.” Thereafter the French received a wave of defectors, which the Spanish
thought included those won over by Tusen’s combative recruitment at Naranjo.
Spanish officials were further jolted when Toussaint Louverture actually joined
the Republic in mid-1794. Fearing an “internal uprising,” officials “awaited news
of further disasters” and rightly assumed that eastward movements by French and
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British forces would further loosen Spain’s grip on the maroons and their
resettlement.72
Amid the chaotic mid-1790s, the revised objective of securing black allies
stumbled. While some at Naranjo perhaps sincerely embraced Catholic piety and
Spanish subjecthood, it seems many more expediently performed these roles while
continuing illicit trade and contact with Maniel. Simultaneously the maroons
became positioned within increasingly momentous French and British geopolitical
designs. This proliferation of imperial conflicts provided them a range of choices
to maximize wellbeing and regain autonomy away from state guarantees.73
As Portillo manufactured the Spanish cultural conquests, and his priests
managed it in Spanish-held territory, García and the military forces continued
striving for geopolitical gains. The governor lauded the arms raised on 8 May by
the “citizens that are in Trou, the camp of Santa Susana…and the brave spirt with
which there were rejected with many losses by the commander Carlos Gabriel
Lesec, mulatto of our auxiliary troops.” Despite the resounding bravery of this
newly-prominent black officer, García was dismayed by the “disunion that reigns
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between the black chiefs Biassou and Toussaint.”74 That conflict would explode
into all-out war in the coming weeks following Toussaint’s open defection to the
French. With the extent of territorial conquests in Saint-Domingue, the numbers
and skill of the black auxiliaries, the full articulation of a counterrevolutionary
Catholic and monarchist project, and the retreat of the French Republic all made
1794 the high water mark for the Spanish counterrevolution.
Spanish administrators aggressively recalibrated their strategy amid
rapidly deteriorating conditions, with a new focus on spiritual solutions. After
begging metropolitan officials to continue funding Santo Domingo’s seminary and
“civilizing those blacks” at Naranjo, they unfurled a more ambitious plan to assign
to the Hispaniola frontier French royalist priests who were exiled in Spain after
the execution of Louis XVI. These priests were uniquely positioned to dissuade
francophones, including many maroons, from the vices of republicanism and
secularism while exhorting them toward Catholic virtue embodied by Spanish
monarchism. Pope Pius VI extended Archbishop Portillo’s archdiocesan authority
to cover French territory on Hispaniola. The Vatican also absolved additional
delinquent French priests there, and across the French Republic, some of whom
the archbishop also tried to recruit to serve in the Spanish Bourbon counter-
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revolution.75

Naranjo was the key link in the chain of frontier assimilation,

territorial reconquest, and pious counter-revolution, as visions of linguistic,
religious and cultural assimilation broadened from españolización of maroons to
assimilating heterogeneous others and potential revolutionaries into Spain’s
colonialist mission.
This seemingly desperate spiritual aspect of geopolitics underscored
growing insecurities and Spain’s weaknesses. The archbishop himself lamented
that the maroons, though new Spanish vassals, were so threatened that they might
have had better “protection through the most imperfect and maimed laws of the
most barbarous kings on the coast of Africa.” Despite this Naranjo expanded
slightly into 1795, though the maroons increasingly fortified themselves against
outsiders and at the same time retreated to Maniel.76
In this period distrust of the state explains their distancing and duplicitous
performances: from the maroons’ preliminary detachment from Maniel to their
resettlement, acceptance of initiation at Naranjo, and reversion to marronage.
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Their break with Spanish offers for subjecthood and counter-revolutionary
upward mobility, and their simultaneous ambivalent response to French
propositions of liberté, egalité, fraternité were parts of this complex choreography of
approach and avoidance.

The maroons’ choices are most intelligible as

maximizations of situational security that expediently allowed them to avoid
structural impositions. Their secessionist tendencies prevailed when imperial
fissures abetted their return to maroon status, where they eluded the perilous
conditions entailed by proximity to competing states.
In June 1794 Father Cibot wrote to Portillo regarding his apprehensions of
his possible return to Saint-Domingue from exile in the United States. He claimed
to want to see an evangelical zeal restored in the clergy. Cibot, a Capuchin and
the Vice Prefect of North, had previously lived in North for about 25 years. 77 He
had arrived in Baltimore from Cap-Français in August 1793, and there was
welcomed by the well-heeled conservative refugees that fled Saint-Domingue.
Upon arrival he gave a rousing sermon drawn from the book of Job, comparing
the plight of this faithful servant of God to the wealthy ex-slaveowners from SaintDomingue, and emphasizing the famed scriptures, “The Lord gave, and the Lord
hath taken away as it hath pleased the Lord, so is it done.” He implored the French
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refugees to have the patience and fortitude specifically like Job who had once
controlled vast wealth before being afflicted with illness, the loss of his property,
and death of his family. He told that refugees that they had been “proprietors of
invaluable Lands, and “sovereigns, of a race of people” as “fortune seemed to have
exhausted her bounty in your favor.” However, like a biblical trial the planters
had their, “property laid waste…your slaves armed against you…your experience,
as Job, [shows] how little solidity there is in riches.” Cibot then beseeched the
refugees to, “Recognize in your present misfortunes the hand of an offended
God…you have provoked the wrath of Heaven by your crimes…and increasing
infidelity.” 78
In no uncertain terms Cibot scorned their excessive lifestyle and implicitly
their unholy treatment of slaves as root causes for the revolution, and which their
divinity was justly punishing. He softened his tone only to say that his message
was surely difficult to hear. While he asked Baltimoreans to extend a friendly hand
to the refugees, he also asked Americans to learn from the hard lessons of SaintDomingue.79 Sometime thereafter Cibot took over pastoral responsibilities in a
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congregation in rural eastern Maryland.80 Later he took charge of a congregation
near Wilmington, Delaware.81 While his rhetoric actually paralleled much of
Portillo’s own fire and brimstone interpretations of French devastations, Portillo
saw Cibot as soft, and negligent of his clerical duties.
He claimed that his evacuation from the island had been forced by the
“horrible French Revolution” and, though Portillo thought he was clerically
derelict, Cibot wanted to renew his ministry there. Cibot painted the danger of
sacrilege, combat, humiliation, immorality, and impiety that he and his fellow
priests had felt. Cibot depicted himself as having been courageous in trying to
reconcile the spiritual and political, and asked for a place in Santo Domingo on his
transit.82 Shortly thereafter Portillo learned that Father Cibot preferred to remain
in North America instead of tending his flock in Saint-Domingue, a decision that
greatly annoyed Portillo. The archbishop requested that García ban Cibot from
any attempts to visit or collect aid from the Spanish side or Puerto Rico.83
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On 12 July 1794 Archbishop Portillo wrote from San Juan de la Maguana
on the frontier. He was there to review evangelization, but also to uplift the spirits
of border priests.

He encouraged these priests to promote the “vestiges of

religion…that the majority of the French erased,” and hoped they could sway the
remaining people of color in conquered and adjacent lands to the Spanish side.
Portillo hoped that their evangelical outreach would further deprive the French
commissioners of their troops and men. More specifically, in Neiba he had
encountered many Frenchmen from Grand Bois, a mountainous area near
Mirebalais. Many had preserved their wealth, and some their “true religion.”
When they discovered that the archbishop was nearby they wanted to see him to
plead for their own church where they could receive the sacraments in their home
community. As a sign of goodwill several prominent residents of Grand Bois
contributed donations for a church building. Portillo pondered how to find a
priest to serve them. He promised them a French priest, a virtuous man who he
had supported in Santo Domingo, who had once been sentenced to death by the
commissioners, who fled to Jamaica, and then Santo Domingo, and he agreed to
founding a parish there that would be funded by wealthy locals.84
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Portillo worried about Father Loizeau, the priest of Petite-Rivière in
Artibonite, with whom Portillo had communicated at length in prior times.
Portillo suspected that Loizeau had sided with the rebel blacks who had recently
driven the Spanish out of Petite-Rivière.85 This loss of the town was at least partly
tied to Toussaint’s recent defection.86 Portillo also relayed information on Spanish
cultural, political, and military operations to the French, which caused him to
further hope that the Vatican would place the whole colony under his ecclesiastical
jurisdiction.87
In late April 1794 a skirmish between black auxiliaries under Toussaint
and Spanish troops in Gonaïves precipitated yet another invitation from the
French for Toussaint to join the Republic. Likely in early May he did defect, and
his troops again defeated Spanish troops at San Rafael. However, he stayed in
touch with Spanish officials for nearly two additional months, and left them
unclear on his new status. Above all else, Toussaint was ambitious and disgusted
with the inefficient interpersonal rivalry of Jean-François and Biassou. General
abolition had given the French a greater base of popular support, but it took
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Toussaint about eight months from the emancipation by Polverel and Sonthonax,
and almost two months since news of the French assembly’s emancipation arrived.
Ever cautious, deliberate, and practical, Toussaint was in no ideological rush to
stand beside French promises of equality and freedom for blacks. The at least three
thousand troops who defected with him, and his trusted officers Jean-Jacques
Dessalines and Henri Christophe, would change the course of the island.88
Toussaint, now a traitor to Spain, began a steep decline in Spanish and
Dominican perception from his hero status. Born into slavery as the first-born son
of an Arada prince and Catholic convert, Toussaint once himself held slaves. Freed
long before the revolution, he also had bided his time to join the insurgency against
France. He was unequivocally brilliant politically, unrivalled in military tactics,
and unwaveringly calculating in positioning himself at major social fractures
throughout his era. He constantly championed Catholic virtues and piety, and
even repressed vodou.89 Nevertheless, despite no change to his professions of faith,
his breaking of the oath made to the Catholic King and Christian deity irreversibly
relegated Toussaint into blackness, radicalism, and heresy in Spanish perceptions.
By extension, his troops and adherents similarly fell from grace. Only at this point
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did the Spanish counterrevolution that had vehemently opposed French-styled
radicalism fully attack the revolution of racial rights as a primary concern.
Once Spanish officials definitively learned of Toussaint’s defection it
demoralized their ranks and severely compromised their war efforts in the frontier
region.

Beyond this, efforts along the frontier were in shambles due to

overstretched resources, among other factors.

García, who had visited and

overseen military operations in the region, was in Fort Dauphin and in very poor
health, likely with some type of tropical fever.90
Almost certainly unrelated to the defection of Toussaint, though
compounding contextual negativity, troops under Jean-François committed an
indiscriminate massacre of white and French-affiliated residents of Fort Dauphin,
which Spanish officials deemed “horrendous conduct” and immediately
condemned.91 Eye-witness survivors of this massacre fled in numerous, some
reaching British-held territory or even the United States, and whose dramatic
accounts appeared in local newspapers. At eleven in the morning on 7 July Father
Vázquez arrived in the town center of Fort Dauphin with a small escort of six men.
He assured residents of their safety. Around noon Jean-François, perhaps adorned
with his gold medal from King Carlos IV, and Benjamin entered the city with about
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600 black soldiers. When the French whites saw the black troops enter they chose
a representative to discuss their fears with the Spanish officers, who promised
them protection. Most of the French whites fled into their homes, as they were
disarmed. Only fifty French mulattoes who had lived in Dajabon and knew the
Spanish were armed. Many of them were planters or their families who had
returned to the area due to Spanish proclamations promising them the return of
their plantations and properties. The French whites understood that the blacks
were unhappy with this deal, aside from the black troops’ disdain for their old
masters. At the approach of the black troops, slaves already in Fort Dauphin began
running through the streets shouting, “Long live the King of Spain: let us kill the
French people and spare the Spaniards.”

When the black troops reached the

market area about half an hour after arriving, sporadic killings began in different
parts of the city.92
The Spanish officers tried to call off the black troops through mediation
with Jean-François, directed by Vázquez. Survivors said that, “The priest Vasquez
(sic), a mulatto, has a great influence on the minds of the Negroes, for Jean-
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François humbly kissed his hand when he came near.” 93 Gathered in the city were
the black troops in an array of mismatched and tattered men’s and women’s dress
clothes from previous raids.94 This conference failed, as Jean-François may have
then whistled, calling on an all-out massacre until the black troops could find no
more victims.95 However, Jean-François much later blamed the arrival of unruly
troops of Biassou’s for antagonizing the whites and inciting the violence. 96
The white residents panicked and fled to the sea where they tried to board
docked vessels, but the majority were massacred at the waterside.

Bodies

remained around the wharves for days. During the massacre the black auxiliaries
yelled, “Long live the king!” Killings continued across the city until six or 7 in the
evening. From an interaction with Dupinous, who was identified as Jean-François’
secretary, the count of 742 dead emerged. Jean-François estimated 771 dead
himself. Many of the 800 Spanish regular troops who remained in the city seemed
indifferent to the French whites’ deaths and sufferings, and apparently repeated
in loud voices that that was what the French deserved, and may have even drawn
bayonets to drive victims back to the melee. Some Spanish officers intervened by
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saving a few residents who they esteemed by collecting and defending them in a
park, and saved other French residents by dressing them in Spanish clothing. The
next day several French royalists who had lived in Dajabon for a few years had
their homes plundered by locals in a possibly related anti-French outburst. One
group of five French survivors, having made it as far as Cape Hatteras of North
Carolina, drowned with seven of their slaves.97
One of the other factors that allowed this massacre to occur was the health
of García, who had been present in Fort Dauphin until he evacuated due to illness.
Also, Jean-François’ wife had also recently departed. The former was not there to
stop the violence, and the latter was there to not suffer collateral damage from it,
and the black troops knew that.98 The cause of the massacre remains in question
among scholars. Perhaps the black troops were irritated by the return of their old
masters.99 The French whites did take resources from Spain that they needed for
themselves, and with all the existing friction of how the French royalists had
treated them. Perhaps Jean-François did suspect a republican plot from within the
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residents of Fort Dauphin.100 Pro-Republic forces, including defected black forces
under Toussaint, certainly had staged urban ambushes. Perhaps the black troops
were indignant at the proclamation from Spain that assured them of keeping their
property and slavery, and rank-and-file black soldiers may have misunderstood
this deal as an effort to reestablish slavery with them included. Or, perhaps there
indignations were stoked at the enduring state of enslavement against people who
they knew from plantations where they had themselves worked under masters
who may have been in Fort Dauphin that day.101 Perhaps the slaves themselves in
Fort Dauphin who ran through the streets shouting, “Long live the King of Spain:
let us kill the French people” triggered the massacre in revenge.102 With the
inspiration of the approaching black troops they may have hoped that their actions
might be protected.

Most likely, none of these explanations are mutually

exclusive. Out of a force of 600 black troops of various ranks and life experiences
reentering a place and context of relationships provoked a range of preoccupations
and emotions. After all, these ostensible “allies” of French royalist whites were the
very same people that the black auxiliaries had rebelled against and overthrown
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at the outset of the revolution. One of the most difficult aspects to explain is JeanFrançois’ role in the massacre. Whether he was overtaken by a frenzy among his
troops, permitted or participated in the killings, or ordered them directly, remains
unclear, and all we do know is that such excessive violence against civilians was
out of his character.
Undoubtedly, Spanish officials were appalled at the apparently
unnecessary violence.

Urízar lamented the understandable impact of the

“catastrophe” of the massacre at Fort-Dauphin involving Jean-François.

He

claimed that the black general was admired there, where his forces visited the
town unleashed a “bloody furor” and “such cruel boldness” that caused great
shock among Spanish officials. However, Urízar complained of these French
colonists’ obstinacy to assist Spanish forces as they struggled.103 Given this recent
massacre of unarmed French whites other royalist colonists were reasonably
hesitant to affiliate with Spain and their black proxies, a windfall for the British
occupation.
Throughout the summer of 1794 Spanish officials Urízar despaired at the
recent turn of fortunes on the frontier, particularly regarding black auxiliary
defections.104 A new threat emerged in late July 1794. Military personnel on the
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southern frontier also reported once again of the, “theft of blacks that various
individuals perpetrate to sell them to foreign ships on the coasts of Petit Trou and
Barahona.” This despicable trade, related to that which had terrorized Maniel and
Naranjo, involved the capture of, “French blacks and even some of the neighbors
at a vile price to foreign ships.” Spanish officers collected substantial testimony
against these illicit traders and sought to capture and send the criminals to the
capital for trial, especially any potential Dominican collaborators.105 However, that
summer as other “blacks slave prisoners of war” were sent by Spanish forces
across the border and they were shipped in four voyages to Puerto Rico, as many
others had been, “to strengthen in this manner our interior security.” Of course,
those prisoners were likely sold as slaves in Puerto Rico. This differed little
compared to the illicit slave trading that Spanish officers complained about, only
that it transpired under the auspices of Spanish governance.106
For example, in June 1794, as in the many months before, Spanish forces
sent yet more prisoners to Puerto Rico. It cost six pesos per person for this freight
of both white and black prisoners, plus the cost of troops who had to escort them.
And, as in the preceding months, the sale of the black prisoners as slaves
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contributed to covering these expenses. This served the dire needs for funds in
Santo Domingo, as repeated by the Viceroy of New Spain who covered many costs
himself.107 Again, in late July 1794 as limited supplies arrived from Puerto Rico,
Spanish officials sent more prisoners the opposite direction, perhaps even as
indirect compensation.108
At the end of July 1794, José Nicolas de Azara wrote from Rome regarding
the requests that Portillo had made in May. He reported that the papacy had
absolved several French ecclesiastics of “censures and irregularities” from when
they “had taken the oath and adopted the maxims of the national convention.”
This cleared the way for additional francophone priests to be integrated into
Spanish operations both in Europe and the Caribbean, building upon earlier
imperial and ecclesiastical conversations among Spanish officials. On authority
from the Vatican Azara also told Portillo that he would be allowed to extend his
archdiocesan presence across the entire territory occupied by Spanish forces.
However, Azara relayed that, “The British, always attentive to exclude all foreign
influence in their overseas possessions, have established a general point that the
spiritual governance of all the Catholics that exist in their establishments in the
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world depends exclusively on the Catholic bishop of London.”109 Thus, regardless
of the state-sponsored Protestantism of the United Kingdom, Portillo could not
exert any evangelical influence over the substantial territory controlled by the
British in Saint-Domingue. The British of course wanted to block the geopolitical
implications of Spanish Catholic outreach, while the spiritual provisions of the
domestically-marginalized British Catholic establishment had a similarly
marginal presence on Hispaniola.
In August 1794 Father Pedro Cabellos wrote to Portillo from San Rafael
with news that Jean-François had routed the enemy Noel Antó, who fled to refuge
at Trou, where he intended to pursue him. Jean-François then arrested many of
his officers, seized his artillery, and killed many of his soldiers. At the convergence
of their territorial interests the Spanish, French, and British all separately attacked
the independent rebels of the strategically-important Grand Cahos – mountains
east of Gonaïves – caused many blacks to descend upon the town Hermita, near
San Rafael, which caused many families to flee.110 Throughout the late summer of
1794 British forces crept closer and closer to the border with Santo Domingo. 111
Spanish officials kept the Vatican aware of their military and geopolitical actions,
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and even called their troops “true Christian soldiers” while comparing them to the
legendary Jewish warrior Judah Maccabee.112
After a “disgraced attack” at Jacquezy, likely by French-allied black forces,
officials in Santo Domingo concluded that, “the enemy has learned that their force
is superior, and after all the blacks have declared for the Republicans, fanaticism
has been made general, and we should consider all of them our enemies.” With
this suspicion of general and spreading radicalism among blacks, and the
precedent of several high profile recent defections – most notably Toussaint –
Spanish officials increasingly mistrusted all black operatives, and expected more
to abandon the counterrevolutionary cause. They only hoped that the horrendous
violence in Saint-Domingue would contrast with the comparative Dominican
tranquility to entice undecided French colonists toward allegiance to the King of
Spain.113
Further compounding these setbacks, Spanish forces evacuating from
Jacquezy had been afflicted by an “epidemic of fevers” and had reasoned that they
would have a better chance to preserve the majority of their conquests by
selectively retreating to recover and regroup. García also reviewed Spanish-held
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territory in West as part of a broader interest among officials to dispense the
magnanimity of Spanish rule into these lands and peoples, as they framed it. “The
black general Tuzaint (sic) and his army,” had committed, “the most bastard
offenses in the part of the West,” against the Royal Treasury. In fact, Urízar warned
commanders understood that they should now watch the black allies with
suspicion, so as to avoid another Toussaint-like defection.

Urízar was left

managing these relationships as García was still seriously ill and debilitated as he
travelled through Santiago toward Santo Domingo. As a response to advances by
both armed black enemies and British forces, Spanish officials sought to maintain
“domestic peace” and repel any attacks on Santo Domingo by commissioning
officer Antonio Boville to form a home guard militia to protect Dominicans from
the neighboring conflagration. The British were, “more than maintaining the
conquered ports,” but also, “making some progress in the interior,” particularly
with the assistance of French royalists in their camp. With Spanish fortunes in an
apparent downward spiral, one consolation was the apparent faithfulness of the
Dominican people.114 Ensuing events would further shake this fragile Dominican
loyalty.
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MARRIAGE OF BIASSOU: CATHOLIC CULTURAL CAPITAL, MID-1794
In mid-September 1794 Archbishop Portillo recounted military setbacks
for the British at Port-au-Prince and Saint-Marc, largely due to the tact of Toussaint
Louverture. However, he also told of rumors regarding a great massacre of
Toussaint’s supporters of color, which likely referred to the affranchis revolt and
massacre in Saint-Marc. He thought that Spanish forces had dispersed thousands
of rebels in the central border region, and he specifically felt confident that
roadways around Mirebalais were safe enough for him to visit there. His main
concerns were that British forces lurked along the frontiers, who were rigorously
trying to defeat black French troops, and that rebels might launch ambushes along
the roadways. Portillo opined that, “…the whole colony [of Saint-Domingue] is
today in the possession of the British or [black] brigands, without the Spanish
possessing more than Fort Dauphin and Mirebalais.” He was right, in that over
the preceding months, and particularly with the notable defections of black
generals, Spanish military might had waned. Portillo was also concerned about
the safety of the “poor priests of the South,” due to the increasing violence,
including British intimidation.115 Also on the southern frontier Father Francisco
Cubillan wrote from Cahobas that he was fleeing eastward with holy relics due to
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the fighting and attacks by the blacks.116 Although its projects had stalled, the
entwined cosmological symbolism of Hispanic monarchism and popular
religiosity remained socially vibrant for many of the black auxiliaries and French
whites who fought with Spain, and, at least for the time being, actively competed
with French republicanism and also British moderation for adherents.
On the first day of September 1794, Juan Sanchez Valverde recorded the
Catholic marriage ceremony the black general Georges Biassou to his fiancée
Romana in the town of Banica. He was listed as having been born in “Guarico,”
and Romana was described as a native of “Cartie Morien” or, mostly likely
Quartier-Morin, an area just a few miles southeast of Cap-Français. Sánchez
Valverde (family of outspoken priest Antonio Sánchez Valverde) said that the
couple were living in Hincha. As legally free people of color both were permitted
to consent to marriage after the bride’s mother had been consulted. Antonio la
Sala, the mayor of Banica, served as the distinguished witness, as did Manuel
Valverde.117 This was, in many senses, the cultural apex of the Spanish and
Dominican counterrevolutionary movement.
Portillo, who actually facilitated this accrual of pro-Spanish cultural
capital, recorded that, “The black general Biassou came here with a great escort to
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visit me. I strained my poverty to make him a decent gift, which will prepare his
mode for confirming his loyalty to the King, which he swore to me and promised
with the most solemn expressions.

In consequence I made all the possible

courtesies.” After their displays of pleasantries and ostentations, Biassou asked
for edification from the archbishop, who appreciated the black commander’s spirit
and affection for Catholicism and Spain. This was a much-needed personal
alliance between two of the most powerful Spanish operatives on the island.
However, “when, after a few days, he asked me for sacraments of confirmation
and matrimony, I changed tone,” at which time Portillo said he chastised the
indispensable Biassou. During his time on the frontier the archbishop had learned
that Biassou, “cohabited with seven women” and made it clear to the black general
that “until he would have satisfied God, and me, with a noticeable correction”
Portillo could not offer him the sacraments that Biassou requested.118
The archbishop tried to make the situation a teaching moment for piety
and greater righteousness. Portillo explained that after “such a serious reply, and
to other grave but sweet reflections that I made to him,” that Biassou then, “retired
to his home without responding to me, nor speaking a word. He closed himself
morosely in a chamber.” Biassou was clearly insulted, and had sulked away.
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When Portillo realized the potential geopolitical and military damage he had
caused, he sent the “vicar of Hincha to console and encourage him.” At the black
general’s residence Biassou, “received him saying that he would like to save
himself, and that the Archbishop was an ambassador from God who had shown
him a glimpse of the Gates of Hell.” Biassou may have experienced serious
spiritual conviction. He may have also realized that his performance of piety to
maintain the goodwill of Spain and their deity – and therefore continue receiving
their material blessings, support for his career, and cooperation in his geopolitical
aims – required an outwardly-visible lifestyle change. Perhaps Biassou felt both.
In any case, the black general, who was so used to directing others and expecting
obedience, told the priest that, “nobody had spoken to him nor dismayed him that
way.” His renewed espousal of Spanish Catholic norms momentarily solidified a
shaky colonial order, cultural reconquest, and military project that had reeled from
high-level defections among the black auxiliaries, a path Biassou could have easily
taken for himself.119
Biassou agreed to change his amorous ways for which Portillo had scolded
him, and, “for love of his fiancé he had separated from the other women, whom
he confessed had been scandalous loves.” The priest from Hincha who Portillo
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had sent further counseled Biassou on this major matrimonial decision. Soon
thereafter Portillo presided over the ceremony, saying, “The day that I married
them…in a home distant from mine, [there was] a great gathering of all the
principal people of the town of both sexes.” The local attendees of the ceremony
further facilitated the royalist tone of the occasion, and brought to the ceremony,
“the portrait of their King, which the groom took on his chest.” 120 Biassou’s use of
the image of the King of Spain displayed an imagined line of spiritual alliance that
spanned the Atlantic, yet further divided the island.
After the ceremony Portillo said that he, “only excused myself from the
party…to leave the couple a decent liberty in the marriage bed.”121 The elderly
celibate archbishop dutifully recused himself from the conjugal atmosphere.
Portillo described the raucous festivities, saying, “They made everything to my
satisfaction. The table was large and abundant… Nor did they lack their dance,”
and the party lasted until one in the morning, with Biassou always at the center of
attention. The priest José Nolasco Mañon helped pay for the whole event, and the
attention to detail and Biassou’s fulfilment demonstrate how aware Portillo was

120

Fernando Portillo y Torres to Eugenio Llaguno, Banica, 14 September 1794, AGI-SD, leg. 1031.

121

Fernando Portillo y Torres to Eugenio Llaguno, Banica, 14 September 1794, AGI-SD, leg. 1031.

354

that this event further tied the frontier community and the black auxiliaries into
the Spanish counterrevolutionary project on the island.122
Like the marriage of Jean-François a year before, the ceremony was an
apex of Catholic cultural capital. The black auxiliaries possessed not only martial,
but also marital tact. Portillo glibly recounted that all races and ranks attended
the raucous festivity. This wedding bound a core of talented and ambitious black
leaders even more deeply into a marriage with Catholic practice and Spanish
culture. Rituals, and in this case particularly marriage, offer a window into
partisanship, and a metaphor for new social pacts. For the black troops, Catholic
belief was a social practice at a convergence of utility, sincerity, and partisanship.
One of the likely participating black officers theretofore more tied to Spanish
power was Pablo Alí, a devoted aid to Biassou who, over the many years of his
career on the island, proved to be a remarkably adept political operative within
these cosmological and geopolitical contexts on Hispaniola.

LEADERSHIP DEFICIT & TERRITORIAL LOSSES: LATE 1794
Portillo reported from the frontier on the British victories at Petite-Rivière
and Verrettes against Toussaint’s forces, and that after hiding for a few days
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Toussaint attacked quickly and surprised the British with an “excess multitude of
blacks.” Toussaint had regained significant lost ground, issuing the British great
losses in the process. The Spanish commander at Hincha had made “arrogant
threats” about surrendering the town, which he thought had encouraged black
rebels to have “repeated their insults” on the border, causing the priest of Cahobas
to flee further inland with the holy vessels.123
At the beginning of September 1794 many more prisoners were sent to
Puerto Rico, likely including many black captives who were to be sold back into
slavery. Fighting stayed near the border and far from the core of the Dominican
colony around the capital and Santiago. This, and due in part to the continued
shipments of dissenting prisoners, the capital remained calm. However, García
remained “gravely ill” in Santiago. After attention from local physicians, he
improved, and wanted to promptly return to the capital. In his absence, though,
Urízar suggested the prudence in employing a wise and seasoned military leader
to substitute for García while he was in critical condition and the war continued. 124
Into late September 1794 Urízar continued to receive updates from medical
personnel who treated García.

García appeared to be improving beyond

expectations, but Urízar still thought that it was unlikely that the governor could
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retake command and again suggested selecting an experienced substitute. Urízar
cited imperial codes that provided for such change of leadership or the formation
of a provisional military council could ease Spanish operations through a
turbulent moment of illness and defeat.125 If defections, military defeats, and
disease were not enough, the impairment of the Spanish governmental and
military leader of the colony further withered counterrevolutionary gains.
In October 1794 Urízar confirmed that four ships sailed for Caracas with
an additional 431 French prisoners, emigrants, and blacks.126 Apparently, 234 of
the black passengers were self-liberated slaves who had been captured with
“weapons in hand” and were being sent for the Intendant of Caracas to sell for the
benefit of the royal accounts. The 188 white prisoners of war would meet different
futures. This was one of the only – very insidious and hypocritical – ways in which
Spanish operations could sustain funding support.

Urízar fretted over the

growing number of “suspicious French” who could with their “flattering mode of
thought” try to subvert Santo Domingo, or stoke Dominicans’ aspirations for
liberty. Funding for Spanish forces was very weak, and because of that he also
asked [once again] for more money from Mexico. 127 At the end of 1794 reports
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arrived that French military officials and troops had been resettled in Trinidad
from Hispaniola were a major problem.

One officer in particular, Colonel

Fresineaux, was very troublesome for administrators due to his shrill demands for
respect and better treatment. These republican prisoners were generally “restless,
rebellious, and dangerous,” generally, and distinguished themselves as the
“murderers of Louis XVI” to Spanish officials, all the while potentially spreading
their political radicalism and discontent to a general population.128 While nearby
colonies handled these prisoners, they also continued to disproportionately fund
Spanish operations, often to their domestic distress.129 In general, neighboring
Caribbean colonies bore a heavy weight for the warfare in Hispaniola. They did
sell off black captives for a profit, but could not treat white French prisoners
similarly, and thus inventories of radicalized and angry white republican captives
collected in Spanish colonial port cities throughout the Caribbean.
In mid-October 1794 Portillo also reported that he had been ill with fevers
again. He feared that the sudden loss of some of the conquered towns would delay
the employment of the six exiled refractory French priests that metropolitan
officials had enlisted to his cause. He speculated that these new priests could stay
at the seminary in Santo Domingo until they gathered enough money to employ
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them on the frontier, and mentioned how useful they might be at the new maroon
settlement at Naranjo.130 At the end of October García finally arrived back in the
capital having been literally carried by others at times along his journey, as he was
unable to ride a horse or walk. Urízar again suggested that it was prudent to
appoint a wise military leader to substitute in case García worsened, died, or
simply did not improve. Spanish officers remained haunted by their failings at
San Rafael and San Miguel and the casualties and territorial losses incurred as
every passing day their frontier defenses deteriorated in condition where they had
lost two critical towns due to malfeasance by officers. To tend his own health from
his exhausting visit to the borderlands the archbishop had travelled away from the
capital to take baths in Baní, though he never flagged in his focus on deploying
religious personnel into newly-conquered French territories.131 Not only were
territorial losses mounting, but the hierarchy of Spanish power on the island was
reeling with García and Portillo severely incapacitated in the midst of some of the
most decisive points in the conflict.
Officials estimated that a successful continuation of their military
campaign would consume millions of pesos in addition to the millions of pesos
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already spent.132 In late November 1794 and additional 354,000 pesos arrived
along with 4,000 barrels of wheat to support troops in Fort Dauphin, San Rafael,
San Miguel, and Las Cahobas.133 Nevertheless, García begged for support from
the Viceroy of Mexico due to their dire needs.134 Further compounding the
situation was that in late November 1794 the fiscal of Santo Domingo, Andrés
Alvarez Calderon, began to investigate the disappearance of funds that had
occurred among Spanish forces on the northern frontier. About 48,000 pesos went
missing and remained unaccounted. Juan Sánchez, who had been in charge of the
budget, conveniently faulted the black auxiliaries under Jean-François who had
operated around Fort Dauphin.135 No concrete proof tied this absent cash to the
black troops, but the accusations and mystery of the situation further deteriorated
Spanish confidence in their allies.
Yet before that aid could even benefit Spanish border positions, by midNovember both San Rafael and Hincha were captured by French-affiliated forces.
By this point Portillo and García – the Spanish colonial brain trust on the island
who were barely healthy – were at odds with each other. Portillo was generally
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displeased with García’s decisiveness and pace, and said that many complaints
had been raised about the oversight of an officer named Lleonart who had been
responsible for the disastrous surrenders at San Rafael and Atalaya to French
forces.136 Besides this malfeasance, at the end of November many troops from
Havana departed from Cuba for the capital city of Santo Domingo, forces that
might have otherwise bolster the colony’s weakened frontier defenses.137
Toussaint had engineered these victories for France at San Rafael, along
with his subsequent victory at San Miguel. The commander of San Rafael had
surrendered and retreated to Hincha early in the attack, abandoning the town and
its residents to the enemies without significant resistance. San Rafael had been
garrisoned with almost 700 Spanish troops, all of whom panicked and fled when
confronted by the “mob” of the black soldiers under Toussaint, despite those
forces not using any artillery.

Complicating matters, Spanish troops had

abandoned their own artillery and all of their supplies during their hasty retreat.
Only about 300 troops defended San Miguel, and these forces actually repelled the
enemy, at least temporarily, and then retreated with all of their arms and supplies.
A steady column of colonists from this region clamored for the ports. Tensions

Fernando Portillo y Torres to Francisco Xavier de Herrera, Santo Domingo, 20 November 1794,
AGI-SD, leg. 1031; Fernando Portillo y Torres to Eugenio Llaguno, Santo Domingo, 24 November
1794, AGI-SD, leg. 1031.
136

137

José Pablo Valiente to Diego de Gardoqui, Havana, 22 November 1794, AGI-SD, leg. 1031, no.375.

361

were quite high as forces regrouped in Hincha under the fear of imminent attacks
by the black French forces, a defense that was complicated by their commander
being away in Banica.138 The suspicious decisions of Juan Lleonart, and the other
officer Matias Armona, in this disaster soon consumed two years of legal
investigations into the nature of this major Spanish strategic defeat on the frontier
of the island.139
García had tried to rally forces to the defense following these debacles,
and Spanish officials hoped that if confronted their ramshackle troops would
defeat Toussaint. He had written to d’Espenville, who was in Mirebalais with 400
well-armed and mounted French royalists. This force had maintained the stability
and loyalty of Mirebalais. Commander d’Espenville was a partisan of the French
House of Bourbon, but was inclined to Spanish allegiance due to their shared
enemies and common worldview, and he had directly supported their operations
on the frontier previously. However, with the recent setbacks, his forces had
retired to Mirebalais to protect their own properties there. Chappotin, commander
of Grand Bois, had returned with some French allies to the capital and according
to Urízar seemed to be a “most recommendable young man…” He hoped he could
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easily unite with d’Espenville.140 However, it was increasingly clear that the few,
fractious, and feeble forces of these white French royalists allied to Spain were
wholly insufficient against the strategic brilliance of Toussaint and his larger, more
motivated forces under the Republic.
Under extreme duress from Toussaint’s forces, and from the British,
several Dominican frontier towns had written about their own struggles against
the enemy, and furthermore their attempts to “sustain the honor of their
ancestors” and “guard the altars, the lives of their children and women.” These
particular Dominicans on the borderland clearly invoked the language of Hispanic
belonging to contrast with the radicalism, irreverence, and blackness increasingly
assigned to their neighbors. Urízar summarized this collective sentiment by
saying that, “During the time of the political war I tried to imprint upon them, and
achieved imprinting upon the hearts of the French that every Spaniard was a
Lion.”141

The Hispanic, religious nationalistic rhetoric had, at least in these

tumultuous areas, taken hold among a domestic population that extended beyond
combatants and partisans.

This momentum of defining differences in Santo

Domingo against their neighbors to the west expanded in direct correlation to the
revolutionary antagonisms that penetrated the colony. Toward the end of 1794
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Portillo received permission to aid Grand Bois in view of his letter from that
summer about the Catholic enthusiasm of the “principal residents” who desired
to reestablish Catholic practices there and offered to support the expenses of a
priest and church. He was told to proceed with mindfulness of the priest at PetiteRivière and Father Cibot, the Vice Prefect for France.142 This was, though, a fight
against the greater tide of French advances and Spanish defeats both culturally
and militarily.
Throughout November 1794 border towns expressed their dire situation
amid the intertwined persistent military advance and political rise of Toussaint.
The local council of Azua, quite a distance from the border, wrote with alarm at
the losses at San Rafael and San Miguel at the hands of the “General of the Party
of Blacks named Tusen (sic),” along with the retreat of troops to Banica. They
thought Hincha had fallen and were very concerned for the stability of Las
Cahobas and Neiba. Multitudes of families filed into Azua from San Rafael, San
Miguel, and Hincha, many of whom were in poor health and on foot. Azua
residents resolved themselves for the “defense of the religion and our monarch
and country.”143 San Juan was also very fearful, but avowed their brave spirit in

“Al Arzobispo de Santo Domingo se le concede permiso para que los habitantes del Gran
Bois…,” San Lorenzo, 17 December 1794, AGI-SD, leg. 1014.
142

Ygnacio Batista, Juan Ximenes, Francisco Gomes, Manuel Ortis, Bartholome Vasallo, 3
November 1794, AGI-SD, leg. 1032.
143

364

the face of threats to sustain their religion and honor.144 The Real Audiencia noted
that after the towns of Azua and San Juan had learned that San Rafael and San
Miguel had been abandoned and troops had retreated to Hincha, and Banica, they
felt terror for their sense of abandonment, but continued wanting to repulse the
enemy, “making themselves worthy to occupy an honorable place in history.”145
With the retreat of Spanish colonialism militarily and politically more and more
Dominicans would feel this same panic at the prospect of entanglements to the
west, and a related panic and demand for self-reliance at the neglect of the Spanish
empire for their concerns. The outward-looking mobilization of conquest became
an internally-focused fight for preserving Hispanic values among the Dominican
populace that in the mid-1790s increasingly deepened its exposure to republican
institutions, revolutionary ideas, and social mobility for people of color amid
radical political engagement.

CONCLUSION
Similar anti-Haitian discourses born in the 1790s have regularly
reemerged to dominate Dominican policy and racism. In 1790s public faith
resonated with many Dominicans, especially elites, in the face of French radicalism
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that threatened their understanding of their place in the universe.

Fears of

rampant African heresy and French anti-clericalism contributed to a hegemonic
Dominican discourse of difference from Haiti. Within this Euronormative civility
and piety a person of color could attain Hispanic inclusion with sufficient
participation in the Catholic supernatural idiom. Even if France and later Haiti
offered greater liberties, not all people of color wanted to trade their cosmological
identity for the de jure distinctions. Rituals such as prayer and marriage offer us
a window into partisanship, power relations, and social networks.
Public displays of devotion or perceptions of irreverence mediated
inclusion for people of color and distinguish Spanish subjects from revolutionaries
during the identity crises surrounding the birth of Haiti. In a Dominican body
politic with a majority of color, allied black troops from Saint-Domingue
contributed to an ideal of national inclusion predicated upon the rejection of the
French Republic based upon the conflation of heresy and violence with blackness
which was increasingly mapped on the local population.

Vodou was

unquestionably influential with Spain’s black auxiliaries, yet Catholicism was the
hegemonic supernatural idiom of their allies in Santo Domingo. For Catholic
observers, the black auxiliaries’ success and upward mobility appeared as
blessings for their faithful service. For the black auxiliaries, Catholic belief was a
social practice at a convergence of utility, sincerity, and partisanship. It offered
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material function with weapons and cash, and metaphysical flexibility to mask or
blend with extant African cosmologies.146 The inverse of this process came when
Dominicans embraced secular ideals and, in Spanish and Dominican eyes, and
passed toward being more French, more black, or, years in the future, more
Haitian.
By the end of 1794 Dominicans were not only terrified at the prospects of
French attack and republicanism, and of the unholy black masses, but by the
weakness of Spanish imperial aid, all of which combined in the ensuing years to
local sense of Dominican belonging and common grievances, particularly among
the free populations. Spanish religious and cultural discourses, and military and
political actions could not permanently patch together disparate actors, from black
auxiliaries, to white French royalists, and residents of all variety in the territory of
Saint-Domingue that their over-extended forces occupied.

By 1794 the

counterrevolution had stalled, and this reversal began on the borders of
Hispaniola as Santo Domingo became more directly immersed in the Age of
Revolutions.
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CHAPTER 5
ENEMIES WITHIN & THE FRENCH ASCENT, 1795-1796

By August 1795 Archbishop Portillo was highly distressed at continuing
news of French anticlerical persecutions and institutionalized impiety. He had
become quite paranoid that pro-French blacks had been monitoring his own
travels. Whether his tirade came due to a fit of paranoia or not, it did follow
mounting losses by Spanish forces along the frontier.

Portillo predicted

widespread retributive murders if Santo Domingo was lost, including his own,
which he counted as, “glorious circumstances to sacrifice life in honor of the
religion and the monarchy…as they are very indifferent to the religion I profess,
equal in their estimation as that of a Mohammedan or idolater.”1 Whatever the
mesh of African and republican traits that he perceived, his fear of social and
religious tumult at the hands of their neighbors became a common and lasting fear
for Dominicans who watched the Haitian Revolution from across the island,
particularly after Santo Domingo was in fact surrendered by treaty to the French
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Republic, which islanders learned of in the latter stages of 1795. Portillo and
Spanish officials had been enthusiastic to embrace black troops who espoused a
mix of royalism and Catholicism, and to overlook these troops’ overtly African
cultural practices while they co-labored for social and geopolitical gain. As the
tide of the Spanish reconquest turned it became harder for Spanish officials and
for many Dominicans to absorb these black troops within their body politic when
peace with France broke out unexpectedly.
When news of the cession of Santo Domingo by treaty to France reached
the colonial capital in October 1795 sentiments of doom and betrayal surged
among many Dominicans.

Spanish officials feared open sedition from

Dominicans who loyal to Spain and might ignore the treaty and fight the French
occupation on their own. Outrage coursed across the streets in Santo Domingo,
with many Dominicans becoming desperate or despondent at the publication of
the treaty. Archbishop Portillo even said that a woman in the street saw the treaty
and then died after exclaiming, “My island, my homeland!” Dominicans were
especially concerned about the lack of legal provisions for religion for those who
chose to remain. Elite colonists were also quite troubled over the status of their
human property, and how downtrodden Dominicans of color might react to the
combination of weakened Spanish power and surging rights discourses. Others
simply could not believe the reversal of fortunes, from the Spanish having been so
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close to taking the entire French side of the island, to the royal court so readily
surrendering the entire Dominican side despite their fervent loyalty and the
absence of threat for a French takeover.2 Though French officials soon wrote to
express their adamant support for religious freedom, many Dominicans and
Spaniards remained dubious about their Catholic future, and resisted removal
from their Hispanic heritage.3 At news of the treaty Vatican officials reacted in
terror at what prospects of peace with secularizing and revolutionary France held.
They feared what destructions awaited Catholicism with their spiritual bastion of
Spain on the wane and on a likely collision course with Britain. 4 While certainly
many people of color welcomed French annexation as a chance to realize greater
liberties, many feared the same trials of faith and social turmoil that engulfed
Saint-Domingue and perplexed Dominican elites.
Further exacerbating the situation, in late 1795 the newly-empowered
French Executive Directory issued instructions to its transitional commissioner in
Santo Domingo asking him to win over “old Spaniards, today our co-citizens,” and
attract them to love and respect the dignity of the French people.

French
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provisional commissioners espoused their aims to “completely Frenchify”
(francesisar completamente) the colony, but also tried to impress upon the
archbishop and parishioners that the practice of religion was not incompatible
with free republics. Uncluttering this apparent cognitive dissonance was French
republicans’ Sisyphean task given what devout Dominicans had read about the
French Revolution, heard from refractory French priests, and witnessed in the
ongoing Haitian Revolution next door.5
Thus, by 1795 all Dominicans became directly engulfed by the
fundamental antagonisms of the Age of Revolutions which, to that point, had been
largely a second-hand, proxy conflict confined to big ideas and the borderlands.
Most importantly, the Spanish peace treaty with France demanded the cession of
Santo Domingo to the French Republic, which cause a cascade of turbulence to
sweep the colony. Weakening Spanish colonial order coupled with exposure to
French ideals due to the new presence of republican officials and citizens did spark
an uptick in internal dissent by Dominicans of color. This, along with the gradual
decline of Spanish power, inspired a mass exodus of white Dominicans and
Spaniards from the colony, which remade the racial equilibrium of the colony
toward an even larger majority of color. Many Dominicans who were unhappy
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with the transfer to the French could not leave. Also, while the leading black
auxiliary generals Jean-François and Georges Biassou accepted exile from the
island, the vast majority of their staunchly anti-French troops were left behind
with the prospect of French takeover.
Throughout 1795 this trend regressed, rapidly eroding Dominicans’
political and spiritual locations. By 1796, due to a combination of religious,
cultural, political, and economic reasons (including maintaining slavery, for some)
thousands of Dominicans felt so abandoned by Spain and fearful of a French future
that the option of British rule developed as a popular third way for Santo
Domingo. Thus, in April 1796 political undercurrents pushed the Archbishop of
Santo Domingo to voice grave concerns over festering tensions in the colony,
saying, “Every day the risk of sedition grows, dividing the people into two factions,
one for the British, and the other the French.”6 Dominican society and politics
fragmented among Spanish loyalism and traditional conservatism, French
radicalism, and later the British third way.
This chapter presents how Spanish decline, pro-French sedition, and black
Dominican revolts forced Dominicans to rethink their Spanish cultural and
political heritage, examine the results of French rights discourses, and explore
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crises of sovereignty, local distinctions, and questions of collective belonging.
With the surge of French republican power Dominicans further engrained virulent
Catholicism and political moderation into their cultural politics, distinguished
their society from perceptions of their proto-Haitian neighbors, and entwined
radicalism and impiety with blackness and republicanism, ideas that shaped
middle sector Dominican ideas about Haiti into the independence era and far
beyond it. The issue of Catholic spirituality during the intensity of Spanish
reconquest from 1792-1794 became a test for the internal population. Images of
black civility and piety set by the Spanish black auxiliaries became standards for
Dominican populations of color, and those who defied Hispanic Catholic norms
fell from grace, just as Toussaint had, and passed toward being more French, and
possibly more African in the process.
With these events the Haitian Revolution finally spilled across the border
to directly unsettle the social order and future of Dominican neighbors.7 In April
1796 Archbishop Portillo reported that French republican ideals of equality and
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citizenship had rapidly won popularity among Dominicans of color.8 Dominicans
of color harnessed revolutionary ideas and exploited imperial vulnerabilities
across the 1790s to remake Dominican cultural politics and realize their social
ambitions. This chapter also proposes that from this Spanish colonialism was
driven from an optimism about assimilating insurgent blacks into useful subjects
in the early-1790s toward conflating African descent with radical sympathies and
racial degeneracy by the end of that decade. Santo Domingo was also a conduit
for French royalist refugees who stoked paranoias with dire rumors. As a French
occupation loomed and race relations destabilized in the late-1790s this riptide of
white flight swept hundreds of elite families from Santo Domingo, which
cemented a permanent Dominican majority of African descent.

This period

reconfigured Santo Domingo's demographics, politics, and discourses on heritage,
governance, and collectivity that subsequently provided the founding ideas of
Dominican national identity. Newly-empowered people of color – including
slaves, peasants, maroons, troops, and clergy – drove these changes.9
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Throughout this period Dominicans were forced to reconsider their place
within the Spanish empire, directly confront French radicalism, and eventually
British promises of moderation. Only in hindsight have historians accepted this
surge of Spanish power in Hispaniola as anachronistic to the growth of rights
discourses and popular sovereignty. On the eve of the treaty the Spanish Empire
had surged in the amount of land they claimed in the Americas. They had gained
Louisiana shortly before, and then expanded their territory during the Haitian
Revolution with conquests in Saint-Domingue. It was a high water mark in the
fight for monarchist, Catholic, and counterrevolutionary interests. It was a highly
ambitious power play by Spain to take the most land in the Americas acre by acre.
It was also a high water mark of Spanish power and imperial order in the
Americas. The inward turn of turmoil prompted a collective pondering of the
Dominican past, belonging, and a future political order, while terribly unresolved
in this era nevertheless enhanced a growing sense of local distinctions. These were
seeds of national difference. As Saint-Domingue stumbled toward horizons
beyond France, Santo Domingo fell into a future without Spain after almost exactly
three-hundred years of colonial rule.
Besides internal Dominican affairs, the Treaty of Basel inadvertently
punctuated two points in the equilibrium of Caribbean colonialism. First, it closed
the era in which Spanish-affiliated black troops had engineered the revolution and
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exemplified black power in Saint-Domingue, particularly before the National
Assembly in Paris confirmed abolition in 1794. Without Spanish support – guns,
uniforms, money, and strategic support – the first iteration of the Haitian
Revolution would not have pushed the French to the desperate measures of
abolition, nor would the military and leadership talent that accrued to the
Republic and later forged independence – Toussaint, Dessalines, and Christophe
– have gained their experience, their prominence, and their hardened troops with
such practiced military and political abilities. Spanish ambitions had been to
mediate the plantation and governmental systems with spirituality and restraint,
since they believed that French excesses in brutality toward slaves, and fractious
and impious politics, had caused the revolutionary turmoil. Spain failed. The
talent that is helped to developed turned back upon them in full force as the
revolutionary bona fides swept to the Republic with their embrace of natural rights’
full universalism.
Secondly, the “Second Spanish Empire” of the ever faithful island colonies
of Cuba and especially Puerto Rico – the Spanish colony most closely tied to
revolutionary-era Santo Domingo – could not have happened without this
counterrevolutionary experience. Their troops and resources flowed into take
Saint-Domingue alongside Dominican actors. With the revolts French émigrés
flowed outward to those islands, followed by well-off Dominicans after the treaty.
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These colonies became the bastions of monarchism, Catholicism, and antirevolutionary fervor abounded in this wartime and paranoid atmosphere. The
slave regimes and plantation economies surged with new emigrant expertise and
capital in the market void left by Saint-Domingue. The treaty of 1795, followed by
the eventual French occupation from 1802-1809, were absolutely essential points
of divergence for Dominicans from their formerly closely-tied Puerto Rican and
Cuban neighbors of the Hispanic Caribbean.

COURSE OF CONFLICT THROUGH 1795
Spain began 1795 with great reserves of optimism for their operations in
Saint-Domingue despite losses along the border.10 Toussaint’s defection roughly
six months prior had definitely caused a reversal of fortunes.11 In his act of
duplicity, and in his looming threat, Toussaint caused Spanish subjects to turn
town defending Dominican traditions and faith from the encroaching tempest of
revolution rather than spreading those worldviews as they had in early years of
the conflict.12 Nevertheless, the start of the year found peace in the vast interior of
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Santo Domingo, where Dominicans – “good vassals” – worked and dutifully
passed their daily lives without few ties to the war.13
For the substantial portions of North and West that the Spanish did hold,
Archbishop Portillo was pleased and optimistic about the absolution of French
priests to aid the counterrevolution and about his new powers over the island, but
was quite perturbed about the British efforts to oversee spirituality in their own
occupied territories.14 Aside from hating the idea of British Catholic control in
their regions, he worried about how this exemption might help them conquer the
island, as the Spanish church did not hold out solitary appeal to disaffected
Catholics. He also wanted to lessen the influence of priests who were hostile to
Spain in conquered territories, and did not think that most of the conquered towns
were peaceful enough to receive his intended pastoral visit. 15 The sacking of San
Rafael and Hincha by “black and mulatto enemies” further soured his view of
military effectiveness which he seemed to think never kept pace with his
evangelization, and urged caution for Havana, especially after recent
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revolutionary conspiracies in Mexico and Bogotá.16 In March fighting erupted on
the borders with setbacks at San Rafael and San Miguel, which forced Spanish
troops to regroup at San Juan de la Maguana and Azua, much further into
Dominican territory.17 By June, Portillo thought the situation was so unstable that
he asked the priests of San Rafael, Atalaya, Dondon, Hincha, and surrounding
regions to take inventory and send their “sacred vessels, vestments, and jewelry”
and silver, gold, and chalices to the treasury for safeguarding during the war. 18
This was unquestionably a strategic retreat, one of the most significant that the
spiritual movement had yet to endure.
Spain had to better fortify their frontiers against the reenergized French
forces under Toussaint. For the time being Spain conserved their conquered
possessions, and were particularly focused on the incorporation and security of
Grand Bois and Mirebalais. Marques d’Espenville was the primary ‘caudillo’
responsible for placing Mirebalais under Spanish control, as was Chappotin in
Grand Bois. They had, instead of fleeing to Jamaica or North America, gone to
Santo Domingo looking for support when conditions went awry in their

Fernando Portillo y Torres to Eugenio Llaguno, Santo Domingo, 25 January 1795 (2), AGI-SD,
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hometowns. Spanish officials believed that their interventions had pleased both
towns, especially Mirebalais. He would try to, “un-imprint from them whatever
annoyance or equivocation from which the volubility of their nation is easily
inclined.”19 These challenging efforts to maintain Mirebalais and Gran-Bois at least
kept the frontlines far to the west, and Santo Domingo remained largely peaceful.
Spanish officials’ other concern was how sincere and durable the loyalty of
d’Espenville and Chappotin was, given their former interest in leaving the island
for Jamaica or North America. Despite mounting setbacks through June 1795, the
capital remained tranquil and in good order without any of the commotions of the
frontier.20
A few sparks had jumped the border before the treaty in 1795. One
significant episode occurred in May 1795 when reports arrived in the capital from
the eastern port city of Samaná detailing an elaborate anti-Spanish conspiracy.
Several local blacks, some of them apparently slaves, and three French republican
agents were captured along with a large stash of arms. Apparently the French
republican instigators and their weapons had been smuggled onto the remote
coast nearby, likely by a French naval vessel from Saint-Domingue. Geopolitically,
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the French coveted Samaná for its ideal position on a large, protected bay. With
subversive operatives and ideas infiltrating the colony on multiple fronts,
Governor García rushed troops to Samaná. With a similar pro-French revolt that
had recently transpired in Hincha, García had decided to send the prisoners to
Santo Domingo to make “an exemplary lesson” of them toward reinforcing
colonial

order

and

intimidating

other

Dominicans

with

revolutionary

sympathies.21
García also wrote that, “blacks are [now] in the majority: exhaustive
surveillance alone outmatches them,”22 and complained that any widespread
future Spanish counterinsurgency would have neither concrete objectives, nor
clear enemies other than Dominicans of color who he feared might rise up at any
moment to massacre whites.23 García explained that, “This diversity of attention
on such an…extensive…island has me like an Argos,”24 in reference to the
panoptical monster of classical Greek mythology.25 Nevertheless, these revolts
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were sporadic and unconnected, and Santo Domingo persisted in relative
tranquility compared to Saint-Domingue.
Spanish generals in North were also negotiating a prisoner exchange with
General Étienne Maynard Bizefranc de Laveaux, a top French commander on the
island.26 Not only were they in need of manpower, but the costs and risks of
maintaining republican prisoners burdened Spanish officials. Unable to wait, a
great number of French prisoners instead embarked for Philadelphia to also
relieve pressure on neighboring colonies who had already taken in so many. 27 In
April, García sent Venezuela a shipment of “French slaves” along with white
prisoners. Presumably these 187 “slaves” were black prisoners of war who would
be sold for profit when they disembarked at Puerto Cabello.28
The Spanish were increasingly pinned in by French ideas as much as by
their military forces, particularly after the unprecedented citizenship for all blacks.
Urízar analyzed that the, “ravages of the neighboring French colony that, the
doctrine beginning in its metropolis, ran to these parts with an incredible impetus
and celerity.” Keeping pace with previous Spanish accusations, he said that, “The
whites began this evil, the mulattoes and free blacks followed their example, and
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they extended it without much delay to the black slaves,” again diminishing the
separate political motivations of black combatants, many of whom fought with
Spain. In practice, they broke, “all respects and ties, divine and human, have filled
these lamentable possessions with horror and blood, converting the major part of
them and its beauties into corpses and ashes.” He wondered how Spanish officials
could stop the ideas of slaves from Saint-Domingue spreading to Santo Domingo
when he wrote, “As greater in number, and having lost the fear of iron, fire, and
blood, in them lies the greatest strength…because men accustomed to maintaining
themselves in leisure…need many and very effective means of containing them,
and reducing them to just limits, and moreover with France having proclaimed
their general liberty.” Not only did he see unallied blacks as lost in frivolity, but
that French abolition and their experience under arms would be quite difficult to
contain after the war.29
More immediately, Urízar worried at how black troops had become,
“exemplars of general liberty, and callings to our slaves…with the passing of time
could perhaps produce some unhappy sensation.” Prophetically, as Spanish
military attempts to stave off political dissent collapsed, radical sentiments soon
inundated Santo Domingo. With all of these considerations Urízar submitted a
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proposal tentatively titled Modification and Limits of Slavery, which he hoped would
reconcile imperial geopolitics, black power, and slaveholders’ rights to dissipate
the looming social storm for Santo Domingo and its extension into SaintDomingue. He hoped that his, “pious and generous King,” would side with him
to implement this “blissful course…[and] memorable example to other Nations, as
that of liberator and restorer of these miserable Africans.”30 One of the liberatory
tenets still espoused by Spain was that of spiritual empowerment against French
radicalism. However, the empire was losing ground, financially desolate, and
regardless of whatever reforms these depleted institutions could muster the tide
of revolution would soon sweep the Dominican polity. Soon enough, plans for
integrating occupied French territory would no longer be a concern.
In mid-July 1795 as British forces pressed up to the southern Dominican
border, formal diplomatic relations with Britain became increasingly thorny.
Marquis Bute, British ambassador to Spain, demanded that the Spanish “refund
the blacks and cattle that the insurgent slaves had sold in Spanish territory” that
were taken from planters in Saint-Domingue. Those same planters had joined the
British and demanded this recompense as part of their terms of alliance with the
United Kingdom. Bute voiced the expected niceties of friendship, conciliation, and
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good understanding, “which His Majesty so sincerely desires to always see
reigning between their respective governments in that part of the world.”31
Aside from demanding the return of illegally sold slaves, securing their
borders, and establishing a claims process operated by newfound Anglophile
Monsieur Malouet, Bute recommended joint operations to prevent slave
rebellions. However, any observer on Hispaniola would have noted the open
friction between Spanish and British interests, soldiers, and subjects, particularly
along the Dominican border. The Anglo-Spanish alliance against France was
barely believable by mid-1795. Furthermore, British agents likely had already
gathered intelligence of high-level negotiations between French and Spanish
officials, an omen of peace and, by logical extension, possible open warfare
between His Britannic Majesty and the surviving Bourbons of Iberia. The British
likely took their aggressive stances for compensation for their new adherents in
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Saint-Domingue to settle these scores and secure critical local support in their
occupied territories before such a war.32
In August 1795 the Committee of Public Safety naval minister wrote to
General Laveaux in Saint-Domingue to announce the terms of the peace treaty,
which ended the war between Spain and France, and specifically the highlyunanticipated Spanish cession of Santo Domingo.

The report from France

mentioned the expectation that Spanish forces should immediately put down their
arms, and that, “Harmony and friendship should reign between the French and
Spanish of Santo Domingo as it exists between them in Europe.”33 Given the years
of warfare, and century of rivalry, such optimistic outcomes were improbable.
In Paris, the Committee of Public Safety’s colonial administrators sent the
commissioners in Saint-Domingue new laws to apply regarding implementation
of the peace treaty and to maintain the valor and energy of soldiers, and enlivening
the zeal, ardor, and activity of the cultivateurs (the term, “cultivator,” used by
French republicans to signify ex-slave laborers). Of note, with the cessation of
hostilities their new task was to “conquer new siblings” – implicitly Dominicans –
through “gentility, benevolence, purity of our customs that will unite them to us.”
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French officials implored colonial administrators to exemplify the character and
generosity of the Republic. The Committee of Public Safety was busily planning
for the defense and administration of this new colony, and would soon send
instructions for its supposed takeover, but commanded French generals to act with
patriotism and wisdom toward the Spanish.34 Republicans in the colony quickly
diverted from this idealized course.
In late August 1795 Archbishop Portillo, wholly unaware of the peace
treaty, had only heard from the metropole that the French had detained an
Archbishop there as prisoner of state, a previously unconscionable act, and that
French radicals more aggressively slandered the church in pamphlets and
newspapers. He lambasted all of these acts as acrimony against divine laws, all of
which would make ensuing peace and partnership with the Republic so unwieldy.
Portillo implored Dominicans to “defend [the nation] with our persons, lives,
blood, moreover when it is so personal an injustice,” spurring the populace
onward against the Republic.35
Portillo also critiqued the more progressive black power that the Republic
had come to embrace, which had outflanked the exceptional Spanish inclusiveness
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of the early revolutionary years.

In this more robust refutation of racial

hierarchies, not only were blacks free and armed, but had, “sent the black deputies
to Paris to procure themselves liberty of the Republic.” Portillo also had two
anonymous informants who assured him that, “some thousands of blacks
observed my travels” when he visited the frontier, when he returned to the capital,
but even when he passed in or out of the city walls of Santo Domingo. Considering
French metropolitan treatment of archbishops, he feared his own safety, and
predicted widespread retributive murders at the hands of the republican blacks if
they ever took Santo Domingo, including his own martyrdom, which were,
“glorious circumstances to sacrifice life in honor of the religion and the
monarchy.” Soon enough, these fears of French rule would become quite real. He
further hardened cosmological divides across the island, saying that French blacks
were, “very indifferent to the religion I profess, equal in their estimation as that of
a Mohammedan or idolater.”36 Their republican affiliation and embrace of rights
discourses further distinguished them from Spanish-affiliated black auxiliaries,
whose faith professions formed an opposing category of black piety.
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At the end of August 1795 Santo Domingo was still mostly peaceful,
despite Spanish setbacks that increasingly included French royalists who fought
under Spanish flags were ungrateful for the generous support, honors, and
commissions that Spain had bestowed them. Spanish officials worried over which
allies had, “joined themselves with the black general Tusen, who previously was
ours and committed similar vileness,” given successful attacks against Mirebalais
by, “this caudillo’s army of blacks.” This included recent republican victories at
Las Cahobas which forced Spanish troops to withdraw to Banica. The precedent
of betrayal had spread eastward from, “the sensitive news proceeding from the
infidelity of the parishes of Mirebalais and Gran Bois,” through newly-absorbed
French colonists who, “feigned to be the most submissive, content, and grateful.”
Specifically, “The two [royalist] legions that were in Mirebalais and Gran Bois, one
with the name Carlos IV and the other with the name of Queen Luisa, composed
of émigrés and other French, both left at the same instant and in the explosion of
Mirebalais and Gran Bois went with the enemies.”

37

Confronted by black

republican power, Spanish officials were also equally perplexed by the white
French royalists in whom they had invested so much cash and trust. Their
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capability, and durability, proved far less than the black auxiliaries who remained
loyal to the Spanish cause.
The Republic symbolically desecrated Spanish bastions of spirituality and
civility, as they did “not guard the Divine nor human…nor respect the sacred
churches that they horrify with sacking.” Spanish officials prayed for retributive
punishments of biblical proportions – specifically, for plagues to afflict the hostile
republicans black and white, whose civil actions subverted sacred duties reserved
for only priests. French attacks against the religious principles appalled many
Dominicans, and Spanish officials wondered if this “libertinage” and vacillation
of allies would start to influence Dominican sectors of color who might embrace
republican maxims. As if French incursions were not enough, rumors had even
spread that the British had arrived in Gran Bois and raised the Union Jack there
with some local support, territories that were quite recently Spanish. Even before
they knew of the peace with France, Spanish officials wondered what type of
preventive rapport they should strike with British officers in the area.38 Their
ostensible allies had decided to withhold assistance against republican attacks
and, once French forces drove out the Spanish, then attack the French and occupy
the territory, thus indirectly pushing Spanish forces back toward Santo Domingo.
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The loss of Banica deep in the interior had even become a concern, so Spanish
officials routed several hundred veteran troops and black auxiliaries of Biassou’s
to fortify the town. If Banica and then San Juan de la Maguana fell, enemy forces
could easily march to the capital, and thus depleted Spanish forces had to also
protect the connecting road through Azua.39 Each of these new defensive needs
drew critical forces away from the battlefront, and underscored the growing threat
of pro-British subversion in Spanish lands.
In fact, Adam Williamson, governor of British-occupied Saint-Domingue,
after having taken Gran-Bois and Mirebalais, reasoned to Spanish officials that the
British would only attack towns where the tricolore republican flag flew as a
military obligation. Gran-Bois was in the jurisdiction of the British-occupied
Croix-des-Bouquets, Williamson had argued, which the pro-British French royalist
officer Montalembert had sought to unify the territory otherwise under British
control. This new, more audacious British policy was the expedient policy by
which the British would eventually make themselves rulers of Santo Domingo,
which they understood as a newfound British target attached to their
machinations for Saint-Domingue. At this moment of compounding crises, in one
beleaguered frontier town Spanish Colonel Villanueva asked a local priest sing a
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Te Deum over his troops and local residents. The priest exhorted locals to unify in
defense of their religion, king, and patria. The colonel and priest, like the religious
and military collaboration throughout the frontier, exhorted Spanish subjects to
behave honorably in the face of fear rather than cower.40

Despite Spanish

insistence in their reconquest values, and despite the attempts to reanimate the
project from recent inertia, the treaty terms crossing the Atlantic would force
Dominicans into French contact, first as awkward allies, and seven years later as
occupiers, while the pro-British movement simmer to a boil over the following
year.

CHARLES LESEC & ADDITIONAL DEFECTIONS
Not only had Toussaint’s volte face to the Republic and other defections
jaded Spanish officials in 1794, these treasons increased even before the peace
treaty, all of which further scared Dominican society from the trustworthiness of
the black auxiliaries.

In April 1794, on the cusp the dynamic Toussaint

Louverture's defection,41 Spain's black auxiliaries had notched a key defeat against
French forces on the northern frontier. The “valiant commander” Charles Lesec,
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who oversaw this victory, earned commendations for his “brave spirit” and the
disarray he exacted against the French.42
On 12 April 1794 a report was forwarded from colonial government
officials in Santo Domingo to Spanish military brass regarding the defeat of French
forces by Spanish auxiliaries during the former's attack upon the frontier town of
Santa Susana close to Fort Dauphin. The “valiant commander” directing the
Spanish forces during the victory only a few days prior, on 8 April, was Carlos
Gabriel Lesec (or, Charles Lesec in French sources). He was identified as a mulatto
officer of the black auxiliaries, was named as the commander of Santa Susana, and
held rank immediately under the authority of the African-born ex-slave from
Saint-Domingue, Jean-François, who was working in the service of the Spanish
crown. On 8 April at four o'clock in the morning Lesec's troops had been attacked
by French forces. With a “brave spirit” they proceeded to inflict disorder and
confusion on their enemies. After the fight Lesec had to enact swift justice against
a Captain Mamba for not entering combat, demonstrating his lack of tolerance for
disobedience to him and the Spanish cause. The Spanish forces under Lesec
achieved “complete satisfaction” in this battle.43
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Lesec's account describes how four columns of “our enemies, the citizens”
tried to attack and burn their encampments. The French forces tried to take the
auxiliaries' fort, but within minutes were repulsed, with enemy soldiers throwing
their weapons and hats down and fleeing. The auxiliaries took sixty guns and
their enemies' drums. By eleven o'clock they had counted fifty bodies of whites,
mulattoes, and blacks around the battle site. The Spanish auxiliaries only lost five
men, with three injured. During the day Lesec himself received numerous cuts on
his face by splinters from a nearby bullet ricochet.44 A black woman visited the
auxiliaries and assured them that the republican General Villatte had been
wounded, as well.45 At that time Lesec's conduct was again heralded and endorsed
by the Captain General of Santo Domingo.46 Thus, into late 1794 Carlos Gabriel
Lesec was considered a hero in the service of the Spanish crown fighting the
French forces along the border region with Saint-Domingue. He was a bright spot
of loyalty and accomplishment for Spanish officials wanting for optimism in the
wake of advances made by the French and defections of other black generals, such
as Toussaint Louverture.47
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Besides earning the trust of Governor García, King Carlos IV praised
Lesec.48 Throughout 1794 this largely overlooked figure was a hero and a glimmer
of loyalty and skill for Spanish officials reeling from desertions.49 Into early 1795
Lesec approached the power that Toussaint once had with Spain, and was only
clearly surpassed by Jean-François and Biassou. He commanded at least 1,000 of
the remaining few thousand black auxiliaries. While the traitor Toussaint routed
Jean-François and Biassou, Lesec alone held his ground. To a degree he had
replaced Toussaint for the Spanish.50
Lesec's fall from grace was swift and precipitous, as in April 1795, exactly
a year after his esteemed victory at Santa Susana, he was accused of treason and
was killed during a pursuit. Interestingly, in the official Spanish documents that
describe Lesec's betrayal he was immediately identified by officials as a gefe negro,
or black leader, whereas in all previous documents enumerating his successes he
was identified as a mulatto. According to Jean-François, the “black” officer Lesec
had been reported to have undertaken some indulgences of conduct that varied
from the “love” he had previously demonstrated for the Spanish, wisdom, and
submission. Jean-François went to Santa Susana to confirm this, restore order, and
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make accord. Outside of Santa Susana he was stopped by one Benjamin Dubison
from entering the camp. Apparently Lesec had given orders that when JeanFrançois and his retinue arrived they should be fired upon from the fort, causing
them to retreat and so that they could be pursued and fought. It was an ambush
intent upon assassinating the top black auxiliary general. Jean-François decided
to order Lesec's immediate capture, and sought to question him regarding the
meanings and reasons for his actions. Dubison created an ambush to trap Lesec,
instead. During the initial encounter Lesec realized what was transpiring and fled
on horseback. Though Dubison's men could not pursue him, as they had no
horses, they shot at him, with one hastily-fired bullet striking Lesec, killing him
immediately. Jean-François said that Lesec paid for his treasonous attempt to join
with the French republicans with his life, and fortunately was unable to deliver all
of the camps and forts of Santa Susana to the “commandante del Guarico,” or the
commander of French republican forces around Cap-Français, who was at that
time was General Villatte, the same high-ranking officer that Lesec and his troops
had been commended for nearly killing roughly one year before.51
After this confrontation had transpired, a republic legislator from Trou, a
nearby town, arrived at the scene. Surmising that he was there to support Lesec,
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Jean-François explained simply that “our blacks killed him.” Two other local
republicans also showed up at the site, and were instead apprehended. The
Spanish auxiliaries found them to be carrying letters and cockades intended for
Lesec, the cockade being a “signal of his patriotism, and the union of his soul with
his brothers the French.” It was determined, though, that Lesec acted alone in
conspiring with Villatte and the republicans to surrender to the French the
territory under Spanish control.52
Joaquín García, Governor of Santo Domingo, authored this report based
on accumulated information and testimony he had received from the battlefront.
García, after reading the letters exchanged between Lesec and Villatte, and other
republicans, reacted with shock at the premeditated treachery by a man that, “in
another time had won himself the general opinion for his loyalty and for his brave
spirit.” For their service and continued allegiance, and to motivate them to greater
achievement, García awarded some of the black officers of the Spanish auxiliaries
in that area the prize of a silver medal. He commended Jean-François for his
actions, excellent service, and vigilance in the face of growing advantages asserted
by the French republicans each day.53
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At this moment, though, it seems that the Spanish colonial officials began
to see the black auxiliaries more than ever as a force to be contained rather than as
optimal allies. At times depending on the writer, or depending on the skin tone of
the individual in question, mulatos could be called negros in Spanish documents.
However, the shift in calling Lesec “mulato” to “negro” may also signify an
intriguing raciality legible within the shifting paradigms of Hispaniola. Two
interpretations are possible, and may even be coterminous. Whatever Lesec's
phenotype was, the pinnacle of his success as a Spanish officer may have had a
whitening effect of acceptance, inclusion, or domestication amongst Spanish
officials. Lesec's identification as black in 1795 may be attributable to the full
abolition and formal racial equality of the French Republic, a turn that may have
signified a radical blackness, a designation as “negro” that may have signified a
posthumous decline in on the scale racial hierarchy for Lesec, whose treason
relegated him to a less worthy social rung.

TUMULTUOUS TREATY
As if Dominican society was not already distraught by infringing
revolutionary and military conflicts, by October 1795 news had arrived in the
capital that Santo Domingo had been ceded by treaty to the French Republic.
Dramatically following this stunning reversal of imperial importance for Santo
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Domingo, by the end of 1795 both Jean-François and Biassou were to be
unceremoniously exiled from the island as stipulated by the treaty.

Before

anybody in the capital even knew of the treaty, Vázquez informed the black
auxiliaries after learning of the treaty from a ship that arrived at Monte Cristi.
Jean-François still commanded 7,500 troops, and had just retaken Dondon, starting
a new and thus far successful offensive near Cap-Français. Immediately both
Vázquez and Jean-François were distraught and almost panicked for their
futures.54 “The famous boss of the blacks” as Vatican officials called Jean-Franc
would soon be gone.55 Before long, they commented on the “truly deplorable
situation of Catholicism on the island of S. Domingo.”56
When Spanish officials more thoroughly explained the outcome of their
war, and of their own fate of forced relocation, the black auxiliaries were crestfallen
and absolutely furious. Urízar suggested sending Jean-François to the Isle of Pines
off of Cuba where his retinue could become bucolic farmers, and thought that
Father Vázquez would like follow them. While specifics of their exile emerged,
the black auxiliaries remained armed, angry, newly-underemployed in the service
of a terminal cause. Urízar worried that the black auxiliaries could, “cause us
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much damage, and even impede our…delivery of our possessions to France.”57
Some certainly would try just that, and immediately explored other options,
especially with the British.
Due to the logistical impossibility of wholesale evacuation, thousands of
black auxiliaries were forced to stay in Santo Domingo. Some married Spanish
subjects and continued their Catholic devotion, and thousands of these suddenlyunderemployed black troops never considered siding with the French making
them unlike, “Toutsaint (sic), Blanc-Casanave, Noel Arto, and other volatile
tempers.” Some left behind, including officers of Jean-François’, and especially
Biassou before he entered exile, began serious conversations with the British about
defecting to continue their war against the despised French. Indeed, the activity
of British agents all along the border had increased dramatically since the treaty,
and targeted the loyalties of not only the black auxiliaries but the general
Dominican populace.58
Motivated more out of gratitude than the fear of Urízar, García advocated
to metropolitan officials to treat their “multitude” of black auxiliaries with grace
due to their dedicated service. The black auxiliaries had allegedly told García that
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they would, “prefer Spanish slavery to French liberty,” such was their hatred for
the Republic.59 By January 1796 Jean-François had been sent to Cuba along with
400 of his closest followers, just as 4,000 prominent colonists had fled to Havana,
Caracas, and San Juan.60 Other well-off colonists from the Cibao began to flee to
Trinidad.61 Georges Biassou and his retinue soon followed, departing Azua and
eventually arriving at the small outpost of San Agustín in Florida. 62 Instructions
from Godoy to Spanish officials in these colonies followed these black auxiliaries,
including to break any contact they might make with the British. 63 The Spanish
colonial order hemorrhaged human resources with the promise of French
encroachment.
Immediately after the treaty, Laveaux in Saint-Domingue constantly
agitated for the immediate exile of the black auxiliaries, who he knew would never
work for the French. Intriguingly, the mulatto general Jean-Louis Villatte who
fought for the Republic continued sending the black generals letters of enticement,
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at least in part due to his hope that their support would turn his own prospects
against his rival Laveaux. Vázquez again dutifully collected these letters and
forwarded them to Spanish officials. The priest also sent the somewhat alarming
message that Jean-François desperately wanted to continue the fight against the
French as “defender of the cause of the Kings.” Jean-François was, apparently,
considering the formation of a purely royalist party to autonomously fight the
Republic.64 Such were his and his troops’ political and cosmological convictions.
Soon, Portillo had to write his priests on the border and in Spanishoccupied Saint-Domingue to explain the treaty and the cessation of his cultural
and spiritual reconquest project.65 The priests were inclined to continue on in their
work, even though some thought that eventual arrival of French troops would
unleash havoc against Christian values in Santo Domingo.66 Other spiritually
dedicated Dominicans were concerned about the lack of religious protections
under the treaty for those who might remain under French rule, and hoped to,
“avoid the guillotine” while keeping the faith. Elite Dominicans were also worried
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over the question of their enslaved human capital.67 Aside from the revolutionary
violence to their west, Dominicans knew well of Robespierre’s Reign of Terror in
France.68 Apprehensions only escalated when the Republic soon sent a transitional
emissary to Santo Domingo with instructions to win over “old Spaniards…[into]
co-citizens,” and “completely Frenchify” the colony.69 This bombastic mission
further antagonized startled Dominicans.
Remaining French royalist allies also evacuated.

In December 1795

François Chappotin wrote from Neiba to brag of his service to Spain in hopes of
favorable relocation to Havana after the treaty. He lamented that his work in
capturing border towns had been ruined by the encroaching British occupation in
those regions, and claimed that he had declined British offers due to his loyalty to
the Spanish. Of course, other French royalists had already taken such offers. 70
With permission, Chappotin briefly passed to Spanish-held Trinidad with some
loyal slaves from Saint-Domingue.71

Spain acquiesced, and the generational
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benefits of wealth and power that accrued to this family stood in extreme contrast
to the treatment of black auxiliaries who, soon after the treaty, the Spanish began
to simply ignore as a hindrance of an overly-ambitious geopolitical project gone
awry.72

FRACTIOUS FRENCH DELEGATIONS
Before having received detailed instruction from France, the embattled
Laveaux selected three delegates to enter Santo Domingo and implement his own
interpretation of the treaty with hopes of securing personal political advantages.73
Laveaux had his own significant opposition to deal with in Saint-Domingue, and
thus sought to pivot Dominican resources, including the potential of new
dedicated Dominican troops of color, for his own domestic purposes. At the end
of December 1795, García had received intelligence from the border region that the
powerful mulatto general Jean-Louis Villatte was preparing a coup to secure
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power for radical gens de couleur against Laveaux and white French republicans.
While Laveaux may have wanted to use Santo Domingo to his advantage, the
turmoil caused by the Villatte conspiracy further disabled French forces and
further delayed their prospects of actually absorbing the Spanish colony.74
Laveaux wanted to occupy Santo Domingo under his command as soon
as possible.

He named not only gaining commerce and thus much-needed

material resources as an imperative, but also the regaining of control in
Ouanaminthe and Maribaroux after forcing Jean-François out, areas that remained
constant thorns in the Republic’s side.75 Near the end of 1795 Laveaux sent these
three “commissioners or parliamentarians” to speak with Spanish officials about
first relinquishing Fort Dauphin and other Spanish-controlled territory in SaintDomingue. These carefully-selected tricolore officials – one white, one mulatto,
and one black – represented not only racial egalitarianism, but the bleue, blanche, et
rouge of the new French flag. The commission had fascinating backgrounds
besides their symbolism.

The white official may have been a comedian or

performer in Saint-Marc. The mulatto official was a distinguished revolutionary
figure. The black official had been a slave of “Lacayo,” owned by some planter of
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notoriety. The commission grated Urízar’s nerves, who said they, “suppose
themselves…as owners in our towns,” and without any notice to Spanish officials
circulated all sorts of printed papers and tried to abolish slavery along their route
to the capital. One of the primary sticking points of their discussions was that the
French, who could not possibly effectively occupy and absorb all of Santo
Domingo, sought a piecemeal delivery of certain Dominican locations that they
viewed as strategically important. Spanish officials thought that this would serve
to both destabilize more territory and also allow the British opportunities to take
more territory, primarily because the British would not attack Spanish-held
positions, but would take them as soon as the French forces appeared.76 This was
exactly the policy that the British professed. 77 Thus, to protect Spanish interests
during the withdrawal of Spanish forces, despite the considerable costs, would
continue to protect Dominican space and property from the British, from internal
unrest, and from a potentially disorderly takeover with possible retribution from
French black troops.78
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These considerations of territorial surrender and abolition drew
immediate conflict, not only due to ideological, military and social contentions,
but because the vague legal language in the Treaty of Basel regarding how and
when these transitions would transpire. As soon as he learned of this impasse,
Laveaux scrawled out a tart letter to García, saying that the French recognized
“humans” and not slaves, which the Spanish wanted to claim as property covered
under their one year to withdraw. Laveaux also condescendingly “forgave”
García for formerly opposing the Republic. Spanish officials contended that their
law prevailed until they actually transferred Santo Domingo formally to the
French.79 García argued that as slaves were owned by people, and not the state,
that the Republic had no claim on Spanish subjects’ property, human capital
included, which the treaty seemed to protect. And, since French law did not yet
apply in Santo Domingo, neither did their claims. 80 Laveaux’s unilateral action
and attempt to enforce his own interpretation prompted a flurry of furious letters
with García, who firmly asserted Spanish claims to enslaved property.81 No easy
solution existed for this standoff. Spanish slavery continued as Spanish officials
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continued to manage day-to-day operations in much of Santo Domingo for many
years. This was itself an unforeseen complication, as was the treaty violation by
which the French were too feeble to effectively absorb the colony, all of which
incurred great cost to Spain. This new Hispano-French partnership between old
enemies existed only in de jure terms, and was barely intelligible even in that
realm.82
When a group of concerned Dominicans from northern Santo Domingo
visited Laveaux asking him to make a proclamation that would calm the populace
in Santo Domingo and reassure them of France’s peaceful intentions, Laveaux
instead decided to pedantically instruct them on republican virtues, and insisted
that abolition would immediately ensue across Santo Domingo. This French
official “made them to know” his expectations that they would adopt the
“customs, practices, friendship, and fraternity” of the Republic, apparently
whether they cared to or not. He did promise them freedom of religion, but to
Dominicans this offered seemed dissonant with the cajoled adoption of French
republican values, which to them appeared to include clear, institutionalized antichurch actions.83 Laveaux said that García’s defiance had continued to cause
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“incalculable damages for the Republic.84 Whatever those damages may have
been, Laveaux had also damaged openness and offended trust that many
Dominicans may have attempted to have with the Republic.
Amidst this flux of power the visiting tricolore French officials also
triggered local events of upheaval in Santo Domingo. Spanish officials concluded
that their presence was simply a pretext to sow sedition among Dominicans of
color, as these emissaries began telling Dominican slaves that they were already
legally free due to French abolition and the impending republican takeover. This
caused “infinitos cimarrones” (innumerable runaways) to flee their owners.85 When
the delegation reached the Dominican border region their presence caused serious
disturbances among local slaves, which Spanish officials counteracted to prevent
them from starting to “escape and incinerate the canefields” like French slaves.86
Up to that point Dominican slaves had remained largely unresponsive, at least in
outward action, to weakening Spanish positions and circulating French rights
discourses that had already extended into Santo Domingo.87
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Spanish officials quickly expelled these three French representatives to the
great ire of Laveaux.88 By and large, despite a temporary spike in marronage, the
Dominican slave regime and daily social order had changed little with the new
treaty, despite Laveaux’s aims.89 García wrote to Godoy for advisement on his
constant conflicts with Laveaux.

Soon, Godoy complained to the French

ambassador in Spain, Emmanuel-Louis-Joseph d’Hermand, about this arbitrary
delegation sent by Laveaux in the name of the Republic. The French ambassador,
unbeknownst to Godoy, was trying to form an actual Paris-sponsored, conciliatory
provisional commission to Santo Domingo. Godoy reiterated the protections of
Article IX for Dominican planters and their property, and threatened that such
haphazard actions might abrogate the treaty.90 Shortly thereafter, d’Hermand took
an apologetic and conciliatory position regarding the rash actions of Laveaux, and
did not try to dissuade Spanish officials from their understanding of protections
for slaveholders.91
While Laveaux acted unilaterally, d’Hermand, admitted that France was
in no position to begin occupying Dominican territory and decided to send a
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distinguished provisional envoy who, he hoped, would soothe the fears of the
Dominican populace and skillfully navigate political, social, and military hurdles
in preparation for the eventual takeover. Ambassador d’Hermand informed
Godoy that the French National Commission had selected one Philippe-Rose
Roume for this role due to his services in Spanish Trinidad, his roots in Grenada,
and his experience under the Republic in Saint-Domingue as a commissioner at
the start of the revolution. Without much warning, Roume soon arrived in Madrid
to meet officials and with expectations for immediate departure as a safeguard
against British ambitions for Santo Domingo.92 Godoy hated this plan, and said
that since the treaty was still secret that any such appointment of a provisional
envoy would provoke a British response. He also noted that this response, and
other French actions, were irregular measures that already risked voiding the
treaty. Godoy moved to postpone the Roume trip pending further review.93
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In less than two weeks Roume arrived, though his conciliatory disposition
lagged. He met Godoy and King Carlos IV to present a list of supposedly modest
aims for his provisional commission. Godoy startled the republican guest by
suggesting that he had wanted Domingo Yriarte, who directed Spanish
negotiations of the treaty, to cede Louisiana to the French rather than Santo
Domingo, yet his ideal offer had been confounded by Yriarte’s sudden illness and
death. Godoy asked to make that trade. Roume thought his idea was horrible,
likely to some extent given his own personal investment on the island, and
d’Hermand referred it to Paris. Then, Roume took offense to the suggestion that
he sail on a courier ship instead of a more official vessel. Finally, Godoy asked
Roume about his experiences in Trinidad, where Roume had briefly been a
prominent planter under Spanish rule. Roume criticized Spanish policy there, and
complained that he had not been compensated for his efforts. His first interactions
with Spanish officials probably could have gone better.94 Later, after Roume had
spent six months in Santo Domingo he again returned to his request for
compensation, including for his brief, more than decade-old written report on
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Trinidad that he submitted to aid Spanish colonization there.95 Roume continued
to pester Spain about compensation for this report through 1800, even after he
became the primary commissioner in Saint-Domingue.

Godoy continued to

ignore his requests, particularly after his “difficult” demeanor as an agent in Santo
Domingo.96
With Laveaux’s tricolore commission, and Roume’s uneasy presence in
Madrid, these awkward, disjointed interactions both started and were metaphors
for the next six years of Spanish rule with French provisional observation in Santo
Domingo.

These envoys had already made the colony a new stage for

revolutionary political competition. Years later, Godoy himself observed that,
“The acquisition of this part of the island of Santo Domingo was so insignificant
that the Republic neglected to take possession of it... Even then it was not an act
of the Republic.”97 Republicans busied themselves with plans as to how Santo
Domingo might suit their own geopolitical or ideological designs often with
limited comprehension of Dominican realities, little tact toward Dominicans, and
less concern for Dominican futures. Even French operatives who acted on sincere

Perignon to Manuel Godoy, Madrid, 6 Vendémiaire an V / 17 September 1796, AHN-Estado, leg.
3395, exp.2; Philippe Roume, “De l'Isle et-du golphe de la Trinite; avantages quel'Espagne...,” 23
September 1783, AHN-Estado, leg. 3395.
95

96

Guillemare, 25 Nivôse an VIII / 15 January 1800, AHN-Estado, leg. 3395, exp. 2.

Manuel Godoy, Memoirs, 412. He continued, saying it was only an act “of Toussaint Louverture,
who accelerated the measure, without awaiting the orders of the French government, to who the
commissioner Roume had a report on the subject.
97

413

convictions for admirable aims of emancipation or equality appeared
pathologically incapable of communicating to Dominicans without customary
condescension.

Years of this approach gave way to republican racism and

hypocrisy of later Napoléonic rule in the colony after their formal occupation
began in 1802.
Roume’s instructions from the new Executive Directory in Paris included
“forestalling” and “counteracting” any British influence, negotiating strategic
handovers of forts to French forces, and enticing Dominicans to “love” the
Republic, all formidable tasks. This presiding body in the French Republic had
inherited the treaty, and Santo Domingo, from the fallen Committee of Public
Safety, and prudently realized that Santo Domingo would be more valuable
without becoming a new Vendée on Hispaniola. The last point, they thought, was
predicated upon dispelling many supposed misconceptions spread by enemies of
the Republic, particularly including criticisms by conservative priests who held
influence in Santo Domingo. Such priests were “rebels,” not “martyrs” worthy of
canonization. Instructing Dominicans on “eternal truths” was part of the “tutelary
muse of the French people” that extended “its wings over both hemispheres.”
Roume would start to “completely Frenchify” the colony. With clever public
relations to Dominican elites, the French instructions noted Santo Domingo as the
first European colony, and flattered them for their milder form of slavery, but said
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that Spain had terribly neglected the colony, leading to fertile territory that was
severely underproductive.

Dominican slaves, once liberated, would become

dedicated like “recognized children” and help the colony flourish. One of the
initial goals was to develop timber for naval uses. The instructions asked for
Spanish officials to stay on in “full exercise of their respective functions” until the
French could eventually take the territory, which might take a great deal of time.
Roume planned to entice the archbishop to submit to the French constitution, and
the Republic expected that if the British took Dominican territory they would take
it as an act of war and fight, even if “bad priests” had encouraged British
sympathies.98 Not only was Godoy less than thrilled with this prospect, Vatican
officials who were already dismayed about sacrificing Santo Domingo in the treaty
were unsettled with the presence of Roume as an agent of the Republic.99
Because of his experience Roume was uniquely suited for this role. He
had many experiences in trans-imperial relations in the Caribbean, having been
born and raised under French rule in Grenada, marrying into and English family
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and learning English under British rule in Grenada, and moving his entire family
to Spanish domains where he practiced Catholicism and learned Spanish in
Trinidad. On his first stay in Trinidad in 1777, he purchased a large amount of
land just northwest of Port of Spain as a show of good faith and commitment to
prosperity. He had once even travelled across the Lesser Antilles trying to drum
up interest from French and British planters to settle Spanish Trinidad.100 He
actually surveyed the island and wrote an extensive report back to the British
governor of Grenada about the suitability of the island for settlers.

Roume

attracted a wave of settlers with descriptions of fertile lands for cotton, coffee,
cacao, and cane. In subsequent years he visited Caracas and even Madrid to
persuade Spanish authorities to welcome thousands of emigrants (enslaved and
free) and their capital (financial and human) into Trinidad. The Spanish also
offered each family the potential for hundreds of free acres, especially if they
brought slaves, and subsidized livestock, food, and agricultural supplies for
settlers.101
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As the new Provisional Agent Roume wanted to draw out the “virtues and
talents” of “Dominican siblings.” Besides this, in paranoia Roume thought that
“counterrevolutionaries” and “evil French priests” had impeded his departure
from Spain, supported by the “worthless Pitt,” an unlikely level of sophisticated
subversion. He did fear what ideas preceded him about the religious policies of
the Republic, and realized that among the “African population” itself there might
be doubts regarding abolition, given violence in the west.

He followed the

Republic’s talking point that abolition would increase the tenacity and vigor of
black labor. Despite all of his political differences, he believed he would become
great friends with Archbishop Portillo and Governor García, who he presumed
would come to love him. He thought he and Portillo together could convince
creole priests that republican values were in fact better for Christianity than
“aristocratic despotism.”102 Roume was certainly ambitious.
Roume traveled onward to Sevilla where he awaited his voyage to Santo
Domingo from Cádiz.103 Godoy remained furious at d’Hermand’s refusal to
address his concerns about Roume and his presence in Santo Domingo, and thus
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delayed his departure pending resolution.104 During his stay in Sevilla he dined
with three French citizens and a Mexican, who Roume asked to help him procure
a portrait of Moctezuma and a copy of the writings of Bartolomé de las Casas.
During their meal a refractory French priest in exile, Father Antoine Drull, entered
the inn to accost the French citizens, apparently also having brought along a
constable who waited outside in case violence ensued. The French were appalled
by his tirade and accusations, and their Mexican companion took them straight to
the mayor’s office to complain. The mayor initially sided with the “minister of the
Almighty,” infuriating the republican entourage. Roume speculated that the
priest wanted to insult them, draw a reaction, and then have a riot against the
Frenchmen in defense of religion. Unsatisfied, Roume complained directly to
Godoy, who he expected to punish the priest and threatened tattle to the Executive
Directory.105 Roume had yet to hit his conciliatory stride before reaching Santo
Domingo.
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When Roume finally did depart, Godoy placated García by saying that the
provisional agent promised to help soothe Dominicans apprehensions regarding
a French occupation, especially after the damaging delegation sent by Laveaux.
Godoy also prepared García for the possibility that due to French involvement in
the revolution and lack of resources it might be a long time before the Republic
could actually occupy Santo Domingo.106 Roume sailed in early March aboard the
Juno with four assistants and arrived in Santo Domingo on 8 April 1796.107 During
his first days in Santo Domingo the new Provisional Agent Roume visited
churches and express interest in spiritual matters. The church administration in
Santo Domingo, unimpressed with republican overtures, continued evacuating its
property from the colony. Spanish officials recoiled at the idea that they were
paying millions of pesos to continue managing and protecting a territory while a
French envoy pulled away its subjects through disdainful maxims of equality, all
the while staving off British advances, who continued making significant gains in
West and South in Saint-Domingue. Abandoned by their own king, appalled by
the French, Dominicans in the interior gravitated toward British moderation and
monarchism. Seemingly uninterested in addressing these issues, Roume instead
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tried to make new friends by espousing his hope to “seduce” Dominicans to the
Republic. Roume also requested the return of French blacks captured and sent
into slavery in Santo Domingo, unaware that a great many had already been sent
off the island to bondage in other Spanish colonies. 108 Much like his first days in
Madrid, Roume’s arrival in Santo Domingo was lackluster.
With Roume’s interventions by mid-1796 the Spanish began to hand over
a few strategic positions to the French.

With his republican presence more

Dominicans began to move out of Santo Domingo for other Spanish colonies.109
This included the handing over of Fort Dauphin in July, after which 1,600 Spanish
troops withdrew to Havana against García’s wishes considering the daunting
British threat.110 As military defenses evaporated, the British encroached, and
occupying black French troops loomed, the war cut deeper into Santo Domingo.
More profoundly, the aggressive provisional agent of the Republic sat in the heart
of the capital of Santo Domingo stirring the political pot in the colony in hopes of
enticing Dominicans to revolutionary virtue. While some joined his cause, by and
large social polarization simply increased, including due to the fact that the
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previously externally-focused evangelical mission of Spain become an inwardfocused defense of religion and Hispanic identity.

STRAINS OF SEDITION, AND THE ACTITUD DE LOS NEGROS
Unlike the calming of tensions and friendship promised, Philippe Roume
accelerated cultural ferment in Santo Domingo. Republicans, many of color and
many from Saint-Domingue, began to move into the capital during this period of
peace in expectation of full French rule. Like they had in Saint-Domingue, they
literally commandeered churches and preached a gospel of equality and liberty
from local pulpits, scandalizing many Dominicans.
Pulpits elsewhere in the colony also became rostrums for revolutionary
rhetoric.

Juan Valerio Quiñones, a mulatto priest from Monte Cristi, had

disparaged and derided the authority of Portillo and tried to unilaterally cede his
parish to the French Republic on his own volition. In an attempt to win the priest
of Santiago over to his perspective he had even called the king a tyrant. This priest
earned the nickname “the Incendiary,” perhaps because of his revolutionary
actions, and perhaps because he had burnt some church records – it is unclear
whether this was accidental or not. He was so convinced by republicanism that he
tried to cede his parish to the French. In attempt to sway other priests he defamed
the archbishop and called the king a tyrant. Spanish officials noted that he read
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“blasphemous” texts, and that “Frenchness” had begun to affect his manners and
pronunciations. This priest even confronted the archbishop in Santo Domingo
with a tricolore cockade in his hat. After this he was welcomed at Commissioner
Roume's residence where he professed his loyalty to the republic. 111 French
officials in Santo Domingo bestowed him citizenship with “Liberty, Equality,
French Republic” emblazoned on his papers.112 Furthermore, amidst the ongoing
abolition conflict this incendiary priest stoked the cultural conflagration by
marrying a Dominican slave girl who was half his age under French civil law. 113 A
slave owner had confirmed that a “good-looking” eighteen year-old mulatto girl
that he owned had drawn the attention of this “bad priest,” and that apparently
before his republican epiphany many people had seen the two spending the night
together.

This was the same priest who, allegedly, had refused to give a

parishioner their last rites because he wanted to finish playing a good hand of
cards. In any case, after their republican nuptials, these newly-secular newlyweds
then dined with French officials as guests of honor.114 Again, none of these events
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soothed Dominicans’ fears about the role of religiosity under eventual rule of the
Republic. This case exemplifies the aggression of French cultural politics well
beyond their formal role in Santo Domingo, as they further emboldened
Dominicans to flaunt Spanish colonialism if they so chose.

Such actions

scandalized the devout.
Only weeks after French Commissioner Roume officiated this marriage he
asked Archbishop Portillo for a divorce from his own wife of thirty years,
explaining that his worldview had dramatically changed during the revolution,
yet his wife’s had not. His wife was from an English family, as well, and she had
never embraced his revolutionary furor. Roume, who insisted he was a serious
Catholic, told Portillo that he hoped the practice of politically-motivated divorce
would become more common, and hoped that the archbishop would accept his
request. Roume said he wanted an egalitarian marriage to a younger woman
whose principles aligned with his own and who might stand with “our brothers
the Haitians.”115 Roume soon married his mistress, a mulata, with whom he would
have a child.116 In these two cases the supposed permanence of priestly and marital
vows suffered disunion by radical fervor. The French republicans were fully
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aware of their actions of religious warfare, and these ritual repudiations of
Catholic norms, on top of the misappropriation of churches, repulsed devout
Dominicans.
After the treaty a wave of anti-colonial conspiracies also jolted Santo
Domingo. Scattered uprisings by black rebels proliferated near La Vega, Baní, and
Cotuí, locations that were both distant from one another, and quite far from the
border with revolutionary Saint-Domingue.117 Very little documentation remains
one these instances of unrest, but Spanish feebleness and French radicalism may
have certainly contributed influence to whatever local or personal grievances the
insurgents held.118 In any case, with increasing frequency the revolution and its
ideals spread in Santo Domingo. Spanish officials quite readily blamed the new
French republican residents.

Whatever the cause, Dominicans became more

paranoid about social disintegration and violence.

White flight escalated,

destabilizing French emissaries arrived in the capital, and opened structural
spaces for marginalized people of color to actualize their own ambitions for
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Dominican society.119 Later in 1796 the archbishop excoriated Dominicans' lack of
loyalty to the crown, and predicted that disunity would foster more chaos. 120
With mounting anticlericalism, Fernando Portillo, Archbishop of Santo
Domingo, wrote of armed black republican opportunists near the frontier who
apparently sacked churches, despite the peace.121 A priest recounted that their
leader, “talked to me... In a miserable state” and took “holy vessels” from the
church to use for amusement, including wearing various church items as
ornaments.122 Many towns in Santo Domingo felt so abandoned by the king that
they no longer bothered to obey Spanish directives. 123 Amidst these attacks on
Hispanic heritage, as part of the Spanish retreat and the evacuation of families and
goods to Cuba, and this included the removal of the tomb of the ‘First Discoverer
of the New World” from the Santo Domingo cathedral with all military pomp.
They moved the tomb of Christopher Columbus, Colón’s bones from a
deteriorated old box into a new one of lead, encased in a new wooden box, draped
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with black velvet and gold trim. It was escorted by a guard on naval ships to
Havana.124 Cut from the vine of Spanish power that had sustained it for 300 years,
Hispanic symbols of Santo Domingo’s position as the empire’s first fruit in the
Americas withered. Many Dominicans, who reveled in their colony’s status as a
first Christian bastion of the Americas in the city that Colón had founded, reeled
from such a major emblematic loss.125
Archbishop Portillo slammed Spanish inability to silence the “seditious
libel” circulating, which he thought induced hate, defamation of the king, and
insurrection.

He felt that this threat required “severe censure or armed

prohibition” against open political dissent, and sarcastically snapped that, “the
government is [not] sleeping, but... Is already dead.” He thus awaited “the
anarchy from [Saint-Domingue] in our populations.” Simultaneously, French
officials became more active in enticing Spain's “best blacks” to stay on the island
with promises of lucrative positions in attempts to stave off British recruitment.126
Intriguingly, the French also asked Archbishop Portillo to remain in Santo
Domingo as the Bishop of Ayti, which they said was “the name that the native
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Indians gave this island, which I think they will restore after the handover.”127
Some colloquially referenced this name on occasion, however, this is the earliest
known usage of “Ayti” by a French republican officials who not only implied that
they wanted restore the name, but hoped to use it across the island and also
integrate remaining Spanish Catholic institutions into the project .128 Portillo was
less than enthused about the idea, perhaps because in this same letter Roume
lambasted the Inquisition, proposed making priests accountable to the Republic
and not church hierarchies, discussed ideas of limiting church property holdings,
and excoriated hypocritical “Jews and libertines” in Madrid who he said misled
Spanish interests.129
Philippe Roume and other French citizens in Santo Domingo continued
their cultural subversion. They very publicly and enthusiastically celebrated
Bastille Day in 1796 in Santo Domingo, and with raucous applause they heralded
what Spanish officials called the “horrible and frightening successes [of their
revolution] that continue to this unhappy day.” The “cleverly tricky” French
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officials also mingled directly with the general Dominican populace, which
accelerated political fermentation.

French citizens migrated into the city

constantly, many of whom were of color. They threatened to exceed the already
diminished local population, and did not bother to abide by Spanish racial
conventions.130 They took homes, opened cafés, and held disruptive funerals with
republican motifs with Roume preaching the gospel of equality and liberty from
the pulpit. As Spanish colonialism unraveled Dominicans had to reconsider their
own best interests and local sense of collective belonging in the face of a new,
unsettling option. The shift from optimistic inclusivity to the divisive imbrication
of blackness with republicanism, impiety, and turbulence was nearly complete for
the Spanish, whose rule and colonial elites retreated in the face of Dominican
popular power.

BOCA NIGUA
Until October 1796 the colony of Santo Domingo had evaded large-scale
plantation rebellions, over five years after the French slave regime exploded into
violence. The Boca Nigua slave revolt of that month seemed to seize upon rumors
of abolition and waning colonial control, and incarnated the worst fears of elite
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Dominicans.131 Though this specific type of resistance was atypical in the colony,
its similarity to the most violent events of the Haitian Revolution further
cauterized racial boundaries and intensified Spanish paranoia and reaction.
Governor García opined that, “As this capital has numerous blacks, mostly French,
that famously hate against the white colonists, I [suggest] precise orders of
caution” to prevent further armed unrest. He also lamented the thriving influence
of “French” blacks on the local populace. Amidst this siege mentality García
warned all Spaniards in the colony to take up arms and protect themselves at the
first sign of unrest.132

Most initial reactions faulted the French and the

revolutionary fervor as contributing factors. However, upon further investigation
of the revolt, Spanish investigators found a much more complex explanation.
Spanish officials were happy to blame the French for the Boca Nigua slave revolt
at first. However, as contextually plausible as this influence may have been,
correlation did not equal causation.133 Spanish officials soon discovered this fact
for themselves.
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Figure 5.1: Central region of Santo Domingo, showing major towns and the Boca
Nigua plantation.
From Philadelphia in that same year, 1796, Médéric Louis Elie Moreau de
Saint-Méry, a wealthy and well-traveled grand-blanc, published a general primer
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(2013): 131–153.
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on the Spanish colony of Santo Domingo. In one of his more picturesque scenes
of Santo Domingo he described a small river backgrounded by gentle slopes that
lead to a plateau which branched the river in two a few miles inland from the sea,
where it emptied amidst a large, sandy beach. Moreau de Saint-Méry noted that
Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, the noted Spanish chronicler of the mid-sixteenth
century who also operated sugar plantations in Santo Domingo and held colonial
positions, had praised the utility of this land. There, over two centuries prior to
Moreau de Saint-Méry's portrayal, Oviedo had surveyed large ingenios, or cane
processing factories, and “beautiful” sugar. This productive plantation set near
the mouth of this river, from which it derived its name – Boca Nigua.134
The area surrounding the Nigua valley was one of the most fertile and, in
earlier times, lucrative areas of the colony, described as “gold” of the headwaters.
Surrounding plantations produced cacao, indigo, and other produce along with
sugar. In the sixteenth century this fecund region generated roughly a tenth of the
wealth that Santo Domingo produced in the eighteenth century. On the eve of the
Saint-Domingue Revolution in the neighboring French colony it was estimated
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that about 2,500 people lived around the banks of the Nigua, the vast majority of
which were blacks, free and enslaved.

It was also noted in the 1780s that

plantations in the wider region had, “a proportional number of blacks as to what
the French have.”135 The specific plantation of Boca Nigua, in fact, was likely the
most profitable in the entire colony of Santo Domingo.136
On 1 November 1796 Governor García contacted the metropole to, “Give
account of the sudden novelty of insurrection of the blacks on Spanish haciendas,”
by those who he thought were the best treated and provisioned slaves of the whole
colony.137 He lamented the, “fatal consequences that…demonstrate an obstinate
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effort for winning liberty with sacrifice of all of the white class” in Santo Domingo,
ominous parallels, he implied to French Saint-Domingue five years prior. García
explained that the night before last, on 30 October, the revolt of blacks had
manifest within the jurisdiction of the capital on a well-known hacienda called Boca
Nigua. The revolt emerged among what he called the “most odious slaves” but
seemed to have been less vehemently pursued by others outside of a small
leadership cadre. The uprising was, García analyzed, “of the contagion,” from the
other side of the island, the “theatre of horrors,” and a “black propensity of
forgetting or misunderstanding that which has passed in the French part.” On
superficial analysis, at least, the governor and others thought that the revolution
in Saint-Domingue and French promises of liberty had been an inspiring force for
the revolt.
This uprising started at the hacienda of Marques de Iranda who had it
administered by Juan de Oyarzábal. The intent of the blacks in revolt was known
– they wanted to kill the whites, burn the cane fields, fortify themselves in
buildings, and claim their liberty.

And with the cession, evacuations, and

multiplicity of French citizens attracted to Commissioner Roume being in the
capital, the connection to rising republican power seemed obvious. The slaves in
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revolt apparently wanted to extend their uprising to capture the forts at Jayna, and
they seemed to target all of slavery. At the time of the revolt Juan de Oyarzábal,
the primary overseer on the plantation, had just enough time to evaluate the
situation and react while initially confined in a house with other armed men. This
ultimately preserved his life, and after repulsing three separate attacks he
managed to flee the hacienda house and then take a route of retreat to alert all of
the neighboring plantations. Not only had his slaves at Boca Nigua revolted, but
of the at least 200 slaves in total who had taken arms many from hailed from other
plantations in the area. Oyarzábal tried to raise an immediate armed response,
and offered gratuities for any assistance along the way. He arrived in the capital
late the next day overwhelmed by fatigue and desperate to restore order to his
plantation and the colony.138
At dawn the next day the seasoned Spanish officer Antonio Barba arrived
to learn of the situation first hand, which he still only vaguely understood.
Officials dispatched “three pickets of grenadiers” and medical supplies under the
command of Joaquín Cabrera, and they quickly ascertained that neither cavalry
nor conventional infantry tactics would suffice. They could only deploy the few
troops that the garrison could offer, as the top priority was to guard the major
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settlements. The revolt further delayed the preparations for evacuation, as García
scrambled to organize a military response, and he wrote to the governor of Cuba
begging for 800 to 1,000 good soldiers to protect the colony. García soon learned
of a second attack, and did not yet know the number of wounded soldiers, and
fretted that this revolt would start an “interminable war” like that of SaintDomingue which had become controlled by blacks, including recent massacres
against the whites of Les Cayes. Per this and other constant violence refugees only
continued to flee into Santo Domingo.139
García understood what this major slave revolt meant to the remnant
Hispanic society that he had tried to maintain in the colony, saying, “The
community is dismayed. Now they will all emigrate and would themselves take
with utility the uninfected blacks.” Only the troops would likely remain because
they had no choice, and even they would soon lack food without laborers to
produce it. Evacuation, and not conservation or future, dominated Dominican life.
García continued, saying, “I could not believe how close this explosion was. Our
well-treated slaves, and none better than Oyarzábal, seemed to live happily under
our government, laws, and economy. I did not know the harshness, and they

García to Manuel Godoy, Santo Domingo, 1 November 1796, AHN-Estado, leg. 3407, exp.2,
no.89. Spanish officials responding to the Boca Nigua slave revolt also had smaller, lesser-known
recent revolts in Hincha and Samaná in mind. See: Manuel Bravo to García, Santo Domingo, 14
December 1796, AGI-SD, leg. 1033.
139

435

seemed to be satisfied.”140 Thus, in the immediate wake the revolt, the longstanding Spanish notions of their more benevolent treatment of slaves as a barrier
to revolt, all in comparison to French precedents to the west, were shattered.
He called blacks, “a machine that yields to whatever movement or
impression,” and blamed the presence of free French blacks, their growing status
and power on the island, and the “arrival of the agent,” and other flaws that
delayed delivery of the colony to the French. He continued, saying, “They have
abandoned the part that they possess to the black, and [we] resist the delivery of
this part to conserve it unharmed. Since their project failed, everything would be
left to run the same fate.”141 García may have identified core threats to traditional
Dominican society imbricated in the gradual French takeover, and though he fully
understood the context of slave revolt, he prematurely diagnosed the precise
communal causes of the Boca Nigua episode.
However, after Spanish troops contained the rebel slaves, Manuel Bravo
investigated Boca Nigua and wrote a detailed account of the causes and
proceedings of the revolt on the night of 30 October and thereafter. Bravo had first
been called into service by Urízar and Barba on the morning of 31 October after
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they had informed him of the revolt as conveyed by Oyarzábal. Captain Antonio
de la Torre of the Cantabria regiment had already led twenty-seven soldiers into
the area. Another twenty-seven soldiers of the granaderos battalion of Cantabria
under José Villasante went forth, and Pablo Yrigoyen their surgeon. José María
Rodriguez, José María Garos, and Simon Jaureguí assisted Bravo in preparations
for combat. Bravo collected intelligence on the two slaves who first affronted
Antonio Collar, the mayordomo who worked under Oyarzábal (his brother Gabriel
Collar, had also previously worked there). Antonio Collar explained to Bravo that
when the revolt erupted he had moved toward the river at Jayna to get detailed
news of what was happening. Oyarzábal, the physician Pedro Anglade, Simon
Yriarte, and Pedro Abadía had all been spared, the latter having passed to the
sugar mill and aguardiente distillery, respectively. These survivors had benefited
from the cover of darkness and some free blacks who assisted them on their flight.
Antonio ran to warn his brother, Gabriel, who was once also an employee of
Oyarzábal’s but now had his own ingenio at nearby San Cristóbal. They also
warned all other “planters and honorable neighbors.”142
Spanish military forces worked to seal off the area the next day. They
began marching toward Jayna near midday. They united with additional forces
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and went toward Nigua, arriving at nightfall.

Gabriel and Antonio Collar

recruited residents and other troops along the way to help, including “mi hijo”
Bernardo Bravo, a sublieutenant with the Cantabria regiment. The heat and
distance of 18 miles exhausted the troops. They encountered a “sick and fatuous”
black nearby whom they suspected of being a spy, and once in a fortified position
near the plantation, Bravo began collecting operational intelligence himself. 143
The rebels had seized rifles, knives, spears, and two cannons that the
managers had purchased to fend off raiding corsairs. Though the Spanish troops
were unsure at first, the rebels numbered around 120 in total. On their approach
around 9PM Spanish troops could hear the rebels’ festivities in the plantation
buildings that they occupied. Troops met cannon fire and burnt cane fields as they
began to battle the “poison ivy” of the rebels. Spanish troops tried to persuade the
support of residents and local slaves. Instead of continuing the attack the officers
instructed their troops to wait until the morning light.144
Gabriel and Antonio Collar assisted the troops in navigating the land to
surprise or confuse the rebels. By three in the morning there were three rough
divisions of troops present, commanded by Antonio de la Torre, José Villasante,
and Bernardo Bravo. A fourth approached in reinforcement. They captured the
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river crossing, but were too exposed to rebel fire and had to retreat. Bernardo
Bravo was injured while trying to secure a position at the Nigua heights above the
riverbanks. Then, rebel blacks swarmed around them in the cover of the nearby
woods in an attempt to outflank the troops. The adversaries exchanged fire for
thirty minutes, after which the rebels retreated behind their line of cannons. Bravo
reasoned that the slaves had other lines of defense or fortified buildings from
which to fight. Forty more troops arrived under the command of Manuel Miedes
and Gregorio Ugarte, by which time Spanish troops and volunteers outnumbered
the rebels. He sent updates and requests to the commanders at Baní and Azua,
and to local residents.145
Likely sensing their predicament, rebels began fleeing to the cover of the
mountains and forest nearby, running through the cover of cane that had not been
burnt. The Spanish troops advanced to the doctor’s house and look for bandages,
stitches, and medicines for their wounded. They then searched the cane for
hidden, injured, and dead rebels. They collected “ravaged and somber bodies,”
including those of Simon, Marcos, Mecú, Quatro, and Diamant, the first two near
the hacienda, the other three near Baní. Only three days later, and only due to the
stench, did they find the body of the rebel Elias in one of the fields. The troops also
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began gathering the injured and prisoners who surrendered or were captured and
started sending them to either the hospital or prison in the capital. They pursued
the fugitives, only three of whom they did not find and arrest immediately – two
were later found around Azua, another eventually was arrested and sent
separately to Santo Domingo. One wounded rebel, Esteban the blacksmith, later
died from his wounds. On the plantation grounds Cabrera gathered prisoners and
divided them by age and sex and began interrogations. The rebel leaders included,
“a black of appalling customs, Tomás Congo, a slave of the [nearby] Buenavista
plantation.” Oyarzábal was most interested in Tomás Congo, whom he already
disliked, as well as the primary overseer Francisco Sopó, who he had greatly
favored. There were also three ex-soldiers of “Jan Fransua,” (Jean-François) who
lived and worked on the neighboring San Juan plantation and were entwined in
the plot.146 Fascinatingly, the slaves plotting a revolt at Boca Nigua apparently
never turned to French republican ideas or precedents for guidance. They did,
however, seek out former black auxiliaries who had embodied the early years of
the revolution for concrete advice as to how to subvert a plantation regime.
From the ninety-six testimonies that Bravo and others gathered he
concluded in the immediate months before the insurrection two deaths prompted
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rage among the enslaved at Boca Nigua. One slave named Francisco became ill
and was treated but died, and some slaves suspected that the doctor had poisoned
him. More dramatically, a slaved called Benito had been caught with aguardiente
that he had taken secretly. Pedro Abadía, the distiller, severely punished him for
it. Benito felt that he had lost his esteem and honor, and became depressed. He
wanted to return home to his native soil, which was not miserable like Boca Nigua.
Benito thus made a noose and committed suicide in his residence.147 He was likely
an African bozal, and likely Kongolese, and probably believed that his soul would
return to his homeland and family. Generally, many Africans enslaved in the
Americas conceptualized the afterlife, or land of the dead, as lying beyond the
Atlantic Ocean in their homelands.148

Specifically, some slave populations

believed that certain Kongolese groups were particularly apt to fly home in death,
including by suicide.149 His inner circle of friends and their response unveil a
cross-plantation network of likely Kongolese kinship that mitigated the social
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dislocations from their natal homes and isolation from their families, as transpired
in parallel [situations] throughout enslaved populations.150
“Captain” Francisco Sopó adored both men, and he decided to exact
revenge upon Pedro Abadía by taking his life. Sopó communicated this plan to
Antonio Carretero, with whom he lived. They agreed to also murder Simon
Yriarte, the overseer for sugar processing. Their plan quickly grew to target
Oyarzábal as well, then any whites at Boca Nigua, and finally they hoped to spread
the rebellion to neighboring plantations. To this end, and to learn of how such
revolts succeeded against the French, they solicited the friendship of three former
black auxiliaries under the cover of night at their nearby plantation and through
other pretexts.151 These newfound allies had been royalists, had fought against the
Republic, and had likely gained some modicum of a better life from their affiliation
with Spain.
Together these five were “of a same nation” and therefore called each
other parientes, or kin. Francisco and Tomás made displays of trust and gave gifts
such as molasses and aguardiente to build confidence. They discussed visiting
Saint-Domingue, but the ex-soldiers dissuaded them, saying that it was too
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dangerous, and also supposedly cautioned them on the use of violence against a
reputedly decent master. Undeterred, Francisco and Antonio continued their
designs, including trying to attract other parientes of their nation at Boca Nigua,
and thereafter to others on neighboring estates who wanted to fight. On about 1
October during the Fiestas del Rosario they explained their plan to Ana María, the
spouse of Antonio. Eight days before the actual revolt began she argued with
Sopó, trying to convince him to cancel the plot and confess to Oyarzábal, but he
deterred her. When 30 October arrived they signaled the former black auxiliaries
at the San Juan plantation who, far from participating had, they claimed, gone to
Santo Domingo to warn Spanish officials only to be turned away by Spanish
soldiers at the city walls. At this time, “Tomás Congo of Buenavista” was enthused
to start the uprising, and with the black Simon led the slaves to take up rifles,
shotguns, pistols, swords, machetes, spears, sickles, knives, and spikes to attack
Yriarte and Collar, who they had seen leave the plantation.152
At dusk the rebels gathered, rested, passed out plantains to eat, and then
bearing arms closed in around the main house. Cristóbal César began lighting
fires, trying to pin down Oyarzábal who they thought might still prevent the
rebellion with his aides. Apparently, Sopó had a late change of heart and notified
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Pedro Abadía of the plot at six o’clock of the preceding Friday, and Oyarzábal at
four o’clock that Sunday of the revolt. Sopó, who spent all day among the plotters
and affirming Tomás Congo, then betrayed other conspirators by staying with
Oyarzábal to help him flee the plantation via secret paths through hills as the
rebellion broke out with the flames from cañaverales (canefields) lit by Tomás
Congo and others who tried to flush out any whites who might have hidden in the
fields.153
The following morning the rebels reunited at the main house, then
abandoned, and broke open all the boxes, doors, and chests to which they had no
key, a few of which Ana María had access to as a house slave. They smashed up
the house and took anything that they liked, including clothes and additional
weapons, such as the cannons. In the main house Ana María, Antonio’s partner,
directed the pillage and consumption. The rebels feasted upon whatever stores
they liked. They held a grand dance. Ana María sat upon a fine seat under a
drape, a makeshift throne of sorts, from which she received treatment as a queen. 154
Her pretensions of royalty were absent any French-inspired rights discourse, and
hearkened more firmly to the establishment of a fugitive African polity. These

153

Manuel Bravo to García, Santo Domingo, 14 December 1796, AGI-SD, leg. 1033.

154

Manuel Bravo to Joaquín García, Santo Domingo, 14 December 1796, AGI-SD, leg. 1033.

444

facets of banqueting, lavish dress, and promoting royal attributes was common
among slave rebellions across the Caribbean.155
With the absence of Sopó they elected Antonio Carretero as their new
leader, leaving a rather dejected Tomás Congo as the second in command. The
rebels then separated into combat groups, set up the artillery, and divvied up
control of parts of the plantation and entrances. Papa Pier led the rifles and Piti
Juan led the dragoons. The following day, after a huge celebratory meal, the rebels
moved on to the ingenio of San Cristóbal to set it on fire and incorporate its slaves
into their rebellion. They then hoped to return to Boca Nigua and travel onward
to Jayna where they wanted to surprise and seize the fortifications there, and after
restocking and gaining fighters eventually attack the fort at San Geronimo near
the capital city.

Through signals and countersignals they then approached

neighbors who might become co-conspirators, some of whom might have been
related to Antonio. Antonio told them that those who fought would be free, and
those who did not would be their slaves, a decidedly un-egalitarian, un-republican
stance.156
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A week after Spanish forces had suppressed the revolt key witnesses were
deposed by Spanish officials, and through the testimony officials concluded that
the blacks of Boca Nigua had a well-formed conspiracy to kill their immediate
masters and whites in the area, and due to much more complicated factors than a
meddling French Republic. The slaves had sought to make themselves rulers of
the ingenio, proclaim their own liberty, attract slaves of other plantations, and
continue the violence. Court records depicted valiant whites who defended that
night as the cane burned, as slave smashed in the doors, and as rebels looted the
property. The next day, armed with weapons seized from the whites, the slaves
offered stiff resistance, including cannons to meet the troops. This fight resulted
in the death of soldier Eleutario del Rosario German. The physician Dr. Pedro
Pablo Yrigo treated six wounded soldiers and two injured slaves. Spanish troops
captured four slaves, and sent ten additional injured combatants onward to the
capital.157
García and other officials had vigorously extinguished the “combustion”
and “contagion” that threatened the colony. In particular, Salvador Corrales
commander of the dragoons at Baní, acted heroically in this effort. When he had
heard that an insurrection erupted he rallied dozens of loyal subjects without
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prompting and deployed to contain the rebels. Joaquín Cabrera also earned praise
for his actions that limited destruction from the “ferocious, scandalous, and
detestable crimes.”

Officials also, “applauded conducts by the very faithful

Spanish blacks” in stemming the revolt, likely in specific reference to creolized
Dominican slaves or freed people around Boca Nigua.158 With a predominance of
African bozales and creolized slaves from the French side in the leadership cadre
of the revolt this was a critical distinction.
The condemned slaves included the commander Francisco Sopó, Antonio
the carter known as the “King”, his partner Ana María called “Queen”, Pedro
Viejo, alias Papa Pier (likely “Pierre”) who often spoke ill of his owner, and
accomplice Tomás Aguirre, alias Buenavista. These “authors, chiefs, and principal
heads” of the rebellion were to be hanged, decapitated, quartered, and displayed
on the major roads of the capital. Piti Juan (likely “Petit Jean”) who led troops and
Cristóbal César, who was the first to begin burning the cane, were also to be
hanged and decapitated, with their heads placed similarly. The slaves Simón,
Elias, Marcos, Joséf Mecú, Raymundo Diaman, y Placido Quatro had already died
from injuries. Esteban, who was injured and treated, died in the hospital, but his
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body was nevertheless to be put on the gallows and then quartered and put on
show in the city. The Spanish clearly wanted to teach a lesson.159
The names of other conspirators appeared in the record along with their
punishments, which largely included fifty to one-hundren lashes, witnessing the
executions, many years in prison, and long sentences to wearing fetters, collars,
and chains. One slave, José Antonio, received twenty-five lashes and was sent to
Panama for four years of confinement. Some younger accomplices received fifty
lashes, six years with chains and fetters same as the others, but did not have to
observe the gallows executions. Those under seventeen years of age received
twenty-five lashes in jail, two years of chains. Joséf, Juan, and Juan Pedro were
sent for eight years in prison in Cartagena, Veracruz, and Havana, in that order
with the time split, after which they would be expelled from Spanish domains.
Another prisoner, Sebastian Sese, was to remain incarcerated. Santiago, the slave
of Francisco Espaillat, was made to watch the punishments.160
Intriguingly, the Espaillat family, French migrants who had settled in the
Cibao region from Saint-Domingue and who were implicated in the Gerard
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scandal of 1792, had also previously purchased slaves from Gerard. Of all the
things that Santiago may have been, he could have hailed from Saint-Domingue
or at least have spoken French, though how he got to Boca Nigua remains unclear.
Later, sons of the family, Ulises Francisco and Santiago, became national leaders
in the independence era and Ulises served as president, all after the family
returned from the later self-imposed exile during the French occupation of 18021809.161
Some accused slaves were actually freed. The suspects Chata and José
Criollo, alias Viasu, were found not guilty and released, as were others.162 Records
identified this particular José as “creole” and, furthermore, the man had taken
“Viasu” as a nickname, likely out of admiration for the general Georges Biassou, a
glimpse into the complex and diverse cultural politics and aspirations of the
enslaved at Boca Nigua. Would be slave insurgents were inspired by the black
auxiliaries who had started the revolution in Saint-Domingue and fought for
Spain. They were the ones who the Boca Nigua plotters looked to for advice and
inspiration, not any figures associated with the French Republic. The other names
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on the full roster of convicts from Boca Nigua tells a fuller story of who the slaves
themselves were, particularly regarding the African ethnic backgrounds.
Tomás Congo and the kin of his nation with whom he organized the
insurrection signify that the leadership was likely Kongolese. “Sopo” in the
Ngombe language spoken between the Mongala and Lopori Rivers, respectively
northern and southern tributaries of the Congo River about 500 miles from the
coast, means “abdomen” or “belly,” and could have been a nickname.163 Other
rebel slaves like Lorenso Congo and Pedro Mondongo were almost certainly from
the Congo River region, and Ambrosio Cita, Ventura Besé, Lorenso Senegui,
Basilio Sengui, Benito Matundo, and Melchor Buey were all possibly Kongolese.
Additionally, the practice of naming a “king” and “queen” were African practices,
and given the commanding roles of Antonio and Ana María they may have been
part of this kinship group.
The fact that many rebels were African is likely, though outside the
leadership many were likely not Kongolese. In fact, many names seemed to come
from the Guinea coast. Fermin Yará shares a name with many captives from the
Guinea and Sierra Leone regions. Lorenzo Cubé shared closest name matches
with Limba-speaking captives form the Rio Pongo in Guinea, though similar
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names also appeared at Lagos. Hipolito Paná and Vicente Pana were possibly
Mende from Guinea or Sierra Leone. Valerio Menguí was likely Temne or Limba
from the Guinea region. Quintin Sará, Anselmo Cobele, and Bernardo Quiná were
also likely from the Guinea region. Andrés Yrá and Estanislao Faré shared names
with some who passed through Bissau. Ygnacio Caná and Cayetano Boy may
have been from a variety of places along the Windward coast. Ciprian Lanzeni
might have been Mandinka from far West Africa.
The diversity among the slaves was significant. Mecú was a name of
possible Islamic heritage, with many captives of this name having passed through
the Bight of Benin, as was the case with Bernabé Yaurú and Pastor Yaurú. Damien
Ofori may have come from the Gen language group and passed through the Bight
of Benin, too. Justo Munda was likely Igbo, and many similar names resembled
those that passed through Calabar in the Bight of Biafra. Martin Yoan shared a
similar name to many who passed through Bimbia at the Bight of Biafra. Placido
Eipú may have been of the Duala language group in the Bight of Biafra.164
Others, such as Pio Mompa, Sabian Sama, and Copa Bozal were likely
African names, though their origins are harder to trace. Creolized slaves Antonio,
Francisco, and Andrés were all convicted and whipped, too. Other intriguing
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names, likely of creole slaves, were Chata (meaning, flat nose), José Yngles
(meaning, English), Faustino Guagua (a Taíno borrow word for transport), and
Copa Francés (literally, French Cup). Piti Juan (Petit Jean), Papa Pier (Pierre), and
Diamant (literally, diamond), were all linked to French names. In the end, of the
103 suspects of the roughly 200 slaves at Boca Nigua, ten were women, and only
four suspects were released entirely (three men, one woman).
In some ways, the Boca Nigua revolt held similarities to earlier revolts on
sugar plantations in Saint-Domingue. There were distinctly African ethnic cliques,
but scaled organization was fundamentally multiethnic. The revolt started on one
of the largest and most prosperous plantations in Santo Domingo amid the
particular brutalities of sugar production. The revolt involved deliberate, lengthy
planning, and cross-plantation ties. It even sought advice on how Saint-Domingue
rebels succeeded against the French, and was perhaps an extension of African
warfare.165

However, outside of Boca Nigua and the few neighboring sugar

plantations Santo Domingo was still very different from Saint-Domingue at the
start of the Haitian Revolution. There were far fewer slaves, fewer African bozales
in the population, far fewer sugar plantations and smaller plantations in general.
This Boca Nigua episode was more driven by vengeance than an obvious
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cosmological imperative as the Bois-Caïman, and although some historians have
connected this revolt to French republican intrigues ultimately the Spanish who
were always so ready to blame French presence for unrest, the slaves themselves,
gave different explanations.

Spanish weakness and growing discussions of

abolition could have certainly provided contextual facilitation, but they did not
trigger the Boca Nigua uprising.
Several weeks after Boca Nigua Archbishop Portillo – who had protested
the “Incendiary” priest’s firmly denied Roume’s revolutionary divorce request –
engaged in his own conjugal politics. Portillo openly speculated that the Boca
Nigua revolt’s impetus was due to the anger of an enslaved man, likely Sopó,
whose same-sex partner had been severely punished and committed suicide, in
reference to Benito. In this heteronormative context he deliberately miscast the
kinship solidarity of a Kongo-organized revolt to discredit slave politics as a
manifestation of unholy passions and African depravity.166

This apparently

imaginative distortion certainly had spiritual and cultural currency in discussing

The archbishop used the word amartelado, meaning infatuated, enamored, in love, even to make
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blackness, but deferred significance from French influence in this particular
event.167
Boca Nigua, unlike the majority of Santo Domingo, was a sugar plantation
with greater economic similarities to Saint-Domingue, and also greater similarities
around management brutality that provoked the revolt. The revolt was organized
through a cross-plantation network, like in early Saint-Domingue revolts. The
revolt also featured specific African ethnic influences, in this case clearly from
Kongolese derivations.

The French republican influences of ideology and

abolition were almost completely unimportant in any of the collected testimony,
and beyond contextual destabilizers, were not motivating factors. The direct link
to revolution that the rebels sought was through the former troops of Jean-François
who, unlike Roume or any other French newcomers, had actual experience as
revolutionaries against a planation regime. Because of the uniqueness of Boca
Nigua as a plantation in Santo Domingo, and the distinct factors fueling this
particular revolt, it was unlikely that similar, Saint-Domingue styled revolts would
occur in Santo Domingo. In fact, they did not.

CONCLUSION

“Testimonio de la sentencia pronunciada contra los negros de la hacienda de Boca Nigua…,”
José Urízar, Pedro Catani, Manuel Bravo, and José Francisco Hidalgo, Santo Domingo, 28
November 1796, AGI-SD, leg. 1033.
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On Christmas Eve 1796 Godoy wrote to García with news that the French
planned to send Rochambeau to Santo Domingo with appropriate troops, and that
the problem of evacuation now sat with the lack of boats and time.168 García said
that he would continue managing the colony given the circumstances, and
expected him to exhibit courtesy and consideration.169 García on New Year’s Eve
1796 wrote Godoy to ask specifically about the threat of war with the United
Kingdom, and also of military alliance with France beyond the peace treaty.
British forces loomed as the next great threat to Dominican society. García had
received news of the potential French military alliance and British war on 27
October, just days before the Boca Nigua revolt, which of course diverted their
attention. He was dismayed at the French captures of “Anglo-Americano” ships
that constantly visited British ports on the island, trying to cut their trade routes.170
While Dominicans came to terms with French republican presence, the British
threat was still wholly unresolved, and only mounting.
Although the war with France had technically ended, Spanish
management that lasted until French takeover cost a great deal of money. Funds
continued to pour in from Cuba, Mexico and other colonies, both to support the
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evacuation and continuing military and official presence.171 García on New Year’s
Eve 1796 wrote Godoy to ask specifically about the threat of war with the United
Kingdom, and also of military alliance with France beyond the peace treaty. They
had no instructions, relief, nor means to govern the colony in such new
circumstances, especially considering the concerns of evacuation and likelihood of
not delivering the island at the one-year mark. García had received news of the
potential French military alliance and British war on 27 October, just days before
the Boca Nigua revolt, which took their attention.172
In the mid-1790s public faith resonated with many Dominicans, especially
elites, in the face of French radicalism that threatened their understanding of their
place in the universe. Fears of rampant African heresy and French anti-clericalism
contributed to a hegemonic Dominican discourse of difference from Haiti. Even if
France and later Haiti offered greater liberties, not all people of color wanted to
trade their supernatural situation for de jure distinctions of equality. Within this
Euronormative civility and piety a person of color could attain Hispanic inclusion
with sufficient participation in the Catholic supernatural idiom. Rituals such as
prayer and marriage offer us a window into partisanship, power relations, and
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social networks.173 In these practices at the confluence of utility, sincerity, and
partisanship, people of color left their material mark on the Haitian Revolution
and contributed to an anti-Haitian Dominican religious nationalism that has
endured from the 1790s to the present.
Amidst Spanish decline, some instances of pro-French sedition, and black
Dominican revolts at least obliquely associated with these contextual factors
forced Dominicans to rethink their Spanish cultural and political heritage, examine
the results of French rights discourses, and explore crises of sovereignty, local
distinctions, and questions of collective belonging. With this episode Dominicans
further engrained virulent Catholicism and political moderation into their cultural
politics, distinguished their society from perceptions of their proto-Haitian
neighbors, and entwined radicalism and impiety with blackness and
republicanism, ideas that shaped middle sector Dominican ideas about Haiti into
the independence era and far beyond it. Overt spirituality during the intense days
of Spanish reconquest from 1792-1794 became a litmus test for the trustworthiness
of the internal population. Images of black civility and piety set by the Spanish
black auxiliaries became standards for Dominican populations of color, and those
who defied Hispanic Catholic norms fell from grace, just as Toussaint had, and
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passed toward being more French, and possibly more African as well, in the
process.
Throughout this period Dominicans were forced to reconsider their place
within the Spanish empire, directly confront French radicalism and eventually
British promises of moderation. This inward plunge of conflict prompted a
reflexive pivot toward considering the Dominican past, presence, and future.
While unresolved in this era, this turmoil enhanced a growing sense of uniquely
local grievances and differences as seeds of proto-national belonging. As SaintDomingue stumbled toward horizons beyond France, Santo Domingo fell into a
future without Spain after almost exactly three-hundred years of colonial rule.
Boca Nigua proved to be only one form of dissent with the status quo. Alienated
from France, disappointed in Spain, the next chapter of Dominican ferment came
from a new, as of yet poorly-understood direction – Britain and Jamaica.
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CHAPTER 6
AN ANGLOPHILIC APEX, 1796-1798

By August 1796, roughly a year after the treaty, Archbishop Portillo
marveled at the political tempest that had beset Santo Domingo. Aside from the
aforementioned social dislocations, Portillo grew more concerned with an
influence that had advanced aggressively from the margins of Dominican cultural
politics, writing that through, “concealed maneuvers of stealthy spies and agents”
a “positive foundation in voice and common opinion” had formed in favor of the
United Kingdom.1 In fact, thousands of people in Santo Domingo, including
soldiers, farmers, merchants, and even whole towns had been “seduced” into
supporting a British takeover.2 On this, Governor Joaquín García simply blamed
British officials’ “flattering promises and alluring cash,” indicating Spain’s gross
underestimation for the myriad motivations of Dominican Anglophilia. 3 Over the
ensuing years Dominicans, jaded by Spanish reaction and ineptitude, and French
radicalism and arrogance, instead explored the more moderate, third way of
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British power that courted their loyalties. By the end of 1796 the royal treasurer of
Santo Domingo had been arrested on suspicion of British sympathies, several key
Dominican border towns had raised the Union Jack, thousands of Spain’s former
black auxiliaries fought for King George III, British spies operated throughout the
colony trying to subvert the population, and the capital of Santo Domingo barely
dodged a major conspiracy that would have secured the colony for British rule.
This British effort attracted wealthy and disenchanted planters in SaintDomingue whose favorable dispositions toward royalism, slavery, and the status
quo precluded their support of the French Republic. 4 British commercial and
military protections yielded new subjects and territorial gains when Spain ceded
Santo Domingo to the French Republic. Stalwart Spanish supporters, most of
whom were white, fled the island and remade the colony’s demographics. The
prolonged Spanish evacuation began by the end of 1795.5 This flight, Spanish
weakness, and incapable French oversight produced a vacuum of sovereignty.
Furthermore, newspapers in Saint-Domingue reported on the San Blas conspiracy
of early 1795, in which disaffected intellectuals and merchants in Madrid
attempted oust the monarchy and install a republic, further presented Spanish
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feebleness across Hispaniola.6

In this void the British middle path appealed to

some Dominicans, some of whom were of color, who sought to retain their
Catholicism and property, and rejected racial solidarity and French radicalism.
As the instructions from Paris specified, Philippe Roume was still only a
Provisional Agent of the Republic. He had no executive power. In fact, aside from
advising the Spanish government on republican initiatives in Saint-Domingue,
easing the transfer of key forts to the French, and trying to cultivate of cult of
republican fervor, he had no power. They were present at the permission of
Godoy. Spain still ruled much of the colony Santo Domingo and the capital itself
in the spheres quotidian governance, military affairs, and official spirituality. This
misunderstanding over imperial management has produced more consequential
misinterpretations of civil society in Santo Domingo from the Treaty of Basel in
1795 through the formal and final French occupation of the colony in 1802.
Emancipation was “invisible” because it did not happen in 1795.7 This inaccuracy
has produced confusion from accounts predominantly from French sources in
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which historians have reiterated these provisional officials’ own iterations of their
ideals, goals, or revolutionary lexicon as fact, eliding the reality of notarial records
that show how Spanish officials continued to adjudicate transactions of slaves, 8
how Spanish military forces responded to revolts,9 arrested suspects under
suspected violations of the Spanish law that still prevailed, 10 and how Spanish
jurists continued to try cases under the aforementioned Spanish law. 11 Spanish
officials were thus responsible for fending off major British advances and their
retinue of highly-motivated Dominican sympathizers.

For example, from 1796 to 1799, see: AGN-ARB, leg.1, exp.58, and leg.3, exp.38, and leg.4, exp.54,
and leg.49, exp.25; AGN-ARH, leg.37, exps.77 and 85 and 95, and leg.39R, exps.28 and 36 and 64
and 65 and 69 and 73.
8

For example, see: José del Orbe to Joaquín García, La Vega, 8 November 1795, AGI-Estado, 5A,
n.50; Joaquín García to Manuel Godoy, Santo Domingo, 21 November 1795, AGI-Estado, 5A, n.50;
Manuel Bravo to Joaquín García, Santo Domingo, 14 December 1796, AGI-SD, leg. 1033
9

For example, see: Casa Calvo to Joaquín García, Santo Domingo, 23 February 1796, AHN-Estado,
exp.2, no.8; Joaquín García to Philippe-Rose Roume, Santo Domingo, 15 August 1796, AHN-Estado,
leg. 3407, exp.2.
10

For example, see: “Testimonio del recurso hecho por John Hodge capitan de la fragata americana
nombrada Sedgeley reclamando la jurisdiccion de este gobierno espanol, y declinando la de la
Francia…,” Santo Domingo, 1797, AHN-Estado, leg. 3394, exp.1; Joaquín García to Manuel Godoy,
Santo Domingo, 26 February 1798, AHN-Estado, leg. 3394, exp.1, no.120; Joaquín García to Manuel
Godoy, Santo Domingo, 27 February 1798, AHN-Estado, leg. 3407, exp.2., no.121; “Testimonio de
las diligencias practicadas por James Phelips Capn. del Bergantin americano del Fiero para que
este govierno interponga sus oficios con el representatne de la nacion francesa a fin de que sin
demora se termine la causa de su apresamiento para los danos que se le siguen,” AHN-Estado, leg.
3407, exp.2; Joaquín García to Manuel Godoy, Santo Domingo, 27 February 1798, AHN-Estado, leg.
3407, exp.2, no.122; “Testimonio de las diligencias practicadas por Joséf Wachs capitan de la goleta
americana la Carmelita, implorando la proteccion de este govierno, para con el representatne de la
nacion francesa, para que sin dilacion determine, y juzque sobre la causa de su apresamiento por
los perjuicios que siente,” AHN-Estado, leg. 3407, exp.2; “Testimonio del Exped.te sobre lo
convenido entre el Sr. Presidente Gob.r y Capitan Gral. de esta Ysla con el Sr. Agente de la
Republica, aconseguencia de lo acordado por el Superior Tribunal de la Real Audiencia,” Santo
Domingo, 1798, AHN-Estado, leg. 3394, exp.1.
11

462

Like their Spanish counterparts, British officials were also stunned by
fervent and often unsolicited Dominican support, yet metropolitan politicians
such as Prime Minister William Pitt and War Secretary Henry Dundas reacted
quickly with secret plans for the annexation of Santo Domingo.12 Hispaniola as a
whole would have been the trophy acquisition in this final major stage of British
Caribbean expansion, an arena that gained priority in the two decades following
the loss of thirteen North American colonies which also featured the opportunistic
sugar land grabs of Martinique and Trinidad. Compared to the Saint-Domingue
intervention, British strategy in Santo Domingo relied upon new sectors of
potential adherents. Underemployed black soldiers who had fought for Spain and
Dominican farmers, the vast majority of whom had African descent, were pivotal
British partisans. Not only did they subversively fly the Union Jack and pledge
fealty to King George III, I have uncovered an elaborate pro-British coup by those
who craved religion, commerce, and stable constitutional monarchy.
These events, despite their intrigue, are almost entirely unknown in
Dominican, Haitian revolutionary, and British Caribbean historiographies. This
case therefore expands upon extant scholarship to show alternative debates over
monarchy, political economy, and rights that portended contentions of the
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ensuing Latin American wars of independence.13

This evolution toward

widespread British sympathies reveals a broader array of moderate cultural
politics that are obscured by a focus on paths toward revolution.14

BRITISH ALTERNATIVES TO DOMINICAN DISCONTENT
Since nearly the outset of unrest in Saint-Domingue the Spanish had
worried about a direct confrontation with Great Britain.

Both empires

opportunistically positioned themselves in Saint-Domingue, and the probability
of conflict only escalated as the zones of British expanded eastward after their
landing 1793.15 Through a series of victories against their mutual enemies the
French, the military forces of the United Kingdom stood at the Dominican border
by 1795.16

In July 1795 Spanish concerns heightened when British officials

protested plans to surrender Santo Domingo to the French.17 Following the Treaty
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of Basel they pledged to hinder the transfer process.18 Almost immediately
thereafter propaganda from British Saint-Domingue began circulating into
Dominican hands.19 A month later, British ships lurked around the colony and
coordinated local spies who enticed Dominicans.20 In October 1795 military service
concluded for Jean-François and Georges Biassou, the two leading black generals
fighting for Spain.

British agents cajoled these officers, who then showed

reciprocal interest.

To prevent defections like the devastating departure of

Toussaint Louverture to the French Republic in 1794, 21 the Spanish relocated them
to other colonies specify where.22 Following the treaty, the newly-established
Directory of the French Republic sent detailed instructions to their emissary in
Santo Domingo on how to francesizar (Frenchify) the Dominican populace into “co-
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citizens.”23 By January 1796 many Dominicans were alienated by French
condescension, Spanish evacuation, and began to listen to British offers.24
The British hoped to entice the military labor of thousands of Spain’s
former black auxiliaries who remained on the island campaign under fragile
Spanish promises of pensions and transfers.25 A notable threat was that Bernardin,
who had once so impressed García, would side with the British.26 One remarkable
defection threatened to exponentially increase pro-British positions. The top
French general Étienne Laveaux was incredulous that Titus – a fiery young black
officer who had fought under Jean-François and Biassou – would continue fighting
the French even after general emancipation, and feared that Titus might rally
disaffected French cultivateurs to the British as well.27 In February 1796 Titus dined
with British officers aboard a navy ship docked somewhere near Monte Cristi.
Soon thereafter he tried to take up the title “Chief of the Blacks,” a name previously
only claimed by Jean-François, Biassou, and Toussaint.28 Titus had orchestrated
covert encounters at the mouth of the Rio Masacre near Dajabon, where through a
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series of gunshots and flag signaling a British ship would arrive to ferry munitions
ashore and the black officers on board.29 García acknowledged that Titus was now
a British combatant and Spanish enemy, and revoked the medal that he had also
been given from King Carlos IV.30
Titus began accepting arms, munitions, uniforms, and money from the
British, with whom he began to fight almost immediately,31 amassed troops along
the border,32 and coordinated operations against Fort Dauphin, Mirebalais, and
Valliere, as Spain prepared their defenses for this threat from their former ally.
Laveaux begged Spain to send out spies, likely former black auxiliaries, who might
learn of Titus’ plans, while Laveaux tried to corral his rival Villatte to surprise the
British.33 Some of this information came from a British spy who had been arrested
while in disguise. This spy had operated in Monte Cristi for six weeks, and
worked with Titus, who would coordinate with the British navy.

Many

Dominicans were turning to the British side. 34 The British operatives played up
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peace and prosperity, and paid good prices for staple foods, livestock, and
weapons with Dominicans along the northern coast.35
The Spanish soon arrested other pro-British conspirators.36 While Titus
rallied an estimated five thousand of the remaining black auxiliaries, spies near
Santiago far from the border reported the surprising news that thousands of
Dominican civilians eagerly supported a British takeover.37 Drive by desperation
and a sense of threat and betrayal, Spanish officials arranged for the assassination
of Titus a few weeks later.38 García, though, blamed the French for his death.39
Nevertheless, throughout the colony Dominican contact with British power only
increased.40 British forces continued trading with Dominicans and winning them
over, built barracks in deserted areas of the northern coast, and continued courting
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the black auxiliaries who were left behind by Jean-François and Biassou.41 Even
after the death of Titus, this remained a primary concern for British forces.42
The French knew the British now had the momentum across the island.
An unidentified officer of the Republic admitted that their only hope was with the
newer plan of arming “Africans” who were former slaves and had given them
recent gains, though their absence from the fields caused a great lack in foodstuffs,
saying, “One has made soldiers more easily than one will make these same soldiers
into farmers again.” If the British sent additional troops they might achieve a coup
de grâce over the French. French command understood that Santo Domingo was
the new weak link, in that the British could win over Dominicans and stage a
military landing there, neither of which the French could prevent, and regretted
not having taken Louisiana or Florida in the treaty instead. This officer also
admitted that the Spaniards under the treaty were allowed to maintain slavery and
even transport their slaves off the island with them, which would only further
devalue the weak economy in Santo Domingo, and prophesied that these
emigrants would combine weak colonies to make one powerful colony – Cuba.43
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On 12 July 1796 British General Gordon Forbes issued a mass print
proclamation in Spanish to the Dominican people.44 This came after incremental
advances in Dominican popular support.45 He empathized with the plight of
Spanish betrayal and French aggression, and implored Dominicans to consider fair
and stable governance and religious devotion as common objectives with the
British. He argued that many Dominicans were already familiar with British
prosperity from visiting their nearby ports and invited “brave” Dominicans to
become British subjects under moderate constitutional monarchy, and that they
should fear Roume and French designs given their track record in SaintDomingue. Forbes especially highlighted the “traitorous” religious policies of the
Republic, and called Dominican “loyal supporters of the true worship of God.”46
A personalized copy of this proclamation entered Banica, with the
handwritten introductory note that British forces would take the town with
peaceful intentions.47 This was just a month after the Republic had taken Banica
to much fanfare by having Toussaint, who many Dominicans despised, deliver the
news, and in fact personally take over Banica, Las Cahobas, and Hincha and raise
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the tricolore.48 As García put it, border residents were now stuck with the French
and their “blacks without talent or education,” which eased the British advance.49
In response, the French next circulated a proclamation in Santo
Domingo.50 It demanded allegiance to the republic, opposition to countervailing
forces, and deference to French representatives who wanted to bring them “love
and equality.” It promised amazing prosperity under eventual emancipation, and
castigated them to abandon ideas contrary to the Republic. It said almost nothing
about religion or belief. However, perhaps none of this mattered anyway, because
unlike the British, the French did not bother translating this proclamation into
Spanish.51 With this turmoil the evacuation of local elites crescendoed.52 In these
efforts to flip Dominican support, General Forbes relied upon French royalists
from the island who best knew Dominican culture, and provided the content of
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his religious appeals. They also dealt with the pseudonymous “Mr. Tabares” from
Santo Domingo, who had read the British proclamation, and wrote with questions
about British rule.53 All the while, British forces captured strongholds near CapFrançais.54
Tabares praised the decree, and passed along information on the French to
the British, who responded by explaining that they wanted to stop the French
occupation of Santo Domingo and would quickly take any position over which the
tricolore flew. The unidentified British officer argued that French actions were, “so
tragic as to be comical. All the works of Republican agents have the same object,
this is to insurrect and electrify all of the blacks, [which is] today the most loved
race because it is the strongest.” This was certainly not what Dominicans wanted,
he contended, especially since the infighting between Sonthonax, Laveaux, and
Rochambeau left only “African troops” to occupy Santo Domingo, which he
suspected they would pillage.55 Roume largely denied any rough conduct by
Toussaint, much to Spanish chagrin.56 News of pillaging and theft by Toussaint’s
forces preceded them in all of these Dominican border towns, which further
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panicked Dominican locals who already mistrusted them. He would not let
Toussaint take San Juan de la Maguana, or Matas de Farfan, without the residents
having thoroughly secured their properties. The only reprieve might come from
the former black auxiliary Gañet (Gagnette) who had joined the British, and might
strike Toussaint a decisive blow in West.57
With such a reputation preceding Toussaint, the British officer and French
royalist Viscount de Bruges, who was a key agent in the recruitment of the black
auxiliaries, rode into Las Cahobas with British troops, gave a speech, and enticed
the Spanish subjects to raise the Union Jack, which they did. He received a friendly
welcome after the residents there had received several copies of the proclamation.
Toussaint, who had yet to see the proclamation, was furious at Spanish officials
for not preventing this outcome.58 Dominicans in Banica conspired against the
French, including ex-Spanish officials and “black Spaniards,” and began actively
fighting the French.59 Roume threw a fit to García about this British influence and
their continued recruitment of black auxiliaries, 60 while García protested to the
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French commissioners about the violence, theft, and disorder perpetrated by
Toussaint’s troops which violated their terms under the treaty and asked them to
send other, white regular troops to handle the exchanges.61
This trend played out across the border region. As Toussaint approached,
hundreds and perhaps thousands of Dominicans either fled, or joined the British. 62
British officials used this panic to contact noteworthy Dominicans who might
sway their neighbors, including Father Juan Bobadilla in Neiba, who seemed to at
least entertain their presentation and after such contact locals, who reported that
they “all prefer the British dominion.”63 When a dutiful Spanish officer notified
Roume of this dissent against the Republic, Roume initially did not respond.
When he did, it was only to voice disbelief at disinterest in the Republic and
without actionable advice.64

French ideological conceit and chronic myopia

toward Dominican cultural politics disabled their comprehension of myriad
reasons why many in Santo Domingo was unsettled by their approach. Similarly,
French presumptions of moral high ground regarding their newfound
emancipationist strategies prevented their comprehension of diversity of thought
among black actors on the island, many of whom continued to prefer Spanish or
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British affiliations to the nation that so recently enslaved and brutalized them, an
interpretive distortion adopted by some historians to the present.
Given these complications with French takeovers, and British support, the
Republic suspended taking Monte Cristi and Dajabon, both areas with heightened
British activities.65 When these handovers loomed, a delegation of Dominicans
and French royalist allies furtively visited the British to warn that the Republic
would take Monte Cristi and Dajabon, and begged for British protection. French
officials had even spoken with one delegate, Juan del Monte, about serving the
Republic. He had others ideas, as did the physician Adrien who, while French,
had fled the Republic into Santo Domingo. Two British ships stayed nearby Monte
Cristi at Manzanillo and made signals all night.66 These signals went to British
operatives or to Dominican sympathizers. A local fisherman told of seeing rockets
sent as communication.67 The delegation had read the proclamation, and sailed all
the way from Monte Cristi to Môle Saint Nicolas. This British sympathy, coupled
with the anti-Republic uprising of blacks at Grande-Rivière, were major setbacks
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for French operations.68 The townspeople of Puerto Plata and La Vega may have
also had similar contact with the British.69
The black uprising at Grande-Rivière came directly from former black
auxiliaries of Jean-François and Biassou, with many still wearing the Spanish
cockade. Likely some of these troops had sided with Titus, and their present
attacks in August 1796 could have been enticed by British agents. 70 The blacks of
the mountains near Grande-Rivière were about 3,000 strong, and completely
rejected the Republic. They had some conversations with the British, and many of
the troops preferred this option, so that when their own commander Gañet took
up the tricolore cockade they killed him. García identified this same battle of styles
between British and French as the fundamental question confronting
Dominicans.71 In response, French commanders in Cap-Français sent out a decree
against unsupervised travel or commerce involving the Dominican town of
Dajabon, which the Republic saw as a hotbed of royalist activity and supplying
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and coordinating with the black insurgents at Grande-Rivière.72 Soon enough, a
French patrol decided to enter Santo Domingo unannounced to hunt down black
royalists, and Spanish troops unaware of their identity almost attacked them. This
region around Dajabon was not under French control, and the patrol was
expelled.73
These were autonomous, diverse actors in the thousands who disdained
the idea of a French hegemony on the island.74 French officials lazily dismissed
this discontent as “traitors and treacherous men” who were “taking advantage of
their simplicity and ignorance,” rather than attempting to address Dominican
dismay.75 Dominican concerns did not dissipate when news of the massacre of
whites at Les Cayes directed by mulattoes under Rigaud and with black
republican troops. Spanish officials understood that Pinchinat and Franc were
involved, who would not yield to the new General Desfournaux. One captain who
hid aboard his ship during “the furies” sailed straight to Santo Domingo, where
he said that for three days the massacres raged, starting with rifles, then swords,
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and finally drownings.76 None of this made Dominicans trust French troops of
color any more.
Since most well-off white colonists had fled to neighboring Spanish
colonies the British backgrounded the importance of maintaining slavery
compared to their earlier materialist appeals in Saint-Domingue.77 Those who
received the proclamation were largely free Dominicans of color who could not
afford to leave and wanted to protect their homes and livelihoods. As Catholics
dependent upon small market engagements, and without racial solidarity with the
sometimes pillaging and violent ex-slave armies aligned with France, they
gravitated toward British offers.78 In contrast to pro-British partisans in SaintDomingue, Dominican sympathizers were less prosperous, more appalled by
French anti-clericalism, and more interested in constitutional monarchy which
seemed far more stable than the constant rotation of governors in Saint-Domingue
and revolutionary leadership in Paris, of which rose at the end of a gun and fell
under the guillotine. More commonly though, Dominican small producers or
peasants, many of whom were of color, appear to have been nonplussed with
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Saint-Domingue’s revolution and French rights discourses, and their ambivalence
echoes in their notable absence from much of the documentary record on this era.
British observers were so certain of their eventual success that in
September 1796 The Times of London published a lengthy article about whole
towns in Spanish Santo Domingo clamoring for British subjecthood. Specifically,
a council from Monte Cristi, a key northern port city, had directly petitioned
British forces to protect them from French irreligion, anarchy, plunder, and
massacre.79 Another such plea from Santiago, a major city 50 miles inland and
hundreds of miles from British lines, claimed to represent an entire pro-British
region.80 By August 1796 the British were circulating more specialized texts
promoting their lucrative trade.81 Dominicans continued defecting,82 as pro-British
gens de couleur from Saint-Domingue detailed their positive experiences to
Dominicans.83 By late 1796 Spanish officials felt increasingly trapped by people of
color who dabbled in British intrigues “without talent or education.”84 British
officers refused, though, to occupy towns unless they flew the Republican
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tricolore.85 The British would then simply attack these new French positions,
unfurling the Union Jack over more Dominican territory. In contrast to pro-French
forces, British officers treated rural Dominicans with maximum dignity and paid
“superabundantly” for their produce.86 Many Dominicans concluded that under
the British they could return to carrying agricultural tools instead of weapons, and
carrying out transactions rather than warfare.87
By mid-August the pro-British seditions had spread all the way to the halls
of Spanish power in Santo Domingo. Based on a tip from French intelligence,
Spanish officials arrested Francisco Gascue, a prominent urbanite, brother-in-law
of the mayor of Santiago, and treasurer and accountant in the employ of the
Audiencia and Real Hacienda.88 Roume, who passed García some evidence, had
once called Gascue “citizen” and offered lofty ideas to Gascue of what he hoped
Santo Domingo might become, just as he had to many others in the colony. Of
course, that did not make his hopes reality, just as it did not make Gascue a French
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citizen.89 When Roume actually arrived, Gascue informed him that he worked for
Spain, not the Republic or Roume, and that whatever instructions he brought were
provisional and subservient to Spanish governance pending a formal transfer. 90
Allegedly, Gascue had not only received the Forbes proclamation, but had passed
it along and explained British intentions among his social circle. In response,
García tightened codes against British papers, not only criminalizing the
documents but legally compelling residents to immediately surrender them to
officials and explain their origins. Spanish officials were skeptical of what this
situation actually meant, given the strong reputation of Gascue, and that Roume
had a difficult time proving he was a British agent guilty of high treason.91
García, likely upset over whatever Gascue had actually done, was even
more irritated at Roume’s theatrics. He called the latter a “hothead” with many
“bad satellites who orbit him” referring to a few opportunistic, or perhaps sincere
Dominicans who followed Roume around seeing an anti-Republic slight at every
corner. The trouble ensued after Gascue mentioned the proclamation to a member
of this entourage of “bad satellites,” one of whom was a priest who wore his holy
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garb with the tricolore cockade. Given his four decades of service to the empire,
Gascue’s professions of innocence had currency with Spanish investigators, and
when Spanish jurists dismissed the case García had to remind Roume, again, that
Santo Domingo was still Spanish and that he was still only a provisional agent.92
Gascue testified to having received the British proclamation and also seditious
French texts, but not having known exactly what to do with them.93

UNREALIZED PROMISES
In December 1796 Forbes issued a second, lengthier mass print
proclamation.

It played more heavily upon religious fears, warning of the

destruction that the French Republic had perpetrated against Catholicism in
continental Europe and asking for martyrs to take arms against irreligious
radicalism. It argued that the French could only provide burnt churches, an
unbefitting outcome for Dominicans, who they called “the successors of the first
missionaries” in the Americas.94
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The British also eroded Spain’s role as champion of righteous
counterrevolution. Numerous Spanish priests in key border towns also defected
to the British side.95 For example, Father Marquez, a particularly popular priest in
the west, had recently been reassigned by Archbishop Portillo due to scandalous
affairs with married women. In his next parish he quickly found a new love
interest. When confronted, Marquez simply crossed the border and accepted a
raise to become chaplain of British Catholic troops, including recent defectors from
Spain’s forces who were accustomed to campaigning with priestly advice as they
had under Spain.96 This was possible because in the mid-1790s the British Catholic
hierarchy, despite being a disempowered religious minority at home,
outmaneuvered Spanish interests within the Vatican. To support British imperial
exploits on Hispaniola they won jurisdictional autonomy from the top church
official on the island, Archbishop Portillo of Santo Domingo, much to his personal
and geopolitical chagrin.97
In mid-1794 King George III realized the value not only of blocking
Portillo’s influence, but of borrowing Spanish ideas of using exiled French clerics
in their own territory. He moved to deploy the Bishop of Comminges, who had
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served the city of Toulouse in France and was exiled in Britain, as the Catholic
spiritual leader for British Saint-Domingue.98 This idea passed to the Vatican, who
did not object to British plans.99 Amid Spanish decline, perhaps the Vatican saw
the British at least as a more pious option than secular French rule. 100 Indeed,
Vatican officials hoped that, with British conquest, Santo Domingo would remain
as fervently Catholic as Quebec had in British Canada.101 These British religious
incursions augmented their presence in the Dominican borderlands.102
The next pro-British phase moved from the border and coasts to directly
strike the capital.

First, officials found that a well-connected government

accountant and respected resident of 41 years, Francisco Gascue, owned a copy of
the Forbes proclamation, and had apparently explained its content and spoken
persuasively about British rule to several people.103 Spanish officials were
scandalized, but this was a modest prelude to a bout of major dissent.
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In December 1796 Spanish officials uncovered a coalition of petty officials,
black soldiers, merchants who, in coordination with dissidents in the interior, were
plotting a coup and British invasion of the city of Santo Domingo.104 The informant
who revealed the coup to Spanish officials, and who later emerged as a suspected
co-conspirator, was Domingo Assereto. He had been a military commander in
Louisiana and later Cuba, and while he had served Spain for many years he was
originally from Italy.105
His colleague, Juan Angulo, was a thirty-eight-year-old merchant from
Havana, where the two had originally met. Angulo, who had arrived in Santo
Domingo after having passed through Port-au-Prince and Neiba, claimed to have
been trading wood in Jérémie and Gonaïves and had been on the island about
seven months. He was arrested in possession of cryptic letters signed by a British
general that derided the French and Spanish and exalted British stability to
important religious officials, including the directors of the seminary and a
monastery.

Angulo carried two British passports, a copy of the Forbes

proclamation to Dominicans, and many additional letters for certain residents and
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black officers. He may have even burned other secret papers prior to his capture. 106
Alleged co-conspirators who were absolutely essential to the networking, staging,
and execution of the plot were two black officers who had formerly served in
prominence under Biassou – Pablo (Paul) Alí and Agustín. Both had, Assereto
alleged, been promised commissions with the British by Assereto. Both black
officers had access to the content of these pro-British papers, and both had lost
salary, social prestige, and career opportunities since the peace treaty. Spanish
officials questioned all of these suspected conspirators over a few weeks. Their
depositions unveiled a sizeable and well-developed pro-British faction plotting an
urban uprising. As soon as Assereto revealed this plot he begged to leave for
Cuba.107

He made it to Cuba by mid-January 1797, but remained under

suspicion.108
Angulo, who Spanish officials considered to be the chief spy running this
ring of pro-British sympathizers, remained locked in a private tower. Not only
had he carried British letters and the proclamation on his person, in his luggage
they found other commercial papers in English or detailing sales involving British
subjects. Besides his claims to trading in woods, he also apparently dealt in
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creams, soaps, toothpastes and fabrics.109 Angulo had tried to portray himself as
hailing from a modestly well-off background but with a life of distress, including
deaths in his family and loss of property.110 He had only been in Santo Domingo
for seven days and said his business there was to seek governmental redress for
hardships in commerce, hassle from corsairs, and the loss of money at the hands
of the French in the west of the island.111 Angulo did file a series of documented
complaints against French treatment in Léogâne, Gonaïves, and off the coast of
Port-au-Prince.112 The Baron de Montalembert, a high-ranking British officer of
French royalist background, had issued him a passport, after which he spent a few
days in Neiba, passed through Azua, and arrived in the capital. Montalembert
had asked him to look for cattle and horses that the Dominicans might sell them.
He said he had not handed out letters that he carried from British-occupied Portau-Prince, that he did not know their content, and that he had learned of the war
building between Spain and Britain and did not want to incite trouble. He had
taken these letters directly from a “gentleman” named Villat who he had on the
suggestion of a contact in Les Cayes because he said Villat had a son in Cuba. His
answers as to why he carried the Forbes proclamation were vague and shifty, and
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said the extra blank passports from Montalembert were only in case he found
livestock to send back.113 He said he knew nobody in Santo Domingo, but hoped
to find family connections, and ended up seeing Assereto, who he had met before,
and stayed in his home briefly before hoping to relocate to a monastery. He and
Assereto had discussed seeking permission to travel about the island to find
friends, family, or commerce in Les Cayes, Azua, Santiago, and possibly
Dajabon.114
Assereto, who had told Spanish officials about the whole alleged
conspiracy, had also become a suspect. In his questioning he said he only knew
Angulo casually, and that they talked about indifferent matters. He had let
Angulo stay with him as a courtesy to Cuban officers that were their mutual
friends. Assereto alleged that Angulo made favorable insinuations about the
British, who he suggested might give better treatment to Dominicans than the
“perfidious” French. After all, he allegedly noted, the British enjoyed greater
prosperity might offer better pay and promotions to Spanish troops, just as they
had with many French royalists. Assereto thought Angulo generally understood
the letters and his mission, and tried to deliver them to the seminary and religious
leaders, and that he had gone along with his conversations to learn of his plans
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and betray them to Spain and prevent a coup. Assereto said he also went along
with recruiting the two black officers, and that Angulo implied that former black
auxiliaries had received correspondence from British officials that preceded his
arrival. From his interactions he learned that the black recruits were to help secure
a landing spot at Jayna for a British fleet that would land, take the fort, and move
on to Santo Domingo, perhaps with the support of Dominicans from various parts
of the interior who sympathized with the British. This was all to prevent the
impending French takeover of the colony, and to strike the new Spanish enemies
while they were weak.115
Agustín was the first black officer with whom Assereto met, a thirty years
old and originally from Grande-Rivière in North. Assereto apparently gave him a
nice blue jacket, epaulets, and a golden shoulder braid to try to earn trust and sway
him toward the British. Agustín may have also received letters from British
officers.116

He said that these black officers were securing others in their

community to participate, and perhaps Dominicans of color, though he was not
sure of that. Assereto thought that Angulo had brought other letters for figures
such as the mayor Nicolas Guridi, and perhaps additional correspondence with
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Montalembert, but that Angulo had burned some of his papers, and that he had
spoken lengthily with the university rector.117 Angulo had allegedly told him of
several co-conspirators lying in wait around Azua, Neiba, and even the capital,
though he gave no names. Possible suspects included a British subject, another
man possibly named Despineaux, and possibly a Spanish subject, all of whom
stayed in either the Pellon and Pons homes. He insisted that “many subjects” had
become British partisans. Again, Assereto claimed that his actions were a ruse to
crack the conspiracy, which also involved a convoluted, poorly-conceived decoy
of a feigned trip to Cuba.118
When Pablo Alí testified he indicated that most of his dealings were also
with Assereto, who he trusted due to his captain’s uniform of the Spanish army.
Alí said that he was thirty-eight years old and a native of Saint-Rose, likely the
parish at Grande-Rivière in North.119 He said when he visited the house Angulo
sat in a hammock and kept his distance. He did not know either man by name,
however. He insisted that neither he nor Agustín had received British letters, but
had heard of such letters in Azua. He said Assereto spoke favorably of the British,
but also, confusingly, spoke well of the French. Assereto also mentioned the
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looming open war with Britain, and said that soon the British would come to Santo
Domingo. He did not think that Agustín and Assereto had any pact, did not know
if Agustín had taken money from Angulo as Assereto had implied, but that
Agustín had received a blue British-style jacket from Assereto. He also knew that
Agustín had recently travelled for five or six days and visited San Juan and Jayna
with the company of another black soldier named Pierre.120
Agustín, aged forty, also said he did not know Assereto by name, but only
as a Spanish officer who had once lived with the Englishman named Joseph
Sterling (known as José Sterlin in Santo Domingo). He only knew Angulo as a tall
white man living with Assereto. Assereto had first asked Agustín to travel with
him to Azua to help find his brother. Angulo, with whom he had never spoken,
was to accompany them, and Agustín was to rendezvous with them at Jayna. He
had met with Assereto in his home twice, accompanied by Alí both times. Agustín
did accept a blue coat from Assereto, but only because he lacked official-looking
clothes, and only offered him money as compensation for the trip. Assereto
offered for him and his wife to move into his home, alongside Angulo, which the
black officer refused due to his many children. He also asked Agustín many
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questions about how the black auxiliaries supported themselves, how they were
treated, how dispersed they were on the island, and what they did since the peace.
He said Assereto never talked much about the British with him, only mentioning
the looming war and to ask him if he was afraid of the British, to which Agustín
said no. During one of these conversations he thought that Alí had said that the
last time he had been in Banica that a British agent had offered him a hefty sum to
join and double salary.

One colleague in Azua had received a letter from

Montalembert. One of their colleagues in Santo Domingo, Gabat, had also traveled
to the frontier town of San Juan supposedly to take care of money matters, but had
disappeared without notice not even two weeks before. That night, with mounting
suspicion, Alí, Agustín,

and

their

companion

Pierre

were

all

jailed

incommunicado.121
The day following his and Agustín’s first statements Pablo Alí had a
change of heart. He wanted to amend his testimony and was taken directly to see
Governor Joaquín García. Alí then confessed that there was, in fact, a British
“surprise” planned against Santo Domingo. Assereto, he claimed, was conspiring
with Angulo, that he had spoken to him about a commission and payment if he
helped, and had showed him and explained several secretive papers. These papers
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included the Forbes proclamation of 12 July and a letter dated 25 November from
Montalembert to Angulo. Alí claimed that he thought, due to Assereto’s rank and
insinuations that the Archbishop was in accord with the plot, that the plan was
legitimate. Alí was supposed to accompany Agustín and the two white men to
Azua to take care of some affair. If they were successful there, they would
continue, if not, they could return to the capital. Eventually, Alí begged out of this
portion of the plan and found reasons to stay in the capital. He maintained that
Angulo interacted little only because he spoke little French, but clearly concurred
with the whole undertaking. Alí understood that the blue jacket, epaulets, and
braids that Assereto gave to Agustín were not just a gift, but actually for Agustín
to make a strong impression with British officers he was to meet during their
trip.122 Later, the stableman who rented out the horses for this journey testified
about Assereto’s behavior. Assereto first rented one horse, then the next day
requested two more, and said he was only going to Azua.

He visited the

stableman’s home four times in total, and asked about how many days it would
take to get from Azua to San Juan, then from San Juan to Banica, then from Banica
to Hincha, and other locations, but only because Assereto said he was “just
curious.”
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rambled to him about British and French military operations, and that the French
would not overtake the British as the latter had stronger forces, and that the British
were better people than the French anyway.123 Banica, a recurring location in
testimony among the suspects, had already been in British hands by mid-1796, and
was where hundreds of Dominicans pledged fealty to King George III that year.
Some still-concealed British agent there had been quite effective, and had also
reached out to the black auxiliaries.124
Agustín soon confirmed the grimmest of Alí’s assertions with minor
clarifications, and added that their trip was part of sorting of money and scouting
locations. Even Assereto confessed to his complicity in these details. 125 This
changed the Spanish approach to the case entirely. It had been a sensational,
scattered set of accusations by a down-and-out Italian serving Spain and his outof-place comrade the Cuban soap and toothpaste salesman. It quickly became a
major investigation into an imminent military threat to Santo Domingo.
When Pierre was brought forth for questioning, wholly unaware of the
testimony already implicating him, he told the Spanish officials that they simply
had the wrong Pierre, and that it must have been some other black soldier who
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accompanied Agustín. After Alí and Agustín both again confirmed his identity,
Pierre relented and said it was, in fact, he who had gone to Jayna with Agustín.
Agustín had also visited San Juan to handle some financial issues. This was, of
course, the same place from whence their comrade Gabat had suspiciously
vanished, while Pierre went to see his children near Banica. He claimed to know
nothing about Agustín crossing the British lines, only that a white man who would
travel with them.

Their trip ended early, apparently with some sense of

disappointment.126
Confronted with mounting testimonies, Angulo tried to defend himself.
He claimed to have only praised the British in comparison to the French, and only
because he had been harassed by the French, whereas he was always treated very
well by the British, and only that Dominicans would be happier under British rule
than French republicanism. Although all of his companions knew of the looming
war with Britain, he said he had no idea of such things. He was not treasonous,
he insisted, and was not helping plot a coup. He said he had no idea of Assereto’s
conversations with the black officers, that he had no idea that his secret papers
were hidden in a chair cushion nor that the black officers saw them, and that his
interest in visiting Azua was solely to explore commercial opportunities. 127 He was
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denied permission to go, though he had also considered visiting Jacmel and Les
Cayes with permission from Provisional Agent Roume.128
With the core conspirators identified and confined, and the broad details
of the threat outlined, Spanish officials began to broaden their investigation.
Songui, a minor French emissary with Roume, and Pedro Logroño, a prominent
resident of Santo Domingo, both had unusual encounters with the white
conspirators asking about the details of the Spanish and French treaty, and
circulating documents. Angulo was perhaps even trafficking “gazettes” with the
Englishman named Sterling at the Pellon house the day of his arrest. Angulo said
he was only handling packages for the chaplain of the Cuba regiment in Neiba,
and that whatever papers Sterling had was his problem.129 In fact, Angulo had
delivered many letters from Neiba and Azua in Santo Domingo, including one
from Father Juan Bobadilla.130

Bobadilla, a distinguished and respected priest,

including from his work with Maniel and Naranjo, had fallen under suspicion of
Spanish officers in Neiba when they knew he had been receiving letters from
British contacts in August 1796, as did other residents, but did not disclose this nor
alerted Spanish officials to their content.131 Spanish investigators began to collect
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and review all documents circulated by Angulo in the capital.132

Angulo

continued, insisting that any inflammatory documents that he brought from the
British was an unwitting act. Spanish officials began to chip away the façade of
Angulo’s ostensible need to meet with Spanish officials about his trade problems
with the French. His efforts to meet multiple religious leaders and the university
rector, especially when he only had letters for three of them, was less explainable.
He had also hired a black women to deliver items.133
Assereto, who insisted upon his innocence and stressed that he had done
the Spanish a great service, continued trying to leave for Cuba. However, as
evidence and testimony collected, Spanish officials had just as much reason to
believe that Assereto was a British agent along with Angulo.134 Spanish officials
also discovered that Angulo had been visiting a black woman who had found a
way to get to his cell. She had been circulating messages from Angulo to the
outside. Her name was Monica de la Cruz Cornejo, a free black woman from Santo
Domingo who may have been the one circulating his messages before his arrest,
and she now became a suspect for observation and investigation.135
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Angulo insisted that he could not stand Assereto, and that was why he
tried to move to the monastery to avoid this “man of impertinent and
inconsequential conversations.”136 He also said he tried to dissuade Assereto from
his trip inland, and doubted Assereto’s credentials and real motives for being in
Santo Domingo.137 Angulo also promised he could not speak French, and therefore
could not conspire with the black officers, and that his contacts in Neiba and Azua
would vouch for his loyalty to Spain.138 However, the black officers said that
Angulo did confer with Assereto in Spanish during their meetings, though
Agustín had never heard him say anything directly against Spain.139
Spanish officials brought forth other contacts of Angulo’s, who said they
had visited him in Assereto’s house where they said a negrito francés was coming.
The black man was known as a barber, and had lived in Santo Domingo for several
years. Assereto mixed in their conversations about Cuba, and said he thought
Spain would soon make him “governor” of four parts of that island. They did see
two black men who had fought with Biassou and who spoke in private with
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Assereto. They heard nothing about the British from Angulo, though the Cuban
did say he could not stand Assereto and would move to a room at the monastery.140
Making the story only more complex, a new Dominican witness said that
he had learned of the Assereto case through Roume, because Assereto had
denounced the coup to the French emissaries when he did so to Spain. Assereto
had apparently stated to Roume that he was a natural republican, as he was from
Genoa, and wanted to serve the French Republic. This witness said, though, that
Assereto had also mentioned his furtive trip to Azua to a woman street vendor,
and was seen with a soldier of Biassou’s, but never mentioned the British.141 The
vendor, Dominga Tapia, said she sold Assereto sausages and chickens as the
captain told her of his trip to Azua on business of the governor.142
Logroño testified, saying that the day of Angulo’s arrest he had been given
a packet by an Englishman in the street, perhaps with newspapers, and that upon
his arrest Angulo muttered that he was suspected as a British spy.143 If Angulo was
actually innocent and unaware of why he had been arrested as he had claimed,
then his statement during his arrest certainly raises questions as to how he so
quickly and specifically knew of what he was suspected. Witnesses from the
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border regions said that Angulo had met with many prominent residents and
officials on his route to the capital, accompanied by a black woman, who was
apparently his cook.144 An old Cuban contact, Herrezuelo, said he never heard
Angulo say anything against Spain, but certainly had heard Assereto say contrary
words about Spain, apparently due to some faults with judicial decisions in New
Orleans, and he complained bitterly about Luis de las Casas, governor of Cuba,
and Baron de Carondelet of Louisiana.145
Isabel Pérez, the landlady for Assereto, said that he was “insufferable”
company, and that his personality was revolting, overbearing, and immoderate,
and that he frequently complained about Dominicans and was generally
disagreeable. She had heard no pro-British talk from the men, but had heard
Angulo speak badly of the French.146 Gabriel Pavillost, a French resident of the
capital, said he had seen somebody who looked very much like Angulo in Les
Cayes weeks before he arrived in Santo Domingo, who had mentioned his trade
problems.147
Joseph Sterling, the Englishman, said he knew where Assereto lived, but
did not know anything about his meetings with black officers. He said he did not
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know Angulo, and had only heard Assereto say pro-French things, not proBritish.148 Joaquín Pellon, with whom Sterling lived, said he never knew Angulo,
but that he had eaten at his home once without knowing it, and had heard Assereto
claim he was a British agent just before he left.149 James Blare, also British and a
resident of the Pellon house, said he did not know Angulo well, but knew he was
younger, rather tall, and had come from Neiba. His acquaintance Juan Estaffot
had met Angulo there, and sent Angulo British newspapers in concealment. In
conversation, Angulo praised Britain and criticized Spain.150
When Monica de la Cruz Cornejo, aged thirty, testified she admitted to
cooking for Angulo and also passing letters for him to military and civil officials.
She had taken the letters from his cell, though she thought Assereto had
intercepted the letter to the mayor. When she visited him there Angulo had asked
what people were saying about why he was imprisoned and his ties to Assereto.
He said that all they could pin on him was that he had criticized the way the French
had treated and praised the British for their treatment of him. He asked her if she
had heard anything about a conspiracy against Spain and France. She said during
the time that Angulo lived with Assereto the two men would speak privately in

148

“Testimonio…,” Santo Domingo, 17 January 1797, AGI-Estado, 1, no.27, 153-154.

149

“Testimonio…,” Santo Domingo, 3 February 1797, AGI-Estado, 1, no.27, 183-185.

150

“Testimonio…,” Santo Domingo, 3 February 1797, AGI-Estado, 1, no.27, 185-187.

501

the street. Angulo had asked her if she knew any black soldiers, and she did –
Osuna and Juan Fulgencio. Angulo asked her to approach them on his behalf, but
only if they were dependable men. She suspected his intentions at that point, and
also hesitated to do so, but also hesitated to talk to officials. 151 Monica likely feared
repercussions whether she reported her concerns or not. Furthermore, it seems
that Angulo spoke most openly with her than others, perhaps because he regarded
her as less powerful due to her racial and gender status, and thus Angulo gave her
key pieces of evidence held against him.
Monica confided in her friend, another black woman named Isabel
Ramirez, who discouraged her from engaging this request. Monica was also the
one who actually arranged the room at the monastery for Angulo. She also
identified the negrito francés barber who was in the suspects’ home as Pierre,
married to Yrene, the slave of Joseph Sterling.152 Another Dominican slave, Isabel
Ramírez, confirmed everything that Monica had relayed.153 At the least it is
intriguing that slaves of Sterling worked with Assereto and Angulo, and was likely
not a pure coincidence.
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Pierre Echalas, aged forty-five, the barber and also slave of Sterling, next
testified. He tended Assereto’s hair and quickly left, and though he cut other white
men’s hair there, he insisted he never overheard any conversations about seditious
topics.154 When deposed the black soldiers Osuna and Fulgencio, who were likely
Dominican and not black auxiliaries, they denied knowing Angulo, Assereto, or
anything about sedition or secret letters.155
Alí and Agustín wrote the governor, asking respectfully for release after
one month of imprisonment. They said they had been duped by Assereto, and
had only agreed to travel with him, thinking his actions were not against the King,
and that Assereto had convinced them that the Archbishop was in accord. They
said that, unlike the “major turbulences of the blacks,” likely a reference to the
defections, that they had remained faithful. They claimed that when they had been
solicited by the British generals in Azua, they told Spanish officials about the offer
and gave them the letters voluntarily.156
García became suspicious of what religious officials knew, and realized
that the British understood that to win over the Dominican populace that had to
convince their spiritual leaders first, and that religious leaders would have the
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greatest grievances and fears regarding the anti-clerical and impious French. That
is why Assereto lied to Alí and Agustín about his actions being in accord with the
Archbishop. García then demanded that religious leaders from the monasteries,
seminary, and churches come forth to explain what they knew, and that they
should be in attendance to see the unopened letters in case they wanted to explain
themselves if the letters contained damning details.157
Religious figures under suspicion flatly denied their involvement or any
firsthand knowledge of pro-British sentiments. Fray Mateo de Espinosa said that
any letter from Port-au-Prince for him was likely just, “one of those fatuous, or
errant fires… burning material susceptible to combustion that it might encounter
on its course,” and that if he were under suspicion he wanted to refute such
“political slander…with the ardor of his heart.” He promised self-sacrifice for the
patria, and promised García to “be an enemy of your enemies.”158
Once the letters were opened or tracked down they seemed innocuous
enough. One did speak of Angulo’s dislike for revolution on the island.159 Another
requested news from the capital.160 Bobadilla’s letter, which Angulo delivered to
his nephew, was unclear in its intent, only saying that Angulo needed assistance
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since he knew nobody in Santo Domingo, but not why or what his purpose for
being there was. When Bobadilla’s nephew went to find Angulo to inquire, he
found out about the arrest.161 Another priest at Neiba wrote his father in the capital
a similarly vague letter delivered by Angulo.162 A letter to the mayor, Guridi, even
mentioned that Angulo would need to return to Azua soon and that he might
travel to Santiago, too.163 Angulo also delivered a letter of support all the way from
Gonaïves, from man who had served in Dondon and was friends with a Spanish
officer in Santo Domingo.164 A letter of support from Francisco Camilo Riofrio of
Azua, with whom Angulo had stayed, was more suspicious of Angulo. He said
Angulo asked many questions about where French naval forces were located, and
that the military lines between the British and Spanish were peaceful. 165

James

Blare, the Englishman in the Pellon house, delivered a letter for Angulo intended
for an “English American” named Nathaniel Preston who also lived in Santo
Domingo in the Pons house. The letter was a recommendation for Angulo from
the same Juan Estaffot who had sent British newspapers.

Preston had
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subsequently vanished.166 In sum, Angulo received a suspicious over-abundance
of recommendation letters from well-placed people across the west and center of
the island, intended to connect him with other well-placed individuals in the
capital.
James Blare tried to respond to this intriguing Juan Estaffot. Estaffot, who
lived in a French-held city that the British wanted to capture had sent British
newspapers and letters to two of the only native English speakers living in Santo
Domingo, which was all highly suspicious. He had done this through a Cuban
who claimed to have just happened to meet Montalembert and carry letters and a
proclamation for him. This all seemed dubious. In his response, Blare told Estaffot
of the recent Boca Nigua uprising, and implied that there were interesting details
about the uprising that he could not yet impart. He cryptically said that, “Our
dear friend Mr. Preston is, as accustomed, very busy and always progressing in
the entertaining art of speaking alone,” and hoped that Estaffot would be able to
visit Santo Domingo soon.167
As mounting evidence made Angulo look even guiltier, García also
requested that Roume reveal whatever dealings he had with Assereto.168 The
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French provisional emissaries in the capital provided a letter that they had
received from Assereto only a few days after Angulo had been arrested. In it he
complained that the Spanish did not take him or the concern seriously enough,
and presented himself as such a worthy servant of Spain. He criticized Spanish
officials for allowing a black woman to visit Angulo, who he thought was helping
to continue organizing the plot.169 The reports that emerged from the French side
not only discredited Assereto’s official story, but completely muddied the true
nature of his involvement in the Angulo case.
Roume explained the first time he met Assereto, which was actually in
Spain at the home of the Duque de Crillon at the end of 1795 just before he
departed for Hispaniola. Assereto was then wearing the same uniform he had on
in Santo Domingo.

Assereto entertained them with an incredible story of

departing the prime minister’s quarters at El Escorial and being ambushed by a
gang of men who roughed him up and tied him up in a tree. Though he told his
audience that he knew who had done this to him, he said that his enemies were
far too powerful to reveal. When he left, the duke told Roume that he thought
Assereto was a “schemer” and “liar” and that he did not believe a word of his
story. Roume saw Assereto when he came to Santo Domingo and reminded him
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of the story, but Assereto said that Roume must have mistaken him for somebody
else. In Santo Domingo the provisional French commission invited the new arrival
to dinner, though Roume could not participate. During dinner Assereto talked
about all sorts of indecent things, including offering his wife or daughter sexually
to Father Quiñones who was also a guest, and bashed Spain.170
The French emissaries wanted nothing to do with him thereafter, yet
Assereto continued to visit them uninvited and make anti-Spanish remarks.
Assereto finally asked Roume to become the French commander at Santiago when
the Republic eventually took that city and wanted to accompany Roume on a trip
to that city. Roume told him no to both. When Roume returned to Santo Domingo
the uncouth Assereto had revealed the Angulo conspiracy to the Spanish. Assereto
told Roume directly that the case would implicate high-ranking officials,
particularly in the religious community. Given their history, Roume doubted
Assereto. Roume speculated that Assereto had overheard a specific conversation
at the Pellon house in which discussion turned to rumors of British spies being in
the colony. Looking for new professional horizons, Roume wondered if the soldier
of fortune Assereto had this possibility in mind when he met Angulo, who had
just arrived from Port-au-Prince. Roume wondered if he criticized the Spanish
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and French in front of Angulo to gain his trust, and, considering his captain’s
uniform and service to Spain, Angulo may have confided in Assereto. Angulo may
have thought he found a perfect co-conspirator, while Assereto had accidentally
found an actual British spy.171
Angulo, Roume speculated, was charged with recruiting black soldiers
left behind by Jean-François and Georges Biassou, and that is what Assereto did
to “help” him and to learn more about the plot. That was when Angulo may have
written a strong recommendation to the British in favor of Assereto receiving just
the kind of promotion he sought – brigadier. The plan was for the British to take
Jayna, then San Geronimo, and then Santo Domingo, with the support of the
former black auxiliaries and pro-British Dominicans lying in wait, all of whom
would eliminate the French. Roume was sure that their trip to the interior was a
pretext to visit the British. Roume thought the uniform that Assereto gave Agustín
was one of his old ones, and was not actually British. After denouncing the plan,
Assereto had still not turned over documents that he claimed implicated high-level
officials and residents, people he either wanted protection from, wanted to extort,
or documents that did not exist. Assereto had initially wanted to allow the plan to
begin so that Spain and France could see all the major players in hiding. He
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suggested secretly detaining Angulo, writing a fake letter telling the British to
launch the assault, and then leading troops himself. Assereto had told much of his
plan to Urízar, who liked the idea, but García had decided to be cautious. Roume
thought Assereto was unhinged, and could not believe his sudden ardor for Spain
and the French, given what he had said to various people, and that his credibility
was soft. He even recalled conversations in which Assereto celebrated the Boca
Nigua revolt because Spanish soldiers would be killed in it.172
After all this complexity, Assereto again asked Roume for a position with
the Republic, and Roume again refused. Nevertheless, after considering the
evidence Roume believed that there definitely was a pro-British coup in the capital
and across the colony and had been planned for quite some time. He believed that
the British had a considerable number of accomplices, too, and perhaps Assereto
cracked and revealed the plot because he was paranoid and thought that
somebody might soon reveal him. He offered to bring in undercover French
agents to root out British sympathizers, He requested a copy of the proceedings in
case the Executive Directory wanted to know about the case. 173 Under oath, eight
separate French visitors to the city verified different parts of Roume’s account.174
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One of the corroborating French witnesses was none other than Charles Gérard,
who years before had been arrested and placed on trial by Spanish officials due to
his leadership of the gens de couleur at Ouanaminthe.175
Finally, on 22 February the Spanish opened the secret letters from
Montalembert with Angulo and various religious authorities present, since they
were the addressees. All were written in Port-au-Prince in November 1796.176 The
letters implored the religious leaders to consider the fortunes and futures of
Spanish government in Santo Domingo, and mentioned the positive promises of
the Forbes proclamation.

The British general of French royalist extraction,

Montalembert, said that the “disgraced Spanish Haytians” – that is, Dominicans –
could be assured of protection under the peaceful and generous rule of His
Britannic Majesty, including religious freedoms that the French would not permit.
The coming war was the Republic’s fault, and that Dominicans should not see the
British as enemies, and that they should consider British rule in Las Cahobas and
Banica as proof of their goodwill. Montalembert called Dominicans virtuous and
pious, and knew that the religious leaders would stand against their sacrilegious
enemies, and recommended Angulo as a man of honesty and discretion who was
there to assist the colony in a time of conflict. Montalembert referenced the
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gracious British occupations of Dominican towns, and said that it they wanted free
religion, respect of worship, and wise rule, the British were their choice. 177
After this, Spanish officials interviewed even more of the contacts that
Angulo had made in his time in Santo Domingo, trying to uncover who among
them might be British sympathizers.178 Spanish officials questioned Alí again in
April 1797, when he insisted that he did not know the plan was a British coup, and
that he had trusted Assereto due to his captain status, experience and his Spanish
cockade, and claimed that he tried to speak about his misgivings with Joaquín
Cabrera, who he knew from their service together during the war in North, but the
general was asleep when he visited. Alí said he believed Assereto, who told him
that the Archbishop and Governor knew of the plans. He promised that he had
been loyal to Spain since he swore vassalage in San Miguel in front of Colonel
Nicolas Montenegro years before. Alí said he knew his error was serious, but that
he did not mean to commit it, and had surrendered other British offers before.179
Agustín, who was also re-interrogated the same day, said almost exactly the same
as Alí, but added that Alí was more suspicious of Assereto because he was more
“intelligent in the French language and about white Europeans.” Agustín said he
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only spoke “language of the creoles,” and that Alí always had to clarify to him
what Assereto wanted. He trusted Assereto for the same reasons, who even told
the black officers that someday he might become the governor of Trinidad. He
also claimed loyalty to Spain since his pledge to Joaquín Cabrera in San Miguel
years before. He said he knew he broke his oath to Spain and his faith, but did not
intend to do so.180 For their actual defense, Alí and Agustín were assigned a lawyer
for the poor, rather like a public defender, a talented young man named José
Nuñez de Cáceres.181 He and a defense team tried to quickly sift through 300 pages
of evidence to free the black officers from jail and prevent them from being
whipped.182
In their defense, Nuñez de Cáceres assembled a series of glowing letters
from Spanish commanders commending their “Dear Alí” who he thought was so
trustworthy, prudent, modest, sober and honest as a colonel under Biassou,
having served Spain with distinction since 1792 (a year before the black auxiliaries
were formally formed, and likely an honest accident that remarked on his service
to Spain that year, too). His loyalty was proven when he rejected offers from the
British through Montalembert, and offer from France through Toussaint
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Louverture, a rejection confirmed by his brother Hippolite Louverture. Alí made
decisive decisions that saved lives and Spanish positions, and once led his troops
to carry cannons and munitions by hand over treacherous terrain. Even when Alí’s
close fellow officer Gabat disappeared, and when Alí was left behind when
Biassou went to Florida, he stayed tied to Spain. 183 Witnesses called to testify for
Alí in person were a who’s who of Spanish military officials.184 Nuñez de Cáceres
said that Alí had been so valorous for Spain that he deserved esteem, not prison,
not only for his “heroic loyalty,” not only for his rejection of the British, but also
for his rejection of former friend and close colleague Toussaint. 185 In spoken
testimony each witness gave their personal, eyewitness accounts of the gritty
determination, intelligence, constancy, fluorescence, and bravery that Alí
especially had given to Spain.186 After these witnesses, Nuñez de Cáceres and the
defense requested a great deal of contextualizing material on Assereto, whose
character they clearly wanted to assassinate.187

Some of the same character

witnesses later reappeared to defined Alí and Agustín, saying they might have
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easily believed Assereto’s claims and rank.188 Almost heartbreakingly, one witness
said that Alí constantly talked about finding a way to go to Florida to be with
Biassou, and that a gentleman in the city, who was likely Assereto, might have had
the connections to make that happen.189
Nuñez de Cáceres demanded that Alí and Agustín were innocent and
should enjoy their liberty. He asked the court to consider the criminality of
premeditated treason to help a foreign nation attack, and then consider his
defendants’ records, and quoted Roman rhetorician Valerius Maximus to say, that
their imprisonment, “causes as much harm to the human race as good faith brings
welfare.” He claimed no proof that the two officers had actually raised their troops
for an insurrection, and that they had only been duped. Nuñez de Cáceres firmly
placed the blame on Angulo and Assereto, and asked, somewhat sarcastically, if
some “clumsy Africans could probe the refined malice of an astute European?”
They had followed orders, just as they had been praised for during the war. Alí had
been called a “friend” by a Spanish general, and had a “strong heart” and was an
“African hero” for Spain, Nuñez de Cáceres said.190
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Over three days Spanish officials reviewed all of the evidence against
Angulo and asked him to confess that he was in fact a British spy, but he repeatedly
refused and insisted upon his innocence.191 In his defense, which began 31 May
1797, Adrian Campuzano, an attorney for the Audiencia, gained access to all the
transcripts and evidence. Angulo still steadfastly refuted all the accusations
against him.192 Campuzano called several more witnesses who said that Angulo
was never seditious, including Juan Bobadilla.193 Campuzano tried to devalue the
very detailed testimony of Monica de la Cruz Cornejo, the free black woman who
worked for Angulo, because he said that she had frequently slept with Assereto,
and thus her words were blemished and biased.194

Isabel Pérez, Assereto’s

landlady, confirmed their relationship, saying that once Monica had confronted
Assereto and fought, with Monica saying that he was, “the black, and I am the
white…you have raised my skirts…what I have in my belly is of your favor,”
inferring that she was pregnant with his child. The defense hoped this would also
cast extra doubt on Assereto.195
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On 15 July 1797 Governor Joaquín García, having judiciously reviewed the
evidence, acquitted Alí and Agustín and endorsed their relocation to Florida. The
young Nuñez de Cáceres had very capably managed their defense, although Alí
never would make it there to be with his beloved General Biassou. On the other
hand, Angulo received eight years in the presidio in Havana. He was fortunate to
have escaped execution for high treason. Assereto would only receive more
questioning, and remained under suspicion as a bombastic, narcissistic,
untrustworthy opportunist with a growing reputation of toxicity.196
In sum, this fascinating series of arrests and testimonies revealed what
seems to have been an advanced network of British spies, pro-British
sympathizers, and a plan for the British military to take over the entire colony of
Santo Domingo, bolstered by the support many Dominicans who were panicked
over republican influences and distressed with the prospect of a looming French
takeover. Assereto, the rather deranged soldier of fortune that he was, likely did
discover this plot by complete accident, although he did already have unusual ties
to several possible co-conspirators and Britons before Angulo even arrived. He
likely also went along with it in hopes of gaining a British commission only to
decide that his probabilities of glory were somehow higher by selling out the
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conspiracy to Spain and their French allies, thereby saving himself, appearing to
be a hero, and perhaps gaining a new commission instead in the eventual French
takeover. He was motivated by selfish delusions of grandeur, and may have
single-handedly foiled what would have almost certainly unfolded as a major proBritish uprising and formal British military offensive. Assereto’s ideological
assertions vascillated so greatly that he did not likely really care about those
prospects.
It is almost certain that Angulo was indeed a British agent. He had
commercial ties to Jamaica and British-occupied ports in Saint-Domingue. Angulo
had meetings with top British generals, and carried of suspicious letters that
hinted at a British takeover to key figures in Santo Domingo. He had connections
to a loose network of (albeit unproven) pro-British Dominicans, none of whom he
seemed to know directly. Angulo made regular anti-French comments, and
discussed his paranoia of being labeled a British spy to Monica de la Cruz Cornejo
although he ostensibly did not know with what he had been charged.

He

facilitated plotting in the city with other possible agents, Assereto, and the black
auxiliaries. All of these factors suggest that Angulo was duly convicted under
Spanish law. Other people in various important offices in Santo Domingo had
certainly been contacted by the British before Angulo’s arrival, and it seems some
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may have actually also been British agents. This murky network also raises doubts
about what Gascue had actually known or done in the months before the plot.
Given the defections of Titus and Gañet, and the previous attempts at
recruiting Alí as well, it is highly unlikely the extremely clever and astute Pablo
Alí did not understand what was afoot. His love for Spain, which seems to have
been quite real, did not necessarily preclude his disappointment with Spanish
decline, with being left behind by Biassou, or with the looming handover of Santo
Domingo to the French, who he despised. He could have easily been hedging his
bets just in case the British did prevail, and allowed the less adept Agustín to front
his and his troops’ connection to the plot and to the British. Alí was simply the
savviest player in this affair, and adroitly used Spanish underestimation of his tact
and intelligence, and the extreme goodwill of General Cabrera in particular, to
build his defense with the young and driven attorney Nuñez de Cáceres (whose
assignment to his case otherwise seems to have been a compelling coincidence.
From this relationship forged in a prison and courtroom Alí and Nuñez de Cáceres
remained tied to each other in equally-unexpected ways during future pivot points
in the history of the island.
The former black auxiliaries, now in and around the capital, had
continued to be critical components of the major events in Santo Domingo proper,
including their Kongolese collaborations in the Boca Nigua revolt that preceded
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the Angulo conspiracy by not even three months, in the defection of Titus and
Gañet and the continued insurgency against the French at Grande-Rivière which
had ties to anti-republican Dominicans through Dajabon, and in this major
conspiracy in the capital that, at least the British thought, would feature the critical
military muscle of Alí’s black troops to facilitate the landing of British regular
forces.

Their integration and standing among Dominicans of color grafted

multipolar examples of black upward mobility and politics into a population that
continued to debate the merits of French radicalism, not the least of which was
how the eventual republican takeover might restrict their religious expressions.
This uprising and attack almost happened, and it might have actually succeeded.
The city of Santo Domingo nearly came under British rule. These events in the
capital were neither isolated, nor uninformed, nor simply anti-French, nor
spasmodic, nor exclusively elite. There were varied reasons for adherents to
consider the British, and there were a diverse range of sympathizers across the
entire colony. With the actions of the Monte Cristi commission headed by Juan
del Monte, and the other towns that actually raised the Union Jack, at least
thousands of Dominicans favored British rule to the looming French occupation.
The prospect of a British takeover also did not entirely end with the foiled Angulo
conspiracy. The geopolitical trajectory of Hispaniola remained as unresolved as
ever.
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SPURNED DOMINICANS, SPANISH DECAY THROUGH 1797
As the trials involving the British plot in the capital trudged along, by
January 1797 Spanish officials in Santo Domingo had learned of the formal state of
war with the United Kingdom. That January the newest Forbes proclamation had
circulated through the capital coinciding with the tensions surrounding the
Angulo conspiracy and trials. García reiterated that the French still had no
appropriate forces for a transfer, and that Saint-Domingue was only operated by
blacks directed by Toussaint, and he and many Dominicans wanted nothing to do
with a possible occupation by Toussaint and his black troops. The rapid loss of
Trinidad and British attacks against Spanish shipping suggested not only
continued difficulties for the Spanish evacuation, but the loss of Santo Domingo
might be imminent despite having cracked the Angulo conspiracy.

British

harassment of maritime trade confirmed this new war, and Spanish officials had a
very difficult time even receiving or sending mail to coordinate with the empire.197
Soon, news arrived that the British were also poised to invade Puerto Rico with a
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considerable army estimated from 6,000-8,000 troops.198 Britain moved for a
widespread Spanish Caribbean land grab.
On 12 February 1797 Charles-François Delacroix, French minister of
foreign affairs, admitted that, “The Executive Directory can only watch…attempts
of Britain against the erstwhile Spanish Santo Domingo and the ways of seduction
that they employed with the inhabitants of Neiba,” and acknowledged deficiencies
in Roume’s temperament toward political situations in Santo Domingo. News of
Dominican towns annexing to the British had even begun to trouble French
national politicians.199 In March 1797, following the war declaration, hundreds of
Spain’s former black allies now serving King George III attacked Dominican
border towns and arrested local officials who were uncooperative with British
operations.200 By the end of April 1797 six more major Dominican towns had
entered British rule.201 The whole colony teetered on the verge of outright British
annexation.202
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Collapses along the frontier occurred throughout early 1797. García
observed that the “confusion” and “bloody scenes that occurred in the French
part” rendering republican responses to the British, who “attracted the Spanish
residents, offering them complete freedom of worship, security of their property
and slaves which they cannot hope for from the French Republic,” nearly
impossible. The French could neither defend their own colony from the British,
let alone absorb twice as much new territory in Santo Domingo. He knew well of
the French lack of forces on the island and their decision to halt the transfer after
the disasters at Banica and Las Cahobas, which nearly transpired also at Monte
Cristi and Dajabon, and desperately hoped to avoid republican massacres of
whites such as that at Les Cayes massacre. García, increasingly strapped for
resources from Spain, pondered pooling his forces around one centralized and
fortified location at the capital, where they could defend the greatest number of
people while simply abandoning all other territory since he could no longer afford
protecting a government presence there and since the French commissioners were
unable to take possession.203
Given British successes with their decrees to Dominicans, they would
likely occupy open territory. In February Neiba had been harassed by black troops
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under Mamsel and Jean Pineau, who were at least nominally allied with the French
then. Soon, British regular troops approached and also had a “ship across the
lagoon.” The forces offered Dominicans in Neiba a semblance of greater stability.
The commander, cabildo, and priests of Neiba, realized they could only muster
one-fifth of the British force for a defense in a town with a growing pro-British
sentiment, decided to surrender. Notably, one of the alcaldes who had promised
immediately defected to the British lines instead of withdrawing with Spanish
loyalists to Azua after the council made their resolution. The British entered Neiba
and immediately detained Juan Bobadilla, who was taken to meet with the British
officers, who successfully convinced him to cooperate and stay with other priests
in his parish. García, despite having only 1,100 troops left, could not simply
abandon loyal Dominicans, but was incapable of offering any defense beyond the
walls of Santo Domingo.204 Spanish government in Santo Domingo was broke and
completely insolvent. They could barely pay employees, and desperately waited
for support from neighboring colonies.205
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Throughout March 1797 British squadrons cruised off the northern coast,
and specifically around Manzanillo. Between Saona and La Romana along the
distant southeastern coast they maintained another squadron, which had even
been seen lurking near Santo Domingo. Conditions in the interior had worsened,
where “the contagion of the British spirit had progressed from town to town” with
great enthusiasm. Spanish troops had to abandon San Juan de la Maguana due to
these tensions there. The detachment at La Seiba (near San Juan) also fell to British
troops. These towns then chose new, pro-British officials. Azua was animated by
diverse sentiments, including a possible pro-British commander. However, Neiba
soon, “had entered repentance” because many British troops stationed there had
retired to defend Port-au-Prince, and they were again vulnerable to attack, and
decided to reclaim their status as Spaniards and acted contrite, which García
thought was manipulative. Bobadilla, a frequent emissary from Neiba who had
collaborated in some capacity with the British, took the lead in mediation with
Spanish officials, just in case Neiba needed the protection.206 Each geopolitical
turn, each attack, each failed imperial safeguard further disenchanted Dominicans
from exogenous solutions, and over time increased their sense of local needs and
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markers of collective belonging that were distinct from Spanish, British, or French
paradigms.
In April Bobadilla, who still served in Neiba, received a twelve-day
passport from the British there to visit Azua, and then tried to dispel Archbishop
Portillo’s concerns about his loyalties and management of church interests on the
frontier under British influence. He expressed his foremost commitment to his
pastoral duties, and somehow convinced García to intercede with British officers
about protecting Dominicans and Neiba.207
With the Republic incapable of mustering a coherent defense, Toussaint
rallied his ex-slave army. In an offensive in April 1794 Toussaint led republicans
to capture the towns of Mirebalais, Grand-Bois, Banica, Las Cahobas, San Juan,
and Neiba from the British all in quick succession, which had all been under British
domination. Toussaint achieved this while also pressuring British defenses at
Port-au-Prince and Saint-Marc.

Short-lived British rule in these towns had

brought few of the promised benefits of commerce and stability. Toussaint had
sent the British reeling, and García’s intelligence said that the black republican
general would soon march on Saint-Marc with 15,000 troops while continuing to
dislodge the British from around Port-au-Prince. Azua had been near British
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operations, and was divided politically with a significant portion of pro-British
sympathizers, yet with mounting British defeats such enthusiasm waned. In
Dominican areas hostile to the British, the Royal Navy simply began taking
livestock instead of trading for it.208
French commissioners informed García that the British were attempting
to take territory in Santo Domingo by sea forces, but again, no French forces could
easily unite with Spanish troops to defend the colony. After British losses in the
interior, Spanish fears were that the British would now target Puerto Plata, Monte
Cristi, and Dajabon.209 Rumors even circulated that they might land black troops,
which might have been West India units from Jamaica.210 García sent preventive
orders to Dajabon, and Santiago after British attacks at Monte Cristi, and at Puerto
Plata, where in late June the British navy entered the port and shelled the city for
three hours. There were barely any troops there, and the defenses were paltry,
and ineffective against the intrusion. He knew the same was true at Azua, La Vega
and Cotuí only had local militias. He thought that the British had turned an
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unidentified resident of Santiago as a spy.211 In November 1797 British ships even
approached Santo Domingo harbor.212
British operations continued for the time being, and continued to pique
Spanish administrators’ fears. This invasion never happened, though. The British
military feats had ground to a halt and the popularity for British rule in Santo
Domingo declined. However, the British Hispaniola campaign stagnated in late
1797 partly due to the skill of Toussaint and his forces, and perhaps more so due
to staggering casualties, many of which came simply from disease.213 Discontented
Dominican Anglophiles then had to make amends with both their neighbors and
French partisans. However, British interests in the island continued, and simply
pivoted away from open warfare to leverage open commerce against all Spanish
Caribbean colonies. New British proposals to the Dominican people welcomed
their ships to British ports,214 with special terms for trade in nearby Jamaica and
the Bahamas.215
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With the threats against the north, García encouraged the transfer of
Dajabon and Monte Cristi to the French in the summer of 1797. The French sent,
apparently, regular troops who were acceptable to Dominican residents. Puerto
Plata and Santiago would soon be reinforced with collaborative French support.
However, García had become concerned about this process due to the news that
Sonthonax had embarked on a ship for France in late August, which itself was an
act of power consolidation by the politically brilliant Toussaint. The only French
officials who remained on Hispaniola for García to deal with beside Toussaint
were “Citizen Raimond, a pardo man” and Roume, who he knew for better or
worse.216 As a further complication throughout the remainder of 1797 Roume
quibbled with other French officials regarding the protracted process of republican
absorption of Santo Domingo. This had included the use of Spanish government
facilities and private property without compensation or legal process, which
further handicapped García’s finances for the Spanish management.217 In the
process, in July 1797 the Audiencia of Santo Domingo began relocating to Cuba bit
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by bit, with a litany of logistical problems. The plan was to send the Audiencia to
Guantanamo Bay and then further inland toward Havana, and it would become
provisionally known as “the Audiencia that has resided in Santo Domingo.”218
In December 1797 the French also sent a consul to Havana, Citizen
Rondineau, who had bickered with Sonthonax at times and sided with the people
of color, and confirmed the ultimatums that Toussaint had made to Sonthonax
prior his departure from the island. Rondineau’s presence in Cuba raised fears
that like in Saint-Domingue a vast majority of people of color and blacks could
overtake a tiny minority of whites.219

BRITISH WITHDRAWAL TOWARD REPUBLICAN RESIGNATION, 1798
In mid-January 1798 the provisional agent Roume had learned from the
provisional agent based in Santiago that the mulatto Commissioner Raimond, now
one of the most powerful figures on the island, was intent upon fully occupying
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Santiago and the vicinity. This raised great concern over how the transfer would
transpire, given the presence of regular French troops and the fact that Raimond
wanted to adapt resources in the Cibao for his own strategic purposes. Roume
had already told Raimond and Toussaint to delay any further encroachments into
Santo Domingo until regular French troops arrived from Europe. To the extent
possible, García tried to prevent Santo Domingo from becoming a new theater for
internecine rivalries among French republican factions.220
At the same time, the British blockaded those parts of the island that they
did not directly control, which made any arrivals of French troops impossible.
Reinforcements of Azua, Ocoa, and Jayna were needed to avoid similar
disturbances, and with the naval warfare evacuations were nearly impossible.
Spanish troops had been attacked by Neiba residents and British troops, about 140
in number, around Algapatal, not far from Neiba. The French government was,
they thought, in the hands of the people of color. He was afraid that the eventual
French occupation of Santiago, Puerto Plata, La Vega, and Cotuí would come at
the hands of black troops, as Toussaint had 6,000 soldiers awaiting his orders in
Fort Dauphin. There were regular raids from British skiffs along the coast, and
their naval power still operated from Môle-Saint-Nicolas.

They were busily
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capturing French ships that venture near Monte Cristi. In Puerto Plata the British
entered the port and took a frigate loaded with ‘negros bozales’ of newly-arrived
African captives who had rebelled on the open sea in the Middle Passage and
killed all the white crew, sparing only one white boy. The self-liberated captives
had sailed at the whims of winds and currents until they neared Puerto Plata.
After being sighted, they resisted being brought into port, and their ship ran
aground. They had nothing to eat, were certainly weakened, and clearly could not
pilot the ship. Some escaped on land. However, many of the African captives
were towed into the port of Puerto Plata, but Spanish and French officials were
dispersed when the British arrived and captured the captives as the decision
awaited as to how, and which empire, would process their case.221
On 27 March 1798 three French warships arrived in Santo Domingo
carrying General Hedouville, who with the title of “Particular Agent of the
Directory” had come to manage Saint-Domingue and obliquely deal with the
delivery of the colony. He planned to march overland to Saint-Domingue at an
opportune time. The transfer of the colony was still logistically difficult, and
Hedouville’s major interest was governing the French side in the absence of
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Sonthonax and with the upsurge of Toussaint’s power, as Saint-Domingue was, as
García said, “in the hands of the blacks.” Some forty officials accompanied him,
along with only a small detachment of troops for their protection, and they all
apparently passed onward to Saint-Domingue, having landed under the security
of Spanish troops who continued to protect the capital from British interference
despite their lack of pay. Hedouville, who seemed to be wholly unaware of the
Dominican situation, wanted to simply take over the city without the necessary
protocols established by the treaty, which García considered given the
complications and financial trouble of Spanish governance, but declined due to his
obligation to continue protecting local interests.222 With that, Hedouville and his
retinue travelled northward through La Vega and then Santiago en route to CapFrançais, promising to explain García’s numerous challenges to the Executive
Directory.223 García was sure that this would now allow Hedouville to concern
himself more with civil affairs. He was convinced that Hedouville, unlike all the
preceding French officials with whom he had worked, was the right person for
harmonious politics. He hoped that soon enough with dissipating British threats
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and new French administration that he and his administration could leave Santo
Domingo.224
In April 1798 Portillo decided on his own volition to board a ship bound
for Havana, with his “luggage transported of his account in an American ship to
avail himself of the security of the neutral flag.” Upon leaving he decided to simply
leave Francisco Xavier de Herrera who worked in the cathedral in control of the
Dominican diocesan affairs. García, who was shocked at Portillo’s flight, said that
all in the colony drew upon his wisdom, and that “this flock needs the presence
and counsel of his pastoral care,” including the troops, the Audiencia, and
Dominican community.225 This came less than a year after Archbishop Portillo had
been basically told to not leave his post in Santo Domingo.226 With that impromptu
departure, Spanish colonialism in Santo Domingo lost the critical political player
who managed the spiritual compass of colonial Christians. Despite the Republic’s
offer for him to become the “Bishop of Ayti” the absence of his anti-radical cultural
pull served French interests.
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By June 1798 Governor Balcarres in British Jamaica began opening free
ports to Spanish merchants.227 This became a British bridge to the resources of
Hispaniola, and a commercial attack against the Spanish and French who they
could never permanently dislodge, which was a parting shot on their withdrawal
from the island, which they began in 1798. The British had begun retreating from
their strongholds in Saint-Domingue. Their evacuations included leaving the
cities of Port-au-Prince, Saint-Marc, Arcahaye, Croix-des-Bouquets, Jeremias, and
were preparing to depart the impenetrable stronghold of Môle-Saint-Nicolas.
García had received British broadsides that announced their decision.228 Not only
had the British sustained enormous casualties through combat and disease and
had suffered major setbacks in their positions on the interior of Saint-Domingue
due to the skill of Toussaint. When the British withdrew they signed a secret peace
accord not with French officials, but with Toussaint himself. In exchange for their
withdrawal Toussaint would not export revolution to British colonies, and Britain
would trade with Toussaint giving them access to goods and him access to war
materiel.229
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However, while direct British military threats evaporated, the British also
began circulating new papers with promises of commercial engagements intended
to not destabilize specific colonies, but the entire Spanish empire in the Caribbean
basin. García noted that, “there have been Spaniards that ambition and interest
has dragged him to commit a crime so contrary to the loyalty of his nation,” and
what once took the form of treason had morphed into contraband. Opening and
welcoming smuggling from Spanish subjects was the newest “atrocious and
scandalous invention” of British “perfidy” and “base conduct of the proud British
government,” said García.230
At the end of 1797, after their dreams of Hispaniola conquests had turned
to nightmares, the British began instructing their naval commanders to attract
Spanish inhabitants to make commerce regardless of imperial warfare in the free
ports of Jamaica and the Bahamas, as long as the Spanish subjects would conform
to British licenses, rules, and needs for merchandise. 231

García informed

metropolitan officials of this new British commercial strategy to undercut Spanish
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power.232 Among these invitations the British specified a clear list of merchandise
that they most desired to procure, including: wool, cotton, indigo, cochineal,
medicines, cocoa, tobacco, logwood, dyer’s mulberry, tint dyewoods, leathers,
hides. Spanish merchants could transact in all specie of money, or silver and gold,
diamonds, or even precious stones, brought from such parts. The British offered
their own exports from Jamaica in particular, including rum and legally-owned
slaves, but banned the export of any shipbuilding materials or tobacco. King
George III expressly ordered the Royal Navy to not harass these ships. 233 These
policies and ports in Jamaica and the Bahamas, in such extreme proximity to Santo
Domingo (and Puerto Rico and Cuba), were severe blows to the rickety
commodity export mercantilism of the Spanish empire that would damage its
resources and tax base while bolstering the already-robust British prosperity, and
policing such actions would become nearly impossible with the aggressing
commercial empire welcome such contraband trade. This was a central policy
through which the British continued chipping away at Spanish rule and prosperity
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in Latin America toward eventually supporting outright independence
movements.234
It took only until October 1798 before news filtered through the republican
provisional agent in Santiago, Kerversau, about the political troubles afflicting the
new Hedouville administration in Cap-Français. Saint-Domingue had completely
fallen into the hands of the people of color, who had fallings out with the Executive
Directory. Toussaint had seized power, and flirted with declaring independence
from France. Hedouville had become cornered by Toussaint and his many allies.
Moïse, powerful lieutenant to Toussaint and his adopted nephew, was in Fort
Dauphin allegedly trying to cull and kill citizens there who opposed him.
Hedouville sent out an official with orders to arrest Moïse. Moïse then complained
to Toussaint, his beloved uncle, after which point Hedouville’s actions became
ineffectual. Rumors swirled that Toussaint was angling for independence and no
longer followed laws of the metropole. Louverture and his army entered CapFrançais, where many whites thought their lives were at stake.235 Hedouville
would not be in Saint-Domingue for long.

Rory Miller, Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, London, 1993, 193.
234

Joaquín García to Francisco Saavedra, Santo Domingo, 7 November 1798, AHN-Estado, leg.
3394, no.135; Letter from Cap-Français, 25 October 1798, AHN-Estado, leg. 3394, exp.1.
235

538

Soon, García received a French official named Vincent, director of
fortifications in Cap-Français, who had arrived in Santo Domingo with an
accompanying black republican official, both who carried commissions from
Toussaint, not a French official sent by the metropole. They were to meet with
Roume following the rapid fall and departure of Hedouville. These visitors sought
to draw Roume to Cap-Français to serve as the lead commissioner there.
Simultaneously, white French messengers arrived in the capital with news for
Roume from Les Cayes, Jacmel, and Cap-Français, some of which simply
confirmed Toussaint’s consolidation of power. Overall, their messages greatly
concerned García who fretted about the spread of black republican civil strife to
Spanish towns. They were not only fearful of the spread of the Saint-Domingue
violence into Santo Domingo, and not only of the power of Toussaint, but of the
violence of his nephew General Moïse who was a ruthless operator and was
stationed near the Spanish frontier. They were concerned that any perception of
dissent from the Republic would yield retribution from Toussaint or Moïse, who
they already feared. García worried incessantly that the transfer of the colony
could happen, he thought, only with promises of safe conduct for those who
remained, and perhaps if the French paid off armed locals to defend their territory
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against any unrest.236 As the British era on Hispaniola passed, so did the presence
of Provisional Agent Roume, who responded to Toussaint’s overtures to become
the lead French commissioner in Saint-Domingue. With his absence, and the
absence of British threats, Santo Domingo became more directly tied to power
jockeying in the west, and came more firmly within the gravitation pull of the true
political heavyweight on the island – their former black auxiliary General
Toussaint.

CONCLUSION
When news of the cession of Santo Domingo by treaty to France reached
Santo Domingo in October 1795, sentiments of doom and betrayal surged among
many Dominicans who began searching out alternative futures. Spanish officials
feared open sedition from Dominicans who were patriotic loyalists to Spain and
who might ignore the treaty and try to fight a French occupation on their own.
Outrage coursed across the streets in Santo Domingo, with Dominicans being
especially concerned about the lack of legal and religious provisions for those who
chose to remain. Elite colonists were also quite troubled over the status of their
human property, and how downtrodden Dominicans of color might react to the
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combination of weakened Spanish power and surging rights discourses. Others
simply could not believe the reversal of fortunes, from the Spanish having been so
close to taking the entire French side of the island, to the royal court so readily
surrendering the entire Dominican side despite their fervent loyalty and the
absence of threat for a French takeover.237 Though French officials soon wrote to
express their adamant support for religious freedom, many Dominicans and
Spaniards remained dubious about their Catholic future, and resisted removal
from Hispanic heritage.238
When thousands of people in Santo Domingo, including soldiers, farmers,
merchants, and even whole towns had been “seduced” into supporting a British
takeover,239 Governor Joaquín García simplistically blamed British officials’
“flattering promises and alluring cash.” 240 This was an extreme underestimation
of the angst toward French radicalism, the disappointment in Spanish colonialist
responses that had sputtered out, and the appeal of a middle path embodied by
Britain. The British third way offered a constitutional monarchy that was more
stable than the Republic but less rigid than Spanish Bourbon rule. Britons offered
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greater prosperity than the stagnant centuries of Spanish management or the selfimmolation of Saint-Domingue under French rule. Britons also promised freedom
of religion and retention of Hispanic culture, which Spain was too feeble to defend
and which the French seemed intent on eradicating. This attracted many people
of color beyond the privileged circles to whom the economic incentives mostly
appealed, including the black auxiliaries who continued to hold powerful political
sway over the Dominican body politic. With a diffused and well-positioned
network of pro-British sympathizers, the entire colony of Santo Domingo teetered
on the brink of becoming a colony of King George III.
Dominican Anglophilia from 1795 to 1798 was a crucial stage of popular
political mobilization, rejections of metropolitan legacy, and debate over
sovereignty. As the conspiratorial network of Angulo, Assereto, Agustín, and Alí
illustrates, the pro-British sympathies were deeply disseminated in Santo
Domingo and appealed across a broad swath of Dominican society. Also, the
alternative strategies of political destabilization by trade that emerged from
failures on Hispaniola were a preview of later British strategies to bolster
breakaway Spanish colonies into the national era.241 British collaboration with
people of color in Santo Domingo forced Dominican society to rethink its Spanish
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cultural and political heritage, question the results of French rights discourses, and
explore collectivity and sovereignty. It molded a critical middle sector of cultural
politics that defined Dominicans as more Catholic and moderate than their Haitian
neighbors, yet more economically and politically progressive than the waning
Spanish Empire, while tying violence and impiety to categories of republicanism
and blackness. These notions evolved in ensuing decades to shape nascent ideas
of Dominican national belonging, including ideas about Haiti into the
independence era and far beyond it.
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CHAPTER 7
RESIGNED TO A FADING REPUBLIC & CONFRONTED BY
INDEPENDENCE, 1799-1806

In April 1799 the new top commissioner in Saint-Domingue, none other
than Philippe Roume who had recently served as the French Provisional Agent in
Santo Domingo, unveiled a new vision for unifying spirituality on Hispaniola
during the Festivals of Youth and Spouses in Cap-Français. The commissioner
implored citizens to “Gather around the Altar of the Homeland,” rather than a
church altar.

He applauded citizens who had weathered tempests on their

revolutionary voyage with an “invisible hand that guides and leads them to the
port after all hope was lost.” He implored islanders to thank the “beneficent
Divinity who protected them…the Pilot who never left the helm of the ship.”
Roume identified this divine presence who captained their ship as something
other than the Catholic deity that he followed and discussed with Archbishop
Portillo during his three years in Santo Domingo. Roume instead asked citizens
in Saint-Domingue to “pay tribute to the Supreme Being” whose “power is visible
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in all that surrounds us,” who created earth, and whose “intelligence…governs
the universe and each component.”1
In a moment of already heightened tensions in Santo Domingo regarding
the French takeover of the colony, this cosmological innovation confirmed
suspicions of many Spanish subjects that the Republic would repudiate their
religious convictions. It made Roume look like a liar for all of his own professions
of Christianity and the role of Catholicism in the Republic that he had once used
to assuaged Dominicans´ fears of French radicalism. Roume’s measured counternarrative to Catholic theology came five years after the height of the Cult of the
Supreme Being flourished during the Reign of Terror in 1794 with the rule of
Maximilien Robespierre through the Committee of Public Safety. Its influence was
brief, and largely limited to France. Robespierre, who almost entirely crafted and
implemented the idea, used it to round off more avowedly atheist deChristianization policies and merge loyalties of citizens’ who longed for a divinity
with noncommittal deism compatible with republican natural rights discourses
and ideas of public virtue and civic duty. In France, the innovative deistic
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abstraction of a Supreme Being was guillotined along with Robespierre in July
1794.2
Incredibly, Roume seems to have revived the Supreme Being in the
Caribbean as big tent under which normally conflicting cosmologies on
Hispaniola could coexist. Roume’s attempted unification of republican, Catholic,
and African beliefs were quite distinct from earlier French variants and came at a
critical moment in which French rule needed to ideologically and socially unify
disparate factions. Roume argued that humans’ perceptions of this divinity
evinced their soul, which distinguished them from other animals, and that
originally humans’ “first religion was Deism, and it was to the Supreme Being that
they addressed their first worship” by marking changes of tides, seasons, and the
stars.

However, his most radical departure from Catholic theology was his

placement of the heroics of Toussaint Louverture as a historically significant figure
on par with Moses, Socrates, Mohammed, and even Jesus. Roume pointed to
Freemasonry and “Vaudou” (vodou) as the primary pillars for republican virtue
and observances of the Supreme Being in Saint-Domingue.3
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In the colony to the east that Roume had just departed Dominicans
unhappy with the eventuality of French rule had little recourse to resist the
Republic or to seek British protection as many notable conspirators had. Santo
Domingo, now absent the presence of the firebrand Archbishop Portillo, with
additional priests evacuating, and without the possibility of a British rule with
religious tolerance, awaited a flood of vodou, freemasonry, and this new iteration
of the deistic Supreme Being to wash out its religiosity.

The ideas of leadership

that espoused such societal and spiritual values terrified many in Santo Domingo.
Interestingly though, social unrest within Santo Domingo dissipated in 1799 and
1800 although direct engagement with internecine strife in Saint-Domingue grew
across the colony, including the capital. This included the brewing civil war
between Toussaint and his ex-slave army in the North and West, and Andre
Rigaud, a powerful mulatto commander with a separate base of support among
the gens de couleur of the South. This War of the South, as the conflict has come to
be known, which was more of a regionalist and personalist struggle for colonial
power than a race war between ex-slaves and the gens de couleur as it is sometimes
depicted. The war erupted in June 1799. Both jockeying parties of color in SaintDomingue not only superseded white French control, but infiltrated Santo
Domingo in attempts to secure new lines of support and supplies. Those mostly
well-off Dominicans capable of fleeing with capital to conserve – including
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property in people – did so in the thousands. The majority who remained did so
with lingering fears of what direct French rule would mean for their lives, both
earthly and eternal.4
Dominicans now had no recourse against French attempts to “frenchify”
them, nor to stop the occupation by an ex-slave army led by a traitor to the Spanish
cause in Toussaint. Though details were not clear at the time, astute observers in
Santo Domingo realized that black power in Saint-Domingue was pushing the
colony increasingly closer to independence from France. Furthermore, with the
ascension of Napoléon Bonaparte to near-dictatorial powers in France in 1799, the
revolution had clearly taken two keys turns that cooled radicalism in France and
steered Saint-Domingue’s local black leadership into direct, open warfare with
their colonizer. This culminated in Napoléon’s attempts to reinstate slavery and
his reinstallment of whites to colonial power in Saint-Domingue which undercut
much of the reasons that some Dominicans of color favored French rule in the first
place. When the French finally did occupy Santo Domingo at the outset of the
nineteenth century, their officials closed churches and sold church properties, all
to the great disaffection of new Dominican “citizens” of a Republic drifting into
the dictatorial clutch of Napoléon.5
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All of this transpired before black French forces under Toussaint marched
onto Santo Domingo to launch an irregular invasion of the Spanish side in 1801 to
serve Toussaint’s own strategic military priorities. Even then, official French
management of Santo Domingo did not formally commence until the arrival of a
republican agent there in 1802, approaching seven years since the Treaty of Basel.
The prospect of black invasion that terrified many elites in Santo Domingo came
to fruition, though Toussaint’s presence did not inspire mass slave uprisings, nor
result in absent labor from the few plantations as they had feared. Toussaint
needed the labor too, as did ensuing French governors, much to the
disillusionment of locals of color who expected a more robust abolition Roume
and Sonthonax had promised them once upon a time.6
This chapter analyzes how Dominican society began to resign itself to rule
by a French Republic in metropolitan transition and colonial chaos. Unlike the
conquest projects of the early 1790s, or the reactionary defensiveness of the mid1790s, as the nineteenth century commenced Dominicans were faced with a choice
of what of their Spanish heritage to preserve (religion, monarchism, and racial
restrictions), where to preserve it (on Hispaniola and in exile), and how to do so in
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a new Caribbean with an unparalleled and increasingly international example of
black power. The astonishing independence of Haiti that arrived in January 1804
ushered in a new era of uncertainty, more so because Santo Domingo was then the
last bastion of the waning French presence in the Greater Antilles. This chapter
also shows how this resignation to the Republic, followed by Haitian invasion, not
only remade a more robust majority of color in Santo Domingo through migration,
but also precipitated a widespread rejection of French rule from many sectors of
Dominican society, not just a white elite.

SAINT-DOMINGUE IN CIVIL WAR
Philippe Roume, the ex-Provisional Agent and faux-friend of Dominicans
everywhere, published a new philosophical pamphlet on 4 February 1799 that
marked the fifth anniversary of the French assembly’s emancipation decree, “one
of the most glorious without contradiction…which we celebrate…around the Tree
of Liberty.” Roume attributed this accomplishment to Paris in 1794, and not the
gradual abolitions by Sonthonax and Polverel in 1793, as one of the “miracles of
the Revolution” that had “avenged Africa from European greed…[and]
Machiavellianism of the French monarchy.” He heralded Toussaint and his troops
as the power that actualized this ideals, which he said equaled any republican
victory in the Rhine, the Alps, Spain, Italy, Vienna, or Egypt. This black French
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army deserved laurels and admiration, and now as free people would revitalize
the cultivation and commerce of Saint-Domingue, which would be “reborn from
its ashes.”7 Not long after this possible peak of anti-slavery realization in SaintDomingue the French sent General Leclerc to return these black liberators to
bondage. Chronologically, Saint-Domingue was closer to the French regression to
re-enslavement and racism than it was to the optimistic outset of emancipation,
liberty that had been delayed for enslaved Dominicans as part of the lengthy delay
of the Republic’s occupation of Santo Domingo.8 It was imperative that the newlyarrived Roume ingratiate himself with Toussaint, who held the great political
cachet in the colony.
Toussaint responded to Roume’s public statements with platitudes for
Roume and the Republic for this “dawn of happiness” from Nord and Ouest to
Sud under Rigaud, his major rival.

Nevertheless, at this moment Toussaint

extolled his union with Roume, Rigaud, and other rivals in the South such as
Bauvais and Laplume, as with his own generals, namely Dessalines, Moïse,
Clervaux, and Agé.9

However, these notable revolutionary figures would soon

Roume, “Discurso…en la Fiesta de la Declaración de la Libertad General,” Port-Republicaine, 16
Pluviôse an VII / 4 February 1799, AHN-Estado, leg. 3394, exp. 1.
7

8

Girard, Slaves Who Defeated Napoléon, 5-6, 37-39, and 57-60.

Toussaint Louverture, “Respuesta del General en Gefe al discurso pronunciado en el Puerto
Republicano por el Agente del Gobierno el 16 Pluviôse del an 7,” Pluviôse an VII / February 1799,
AHN-Estado, leg. 3394, exp. 1; García to Francisco Saavedra, Santo Domingo, 15 March 1799, AHNEstado, leg. 3394, no. 139.
9

551

bear arms openly against each other as Toussaint and Rigaud, pugilists in the
sectionalized Saint-Domingue, accused each other of overstepping their limited
legal prerogatives.
As a strategy to better unify these warriors of Saint-Domingue Roume
announced his embrace of the Supreme Being as a bridge toward Christians,
freemasons, and vodouizan.

In the same pronouncement that scandalized

Dominicans in April 1799, Roume went on that divergences in belief muddied
earlier, innocent deism across Greece, Egypt, Ethiopia, Persia, India, and
elsewhere, forging beliefs intelligible only to initiates familiar with specific “vulgar
fables and absurdities.” These bastard religious creeds were “made famous by the
magical mechanism of poetry” in holy texts, and into which believers had to be
indoctrinated from childhood into “monstrosities admitted as religious
principles” that obscured “true principles of science and morality.” These words
hit devout Dominicans rather hard, though perhaps not as hard as the ensuing
statements. Roume then point to two “ancient initiations…of major utility.” One
tradition, preserved in Europe, was Freemasonry.10 The French Revolution was
thematically and ideologically marked with masonic legacies of liberty, equality,
and fraternity, and many of the most important metropolitan figures of the
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Republic were freemasons.11 It is certainly plausible that Roume was a freemason,
as were Sonthonax and Polverel who preceded him.12
Roume asserted that the other tradition was “named Vaudou, present still
in African countries,” which he described as vestiges of the “mysteries taught by
the sages of Ethiopia.” Roume argued that there had always been a tension
between reason and fanaticism. For example, he said that Moses had to guide the
monotheist Jews out of bondage in Egypt. Powerful figures such as Socrates and
Jesus had been forced to their deaths for their principles. Mohammed had to
restore commitment to a single “Infinite Being.” Humans often abandoned their
original, simple, deistic virtue, as “gentle, modest, good men were subjected to the
force or trickery of the wicked…under the titles of kings and masters who
commanded subjects and slaves.”13 This was a drastic reversal of republican policy
toward vodou. In 1796 Sonthonax had issued sweeping laws against the practice
of African-derived spirituality, as he and other French officials viewed “le
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vaudou” as a separate allegiance for blacks that could undercut republican
loyalties and undermine black discipline or labor.14
Roume argued that, “the Supreme Being…judged with impenetrable
wisdom that it was time to start the seventh epoch of nature,” and entrusted tis
spiritual quest to the French. As part of other noble legacies of cosmological
renewal Roume said “the French Revolution is but the first act of the total
regeneration of the human species.” In this new spiritual era and journey he said
that Saint-Domingue had to marvel in the leadership of “this phenomenon, one of
the most astonishing of the Revolution…TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE.” Roume
praised Toussaint’s closest officers almost as disciples, including Villatte, Moïse,
Agé, Dessalines, Henry Christophe, and also Rigaud, Bauvais, Chanlatte, and
Laplume in the South.15 Governor García saw such commemorations in the
Republic as “despicable” and great “moral risks” for the Spanish people, their
traditions, and their religion.16
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Domingo, with many who hailed from Puerto Rico, Venezuela, Cuba, and Spain,
but they would be no match for Toussaint if he suddenly looked eastward.17
Vague references to the “Supreme Being” had appeared within
Toussaint’s public professions of his brand of Christianity. 18 This republican
deistic neologism may have comported with extant syncretism of the Bon Dieu (the
Catholic “Good Lord”) and Nzambi (the all-creating, all-knowing deity broadly
observed by Kongolese peoples).19 However, when he eventually became the
primary political power on the island Toussaint also initiated his own persecutions
of vodou as part of his attempts to revitalize agricultural production on the island
by forcing ex-slaves back to work. This eliminated dissent from ideologies beyond
his manipulation that had also inspired black resistance in years past. Also, when
Saint-Domingue was in his grasp, Toussaint did look eastward to take Santo
Domingo without French or Spanish permission. To legitimate his own rule to the
French metropole, to secret British trade partners, and to assuage devoutly
Catholic Dominicans, his move toward formally distancing his rule from vodou
also served broader geopolitical aims.20
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Soon these factions were either at civil war with each other or were
banished from the island. As García reported in July 1799, “The blacks and the
mulattoes of the French part have already commenced their factions, and harass
each other between the parties of the North and West against those of the South,
whose heads are the black general Toussaint and the mulatto general Rigaud, the
latter who had taken the two parishes of Petit- and Grand-Goâve,” and cut
supplies to a North column around Port-au-Prince.21 That summer as civil warfare
spread in Saint-Domingue, Rigaud began sending printed manifestos into Santo
Domingo trying to find a new base of support and resources to wield against the
potent Toussaint.22 Roume had very little influence on this civil war. His power,
in fact, quickly eroded, and eventually when Toussaint had no use for him Roume
was imprisoned and eventually banished. 23 Just like Roume had failed in easing
Dominicans into an occupation by the French Republic, he also quickly failed at
gluing together the broken republican pieces of Saint-Domingue where the
overpowering talent of Toussaint in the West and North had sidelined white
politicians and left the South as a holdout region of gens de couleur dissent. One of
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the reasons that printed papers said the split had occurred was that Roume had
taken favor of Toussaint over Rigaud.24
García also received letters detailing major setbacks for the Dutch. On the
surface complications for a neighboring empire seemed unrelated to his own
concerns, but with closer investigation García realized the Dominican interest in
collaborating with the governor of Curaçao to share information on how their two
colonies were mutually mired in the internationalization of Saint-Domingue’s civil
war.

Almost immediately, and as a corollary to internal fighting in Saint-

Domingue, a major Roume-orchestrated republican conspiracy swept Curaçao.
Governor Johann Rudolf Lauffer of this Dutch island appealed to García, who of
course had no means of assistance.25 Just as Santo Domingo had for years been a
site of French radical experimentation and British ploys for commercial dominance

García to Maríano Luis Urquijo, Santo Domingo 21 August 1799, AHN-Estado, leg. 3394, exp. 1,
no. 145.
24

Johann Rudolph Cádiz to García, Curaçao, 23 September 1799, AHN-Estado, leg. 3394, exp. 1.
Also, in August 1799 the British, having been thoroughly rebuffed on Hispaniola, seized Suriname.
It was a vision of what could have happened to Santo Domingo had pro-British sympathizers and
their plot not been foiled. The British sailed into port with 22 warships and rapidly landed troops.
Without firing a shot the British commander negotiated a surrender with the Dutch governor and
officers over four days, who could not really resist with only 450 Walloon royal guards defending
the city. The colony’s transfer was sweetened with a large cash sum. Before the British arrived
papers had circulated promising that colonists of Suriname would happily thrive under British
rule. All of the local Dutch magnates seemed to agree with the deal, the Dutch troops and colonists
were almost suspiciously peaceful with the transition, and thus British governance swept in
without resistance. This was almost exactly like the pro-British conspiracy that had swept Santo
Domingo just years before. See: Jose de Liano y Bustamante, “Declaración,” Santo Domingo, 18
September 1799, AHN-Estado, leg. 3394, exp. 1; García to Urquijo, Santo Domingo, 28 September
1799, AHN-Estado, leg. 3394, exp. 1, no. 147.
25

557

in the Caribbean, so did weaker Dutch colonies become new theatres for proxy
partisanship and potential new bases of support. In these intrigues Spanish
officials

played

an

awkward

mediating

role,

especially

given

the

internationalization of factions from within Saint-Domingue in which Dominicans
were contextually caught.
In a manner similar to previous French meddling in Santo Domingo,
Roume had sent two agents into Curaçao to organize a revolt that would install
republican principles favorable to his sphere of influence in Saint-Domingue,
while shutting off trade with Rigaud’s ports in Sud. This was perhaps part of a
wider strategy to export revolution across the Caribbean not only on principle, but
to also expand his own base of influence and support. Rigaud himself apprised
Lauffer of the plot. Also, Roume attempted to send his own agents to subvert the
slave population of Jamaica into revolt, only to have his plans secretly quashed by
none other than Toussaint, whose furtive accords with the British secured him
their promise of non-intervention.26 Roume had in fact sent agents to Jamaica,
Cuba, and Mexico, and possibly other Spanish dominions. 27
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García absolutely saw this conflict in Dutch Curaçao as a settling of scores
between the jockeying Rigaud and Toussaint factions. Furthermore, he had heard
rumors that Toussaint was musing a strategy of taking Santo Domingo, with
British aid perhaps, as a way to further undercut Rigaud geopolitically and
economically.

He thought that Toussaint was surrounded by people who

adulated him and would not contradict his strategies. His ambition and name
were simply hated by proprietarios in Santo Domingo, who were sure that
Toussaint’s stance against slavery and dislike of certain powerful Dominicans,
would drive him to conquer Santo Domingo without formal French permission.
The Directory could not directly stop this, nor the civil war between “personalities,
colors, parties, passions, pride, and ambition,” between Rigaud and Toussaint, the
one of the only matters delaying the transfer of the Dominican side. García also
could not prevent the factionalizing of Dominicans between these two sides. With
time and infiltration from Saint-Domingue, white and mulatto sectors of Santo
Domingo began to side more with Rigaud, who was not only closer
geographically, but whose background was more similar to their own social class
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and ideals of European civility. Those less advantaged in Dominican society,
particularly the enslaved, grew to see Toussaint more favorably. These factions
became more consequential the harder that Toussaint pushed to annex Santo
Domingo on his own accord.28 However, one of the most divisive policies of
Toussaint’s ascent in Saint-Domingue was that of enforcing renewed plantation
productivity of the juridically liberated cultivateurs, through the creation of a
forced labor regime that reminded ex-slaves of bondage, all to the detriment of
French rule.29

NEW AGENT, NEW INSTABILITY
Throughout 1799 the civil war slogged along between Rigaud and
Toussaint, who had just regained Môle-Saint-Nicolas. Grand- and Petit-Goâve
both remained under Rigaud’s control.

They were in the command of his

lieutenant Bellegarde, who had revolted against Toussaint and initially taken
Môle-Saint-Nicolas. Bauvais, who was a powerful officer and close friend Rigaud
though he had never fully backed him during the civil war, had commanded
Jacmel. At Toussaint’s approach Bauvais fled for France via Curaçao, leaving the
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town vulnerable to Rigaud’s foes, and soon drowned in an accident at sea.30 With
the bitter civil war and its high casualty rate, Roume began regrouping all available
officers, including General François-Marie Kerversau who had briefly replaced
him as Provisional Agent in Santo Domingo. Roume selected General Antoine
Chanlatte as Kerversau’s replacement. Chanlatte’s poor health prevented him
from full combat deployment.31 Roume instructed Chanlatte to pursue political
stability and commercial possibilities, both of which the French direly needed
amidst their civil war to the west. So strained were French finances on the island
that they could barely pay Chanlatte.32
Most importantly, Roume stressed the need for Chanlatte to prevent any
support for Rigaud in Santo Domingo, and to remain vigilant, and recommended
that he speak with the local Oyarzábal (of Boca Nigua) who had been amenable to
French concerns and could offer advice on local cultural politics.33 Roume then
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begged Spanish officials to honor Chanlatte and his mission. 34 García was quick
to remind Roume that such a Provisional Agent was still unnecessary, since
Spanish officials had paid for and handled day-to-day colonial administration in
good faith during all the years in which the treaty had not been enacted. To García,
this position had no, “diplomatic sphere or business that merits sustaining this
job,” and asked Roume why the Republic bothered to send him when he had
neither purpose nor money.35 However, political observers in Saint-Domingue –
such as the American consul appointed by President Adams who worked closely
with Toussaint – suspected that Chanlatte’s appointment in fact was a maneuver
to neutralize Toussaint’s influence in Santo Domingo and, perhaps, later annex the
Spanish side without the influence of Toussaint, as much as it was about
preventing Rigaud from collecting Dominican support.36 García, on the other
hand, simply wanted to avoid all of the complications of French radicals
interfering in the local populace, as Roume so notably had.
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In any case, Chanlatte arrived at the end of October 1799 with overt
loyalties to Roume. All the while, García seemed to prefer the politics and manners
of Rigaud in South, and critiqued the “pretexts” of Toussaint’s war against him.
He politely doubted that Roume was up to the task of pacifying and unifying
Saint-Domingue, let alone controlling Toussaint. At least García appreciated the
“European education, intelligence, and appreciable customs” of Kerversau. At
first, these attributes seemed to contrast starkly with “General Chanlatte, one of
those of mixed bloods, natural of this island.” who García doubted he could trust
him, as he assumed the Chanlatte was also a puppet of Toussaint. Soon enough,
García would learn of his shared interests with Chanlatte. To García’s great
irritation, Spanish personnel were still the ones preventing this internecine turmoil
from spreading to the Dominican population, and feared what might come if
Toussaint moved toward independence as rumors suggest he might. He also
thought that a mulatto general was an affront and potentially provocative given
the context of racial warfare, which had yet to fully overtake Santo Domingo.
While this new French agent was a local embodiment of the Directory, Chanlatte
still had no legal power.37 In this state, the Audiencia withdrew more of its archives
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and functions to Cuba despite any permanent resolution in the capital, but was
ordered to stay in management of Santo Domingo until a formal transfer.38
Speculation about independence in Saint-Domingue, and perhaps the
entire island, swelled in Santo Domingo when a well-known citoyen of SaintDomingue wrote to a Dominican friend inquiring about rumors of British and
American designs to support an autonomous government of Toussaint. The
author doubted that the British with their slave islands, and the United States with
their “southern provinces” with slavery would want to deal with black power on
Hispaniola. He was less sure of the black leaders’ intentions, whose “incendiary
system” contrasted to the “peaceful and fortunate Spanish territory.” However,
the citoyen continued, “But my friend! Yesterday some mail arrived in this city
from the black general Toussaint Louverture with letters for Agent Roume in
which he communicated [his] resolution to take possession of the Spanish part of
the island” after taking Jacmel. He implored his Dominican friend to flee the
colony if possible, as Toussaint had allegedly threatened to bring “blood and fire”
to the Dominican side should the Spanish resist his impromptu takeover.39
Whatever the unlikely prospects of independence at that time were, the growing
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likelihood of a unilateral invasion by Toussaint terrified Dominicans more than
anything.
Given these omens, by the end of 1799 García was livid with the French
for their inertia regarding Santo Domingo and incompetence in dealing with
Toussaint. He railed against the Republic’s negligence to use ciphers in their most
sensitive political letters for French agents, including instructions from Paris on
plans to subdue the rebellious blacks. This had tipped off black powerbrokers to
long-term French plans, and thus scuttled the slim possibilities of peace under the
Republic. Toussaint in Gonaïves learned the content of these letters while they
were en route to Roume. García speculated that Toussaint had been pondering
independence since that discovery, along with “the destruction of all white
individuals.” He already knew that Toussaint had, “solicited from the British and
United States arms and munitions, and all types of support,” and in turn allowed
ships from both nations to enter ports under his control. In these regards, perhaps
García had a more realistic appraisal of Toussaint’s power and autonomy than
many French officials. Such external support aided Toussaint in the civil war, and
would likely support his absorption of the Spanish side in the near future, García
reasoned.40
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Toussaint had already dispatched Colonel Vincent to Paris to retrieve his
two children, a sign García took as a prelude to independence, accompanied by
Toussaint’s provocative messages to the Directory that blamed the Republic’s
commissioners in the colony for its ruin. García knew this was a ploy to centralize
his own power within the Republic should Toussaint choose to keep his
allegiance.41

Some whispers of Toussaint’s machinations swirled without

attribution, but García had a specific, secretive source that passed along this
sensitive information.

That source may have been some close associate of

Toussaint’s who had, like the black general, also served Spain with the black
auxiliaries and never entirely severed sympathies toward the Catholic king. Also,
the tips that García received from Governor Lauffer of Curaçao and news of agents
French arrested in Jamaica heightened his alarm for imminent threats to Santo
Domingo. Thus, García warned the governors of Cuba and Cartagena to be on
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alert for similar French plots.42 That option of resistance now foreclosed, those
Dominicans with means simply fled the island.43
With mounting speculation over Toussaint’s plans to rule the entire
island, in April 1800 pro-Toussaint French officials in Saint-Domingue undertook
one of the few meaningful actions regarding Santo Domingo during Chanlatte’s
brief sojourn there. The Republic registered complaints against the “abuses” of
“transporting cultivateurs and other citizens from the old French park to the new
of Santo Domingo.” Specifically, the complaint dealt with the old Spanish practice
of selling off black prisoners (or, sometimes, simply captured or illicitly trafficked
slaves) from the warzones to other Spanish colonies.

By extension, a more

contentious complaint became the outmigration of Dominicans with their slaves
in the few years subsequent the as of yet ineffectual Treaty of Basel. As part of this
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renewed, strategic concern for Dominican slaves, coupled with French officials’
hints at how Toussaint might otherwise approach Santo Domingo, they asked
García to welcome the arrival of General Agé with a detachment of white troops
to take over the colony. In his lengthy instructions, Agé was specifically told to
tolerate Dominican religiosity and the public role of priests in Santo Domingo
while encouraging them to comply with republican policy. To formalize this
process (and obviate public surprise) the French officials had already circulated
printed proclamations into Santo Domingo that explained Agé’s presence and
intentions.44

TOUSSAINT, TRIOMPHANT
Agé was a successful general who had served loyally and closely under
Toussaint during the civil war. Just as rumors had indicated, Toussaint sent Agé
directly after his forces captured Jacmel and secured the probable fall of Rigaud.
However, observers in Saint-Domingue more or less expected a fight, either from
Dominicans, from remaining pro-Rigaud partisans, or from both. Toussaint only
undertook this after he had overpowered and imprisoned Roume for protesting
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his aggressive plans for Santo Domingo.45 His ostensible colleague Chanlatte was
a fairly open opponent of Toussaint and favored Rigaud, who was from the welloff gens de couleur background as he was. Surprisingly, García had actually found
himself an ally in delaying Toussaint’s plans for Santo Domingo.46 To dissipate
the tension in this situation Toussaint wrote to García as soon as Agé departed for
Santo Domingo. He informed García of his intention to complete the treaty and
made it clear that Agé would respect local property, keep black Dominicans on
plantations, and respect priests and religious practice. Toussaint elected to not
send any black, ex-slave troops, a condition upon which García had always
insisted.47
In mid-May 1800 García acknowledged French concerns pertaining to the
sale of cultivateurs from the French side both to and through the Spanish side. He
denied any firsthand knowledge of such “sins,” though he promised judicious
punishment for actual offenders. García had issued a declaration in January
against this practice with the concurrence of Chanlatte, and had prosecuted Tomás
Regalado and Antonio Croue for having trafficked the black French citizen
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Felicitas in Santiago. García was also quick to point out the many French promises
and failed attempts at transferring the colony, such as when Rochambeau arrived,
and that their substantial delay was already a breach of the treaty. He lashed out
at Roume for French condescension and inconsideration, all the while he tried to
protect Santo Domingo and remaining Spanish interests. Meanwhile, they could
not evacuate due to the lack of ships and also being surrounded by the British
navy. He also pointed out to Roume that the whole situation had consternated the
Dominican populace, and that ambitions of the Republic to francesizar (Frenchify)
the Dominican populace would take a great deal of time.48 Like previous attempts
to win over Dominicans, or to occupy Santo Domingo, the most recent French
attempts would soon be frustrated.49
Agé had arrived the day before on 13 May 1800, and he told Toussaint that
he doubted that circumstances would permit Agé to fulfill his commission. García
said he enjoyed the meeting with Agé, but reiterated that Dominicans’ needs for
religion, tranquility, a more formal transfer process, and more time and resources
to evacuate.50 Two days later over 200 local signatories, who represented a total of
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1,300 Dominicans, delivered an appeal to the Cabildo and begged Spanish colonial
officials to suspend the delivery to France until sufficient they could safely depart
the colony. They confessed their great fear of being governed by French principles
and the “wisdom of their dictators” and expected the transfer to cause an “abyss
of confusions.” Their “indispensable civil expectation” was, simply, to not be
overcome by “a multitude of blacks rebelling en masse” as in Saint-Domingue
where it had spread “amazing disorganization, misfortunes, fires, knives, [that]
ravaged its residents.” They could not abide the ascendance of people of color and
blacks, and doubted the colonial effectiveness of “First Consul Buonaparte” that
is, Napoléon Bonaparte.51
The powerful French general had indeed asserted himself directly into
imperial politics, and would play a major role on island affairs over the coming
years.52 Local officials wrote their own specific complaints, as similar letters
poured in from other Dominican towns.53 Some appeals claimed to represent the
“100,000 souls” on the Spanish side, and even clamored directly to Bonaparte for
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sympathy with their plight to suspend the colony’s transfer.54 Other appeals
directly accused Agé of destabilization.55 Of course, the orders for the French
occupation had come not from Bonaparte, nor anyone in Paris, but from the First
Consul’s newfound colonial rival – Toussaint.56 This entire situation put Chanlatte
in a difficult situation, caught among Toussaint, Rigaud, Roume, García, and
Dominican dissenters.57
Chanlatte told García that the appeals helped him understand Dominican
fears. However, despite clergy, officials, and citizens’ concerns, he thought they
were exaggerated, and insisted that his orders for the time were to yield Santo
Domingo to the Republic.58 García then begged Roume, Agé, and Chanlatte to
delay the delivery in lieu of new direct orders from Madrid and Paris. Five years
had already passed since, and García could not abide the sudden, hasty rush.
Thus, he announced that, “I have resolved…unanimously the suspension of the
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delivery,” and asked Agé to return to Saint-Domingue.59 Even the Cabildo of Santo
Domingo wrote that there were threats against General Agé’s life from deeply
distraught Dominicans who were panicked that Toussaint, the “enemy of the
white race” and “perturbor of the tranquility” might hold their city. With news
that Toussaint was sending additional troops, a movement grew to drive out Agé,
and stated that he basically had six hours to leave the capital.60
García called a conference in his home with Agé and Chanlatte. He
explained the impossibility of evacuation at that point, and begged them to wait
for a formal commission from Paris, or at least a better planned operation from
Saint-Domingue, instead of rushing the transfer.

García had also heard the

whispers that Roume was outraged with the blacks’ demand for the delivery of
Santo Domingo, and that his orders were truly only from Toussaint and not
Roume (who was under arrest by Toussaint at that time, though he did not yet
know that for certain). García convinced Agé to leave with an honor guard instead
of being expelled. He felt completely justified in avoiding the “brigandage of
Toussaint and his blacks” who did not follow laws. To better protect the capital,
400 city residents travelled to Azua to set up defenses, just in case of hostilities
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from Toussaint. The actual garrison then had only 1,165 men, not including the
militia.61 Later lore recounted that Agé had been abused, or even attacked by
Dominicans. More accurately, he had been intimidated into leaving by those who
wanted nothing to do with Toussaint, and who were emboldened by the proRigaud presence of Chanlatte. This exaggeration played well as an enhanced
justification for Toussaint to intervene, though.62 García would do just that at any
moment.63 Across Santo Domingo towns prepared arms for such an impromptu
takeover directed by Toussaint.64
In the midst of this frantic situation Rigaud sent an envoy and letters to
Chanlatte and García in mid-June 1800. In this offer Rigaud provoked García to
stand against Toussaint, who he called “a genius exterminator and inhuman
destroyer.”65 In his letter, Rigaud called Toussaint treasonous, and said that what
he could not do in conquering the South he wanted to do against Santo Domingo.
All this only fueled Dominican fears and steeled their resolve. Rigaud told García
that it was “of the highest importance to persecute in concert this plague of nature
and humanity, and destroy it, or at least put it in absolute impotence in pursuing
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their black projects.” He complimented “the character of the Spanish nation” and
offered to work in conjunction with García to contain Toussaint. 66 No wonder that
Rigaud offered such encouragement and terms.

He had just learned that

Napoléon had, in effect, sided with Toussaint, whose forces were already winning
the civil war.67 Rigaud was more than likely looking for a territorial base, and
supporting population, from which to continue his fight.
As much as García might have agreed with Rigaud, and as unpopular as
Toussaint was, he was conflicted by the fact that any partisanship toward Rigaud’s
interests also far overstepped his governmental charge. However, García did
entertain the possibility of transferring the colony to Chanlatte in an emergency,
which would leave Rigaud in de facto control. Chanlatte had won over his and the
colonists’ trust, and knew better how to manage the risks of a sacking by the black
armies. This would have of course put Santo Domingo in the sphere of Rigaud,
the “russet” colored leader who he suspected was also more favored by France.68
However, García responded to Rigaud by praising his sensibilities, but said that
he could not choose one side or another in their civil war, and despite his criticisms
of Toussaint he could not risk spreading the war to Santo Domingo.69 Apparently
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Rigaud may have also contacted several other distressed Dominican towns in the
southern and western stretches of the colony.70 The lack of communication from
Roume continued to make García quite uneasy.71

Roume, though, was at

Toussaint’s mercy. He was arrested, in fact, and would soon be on a ship bound
for France, leaving the black general even more potent across Hispaniola. 72
Dominicans outside of the capital hoped to find peace under France
eventually, but more realistically viewed vying French partisans as, “a Bloody
Lion that by keeping us in its claws threatens us day by day with our fatal end.”73
As far as they could tell, the fight in Saint-Domingue was no longer even about
principles. Dominican towns were unable to defend themselves against any
sudden attacks from the west, and felt that they were without father and mother,
and lamented the eventual tyranny of the Republic over those Dominicans
abandoned by Spain.

Their new republican neighbors had recently demanded

hundreds of heads of cattle to support their war effort, and promised to pay for
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them. When the pay arrived it was only for a quarter of the needed amount. The
same had happened with dozens of horses. Some towns closer to the border that
French troops already occupied were forced to pay for their French occupiers’
presence, a very unpopular levy that the republicans enforced through threats. At
times they did not even bother to pay for supplies, but instead raided for supplies
and basic foodstuffs. Dominicans considered this theft. The French did not care
what they considered it. Some planters noted they had been disarmed, and their
weapons given to local blacks, some of whom whispered their plans to kill
Dominican whites. These colonists begged Spain to intervene in some fashion.74
Spain would not, because they could not.
By August 1800 Rigaud had already lost the civil war to Toussaint, and
evacuated from the South of Saint-Domingue. Toussaint swooped in to occupy
the southern peninsula of Saint-Domingue and cease hostilities there between the
mulattoes and blacks. Dominicans wondered what level of retribution Toussaint
would exact, and how long he would wait before turning his attentions toward
Santo Domingo. Nobody knew exactly where Rigaud had gone, or what would
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happen with Roume, who was still a captive of Toussaint’s. A detachment of
French troops had recently visited Neiba asking for a meeting with Bobadilla, who
was apparently in Azua at the time. The officers LaFortune, Gay, and Diego Felix
wanted to draw the blacks of Maniel into the Republic. LaFortune, who was likely
the same spokesman from the Maniel maroons during the 1780s and early 1790s
negotiations with Spain, threatened consequences for any delay to his meeting
with Bobadilla, and also had a Spaniard at San Juan de la Maguana arrested on
suspicion of being a spy.75 LaFortune, the ex-maroon leader, had risen to a leading
officer affiliated with Rigaud and was a rival of Toussaint for black loyalties in the
South and portions of West. In the wake of Rigaud’s capitulation it is unclear
exactly what he and his retinue intended for Neiba, Bobadilla, and the maroons. 76
The majority of maroons never allied with France, and they only half-heartedly
acquiesced to Spanish designs in their mission at Naranjo. This resettlement
project faded throughout the late 1790s as maroons moved back into the
mountains to elude violence and imperial constraints.77

García to Urquijo, Santo Domingo, 22 August 1800, AHN-Estado, leg. 3394, exp. 1, no. 165; Julien
Raimond, "Memoire sur la colonie de saint-domingue…," 1799, BHFIC, H-5a7i.
75

76

Girard, Slaves Who Defeated Napoléon, 84, 124, and 196; Geggus, Haitian, 117.

Charlton W. Yingling, “The Maroons of Santo Domingo in the Age of Revolutions: Adaptation
and Evasion, 1783–1800,” History Workshop Journal 79 (Spring 2015): 25-51.
77

578

In November 1800 García learned that certain republicans, no doubt in
Toussaint’s camp, were considering punishment against Santo Domingo for their
rejection and treatment of General Agé. Concerning one of Agé’s central concerns
during his brief visit to Santo Domingo – the plight of black French citizens
enslaved in Santo Domingo – García also learned of new, specific complaints. The
Republic’s General Pageot and General Michel had, during transit through the
Dominican side, arrested some slaves fleeing a local hacendado. These people were
arrested. Upon investigation the slaves told the generals that they were in fact
French, and had been kidnaped and sent to the Spanish side. García dismissed
these claims, and obliquely referenced how such a story would benefit both
runaway Dominican slaves and French politicians, and asserted that Dominican
planters still were within their rights to procure or recapture slaves.78 García later
found out that the three men and one woman who were slaves that General Pageot
had mentioned as the prisoners, and he said he was sure they had fled from the
plantation of Antonio Mañon and were Dominican creole slaves.79

García

demanded more concrete proof of any other infractions. 80 In any case, the French
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used these accusations to justify placing new commissioners in Santiago and Azua.
To García, this was but another new pretext to gaining Santo Domingo on their
own terms and without metropolitan sanction and toward collecting support from
Dominicans of color.81
By the close of 1800 García finally understood that Roume had been
ousted and sent to Dondon, and that throughout the colony Toussaint presided
after having declared himself the Republic’s chief agent on the island. The black
general’s massive forces soon reiterated their plans for taking possession of Santo
Domingo. García thought that the only hope for continued tranquility in Santo
Domingo was either an unlikely, rapid peace or new fighting among mulattoes
and blacks in the South. Those possibilities were quite slim, and he had learned
also that the new imperative to send black soldiers back to work on plantations as
cultivateurs had been received by ex-slaves in Saint-Domingue with great
acrimony. In retribution to the South for siding with Rigaud, blood ran in Jérémie
and other towns, while Dessalines and Laplume consolidated military positions. 82
With Saint-Domingue increasingly in the firm grasp of Toussaint, Santo Domingo
and the vast eastern stretches of the island were soon in Toussaint’s ambitious
gaze.
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TOUSSAINT TO SANTO DOMINGO
Toussaint wasted little time in asserting his dominance over the remnants
of Spanish colonialism in Santo Domingo. In the first week of January 1801 the
black general began issuing proclamations to the Dominican side. He reminded
them that, “General Agé, sent by me to take possession of the Spanish part in name
of the Republic, had been ignominiously rejected, without respect to his
character.” Toussaint insisted that he had sent Agé in peace, and without an
overwhelming force of troops, to enforce the treaty. He was irate. In response,
Toussaint announced that, “In consequence, I prevent you the outcome of
insulting the Republic a second time; I have dispatched the armed forces, and I
will come myself.” This was the outcome that García and many Dominicans had
most feared. In an attempt to preempt panic and resistance, Toussaint promised,
“security, protection of property, and respect for proprietors,” to those
Dominicans who would stay. He said that he understood “a considerable number
of Spaniards have been deceived, but I exhort them to revert from their error,” and
explained that the Republic did not want to confiscate their goods, but instead
“only asks for your hearts.”

Toussaint proposed that he was compelled by

“religion and humanity” to offer Dominicans only a “culture of commerce” in
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“peace and the happiest tranquility.”83

His problems would be convincing

Dominicans of his sincerity.
García immediately responded to Toussaint, pleading with him to not act
out of vengeance. One the one hand, García appreciated the proclamations that
he had circulated declaring his peaceful intentions, but suspected that sending a
large army of ex-slaves with a violent reputation were more the actions of an
enemy. Perhaps even more provocatively, he questioned Toussaint about his
religious motivations, implying that such appeals to Dominicans exemplified
crude pandering.84
Roughly when Toussaint received García’s reply, Santo Domingo received
news from Baní that as many as 12,000 troops in total, had entered the colony from
Saint-Domingue, with an additional five regiments en route to Santiago. Rumors
also circulated that British frigates carried an additional 5,000 troops for Toussaint,
all flying the neutral American flag. If the city did not surrender the suspicion was
that these troops would be disembarked at Boca Nigua plantation due to the
favorable terrain and friendly relationship that Oyarzábal had with the French.
Toussaint would be in Azua by 9 January, leading an army that marched with little
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discipline and complete confidence.

Baní, Ocoa, and Azua all panicked as

Toussaint’s army approached, in no small part due to their understanding that if
they did not fully cooperate with Toussaint’s orders then their homes would be
razed.85 Toussaint used his upper hand in these towns as leverage against the
Spanish government in Santo Domingo, who might precipitate the destruction of
Dominican interests by Toussaint if they did not acquiesce to his demands. Thus,
Toussaint made a piecemeal and peaceable absorption of Santo Domingo.
At Azua Toussaint decided to pause, and sent residents Nicolas Gonzalez
and Geronimo Diaz with special messages to the residents of Baní. He simply
wanted to avoid any misunderstandings. He reiterated his lack of interest in
seizing Dominican goods, and made it known that he hoped to deal peacefully
with García. Toussaint was less than pleased when local cabildos referred to
promises from Roume and Paris that the delivery of Santo Domingo would wait
until new troops arrived from France. Perturbed, Toussaint again insisted that he
was within his rights to take the colony and was not beholden to other deals.86 He
sent out similar manifestos of peace to La Vega and Cotuí, two key towns near
Santiago in the Cibao region. His method of selecting two locals to transmit his
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messages for him to the next town on the two routes to the capital produced
results, as these towns did capitulate, just as Azua and Baní eventually did. These
towns had little choice but to comply. He promised to spare property and lives,
and, intriguingly, made no mention at all of slavery.87 He even sent messengers
onward to Monte Plata and Bayaguana north and east beyond Santo Domingo.88
García was well-informed of these capitulations, and knew that the
occupation by Toussaint he so dreaded was nigh.89 When Toussaint claimed to
have not received a reply from García, or perhaps when he did not like the reply
that he had received, Toussaint then decided to deal with the cabildo of Santo
Domingo. They had also received Toussaint’s messengers from Azua and Baní,
but reiterated their commitment to the Spanish transfer process and disputed that
they had somehow insulted Agé. They blamed the partisanship of Chanlatte
among Dominicans in the city for any bother against Agé.90 Toussaint continued
to slowly tighten his grip on Santo Domingo throughout January, which included
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the skillful deployment of Moïse and his forces to Santiago and his southward
push through the Cibao toward the capital. Out of options, García moved to
deliver Santo Domingo to General Toussaint on 26 January 1801, though not
without substantial local resistance and turmoil. All along the way the black army
promoted proclamations, exhortations, securities, and benefits for the public,
though spurts of violence for noncompliance conflicted with their messages of
peace.91
After taking Baní Toussaint sent black troops forward to plantations in the
vicinity of the capital with hopes of winning over local black Dominican support
and of obtaining food provisions for the army. They encircled the capital with the
help of Moïse from the north. However, just past Baní at the mouth of the Nizao
River a force of about 1,000 Spanish subjects decided to stage last ditch resistance
effort against Toussaint and his army, which resulted in deaths on both sides. This
final act of defense was actually directed by the French Provisional Agent Antoine
Chanlatte, who had no future under Toussaint given his pro-Rigaud leanings.
This fight occurred, apparently, without the approval of García who did not want
to further provoke Toussaint. Those militiamen returned to the capital in great
distress and immediately boarded a ship to flee, just as other Spanish regular
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forces did.92 Soon thereafter Chanlatte and Kerversau arrived in Caracas with this
retinue of troops and exiles who had fled the wrath of Toussaint.93 Once in
Venezuela, Chanlatte and Kerversau issued a decree that qualified Toussaint’s
actions as treasonous and antagonistic to the Republic.94
García decided to send from the capital a delegation of Leonardo del
Monte, Joseph Sterling (the Briton), and Joaquín Colás of the Cantabria regiment
to stop the violence and entreat with Toussaint. Moïse also closed in on towns just
north of Santo Domingo with thousands of troops. He had been given some armed
resistance in Santiago, where the uncooperative Captain Cayetano Rozon was
killed by Moïse’s troops. After that the towns of La Vega and Cotuí organized more
orderly surrenders. The arrival of the delegation from the capital halted the
violence, and Toussaint ordered Moïse to suspend his march, which was already
at Hato San Pedro about forty miles north of the capital. Negotiations then began
on the formal surrender of the colony to Toussaint. The transfer officially began
at Jayna on 25 January, and then Castillo San Geronimo the next morning,
followed by the capital Santo Domingo in the afternoon of 26 January. Many
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Spaniards and Dominicans crowded the docks but still could not embark. Spanish
officials understood that Toussaint had taken the colony with significant British
support. Besides Toussaint’s own corsairs that blockaded the area, the British had
many ships present as well, and Toussaint vaguely threatened British harassment
of fleeing vessels that did not comply with his prerogatives. To conciliate the
locals, the British allowed ships with women passengers to leave port, including a
neutral Danish ship with families of the Cantabria regiment.95
The city now had to reckon with an occupation by “hungry, naked,
licentious, and rapacious” black soldiers who Spanish officials could not deal with
on typical bureaucratic grounds given their “strange language and nasty
character.” That was quite a harsh, racist appraisal, but the invading troops’
hostility and hunger were certainly probable.

With these “petulant” new

occupiers, García himself prepared to leave. Many elite families fled without their
slaves, with some even signing formal freedom papers before departing (which
calls into question exactly what orders of emancipation Toussaint had, or had not,
given upon his arrival). In fact, Toussaint made no clear declarations regarding
mass liberation of slaves upon his arrival. He prevented them from leaving with
emigrants, but certainly attempted to keep black labor on the land. Regarding
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departures, for some reason Toussaint turned a blind eye to wetnursing slaves
who left with young white families. Violence had ceased, though Dominicans
were on edge that any slight provocation might trigger open conflict. For one,
Toussaint’s thousands of troops were famished. Moïse, who García thought was
quite arrogant, plotted the sacking of the Spanish royal treasury as he had already
taken the keys of the storekeeper and raided the provisions for Spanish troops.96
Toussaint told García of his desire to keep Dominicans in the colony, but
that whether they stayed or fled “they could not have, without wanting the
annihilation of this country…the extraction of the people devoted to the work of
cultivation.” That is, Toussaint demanded that all slaves stay in the colony, rather
than be evacuated with their masters. Toussaint was upset enough that “not only
have an infinity of Spanish families left this country...contrary to the true spirit of
the Treaty, they have taken with them their slaves.” He asserted that these
captives, “for the most part were blacks robbed from the French part and sold in
this one.” He was convinced that the practice was ongoing, and stressed to García
his irrevocable demand to prevent all evacuations of enslaved humans that
resulted in the “stealing from agriculture the arms devoted to it” which he thought
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had sent three-thousand cultivateurs to other Spanish colonies. Oyarzábal had
offered Toussaint a “shocking example” of this, as some blacks under his
management had been shipped away, and the “most beautiful habitation of the
Spanish part is going to fall in ruin and turn itself into forest.”97
If the Boca Nigua plantation had purchased slaves illicitly from SaintDomingue, then Oyarzábal was implicating himself in this trade given his
management. Such a practice could explain the several francophone names in the
court records pertaining to the revolt on that hacienda. More likely, Oyarzábal was
simply referring to slaves that were, under enduring Spanish law, still legally in
bondage, who also in republican terminology still fell under the indiscriminate
cultivateur nomenclature. Toussaint was outraged by the flight of all capable labor,
regardless of their former, present, or future legal status of liberty, simply due to
his extreme necessity of revitalizing agricultural production for local consumption
and external exchange for direly needed war materiel.98 Many of these evacuated
slaves had left the island with Pedro Abadía, the employee whose heavy-
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handedness in punishments at Boca Nigua had sparked the revolt there in 1796 as
recounted by slaves themselves, as analyzed in Chapter Five.99
Toussaint demanded the cessation of any black outmigration. He told
García, “I am instructed that the frigate that at this moment is anchored in this port
and is ready to depart has an infinity of blacks on board that have been embarked
by force.” Slavery was not recognized by France, and with his presence he
demanded their release from the ship. He specifically asked for any Boca Nigua
blacks to be returned Oyarzábal, so that his plantation would not be annihilated.100
Insisting that France did not recognize slavery was also quite different than
abolishing Dominican slavery, as seen in Toussaint’s imperative to redirect labor
back to producing from the land, just as he had in Saint-Domingue.
Given that Oyarzábal managed that plantation for an absentee owner, and
that he was one of several white employees, it seems more likely that he
misrepresented exactly how slaves from Boca Nigua came to leave the island, or
be placed on a ship. Spanish officials tried mightily to protect colonists’ desires to
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take human property from the colony, but did not force colonists who wanted to
stay to surrender their slaves for coerced export. If the Marques de Iranda had
asked for the slaves to be sent away, then under Spanish law, and within the
distended legal protections of the Treaty of Basel, nothing illicit had likely
transpired. Oyarzábal’s strategic placation of French officials after the Boca Nigua
revolt was likely more an indication of his inclination to protect profits and
productivity under French rule than out of any political conviction.

His

accomodationist strategy with Toussaint helped secure better treatment of the
property with which he was entrusted.101
García complied, and ordered the blacks disembarked from the ships.
But, he asked that those who were not cultivateurs to be allowed to go with the
Spanish. He promised to negotiate the return of Oyarzábal’s blacks, though in
practice he likely knew that such an outcome was likely impossible. García
insisted that those planters leaving did not put their estates in intentional disrepair
as Toussaint had alleged, and that many might return once they saw good
governance in Santo Domingo from Toussaint and the Republic. García protested
the figure of three-thousand evacuated slaves, since he claimed the capital area
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never had that many enslaved agricultural laborers anyway.102 At the end of
January García tried to allow emigrating families to take their “domestics” who
did not work in the fields, but Toussaint again refused. García again pleaded with
Toussaint to respect Spanish understandings of Article 9 of the treaty that allowed
colonists to withdraw their property. He reiterated, as he had for years, that “No
doubt that the word goods is understood as slaves in conformity to Spanish laws.”
He argued that the original time windows of the treaty simply did not apply, given
the failures of both sides due to the geopolitical situations, and asked Toussaint to
consider this due to his “known virtue and religion,” a sarcastic reference back to
Toussaint’s own promises to treat Dominicans fairly due to his Christian
convictions. 103 Nevertheless, certain planters shipped fifteen black captives in
early February only to be intercepted by the British Royal Navy just after
departure. This enraged Toussaint. The inexplicable release of the slaves, though,
seemed to indicate that Toussaint was working in coordination to thwart the
evacuations of Santo Domingo.104 García denied any complicity in aiding the
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departure of human property.105

Many black Dominicans had supported to

Toussaint. However, with this unrealized promise of complete freedom their
fervor for France became jeopardized.106
As pressure mounted, and without a clear mandate of governance, García
left Santo Domingo and arrived in Maracaibo, Venezuela on 22 February. Other
Spanish officials had evacuated to Puerto Rico and Cuba around the same time.
The governor of Venezuela had few resources to support Dominican evacuees. 107
García moved on to Havana where only at the end of September 1801 did he
receive formal permission from Spanish imperial officials to proceed with the
transfer to qualified French officials. He lamented this decrepit delay, and that
Dominicans had to suffer the irregular takeover and occupation by the “brusque
character” Toussaint, and as of yet Santo Domingo still had no formal French
official to govern the colony by the rule of law.108
Even in Cuba García continued to pursue the claims of Dominicans
against French aggressions, which greatly impressed officials there.109 Throughout
1802, as the Haitian Revolution reached a pivot point of a break with the Republic,
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García and Dominicans exiles kept highly engaged with news from the island,
including the arrival of a massive expedition at Cap-Français in February 1802.110
Their collective hope was that this massive French force would better regularize
the occupation by Toussaint.111 Spanish imperial officials had taken up García’s
reports as evidence or reckless and harmful conduct by the French, and the
Spanish ambassador in Paris lodged formal complaints against the Republic to
accept financial and political responsibility for the damages caused by their
representative Toussaint at that time.112 One of the irreconcilable legal quibbles
regarded the demand of Dominican slaveholders to claim and export human
property against French wishes.113 García himself had left behind five slaves in
Santo Domingo, who he had bought from slave ships himself and trained in
domestic tasks. The subtext to his grievances of losing his own domestic slaves
was a loss of paternalist symbolism and social status more than capital loss,
compounded by his loss of political clout.114 Eventually García, rejected in his
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attempts to reclaim both personal property and the colony that he governed for
well over a decade, made his way to Madrid in 1803.115
Whatever force Toussaint had actually used in taking Santo Domingo, and
whatever damages his forces actually caused, he could have been much more
violent and could easily have wrecked the entire colony. Ever the calculating
pragmatic, Toussaint knew that he needed no new additional enemies. He needed
laborers, ports, and productive properties to fund his own regime. He needed a
buffer of territorial security from an unanticipated French expeditionary force. He
needed no other guise than the unfulfilled Treaty of Basel, regardless of what
Roume, Madrid, or Paris said on the matter. In fact, Roume’s health had worsened,
and as Toussaint did not want to be known for his death in 1801 he shipped Roume
back to France where the failed agent regaled Napoléon with tales of the black
general’s excesses. That summer, having permanently ousted Roume and with
control of the whole island Toussaint promulgated a new constitution under
which he assumed the governorship for life within a more autonomous imperial
relationship with France. Napoléon was outraged with these unilateral actions of
power accumulation.116
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FRENCH OCCUPATION IN SANTO DOMINGO
On some matters Toussaint pursued a policy of conciliation toward Santo
Domingo and local cultural politics. He had told locals of his interest in visiting
the chapel for Nuestra Señora de Altagracia, the shrine to the patron saint of Santo
Domingo in Higüey, to pay his respects.117

He repeatedly avowed his own

Christianity, and promised to keep the churches open and clergy active. 118
Toussaint did try to install Guillaume Mauviel, the new bishop in the South of
Saint-Domingue, as the new prelate for Santo Domingo. This may have been a
way to extend religious rites to Dominicans in the absence of Archbishop Portillo,
who had disreputably absented himself. It also may have extended his and the
Republic’s ideological influence over Dominican society.

Mauviel was from

Brittany, and had served as a priest around Paris before his appointment to SaintDomingue. Santo Domingo actually rejected Mauviel, while Santiago was more
open to his spiritual oversight.119 Toussaint seemed to advance Mauviel, whereas,
at least later, Dessalines opposed him.120 The protracted course of ecclesiastical
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shuffling deeply concerned the Vatican, which feared that French rule would
disrupt Catholicism in a formerly devout colony.121
Toussaint did organize some semblance of payment to Dominicans whose
crops he confiscated, and left his brother Paul to manage this affair and eventually
to govern the whole capital region. He tried to moderate public relations with a
Dominican populace that was uneasy at the least. However, he did convince – or,
coerce – some troops and officers who he had known from his own service with
Spain to stay on in his army, and shut down the flight of migrants to the best of
his abilities. He also broadened enlistment of Dominicans for defense forces into
a quasi-draft, and while he made promises of pay, few believed he could realize
them.122 Toussaint’s regime in Santo Domingo had barely formed when a new
powerplayer arrived on Hispaniola.
On 29 January 1802, barely a year since Toussaint had taken Santo
Domingo, the black general and governor of the colony stood at the coast of the
Samaná peninsula in northeastern Santo Domingo due to intelligence that he had
received of a possible French expedition to curtail his authority. He was met with
the sight of the approaching sails of some fifty ships, carrying what would total an
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expeditionary force that eventually surpassed 40,000 of Napoléon’s finest troops,
commanded by none other than his own brother-in-law, General Charles Leclerc.
Most of these troops would never return home to France, part of the more than
70,000 troops that perished fighting for France to first protect slavery, then to
secure liberty for all, and finally to reinstall slavery and reverse black power.
General Leclerc would be one of these casualties, dying of disease in November
1802 after ten months on the island.123
Nevertheless, in the interim Leclerc very effectively outflanked and
outgunned Toussaint’s forces. Soon enough, Kerversau, who had very briefly
served as an agent for the Republic in Santo Domingo, took the capital from Paul
Louverture, Toussaint’s own brother. Paul then flipped to Leclerc’s side, much to
Toussaint’s outrage. Kerversau then took Santiago without a fight and with the
aid of Mauviel’s cajoling.

And with that military action, the first formal

representative of France assumed day-to-day management under the military rule
of Leclerc.124 When Leclerc was preparing to depart France with his expeditionary
force Napoléon had clarified to Spanish officials his intentions or rectifying and
regularizing whatever disorders Toussaint had enacted upon Dominicans, and
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promised to properly complete the Treaty of Basel with a formal French
administration.125 Neither France nor Spain acknowledged the completion of the
treaty and transfer of the colony until the Leclerc expedition had undertaken its
own governance of Santo Domingo.126
During Kerversau’s forgettable year governing Santo Domingo, one of his
least favorable acts of his year as governor was the punitive closing of Dominican
churches because locals were still loathe to accept a new bishop of the Republic –
that is, Mauviel.127 For Mauviel, the appearance of Leclerc, and Kerversau, was
another opportunity to establish himself as a bishop in Santo Domingo. As
conditions deteriorated in Saint-Domingue, Mauviel evacuated his post in the
South, as did Adrien Cibot, who had served as the prelate in the North after
returning from years of exile in North America. 128

The Vatican was soon

disappointed that Mauviel’s presence did little to stabilize the status of Dominican
devotion.129
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The increased presence of French bureaucrats presented an opportunity
for Dominican and Spanish parties to pursue legal issues. The paper trail of legal
claims, account settlements, and criminal cases stemming from the roughly ten
years of direct Spanish involvement in the Haitian Revolution stretched on for
years after the French occupation of Santo Domingo, which itself led to an entirely
new and separate round of inter-imperial proceedings. One such continued to be
the 1794 theft of the royal treasury during the Spanish occupation of Fort
Dauphin.130 The Atlantic scattering of exiles related to these cases made pursuing
them even more difficult. One of the final political appearances of Jean-François,
one of the major figures of the entire revolution, came from his exile in Cádiz and
only arose due to his need to testify in one such court issue.131 This, one of his final
governmental statements was a continuance of his concern for the integrity of his
troops, who he claimed were not responsible for the loss of the royal treasury at
Fort Dauphin, and were always loyal to Spain.132
Biassou had already died in poverty in Florida. Jean-François’ reward for
his remarkable service and dedication to Spain was a similar, albeit lengthier and
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depressing demise in Andalucía.133 Back across the Atlantic the former primary
spiritual and political advisor of Jean-Francois was rebuilding his career. Like
many other Dominicans who fled French rule, Father Vázquez had emigrated
from Santo Domingo to Cuba. Though the black general and priest had wanted to
continue serving king and country together, their separation became permanent.
Instead, by 1803 Father Vázquez had become treasurer of the cathedral in Santiago
de Cuba where he ministered to the numerous devout Dominican exiles who
congregated in that city and across Cuba, all watching Santo Domingo with
interest at this distance.134

SPANISH EYES ON SANTO DOMINGO
The Dominican exiles watched the unfolding horror in Saint-Domingue
with particular interest, and some even held unrealistic hopes that Spain could
recover Santo Domingo amidst the chaos next door. To proceed with claims
particular to the island, Spanish officials sent a special agent, Francisco Arango, to
entreat with French officials in Saint-Domingue.135 Arango became perhaps the
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leading architect of Cuba’s sugar boom, which launched the island as the major
global producer for the next century and beyond.

This trip was certainly

consequential to his treatises on Cuban agriculture.136 Yet only one of the charges
of his mission was to reconnoiter the fallout of French weaknesses and black power
for the growing Cuban plantocracy. A major irregularity was that French ships
had been illicitly selling blacks from Saint-Domingue to Cuban planters. The
crackdown by Napoléon against black rights in Saint-Domingue, and the plans to
re-enslave black republican soldiers, provided a new opportunity for
unscrupulous profiteering more brazen than the allegations of illegal slave trading
by French officials against Dominicans. Cuban planters and Spanish officials
largely wanted to avoid purchasing slaves that had experienced freedom and
knew of universal promises of political rights to avoid subverting their own slave
regime.137
Arango also requested hundreds of thousands of pesos for the damages
associated with the irregular and forcible takeover of Santo Domingo by Toussaint.
Dominicans wanted easier movement to the Dominican side of the island, and
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Spanish ships wanted to trade in Dominican ports.

Covertly, Arango was

instructed to inventory the morale of Dominicans left behind by the Spanish, to
survey the condition of properties, and to review the quality of French governance
in Santo Domingo.138 When Arango arrived in Saint-Domingue in March 1803 the
final months of the Haitian struggle for independence were approaching a fever
pitch.139 He returned two months later with quite intriguing results.140 French
officials headed by General Rochambeau had actually signed an accord with
Arango, and basically apologized and admitted fault for Toussaint’s handling of
the occupation of Santo Domingo, and promised to make the Spanish whole for
the funds lost, provisions taken, and damages sustain during the Toussaint
takeover.141
Arango negotiated with Du-Raims aboard the Duquesne in the harbor of
Cap-Français, and also Rochambeau, about the thorny issue of around 500 troops
who had served Spain but were forced by Toussaint to stay on the island. These
troops had been put into service with appeals at the time to Spain’s alliance and
Toussaint’s own security needs and had been dispersed widely across the island,
including under the command of General Sabès and a detachment under
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Sauvignon in Jacmel. Apparently only 150 of these troops had survived the two
years after the Spanish departure, and the Spanish sought their return. Arango
had wanted to visit Santo Domingo, but the only way to do so was via Port-auPrince by sea, as overland routes were unsafe due to deadly warfare and ports
were the only areas that the whites still held. However, reports suggested that the
rebels had not penetrated the old Spanish side of the island. Nevertheless, poverty
in Santo Domingo was rampant and the “poor Dominicans” were forced to guard
the borders for the French. From the news that he had heard Arango was certain
that many other Dominicans would prefer to leave the island. Commerce and
agriculture across the island had almost entirely halted. During his stay in Portau-Prince he met many displaced Dominicans, most of whom wanted to leave for
Spanish domains.

Rochambeau mentioned that Kerversau, the new French

governor of Santo Domingo, was in the process of organizing a defense force of
2,000 Dominicans.142
Arango could not accurately calculate the significant losses to Santo
Domingo. He said, “The plume falls from my hands when I try to begin the sad
painting,” of what had befallen the island, and particularly the French side. His
numbers showed that in 1788 he said there were 38-40,000 whites, 28,000 free
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people of color, 452,000 slaves, 793 sugar plantations, 3107 coffee plantations, 3150
indigo plantations, and 799 cotton plantations. In 1803 commerce was almost nil,
just like the white population. Only minor sugar production from the Cul-de-Sac
and coffee from Grand-Bois and Jérémie remained. Most properties were burned
out, and Leclerc had failed miserably in his brutal attempt to reanimate exports.
Instead, the massive French army that he commanded had been simply decimated
by disease and the black rebels. The massive clandestine trade that once flowed
from Saint-Domingue to Spanish colonies had almost entirely been replaced by
Jamaica.143
General Boyer and Commissioner Dontrans had departed for France on
17 April. Rochambeau wanted to introduce “new blacks” to the island to work
instead of the cultivateurs who refused to subordinate. Only 14,000 French troops
left. Aside from two black companies that remained pro-French in the Cul-de-Sac,
all other blacks, including even women and children, had become avowed,
obstinate rebels to the death. General Sabès, a respected commander in Guarico,
had been a prisoner among the black rebels for two months, and he was convinced
of their pleasure in wiping out whites. Some said there were 80,000 rebels, but
numbers varied. Sabès speculated that 5/6 of the black rebels had perished in the
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course of the war. Some thought only 10,000-30,000 rebels were actually wellarmed fighters. These and other numbers offered by officials in conversation
caused Arango to conclude that the French had actually very little intelligence on
the state of the black rebels. General Cluset said that in North the “Congos” among
the black population were eliminating “creoles.” More broadly, Arango explained
that, “The black De-Salines (sic) was recognized as successor of Toussaint when he
made the last insurrection public and divided the command of the colony among
the rest of his generals… De-Salines established his headquarters in Gonaïves, and
there subsists well-fortified, and with a corps of troops of 3,000-4,000 men.” In the
South it was said that the blacks were governed almost independently by a
talented mulatto named Pétion, who had once been a colonel of engineers for the
Republic.144
Arango could not believe the “atrocious” ruthlessness of the French. They
killed all black prisoners without exception, which had been Leclerc’s policy.
Prisoners were shot, stabbed, thrown into the sea, or worse. He learned of a female
black prisoner having been put to the dogs, and that this was a regular form of
execution. Also, the leader of a group of twelve insurgents who were captured
had his eyes pulled out. Arango believed that these practices were simply
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counterproductive, and thought that, “this war is interminable if they take from
the rebels the hope of capitulation or pardon.” One French citizen in SaintDomingue suggested that the subjugation of the blacks was impossible, and the
French should instead try for a “chimeric project of union and commerce with
them.” Arango thought the colony’s old productivity was lost forever, as was the
war.145
He was more concerned about the black insurgents’ example to Spanish
slaves, wondering if “these warriors of twelve years, already respected and feared
by the soldiers of Bonaparte…[might] pass someday to our colonies to make our
slaves adopt their disastrous maxims.” He feared a new era of black “filibusters
and buccaneers” infesting coasts of Spanish colonies. Arango recognized an
encroaching tide of abolitionism, including “The philanthropy of the Quakers who
in North America have pursued the abolition of slavery, would not avoid support
for those in Saint-Domingue to conquer their freedom.” The British, he thought,
were maturing toward a project of abolition in their colonies, a possibility bandied
about prominently in parliament. The British also wanted most to extend their
commerce across the Caribbean, a plausible task considering their superior navy
and manufacturing. He further lamented the longstanding Spanish preference for
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extracting precious metals rather than developing major agricultural regimes to
rival Jamaica and old Saint-Domingue. He suggested limiting the importation of
African slaves to Spanish ships exclusively to further profit from the buildup in
slave labor that he suggest was necessary. His greatest fear was that “Cuba repeats
the catastrophe” of Saint-Domingue. Independence and recognition of black
insurgents might make this possibility even worse. He suggested supporting the
“Spanish Dominicans” of the eastern part of the island, without hesitation, who he
thought were neglected by the French and were a buffer on the island, even if they
were technically allies.146

THE SPECTER OF HAITIAN INDEPENDENCE
Exiles from Santo Domingo throughout the Atlantic watched as French
rule in Saint-Domingue careened toward total collapse in 1803. A brief flicker of
optimism for France had come and gone in mid-1802 when Leclerc arrived with
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his massive force, then arrested Toussaint, and successfully reintegrated many of
his most powerful black officers and regiments into the French army.
In Cádiz the retired black general Jean-François, roughly eight years after
his own departure, watched as a new exile arrived in Andalucía. 147 The talented
black general Laplume had fought in the South for Toussaint and had skillfully
routed Rigaud during the civil war.148 At the arrival of Leclerc, though, Laplume’s
staunch loyalty to France prevailed, and he quickly turned against Toussaint and
achieved significant victories in the South for the Republic. During the later war
for independence he remained an intractable thorn in the side of Dessalines,
Christophe, and Pétion in the South.149 Despite his undying loyalty to France,
Rochambeau decided to strip black officers of authority in the South in favor of
white leadership. Laplume still did not defect to the independence cause, despite
the fact that his exile in May 1803 further divided black opinion in the South
against Bonaparte and the French.150
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Likely out of a desire to keep black power from French shores, Laplume
instead was sent to Cádiz as another imposition on their Spanish allies perhaps
due to the residence of other retired black officers like Jean-François. When
Laplume died in September 1803 the French consul in Andalucía leaned heavily
upon local Spanish officials to approve and assist in undertaking a military and
state funeral for the newly-arrived black general. Laplume was buried with a
hero’s pomp and commemoration on Spanish soil.151

His name, unlike any

prominent pro-Spanish black auxiliaries who died in Cádiz, appears on the local
cemetery registry.152 Another exiled black general who had commanded Laplume
had also died in the French Alps alone and in prison – Toussaint Louverture would
never see the outcome of the Haitian Revolution. 153 Shortly thereafter, the black
revolutionary directed by Jean-Jacques Dessalines, Toussaint’s right-hand man,
defeated French forces once and for all in November 1803, Dessalines issued the
Haitian proclamation of independence in Gonaïves on 1 January 1804.154
Jean-François, still in Cádiz, watched on with scoffing incredulity as his
former subordinates Dessalines and Christophe arose to founding figures of a bold

Tomás de Monla to Pedro Cevallo, Cádiz, 6 September 1803, AHN-Estado, 5240, exp. 69; LeRoy
to Tomás de Monla, 19 Fructidor an XI / 6 September 1803, AHN-Estado, 5240, exp. 69.
151

152

Geggus, Haitian, 294n.103.

153

Dubois, Avengers, 296-297.

Julia Gaffield, ed., The Haitian Declaration of Independence: Creation, Context, and Legacy
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2016).
154

610

nation of ex-slaves in a slaveholding hemisphere. Despite their victories and
audacity, the retired black general who had directly helped start the revolution
and was its leading figure for at least three years, was quite unimpressed with the
talent at the helm of new Haiti. Briefly Spain considered resurrecting his career
and charisma by returning him to the island as a more favorable leadership
alternative to imperial order in the Caribbean than his old officer Dessalines. This
plan never came even close to fruition.155
The metamorphosis of Saint-Domingue, bastion of white plantocracy
power, into Haiti, the first independent state in the Americas based on universal
liberty, had nevertheless changed the world. The exceptional anti-imperial, antiracist defiance of Haiti radiated throughout the Caribbean and across the Atlantic
regardless of its deep domestic imperfections. It was an example of successful
slave resistance that inspired revolts across the Americas, and served to show an
alternate pathway of citizenship and rights for people of color.156
The society most impacted by the advent of Haiti, and closest to its
outward-reaching growing pains, was of course Santo Domingo, which by January
1804 had seen only two years of lackluster formal French management in the three
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years since Toussaint had invaded. Since the announcement of the Treaty of Basel
in 1795 perhaps as many as 40,000 Dominicans had fled the looming French
occupation, though such figures are difficult to calculate. The majority of these
emigrants were white Dominicans from across the colony, but especially the
capital. All Spanish bureaucrats and military personnel evacuated the colony.
Perhaps Toussaint overestimated the export of Dominican slaves, or perhaps
García underestimated it, but certainly hundreds if not thousands of slaves were
made to leave Santo Domingo. From the maximum of 14,000 slaves that Sánchez
Valverde estimated in the 1780s, it is unlikely that natural increase or small
numbers of captives illicitly traded from Saint-Domingue mitigated an overall
decline due to forced emigration, natural deaths, and manumissions, the latter of
which already perplexed Spanish officials before the war began in SaintDomingue. This population decline drastically remade Dominican demographics,
creating an even larger free majority of color, with likely fewer overall slaves. The
backfill of this population decline came from the humiliated French troops routed
by Dessalines, Christophe, and Pétion.157
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One of these embarrassed French officers had been General Jean-Louis
Ferrand, who had failed in his responsibilities to defend French positions around
the town of Monte Cristi and was driven out by Dessalines. He took refuge
southward across the island in Santo Domingo. Upon arrival, he realized that he
outranked the existing French administrator there, Kerversau, and thus rallied the
support of troops for his removal. After the brief occupation by Toussaint’s forces
in 1801, followed by the transitional rule of Kerversau in 1802, Ferrand’s arrival in
1803 introduced a more lasting French presence to Santo Domingo, which was
accompanied by French troops that had evacuated Jacmel and the Cul-de-Sac. In
further retribution against the uncooperative Dominican populace, and to simply
raise much needed cash, French rulers initiated a firesale of church properties in
Santo Domingo, and even utilized a special property broker based in nearby
Danish colonies.158
These French troops left behind remaining whites in what soon became
Haiti. They were subsequently eliminated by Dessalines as a finale to the war of
extermination commenced by Leclerc and Rochambeau. Only shortly after the
first anniversary of Haitian independence, Dessalines decided to look eastward as
Toussaint once had, only on this occasion he sought to destroy the lingering French
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presence on the island rather than to impose it upon Santo Domingo as Toussaint
had. Thus, under the governance of France the colony of Santo Domingo was fully
exposed to the anti-French violence foundational to the liberatory struggle of
Haitian independence. This siege only lifted when Dessalines, having sighted
French sails on the sea off of Santo Domingo. Fearing an all-out French invasion,
he abandoned his Santo Domingo campaign and retreated westward to defend
Haiti.159
Jean-François, the early engine of revolution, died in 1805 just as
Dessalines became Emperor Jacques I of Haiti. However, by 1806 Dessalines had
been assassinated, and the new state of Haiti disintegrated into divisions crudely
congruous to the civil war between Toussaint and Rigaud, only with Christophe
and Pétion claiming the North and South, respectively. While the projects of
building black states that Christophe and Pétion attempted far exceeded any
ambition of Jean-François, the promise of rights for all in an ex-slave society
became mired in over a decade of heavy-handed personalist politics at the expense
of a majority of Haitians.160

Moya Pons, Dominican Republic, 108-116; Fernando Picó, One Frenchman, Four Revolutions: General
Ferrand and the Peoples of the Caribbean (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 2011): 33-47.
159

Geggus, Haitian, 199-200; Gaffield, Haitian Connections, 93-181. It was Jean-François, more so
than Toussaint, Dessalines, or others, who lived on in the Spanish Caribbean as the emblem of slave
insurrection and black empowerment. See: Childs, Aponte, 163-168.
160

614

CONCLUSION
Dominicans unhappy with the eventuality of French rule had little
recourse to resist the Republic. When the War of the South erupted in June 1799,
the jockeying parties of color headed by Toussaint and Rigaud in Saint-Domingue
not only superseded white French control, but infiltrated Santo Domingo in
attempts to secure new lines of support and supplies. Those mostly well-off
Dominicans capable of fleeing did so in the thousands, and many took their slaves
along with them. The majority who remained did so with lingering fears of what
direct French rule would mean for their lives, both earthly and eternal.161
Dominicans now had no recourse against French attempts to “frenchify”
them, nor to stop the occupation by an ex-slave army led by a traitor to the Spanish
cause in Toussaint. Though specifics were murky at the time, astute observers in
Santo Domingo realized that black power in Saint-Domingue was pushing the
colony increasingly closer to independence from France. Furthermore, with the
ascension of Napoléon Bonaparte to power in 1799, the revolution had clearly
taken two keys turns that cooled radicalism in France and steered SaintDomingue’s local black leadership into direct, open warfare with the empire. This
culminated in Napoléon’s attempts to reinstate slavery and his reinstallment of
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whites to colonial power in Saint-Domingue, which undercut much of the reasons
that some Dominicans of color favored French rule in the first place. When the
French finally did occupy Santo Domingo at the outset of the nineteenth century
their officials closed churches and sold church properties, all to the great
disaffection of new Dominican “citizens” of a Republic drifting into the dictatorial
clutch of Napoléon.162
All of this transpired before black French forces under Toussaint marched
onto Santo Domingo to force an irregular invasion of the Spanish side in 1801 due
to Toussaint’s own strategic military concerns.

Even then, official French

management of Santo Domingo did not formally commence until the arrival of the
French agent Kerversau there in 1802, approaching seven years since the Treaty of
Basel. The prospect of black invasion that terrified many elites in Santo Domingo
transpired, though Toussaint’s presence did not inspire mass slave uprisings, nor
result in absent labor from plantations as they had feared. Toussaint needed the
labor too, as did ensuing French governors, much to the disillusionment of locals
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of color who expected the more robust abolition that Roume and Sonthonax had
promised them in an earlier, more optimistic time.163
With Haitian independence, the presence of incompetent and antagonistic
French rulers, and the siege of Dessalines to drive France off the island once and
for all, Dominican society endured the occupation of a France in metropolitan
transition and imperial morass. Dominicans were faced with a choice of what
aspects of their Spanish heritage to preserve – religion, monarchism, and racial
restrictions – where to preserve it – on Hispaniola and in exile – and how to do so
in a new Caribbean epoch with an unparalleled and increasingly international
example of black power. This era remade the colony with a more robust majority
of color in Santo Domingo through migration.

More dramatically, it also

precipitated a widespread rejection of French rule from many sectors of
Dominican society, not just a white elite, which would fester into open rebellion
against France in the years to come.
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EPILOGUE
FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO THE “SPANISH PART OF HAYTI”:
DOMINICAN BELIEFS ON NATIONAL BELONGING

While French forces were able to endure the siege of Santo Domino by
Dessalines and Christophe in 1805, the majority of the colony suffered as Haitian
soldiers attacked French positions and wrought devastation upon Dominican
towns. Several key cities, including Santiago, La Vega, Cotuí, and Moca were
nearly destroyed by arson and hundreds died. The Haitian army intended to
obliterate the last bastions of French influence on the island, not to destroy
Dominicans. In any case, this invasion illuminated French deficiencies even
further in Santo Domingo, and for the mostly elite families who collaborated with
French forces to fight Haitian advances the Dessalines march on the capital was a
clarion call to mistrusting Haiti. Yet, on the other hand, the massive Dominican
cattle industry was still dependent upon sending livestock westward to Haitian
markets, as it once had to supply Saint-Domingue. When Ferrand attempted to
end this and all trade with Haiti, many rural producers beyond the small urban
pockets of French power were livid. This population became exposed to violence
due to French rule, to the enslaved who never experienced once-vaunted French
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liberties, and to the free majority of color who fell under Napoleonic racism.
Furthermore, some accused Ferrand himself of overseeing the kidnaping of free
citizens of Haiti for enslaved labor in Santo Domingo, the same offense that
Toussaint had accused Spanish officials of in 1801. For those who remained
devout, the constant French antagonism against Catholicism continued to incite
frustrations.
Finally, the 1808 invasion of Spain by Napoleon witnessed a massive
backlash of anti-French demonstrations across the Spanish Caribbean, and
including in Santo Domingo. The French forced King Carlos IV to abdicate, and
his son the heir apparent, Fernando VII, effectively became a prisoner of in France
under Napoleon. Juan Sánchez Ramírez, one of the many Dominicans who had
fled to exile Puerto Rico, returned home to his family’s failing commerce in cattle.
With support from Governor Toribio Montes of Puerto Rico and from the
Dominican exile community there, the mulatto Sánchez traveled the colony
covertly conjuring popular support to end the French occupation. In exchange,
Sánchez promised to send sufficient supplies of mahogany to Puerto Rico to cover
war expenditures. Simultaneously he sought munitions and geopolitical cover
from the two relatively new rulers of a divided Haiti. At that time Alexander
Pétion presided over a republic of the south based in Port-au-Prince, and Henri
Christophe ruled over what became a kingdom in the north with its capital in the
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former Cap-Français, which had been renamed Cap-Haïtien. Both were eager to
supply guns and cash to rid the island of the French. The British also provided
critical naval support during a siege of Santo Domingo that ultimately ousted
French power from the capital, and did so in return for free trade across Santo
Domingo and lax taxation on British imports.
In contrast, Spain had just become a Bonapartist outpost and anti-French,
Bourbon loyalists could provide no tangible support to Sánchez and his cause. For
the second time in not even four years, residents of the capital Santo Domingo
were besieged because of their French occupiers. After they and the French troops
tired of eating mules, rats, pigeons, and even leather, the city fell to the British in
July 1809. The rallied Dominicans forces in the interior under Sánchez had already
struck a pivotal military defeat against Ferrand and the French army at Palo
Hincado in November 1808. After this defeat Ferrand committed suicide in
disgrace.1

This ouster by Sánchez ended the protracted French demise on

Hispaniola. This unraveling of French colonialism began with slave revolts in
fields of northern Saint-Domingue in 1791, and ended with Ferrand’s suicide
seventeen years later in a field in eastern Santo Domingo amidst Dominican
insurrection.

Moya Pons, Dominican Republic, 110-116; Juan Sánchez Ramírez, Diario de la Reconquista (Santo
Domingo: Editora Montalvo, 1957).
1
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With other pivotal chronologies in mind, one of the final acts of the French
government in Santo Domingo was to issue an 1809 almanac. It began by marking
the thousands of years since the death of Abraham, the construction of Solomon’s
Temple, and the birth of Christ. The first Olympiad had been held 2,584 years
prior, the invention of gunpowder had occurred 471 years prior, the arrival of
Columbus in the Americas had happened 317 years prior. It marked the more than
three centuries of Santo Domingo’s existence as a Spanish colony, and the brief
seven-year presence of French rule, only five of which had been formally under
the Napoleonic empire.

An anonymous but dutiful French official wrote

marginalia on the Dominican uprising, French defeats, and French surrender.
Ferrand’s suicide was one of the most notable events printed regarding the
preceding year. Of note, one lieutenant named Emiglio Pezzi, an Italian-born
officer in French service, was marked as a deserter among many other officers who
were listed as dead, captured, or disappeared. He had, apparently, defected to the
Dominican insurgents, as had many others. The almanac listed the long-departed
Mauviel as the current archbishop appointed, though no Dominicans recognized
him as such. Perhaps as few as a dozen priests remained in Santo Domingo under
the French, and the religious orders had all also fled along with other clergy. The
ecclesiastics staffing the cathedral were locals, with the exception of a priest exiled
from Jacmel who conducted services in French.
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One prominent ex-Spanish

official, José Labastida, was listed as a judge for the French and a municipal
administrator.2

After the French officials fled the island, the Dominican

conquerors had to staff governmental positions for which many had no experience
in the vacuum of Spanish power.

Also, reintegrating Dominicans who

collaborated with the French such as Labastida, absorbing French-influenced
defectors such as Pezzi, re-inspiring Dominicans whose piety may have dwindled
with the decline of Catholic hegemony across the colony, and managing a majority
of color that had experienced the promises and failures of the revolutionary era all
became major social challenges for this makeshift government.

SPANISH RECOLONIZATION, DOMINICAN DISSENT
With King Ferdinand VII off the throne in Madrid, the Spanish colonies
including the newly-reconquered Santo Domingo, were loosely managed by the
loyalist Junta in Sevilla. The colony was nevertheless financially insolvent, and the
death of Sánchez only thrust the colony into greater instability. One major attempt
at mediation was to re-evangelize the entire Dominican population that had lived
under French imperial control. The French converted the abandoned Convent of
San Francisco into an armed garrison. For both symbolic and strategic value, they

2

“Almanach Colonial de Santo Domingo, Pour l’Année 1809,” BHFIC, B-1a23.
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had mounted a large artillery piece onto the chapel roof.3 At the first sign of the
occupation ending, many monks petitioned to return to minister to the masses and
restore Spanish spirituality. The successful revitalization of Spanish colonialism
in Santo Domingo was predicated upon religious works of cultural reform. A
group of Capuchins who had first worked in Louisiana prior to lengthy service in
Santo Domingo wrote from exile in Jalapa, Mexico. In 1810 metropolitan officials
expressly encouraged the reestablishment of the convents and seminaries and the
recruitment of friars to Santo Domingo.4 These Capuchins offered to spiritually
reawaken Dominicans who, they feared, had succumbed to secularism and
republicanism after seven year of impious French rule. These monks claimed that
their earlier service in francophone Louisiana had equipped them to deal with
French partisans who remained in Santo Domingo, and apparently their offer was
accepted.5 By 1813 the Convent of San Francisco had again returned to the rhythm
of the Franciscan order.6 Thereafter, the Poor Clares, a group of exiled nuns, wrote
from exile in Havana asking to return as well.7 Cases like these, and subsequent
responses to them, reveal the inextricable cultural and religious relationship

3

Juan Sánchez Ramírez, 17 July 1810, AGI-SD, leg. 1041, no. 18.
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Consejo de Indias, Sevilla, 3 April 1810, AGI-SD, leg. 1041.
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6

Jose de Limontas, Cadiz, 31 March 1813, AGI-SD, leg. 1041.

7
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between Spanish loyalty and Catholic piety, which had a long-lasting impact of
Dominican culture.
Such re-indoctrination could not come fast enough for the newly-formed
Spanish recolonization managed in effect by the Dominican insurgents.
Conspiracies and coups against the Spanish began almost immediately, and
almost always bore some link to the Haitian side of the island. Despite having
granted liberty to some Dominican slaves who fought against France, Sánchez and
his new pro-Spanish government continued to support slavery.

Spanish

recolonization failed to soothe whatever seething anti-French sentiments stirred
Dominicans into actions. Disaffected, well-placed minor officials, such as the
deserter Pezzi, plotted an insurrection that would rely upon Haitian aid to oust
Spanish rule once again. Involved in this coup were several veterans of the
legendary black auxiliaries and, perhaps, even some maroons who may have been
from Maniel. The black officer Santiago Foló, who had once fought under JeanFrançois and Biassou, was a key conspirator, as was the ever-present Pablo Alí.
Conspirators also included a local elite enraged by Sánchez, and Venezuelan-born
partisans influenced by independence discourses percolating from the Latin
American mainland. Ultimately, the coup failed and the key conspirators were
executed. Nevertheless, their murky preferences for Pétion and the southern
Haitian state illuminated an ally for Dominican dissent. Alí, who almost certainly
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knew of the plot and never revealed it, acquitted himself yet again and continued
to serve Spain.8
Over the ensuing years the Haitian model of black citizenship became
more appealing to disaffected Dominicans of color, particularly after the new 1812
constitutional monarchy in Spain decreed by the Cortes de Cádiz, which
technically governed Santo Domingo, extended full Spanish citizenship to colonial
residents. This included those of indigenous descent, but not of African descent,
and therefore the majority of Dominicans. White Dominicans celebrated this new
constitution to popular consternation.9 Instead, a Dominican majority gradually
came to associate the promise of freedom, rights, racial equality, and national
belonging with being Haitian citizens. This evolution of cultural politics to a postemancipation, post-colonial world was less abstract in Santo Domingo than for
people of color elsewhere. The Dominican polity became a colorful palette of
loyalties, visually manifested in racial divisions and national flags. This spectrum
of sovereignty increasingly bypassed old metropolitan affiliations for more radical
local configurations.
For example, in 1813 in the far eastern town of Higüey a minor official

8

Eller, “All Shall Be Equal.”

“Actos y ceremonias con que fue proclamada y jurada en Bayaguana la Constitución de Cádiz,”
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9
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uncovered a plot of “French mulattoes” in the area who he said were attempting
to oust Spain in a colony-wide uprising to align with Haiti.10 Allegedly a slave had
revealed this secret in exchange for a shot of rum and a bit of cash, and this slave
claimed that letters had circulated from Port-au-Prince around Santo Domingo.11
The specific Dominican named in the warrant was Dusan Montas, who had
facilitated conspiratorial meetings. “Dusan,” quite an atypical name in Spanish,
was possibly a nickname fashioned after Toussaint Louverture.12

The

investigation of this “seditious and revolutionary voice” tantalized the colony.13
Free Dominicans of color José Castro, Antonio Oviedo, and Casimiro Castillo all
had prior knowledge of the alleged plot as their occupations and racial status gave
them greater social proximity to accused Haitian mulattoes who were themselves
small-scale merchants who traded across the island.14

Marie-Claire Moré, a

middle-aged woman of color,15 had hosted itinerant merchants François LaPlen

Bartolo Rijo, “Orden del Alcalde,” 9 February 1813, Archivo General de la Nación Dominicana
AGN-ARH, 4, leg. 26R, exp. 8. Marie-Claire More, Jean Riche, François Laplen, Philippe Jeriso,
Jacques Tibney, and Fanin Pilie, “Testigos,” 8 and 29 March 1813, AGN-ARH, 3, leg. 11A, exp. 297;
Édouard Montulé, A Voyage to North America and the West Indies in 1817 (London: Phillips and Co.,
1821): 19-22.
10
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and Jean Riche. These men had traveled with suspicious cargoes late at night. 16
Moré then betrayed Philippe Jeriso, Fanin Pilie, and Jacques Tibney – “French
mulattoes” – to the officials. They had once been soldiers in Spanish service,
perhaps in the black auxiliaries. Their implication in the apparent plot stunned
officials.17 They had all met at Moré's residence, perhaps to draw less attention by
using a woman's home. There the Dominican free black Dusan Montas and other
locals learned about Haiti and conspired to stage an uprising.18 Governor Urrutia,
who had succeeded the recently-deceased Sanchez, evicted all “French mulattoes”
from the region.19 Only weeks before the 1813 incident an arrest order circulated
for Domingo Ramos, a twenty-year old Dominican slave who also spoke Spanish
poorly, had braided hair, and was accused of organizing a revolt in the north.20
Pétion and Christophe had turned their ambitions eastward, and their agents
competed for Dominican loyalties, an extension of Haitian civil divides. 21
Dominicans had easy access to smuggled constitutions, speeches, and laws from
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Haiti.22 In 1811 officials had also uncovered two other pro-Haitian plots. One was
headed by Dominican José Leocadio,23 and a separate conspiracy emerged in
Samaná.24 The intensity of pro-Haitian popular dissent only deepened in years to
come.
Furthermore, given the chaos in Spain the government in Santo Domingo
could not receive much imperial support, nor could they export cash crops for
profit. Devastation and internal dislocation had further eroded economic activity.
The strongest economic connection for Santo Domingo was actually Haitian
markets, for which Spanish administrators made exceptions to formal attempts to
exclude the divided black state of Pétion and Christophe. Particularly in the South,
Pétion offered safe haven to a range of revolutionaries from South America who
posed threats to Spanish imperial power in the Americas, such as Simón Bolívar.
These agents of subversion also operated into Spanish Santo Domingo, which
became a theatre of operations of independence struggles. With lack of protection
from Spain, Dominican elites considered the possibilities of breaking with pain to

“Nota de los papeles que remita desde la bahia de Santo Domingo el comandante del bergantin
Perignon, interceptados en ls goleta danesa Luisa, Capitan Pierre Freer,” Madrid, 12 March 1817,
AGI-Estado, leg. 4, n. 13; Carlos de Urrutia to Juan Antonio Ariban, 30 January 1817, AGN-José
Gabriel García, 4, 12, c. 42, exp. 6, fol. 18; Sebastian Kindelan to Secretario de Estado, 26 March
1820, AGI-Estado, leg. 12, n.94.
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seek out their own security, not only to define the terms of separation from Spain
and the postcolonial world, but to inoculate the Dominican body politic from the
increasing encroachment of Haiti.25 Increasingly, Pétion not only sided with South
American independence projects, he viewed Spain and officials in Santo Domingo
as allies of Christophe, his rival. In 1816 Pétion supported the infiltration of one
Fermin Nuñez of Caracas, a pro-Pétion and pro-Bolívar agent who attempted to
conspire with disaffected Dominicans to stage an independence war. While this
plot also failed, one of the residents that this agent tried to attract was yet again
Pablo Alí, along with many other troops of color in the colony.26 Upon Pétion’s
death in 1818, his acolytes framed his accolades to include him as the co-founder
of Haiti with Dessalines, and also the co-liberator of Spanish America with Bolívar,
who they claimed had himself compared the President of Haiti to George
Washington.

He never saw the liberation of Spanish America, but perhaps

attempted to oversee it directly in Santo Domingo.27

INTO INDEPENDENCE
His successor, Jean-Pierre Boyer, was able to unify Haiti in 1820 when
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Henri Christophe faced unpopularity among his subjects and officers, likely
suffered a stroke, and killed himself. That unification was what his mentor could
never accomplish, and now Boyer could ponder Pétion’s other dreams of antiimperialism and island-wide solidarity. Boyer also learned of a new French plot
to launch a recolonization project through Santo Domingo. He clearly understood
Dominican security as a Haitian interest. From this premise Boyer also continued
building popular Dominican support for Haiti by reminding his neighbors of the
hardships of French rule, and stressed their common interests in commerce and
co-fraternity, rather than conflict. Governor Kindelán, the new Spanish manager
in Santo Domingo, was simply outmanned and outmatched. By this time the
Dominican population was not only as low as perhaps 60,000, only a quarter of its
residents were white. Lack of Spanish support, lack of Spanish competence, and
lack of Spanish security all combined for autonomous thinking, although Iberian
religiosity permeated popular culture.

Those “rustic people” who Spanish

officials appreciated for having ushered out the French began to consider ousting
the Spanish in favor of Haiti.28

Gobernacion de Ultramar, 4 July 1821, AGI-SD, 970, no. 4; Palacio to Ultramar, Santo Domingo,
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Domingo, 29 June 1820, AGI-SD, 970; Prophète Daniel, Ichar, and Monpoint to Sebastian
Kindelan, 12 October 1820, AGI-SD, 970, no. 1.
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Though Boyer denied his complicity, a Haitian colonel named Dezir
Dalmassi even appeared in Dominican border towns at this time meeting with
Dominicans interested in Haitian unification.29 Kindelán fully realized that the
populace had largely turned against him. Boyer circulated texts throughout the
colony. In the capital, a small, mostly white clique of professionals pondered
Bolívar-style managed republicanism and independence from Spain and had
founded “patriotic societies.” In response to both threats officials founded the
Telegrafo Constiticional Dominicano, a pro-Spanish newspaper. Its first issue decried
the need for better political policing.30 Kindelán even tried to explain the Spanish
ideals of liberty and equality to the masses, and asked priests to do the same from
pulpits.31 He tried heroically to explain away the exclusion from citizenship for
people of African descent, and that strife between whites, mulattoes, and blacks
was a social ill which could produce only revolts and unrest as in the recent past.32
Meanwhile, the governor pleaded with Haitian officials for friendship and
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cooperation, and the foment of independence sentiments.33
This came to no avail. No longer were isolated conspirators leading this
charge, but whole towns heeded Haitian calls. Others Haitian agents won over
Dominican militia loyalties as early as November 1820, when Boyer promised that
he preferred to send his constitution to Santo Domingo rather than his army.
Azua, Las Matas de Farfan, Neiba, and San Juan de la Maguana began to tip
toward Haitian annexation.34

Officials in Santo Domingo begged “Spanish

Dominicans” for their loyalty, though many had started to consider themselves as
something else.35 One of the major Dominican figures that these agents targeted
was against Pablo Alí. They called him a natural Haitian, and promised him peace
and prosperity for his allegiance. In addition, they proposed Dominicans could
send their own locally-selected representatives to the Haitian national legislature.36
Dominicans of color were not the only people looking westward with optimism.
Apparently dozens of Puerto Rican slaves had made canoes and paddled to Santo
Domingo with the express hope of reaching freedom in Haiti.37

Kindelan to Prophète Daniel, Ichar, and Monpoint, Santo Domingo, 4 November 1820, AGI-SD,
970, no. 2.
33

Ysnardi to Pablo Baez, San Juan de la Maguana, 9 November 1820, AGI-SD, 970, no. 24. Agents
also operated in Puerto Plata: Alejandro Infante to Kindelan, Santiago, 16 December 1820, AGISD, 970, no. 16; Kindelan to Infante, Santo Domingo, 24 December 1820, AGI-SD, 970, no. 17.
34

35

Kindelan to Ayuntamiento de Neiba, Santo Domingo, AGI-SD, 970, no. 14.

36

Ysnardi to Pablo Alí, San Juan de la Maguana, 9 November 1820, AGI-SD, 970, no. 25.

37

Kindelan to Ultramar, Santo Domingo, 17 May 1821, AGI-SD, 970.

632

As a demonstration of goodwill and efforts at piety, Haitian generals and
Boyer asked the Dominican church to send priests to minister to the Haitian
populace.38 This did not assuage officials in Santo Domingo, but perhaps the
Dominican populace. They sent priests to the North of Haiti, perhaps where Boyer
most wanted them to counteract the stronger influence of vodou in the region.39 By
1821 Boyer insisted he knew nothing of rumors about an invasion, all the while
pro-Haitian Spanish speakers from the west mixed among the Dominican
populace.40 Proclamations against Haitian influence stirred little loyalty to Spain.41
White Dominicans who had supported Spanish recolonization and governance
were severely disappointed, and in the capital they increasingly voiced their
qualms. A great deal of their angst was due to Spanish malfeasance in warding
off Haitian intrigues.42 King Fernando VII, who had been restored to the throne in
late 1813, feared the ambitions of Boyer. However, he was powerless to do
anything about it, and was more occupied with major wars in Mexico and across
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South America.43
Toward the end of 1821 this turmoil boiled over, as anonymous white
independence sympathizers in the capital began to contact South American antiimperialist leaders such as Bolívar.44 The appeal of linking with Venezuela and
Gran Colombia came in no small part due to pamphlets sent by the “Caracas native
to his Dominican compatriots,” which promised the integration of clergy into
independence struggles. He promised them that the “Spanish part of Hayti” could
thrive economically, and needed someone like “Tupac Amaru I” to expunge
Iberian injustices, or “Washington in the north” to extoll civic virtue.

This

Venezuelan suggested that Haiti could help Dominican independence, and offer
mutual defense, as part of a cooperative but separated island. This proactive step
was, he suggested, the best way to avoid slave insurrection and black power in
Santo Domingo.45 Some Dominicans read these thoughts quite intently. For
example, at some point in 1821 the ambitious attorney José Nuñez de Cáceres, who
in 1798 had successfully defended Pablo Alí from charges of treason, was demoted
in the colonial hierarchy after decades of service. Nuñez de Cáceres became one
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of these critical anti-Spanish white conspirators in the capital.46
Amid this ferment, pro-independence partisans near Monte Cristi and
Dajabon asked for Haitian protection and hoped to rouse popular support for their
project in November 1821. They failed.47 Haitian sources believed that the leader
of this opaque attempt, named Amarante, had raised the Haitian flag out of
interest for joining the Republic.48 With mounting mistrust of Spanish officials,
Boyer’s own interest for Haiti came into conflict with South American
revolutionaries that he and his predecessor Pétion had supported. However,
before he could take action on 1 December 1821, Nuñez de Cáceres and a cadre of
disaffected whites in the capital proclaimed the “Independent State of the Spanish
Part of Hayti” and sought affiliation with Gran Colombia ruled by Bolívar. This
group sought a treaty of mutual defense with Haiti, but not a federation. Their
actions were as much to oust Spain as they were to secure the continuity of their
control in an independent Dominican society, apart from the racial egalitarianism
of their Haitian neighbors. Their constitution sanctified the role of the church, it
also defined their own terms of liberty, but made no mention of slavery.49
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In 1821 Pablo Alí, by then an officer formally in Spanish service since 1793,
applied for Spanish citizenship. He cataloged his illustrious service, dating from
the Haitian Revolution through his work in subduing many of the conspiracies of
the 1810s. Despite skill, bravery, and respect from white officials, the loyal Alí was
denied citizenship. In 1821 the last pillars of Spanish power in Santo Domingo,
such as Alí, collapsed.

After his citizenship denial, he actively supported

independence, albeit the version proposed by Nuñez de Cáceres and not Haiti. 50
It is difficult to speculate as to why he supported Nuñez de Cáceres, but it could
have stemmed from his appreciation for the attorney’s help in getting acquitted of
treason years before, and/or because he also supported local rule and Spanish
traditions. Alí may have been loyal to Spain up until Nuñez de Cáceres himself
showed him the papers that denied his and his officers’ requests for citizenship.
Perhaps he even suggested to the black troops that “Spanish Hayti” would address
slavery.51 He and his troops then helped Nuñez de Cáceres expel Pascual Real, the
governor at the time, to Great Britain at the point of bayonets.52 Though basically
compelled to do so, the then-Archbishop of Santo Domingo, Pedro Valera, was
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loathe to swear fidelity to the new government. He nevertheless wanted to avoid
unnecessary bloodshed, and did not want to make the clergy a target, so he
cooperated. Many priests simply became quiet royalists.53 Alí got his citizenship,
albeit in a state that barely lasted two months, and barely controlled just the capital
city. Unflattering portrayals of Nuñez de Cáceres depicted him as insecure due to
his modest family origins and constant agitation against peninsular Spaniards
who were less intelligent than him, but more cultured and therefore favored by
the government. Some reported that he had slipped into fanaticism, and for others
he had suffered a nervous breakdown. As much for political reasons, his erratic
behavior alienated him from the populace.54
In December 1821, the same month in which the new state arose in Santo
Domingo, the Haitian press commented on its peculiar association with Gran
Colombia, which at a great distance, would be unable to assist the new state
(which the Haitian newspaper called the Dominican Republic to distinguish
“Spanish Hayti” from the Republic of Haiti). The newspaper asked Dominicans
to, ““remember the support that the Haitians have sent them on other occasions to
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help them in the liberty of their territory, when they found themselves occupied
by the French forces.” They had no better or more natural ally than Haiti, it
suggested.55 Metropolitan officials soon learned not only of the independence
project by Nuñez de Cáceres, but that Boyer had perhaps as many as 30,000 troops
prepared to unite the island.56 A newspaper in Port-au-Prince soon printed a plea
to Boyer to unify the island from local leaders in Santiago who did not wish to
support Nuñez de Cáceres, nor his “Spanish Hayti” in the capital.57 In a direct
letter to Nuñez de Cáceres, Boyer patiently elaborated his own concerns regarding
the instability of “Spanish Hayti,” declared his interest in unifying the whole
island. Boyer claimed that already Dajabon, monte Cristi, Santiago, Puerto Plata,
Las Cahobas, Las Matas de Farfan, San Juan de la Maguana, Neiba, Azua, La Vega,
and other key towns already recognized Haitian governance. He professed to
come as a pacifier and conciliator, not a conqueror, and hoped that soon all
Dominicans would raise the flag for all Haitians.58
As the leading Spanish general in the colony later noted, “The towns
adjacent to the French part are dedicated to the government of Boyer, because their

“La Concordia diario histórico político y literario: Gazeta del Gobierno de Hayti Francés,” Portau-Prince, 23 December 1821, AGI-SD, 970, no. 33.
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population of the day consists for the most part of mulattoes and blacks.” He
further concluded that they supported Haiti because of racial solidarity and offers
of “liberty, prosperity, and dominance over whites.” 59 With a change of mind, or
perhaps simple recognition of the true demands of most locals, Nuñez de Cáceres
announced to all “Loyal Dominicans” a stance of docility and peace toward Boyer
because he came as a “father, friend, and brother” to blend the island under one
constitution, which required that Dominicans “must all reciprocate with union.”
He asked resistant Dominicans to “open your hearts” and “cover yourself firmly
against hearing the echoes of old worries” about Haiti, because they would all
soon benefit under the laws of one Republic.60 When President Boyer entered
Santo Domingo on 9 February 1822, nobody tried to stop him from unifying the
entire island.61 He was greeted by thronging crowds of Dominicans whose dreams
of national belonging had been realized with Haitian citizenship.

In Haiti,

Dominicans gained a more stable and inclusive state than any other new American
republics. As a constituent region Dominican identity persisted around religion,
language, and Spanish cultural heritage. Emancipation was immediate, in contrast
to the lingering of slavery in much of Latin America during the three decades after
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independence. Unlike counterparts elsewhere in the Atlantic, Dominicans also
evaded the common racist curtailment of post-emancipation civil rights.

DOMINICAN BELIEFS OF NATIONAL BELONGING
Understanding this unification as the culmination of a lengthy, successful
collaboration contradicts the national incompatibility projected on the past by
much of the discourse on Dominican nationalism and historiographical writings
on the origins of Dominican identity. It was not an aggressive invasion and
unwarranted occupation. Who is the face of Dominican independence? Is it
Nuñez de Cáceres, or Boyer? Or, are there many faces of independence in Santo
Domingo, both Dominican and Haitian, and mostly of color? Dominicans attained
freedom, rights, equality, and state belonging as Haitian citizens in what was
perhaps the most resounding victory for popular ambitions in the Spanish
American independence conflicts.

The particular dynamics of racial formation

and religiosity from the 1790s through 1822 made this one of the most unique the
contests over national belonging in the Age of Revolutions.
Many Spanish officers stayed on under Boyer, and some Haitian
commanders were beloved by locals. Even the steadfast Pablo Alí agreed to
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Boyer’s terms and donned a fine new Haitian army uniform. 62 He would live out
his days as the commander of defenses in Santo Domingo and a leader of the
Dominican black community.63 In the early days of unification freed blacks
mocked their former owners and eagerly assisted Boyer’s forces.

However,

Dominicans of color refrained from retributive violence against white Dominicans,
in part due to the moderation counseled by Boyer. Even those who disagreed with
Boyer respected his political tact and superior strategy to have gradually
persuaded the Dominican populace to his side through covert agents and the
circulation of texts.
However, one sticking point that emerged was on religion.

Many

Dominicans, even those of color, were affronted by lack of Catholic practice among
Haitian citizens and soldiers.64 Not long after unification white Dominicans in
Samaná and elsewhere began courting French and Spanish interests for
reconquering Santo Domingo from Haiti. They had fortified Samaná as a royalist
refuge and flew the Spanish flag there. Despite begging for assistance from Puerto
Rico and Martinique, no aid arrived.
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Soon, white dissenters stirred against
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Boyer’s plans, and Haitian forces reacted with several executions and dozens of
expulsions, both of which included priests.66 Boyer had anybody flying the
Spanish flag shot in the head.67 Haitian officials were also sincerely surprised at
the Catholic devotion of Dominicans of color, and particularly of ex-slaves.68
Boyer remained perplexed by the possibility of French or Spanish
invasion, but his conscription of Dominicans and poor pay for soldiers eroded his
popular support with time. Land redistribution of old plantations only benefited
his officers, and not common Dominicans. In later conversations with Spanish
envoys Boyer said he would not have invaded had a flimsy state not declared
independence and jeopardized island-wide security. Perhaps this is true and he
had hoped for a more gradual unification, but popular anti-imperialism had
forced his hand.

Boyer would have a difficult time truly integrating all

Dominicans, who he called his “siblings of the same soil.”69

Soon some
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Dominicans began closing their hearts to Haiti, listening to old worries, and
perceiving not only in their innate differences from Haitian rooted in fears of
decades past.

Actual religious differences, and the perception of religious

superiority propagated by elite Dominicans and the church all festered a belief
that Haitians and Dominicans did not belong together, a belief in superiority of
Iberian heritage, and a belief in Haitian depravity.
Sturdy independence, abolition, and republican rule had come to Santo
Domingo through popular Dominican demand in coordination with a Boyer-led
Haitian army. This was a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, egalitarian state project with
nearly two decades of independence under the original Republic of Haiti.
However, despite all the preceding anti-imperial attempts, and the pro-Haitian
sentiments across Santo Domingo, the small and short-lived project by Nuñez de
Cáceres is the first independence recognized by Dominican historiography and
nationalism.

This historical narrative that teleologically telescopes toward a

separate nation-state omits the inconvenient fact that Nuñez de Cáceres quickly
folded his attempt under the umbrella of Boyer’s Haiti, which already controlled
much of Santo Domingo. Denying the peace of Boyer, denying the demands of
the Dominican majority, and denying the much lengthier Dominican ties to the

no. 1. Juan Nepomuceno de Cardenas to Nicolas Mahi, Puerto Rico, 4 March 1822, AHN-Estado,
3395, exp. 4
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Haitian Revolution have all constructed a selective national memory about the
shared Dominican and Haitian paths of independence and collective unraveling
of colonialism. This state of denial bolsters the Dominican state’s “historical”
justification of the most corrosive manifestations of national belonging and racial
exclusion to this day.
From 1791 to 1804 the Haitian Revolution transformed the wealthiest
plantation colony in the Americas into the world’s first black republic through the
largest and only successful slave revolt in history. After this infinitely complex,
watershed event Haiti's subsequent nation building spilled over the border into
the Dominican side of Hispaniola and shaped anti-colonial aspirations, struggles
for emancipation, and desires for civic participation. Their ambitions, manifested
in plots and revolts, taxed Spanish power and spread debt, prisoners, and agitation
to colonial neighbors. Competing paths of empowerment, including the heavy
involvement of people of color in Spanish military forces, combined to form lasting
legacies of irreversible popular mobilization. The self-empowerment of slaves in
Saint-Domingue, and eventually oppressed Dominicans, pressed Spanish
colonialism to offer upward mobility to these formerly excluded social sectors in
exchange for much needed support. To secure loyalties and prevent enemies from
arising within, Spain championed inclusive colonialism based around popular
religion and populist royalism. The long-lasting legacies of Catholicism and
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Spanish culture tied emergent Dominican identity to selective memories of Iberian
heritage.
From 1791 to 1804 the Haitian Revolution transformed the wealthiest
plantation colony in the Americas into the world’s first black republic through the
largest and only successful slave revolt in history. After this infinitely complex,
watershed event Haiti's subsequent nation building spilled over the border into
the Dominican side of Hispaniola and shaped anti-colonial aspirations, struggles
for emancipation, and desires for civic participation. Their ambitions, manifested
in plots and revolts, taxed Spanish power and spread debt, prisoners, and agitation
to colonial neighbors. Competing paths of empowerment, including the heavy
involvement of people of color in Spanish military forces, combined to form lasting
legacies of irreversible popular mobilization. The self-empowerment of slaves in
Saint-Domingue, and eventually oppressed Dominicans, pressed Spanish
colonialism to offer upward mobility to these formerly excluded social sectors in
exchange for much needed support. To secure loyalties and prevent enemies from
arising within, Spain championed inclusive colonialism based around popular
religion and populist royalism. The long-lasting legacies of Catholicism and
Spanish culture tied emergent Dominican identity to selective memories of Iberian
heritage.
From the Dominican split from Haiti in 1844, to the Haitian aid against
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Spanish recolonization in the 1860s, to the 1937 massacre of tens of thousands of
Haitians by a Dominican dictatorship, to Dominican assistance after Haiti's
ruinous 2010 earthquake, Haitians and Dominicans have long been entangled in
layers of antagonism and amicability, hostility and harmony, conflict and
cooperation. Anti-Haitian racism often fills Dominican policy, evinced by the
Dominican revocation of citizenship from thousands of ethnic Haitians in 2013;
followed by their tragic mass deportation in 2015. This most corrosive cases of
Dominicans asserting their national difference draw directly upon a series of
grievances against Haiti rooted in a particular national memory of the late colonial
era. Ideas about this era have enormous contemporary consequence, as the
historical pendulum of Dominican cultural politics swings to knock “othered”
groups out of political, legal, economic, and civic arenas.
Dominican society was born into modernity in many ways as a fraternal
twin to their Haitian neighbors. These societies – siblings of the same soil, as Boyer
stated – were locked in cooperation or conflict, locked on admiration or
admonishment, but always locked with what could be accurately described as
fraternity at best, and a sibling rivalry at worst.

When in 1785 the priest-

intellectual Antonio Sánchez Valverde hoped for a better future for “creoles of
Hayti” he could not have imagined that over five years later the island would be
riven by revolution, nor that twenty years later the island would host the world’s
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first black republic. Most unimaginable might have been that over three decades
later a majority of Dominicans would strive for co-citizenship as “Haitians” in that
same neighboring state.70 This choice and shared trajectory with Haiti are truths
that dominant Dominican historical memory refuses to believe. This belief in
belonging also excludes Dominicans from the shared interpretation of Taíno
legacies on the island that they often unwillingly share – Hayti.
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